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Correction for Volume LIV

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error in Volume LIV:

January 3, page 4: In the third paragraph in the first column the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan was incorrectly identified. Aziz Ahmed was Foreign Secretary; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

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U.S. and Pakistan Agree on Need for Peaceful Settlement of Asian Conflicts

President Mohammed Ayub Khan of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan made a state visit to the United States December 12-16. He met with President Johnson at Washington December 14 and 15. Following are an exchange of greetings between the two Presidents on December 14, an exchange of toasts at a state dinner at the White House that evening, and the text of a joint communique released on December 15.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated December 14; as-delivered text

President Johnson

Mr. President, I am happy, on behalf of the people of the United States, to welcome you once more to our shores.

We Americans have admired Pakistan's rapid progress as a nation, and we have had particular respect for you as the leader chiefly responsible for this progress over the past 7 years.

It is also a great satisfaction for me,

personally, to have you here with us at this time. I have not forgotten the hospitality which my wife and I received during our visit to Pakistan 4 years ago. It seemed to me then, as it does now, that Pakistan and the United States have very much in common. For one thing, each of our countries began as what most people called "an impractical experiment." No one expected us to survive. Yet here we are.

I remember, most gratefully, how much at home I was made to feel on my visit to your country. I also recall my feelings when you addressed the legislature of my home State back in 1961. Mr. President, I don't know whether you felt equally at home on that occasion, but I remember thinking at the time that you could have had a very great future in American politics.

So we do have, I think, much in common. We have also had our differences. Yet I hope that the bonds which unite us are far stronger than any temporary disagreements.

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ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Both of our nations are dedicated to government by, and for, the people.

Both you and we, each in our own way, are trying—trying so hard—to provide a fuller life for all of our people. We, in America, admire Pakistan's efforts to this end, and we have sought to work with them.

We also agree, I know, that the ultimate success of all of our efforts really depends upon the restoration of peace and stability, not only in Asia but throughout the entire world.

I am quite confident that, working together with the millions of others who share these ideals, we will ultimately reach our goal. I am confident, too, that the discussions which we are about to have will bring us—and the world—one step closer to that common objective.

Mr. President, we are delighted to have you here this morning. We hope you will enjoy your stay in our country, and we certainly want you to know that we warmly welcome you as our friend.

President Ayub Khan

Mr. President, I am deeply touched by the warm welcome you have given me and my party, and also for the gracious words you used for the progress that Pakistan has made during the last few years.

May I say that we got our independence after 150 years of British rule 18 years ago, and when I became responsible for running the country, my main concern was to do such things which would improve the living standards of the people and give them hope for a better future.

Now for a country like yours, which started much earlier, perhaps such things are simpler—also simpler perhaps because of your vast resources. But for us, we had to establish the infrastructure of all descriptions to be able to embark on the road to progress.

And I am very happy to be able to tell you that we made considerable progress. And I also would like to take this opportunity of

thanking your Government and you, sir, and your people, for the very generous assistance you gave us in these endeavors.

I am very happy to be here again in Washington. It reminds me, first of all, of my last visit when the President, as Vice President, under no obligation on him to waste his time on me, he very kindly, and his lady, took me to the ranch, and the amount of affection and the amount of hospitality they showed, I can never forget in my life and I keep on repeating it to my people in Pakistan. I come here again; I am looking forward to meeting you, sir, and discussing with you our mutual problems, and also to have the opportunity of meeting several other good friends of Pakistan here in Washington and in the United States.

There are several places in the world which are troubled, which are under stress; so is our part of the world. Unfortunately there has been a war, a short war, but a sharp war and bloody war. The peace there hangs on a very thin thread of cease-fire.

I know you are far away, but you, as the greatest country today, have an obligation to the rest of the world, and I have no doubt, sir, that your Government, under your dynamic and powerful leadership, will lend its full support toward the resolution of the problems which are besetting us.

We can't afford wars. We can't afford tensions. Our task is difficult. Our task is to do something for humanity. Our task is to search for peace. And we, in Pakistan, certainly make every endeavor to be able to make our contribution toward peace on honorable and reasonable terms.

Sir, again I thank you for a warm welcome, and I am happy to see after your very serious operation you are looking so well and you are regaining your health, and I do hope that you will completely recover soon, because the responsibility you hold—not only on behalf of your own people but on behalf of the largest part of the world—is so great that your health is of tremendous importance to us all.

Thank you, sir.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated December 14; as-delivered text

President Johnson

Mr. President, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

There is no need to say how very pleased we are, Mr. President, to welcome you to this house this evening. The President of Pakistan comes on a new visit, but he is a very old friend. This is his third journey here as head of a young state already grown to world importance.

Mrs. Johnson and I want to thank you, Mr. President, for honoring us with your distinguished Ambassador [Ghulam] Ahmed and his charming wife, whom we enjoy very much. We are also particularly pleased that we could renew acquaintances with your former Ambassador, your present Foreign Secretary [Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]. I observed that perhaps when he was Ambassador and I was Vice President we were doing a little better job with our relations than we are in our new positions. But it just shows you what happens to people when they get promoted.

President Ayub and I have a great deal in common, just as our peoples share many values and many dreams.

President Ayub is a rancher, as I am. His home district is country much like Johnson City, Blanco County, where I live. He also has a special bond with Mrs. Johnson and, for that matter, all lovers of beauty in this land. President Ayub is building a new capital for his country, just as we are trying to rebuild and beautify ours.

With so much to share it is not surprising that President Ayub and I found our talks today fruitful. They will continue in the evening, and we hope for more extended sessions tomorrow.

We share the basic values and beliefs: man's fundamental dignity and worth, a love of liberty, a pride of excellence, pursuit of beauty and truth, a vision of a better and a fuller life for all human beings.

I have recalled a courageous and a com-

passionate appeal made by President Ayub in a broadcast back in 1963. He said then—and I quote:

Hatred and anger fan the fires of hell in human minds. Why not put them out? It is nobler and better for one's own happiness to live on terms of friendliness with others.

And so tonight we share the greatest hunger and the most burning thirst of all. We want so much to find peace in the world. We want so much to bring peace to Asia and peace to all the other countries that are troubled. We want peace not only in our time but peace for all time. We want peace. And we shall work every minute, day and night, for peace.

President Ayub visits us as the architect of his country's inspiring struggle for economic emancipation. And nowhere have we observed a better administrative effort. Today Pakistan surges forward in a very great adventure—and Dave Bell [AID Administrator David E. Bell] will talk to you about it for hours if you will listen to him, because we are very thrilled to observe the economic advances and the other results that the leadership of President Ayub and his associates provide and inspire. We all must rededicate our very best efforts to conquering the curses of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, the human and physical problems that, as President Ayub has said, and I quote him again, "cannot be resolved by the magic wand of just freedom alone."

So Mr. President, with your permission I am sending a very high-level team of medical teachers and scientists shortly to your country of Pakistan. This team will be led by the President's Science Adviser, my own trusted counselor, Dr. Donald Hornig. Its mission will be to work with your own medical authorities in instituting a very broad improvement in medical training and working with all of your fine people in the attempt to improve rural health and public health among your fellow countrymen.

This will be a beginning. If our purposes are as one, we can continue and expand the dynamic partnership that we have had in the past. Together we can press the battle

against waterlogging and salinity, against devastating cyclones, cholera, heart and eye disease. Together, as friends working shoulder to shoulder, we can improve weather forecasting, and improve flood warnings, and multiply housing programs such as the Korangi project that I visited in 1961 when I met my good friend the cameldriver. He came to this country, and he spread good will from one end of it to the other, and he is remembered most affectionately by all who met him. We can speed in many ways the transition from a subsistence economy to a life of plenty and a life of purpose for every Pakistani.

This has been a stimulating and inspiring day for me. It is always so when I am in your presence.

So tonight, here in this, the first house of our land, I would like to ask those friends of mine whom I have asked to come here from various parts of this country—California to New York—to raise our glasses to salute the spirit and the success of the Pakistan nation and the dedicated leadership of the great President of Pakistan, Mohammed Ayub Khan.

President Ayub Khan

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen:

I am deeply touched by the warm reception given to me and my party and by your great hospitality tonight. You are a generous man. I am only talking to a friend now. May I have the liberty of doing so with a great heart.

I am so very happy that this great country has a man like you, sir, at its head, and that is how it should be. It is only people with large hearts, broad understanding, forgiveness, and so on, that can tackle the sort of responsibilities that devolve on you—not only responsibilities on behalf of your country, but, in fact, on behalf of the world even, because you are the head of the mightiest country in the world.

As far as Pakistan is concerned—the people in Pakistan are concerned—there

Cyclone Victims in Pakistan To Receive U.S. Relief Funds

Department Statement¹

The Chargé of the American Embassy in Pakistan, William I. Cargo, today informed the Acting Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, that he was making available to the Government of Pakistan the equivalent of \$25,000 of U.S. Government funds as an immediate contribution to the relief of the sufferers from the cyclone which struck Chittagong, Cox's Bazaar, and the offshore islands December 15. Mr. Cargo was acting in response to reports of extensive loss of life and material damage caused by cyclonic winds and high waters.

The money is being given for immediate relief purposes. Mr. Cargo further expressed the regret and deep sympathy of the American people with respect to the loss of life, suffering, and damage resulting from this cyclone. He further stated that the American Government stood ready to consider additional emergency assistance if needed.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Dec. 16 by Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News.

have been very friendly and warm relations between our people. Lately—and I would be less than honest if I did not admit it, since I was largely responsible for this friendship and understanding between our two countries—it hurts me to say that our relations have, to a certain extent, been soiled, and I think that has happened because of a lack of understanding of each other's difficulties and problems.

You have certain obligations and certain problems which you are facing, of which we are aware. We have certain difficulties in the location and the situation in which we live. You have been very generous and kind to invite me to come to your country to see you and talk to you in heart-to-heart fashion. And I have with all sincerity and honesty put to you our problems, and you have been good enough to tell me your problems.

I think that in countries like yours and mine, situated so far away, with different

sorts of obligations, locations, and so on and so forth, friendships can be maintained—and they must be maintained. And the way to maintain them is to bear friendship with friendship and understand each other's difficulties, and don't do anything which is against the interests of a friendly country.

I have no doubt in my mind if that principle is observed—we certainly will observe it, sir—there is no reason why our friendship should not continue.

Your country and your people have in many ways been assisting us, and I am the first one to admit it. Not only do I do so in my heart but I do so in front of my people. And it has been a very stimulating experience for our mutual relationship.

We regained our independence after a long time. In a period when the world has shrunk, peoples' expectations have risen. They want the good things of life quickly. Demands on government, therefore, have increased enormously. After all, it takes time with the best will in the world and the best effort in the world to produce results.

The people are not prepared to wait. They are impatient. Therefore there is great pressure, tremendous pressure, in our country to produce results to the satisfaction of the people. We have been, in our humble way, trying to improve the conditions of our people and remove sufferings and wants, and so on.

I think we made a considerable success in that. One lesson I learned from that was that the people really try to improve their lot once they are given the right direction and the opportunity.

Lately, unfortunately, we have been bedeviled with a major conflict. My own hope and prayer is that we shall be able to overcome. My endeavor always has been to live in peace with our neighbors, especially with our big neighbor India. They have tremendous problems, and we have tremendous problems.

We need peace. We need peace not only for the sake of peace but also for the sake of doing a very noble task of improving the lot of our people.

In that connection, I am very grateful to you, sir, for sending this mission out. I am sure that it will be appreciated, and I am sure that they will get the fullest cooperation from our people and they will benefit by their experience.

The last time I was here President Kennedy and I had long discussions. I mentioned to him about this problem of waterlogging and salinity in West Pakistan. Those of you who are familiar know the circumstances there. Our agriculture is totally artificial in West Pakistan. It is dependent on artificial irrigation. I think—I don't know whether I am right in saying—but it is probably the biggest, shall we say, artificially irrigated area in the world in one block—some 32 million acres of land. And through this process of irrigation the water table has gone out, the salts have come up, and we were facing tremendous problems. And he was good enough to send a team of scientists out, and they have done, in conjunction with our people, a tremendous job. I am sure if your set of people come they will have a second look at these things. We made a start in this project, and we made a great success.

So I am very grateful to you for this offer. Our effort really is to do the very best we can for our people.

We also find that our population is growing at a rate which is not acceptable and which can create serious problems. That is another thing that we are putting our major efforts on.

Similarly with our agriculture, and so on, results have been very heartening. And so any advice and assistance of that nature will be most welcome, in keeping with the wishes and the desires and endeavors of the people.

I am glad to see that after your major operation—apparently it has been a very serious one—you are looking so well and regaining your health. I hope you will regain your full vigor.

May I say that the talk we had together has been very exhilarating for me. You have been patient enough to listen to me, and I do hope that you will be convinced of my

sincerity. I may be wrong in my approach, but you can be assured of my sincerity of approach.

I have no doubt that if we understand each other's difficulties there is no reason why our friendship can't last forever.

So I thank you for all the understanding you have given me and us all, and this warm welcome and great hospitality, and also given me the opportunity of meeting you again. It has done my soul a lot of good.

So, in return for that, may I ask you ladies and gentlemen to join me in drinking to the health and happiness of the President of the United States of America and to the well-being and happiness of the people of the United States of America.

Mr. President, sir.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated December 15

President Johnson and President Ayub have had frank, wide-ranging, and productive talks for the past 2 days. President Ayub's visit has given the two Presidents the opportunity to renew their warm personal acquaintance and to recall with pleasure their respective visits to Pakistan and the United States in 1961.

The two Presidents discussed at length recent events in South Asia, including the tragic conflict between India and Pakistan. In this context, they reaffirmed their Governments' support for the U.N. Security Council resolution of September 20, 1965,¹ in all its parts, as well as the resolutions adopted on September 27² and November 5, 1965.³

President Johnson reaffirmed that the United States regards as vital to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan and expressed the continuing interest of the United States in Pakistan's economic and social development.

President Ayub reaffirmed the importance that Pakistan attaches to a close and cooperative relationship with the United States and expressed the continuing desire of his Government to contribute to this objective.

The two Presidents agreed on the need for a peaceful resolution of all outstanding differences between India and Pakistan, so that the energies and resources of the peoples of the subcontinent would not be wastefully diverted from their efforts to meet their vitally important social and economic problems.

Within the context of a review of worldwide developments, the two Presidents discussed in depth the problem of achieving peace and stability in Southeast Asia. They expressed the hope that the conflicts in that area would be peacefully resolved. They agreed that their diplomatic representatives would remain in close touch on these wider and critical Asian problems.

North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris

The North Atlantic Council held its regular ministerial meeting at Paris December 14-16. Following is the text of a communique issued at Paris on December 16, together with a list of the members of the U.S. delegation.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 293 dated December 17

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Paris on the 14th, 15th and 16th December, 1965.

2. In a comprehensive survey of international affairs, the Ministers reviewed the whole field of East-West relations.

3. In pursuit of their common objective of ensuring peace and security, the members of NATO have promoted and extended their contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1965, p. 608.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/214 (1965).

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1965, p. 957.

They will continue to seek an improvement in their relations with these countries. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that these efforts had met with some degree of response, mainly in the sphere of bilateral relations.

4. Although no major crises had arisen in Europe, the Soviet Union continues to oppose a settlement of the cardinal issues between East and West. Such a settlement, which must safeguard the legitimate interests of all concerned, remains one of the essential objectives of the Alliance. At the same time, the Ministers also noted that the Soviet Union continues to devote an increasing share of its economic and technical resources to military purposes.

5. In this situation the Ministers emphasized their determination to maintain the unity of the Alliance and to ensure its collective defense.

6. The Council noted with regret that no progress had been made towards overcoming the division of Germany. The accusations leveled against the Federal Republic of Germany do not make a solution any easier. Rejecting these accusations, the Council reaffirmed that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of Germany can be reached only on the basis of the right of self-determination. They also reaffirmed that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs. With regard to Berlin, the Alliance stands by the terms of its Declaration of 16th December, 1958.¹

7. Turning to problems outside the Atlantic area, the Ministers noted that tension had diminished in some parts of the world. But in Southeast Asia conflicts continued. With regard to Viet-Nam, the United States Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States, while determined to fulfill its commitments, remained ready to enter without preconditions into negotiations to

end the war. He recapitulated the views of his government as to the bases for a peaceful settlement. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense outlined British policy on the subject of Rhodesia and expressed appreciation for the support received from the Allied Governments. He stressed the need for further concerted action by members of the Alliance. Consultations will continue not only on these problems but also on those to which several Ministers drew attention, arising out of the policies pursued by the People's Republic of China.

8. The Ministers reaffirmed the concern of their governments for the social and economic welfare and continuing progress of the developing countries.

9. The Ministers reaffirmed that the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remained one of the principal objectives of their governments. They expressed their regret that so little progress had been made towards this end. They viewed with concern the potential danger of the spread of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. They agreed that this problem should be kept under constant review and that the search should be continued for ways of averting the danger. The Ministers welcomed the recent decision to convene periodical meetings in NATO in order to intensify the examination of detailed technical aspects of arms control and for the exploration of new possibilities for progress in disarmament.

10. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress made in studies of the inter-related questions of strategy, force requirements and resources, which had been initiated by the Ministers at their session in Ottawa in May 1963.² Force goals for the period 1965 through 1970 are being worked out, as the first of a series of steps designed to secure a closer alignment between NATO military requirements and national force plans within the agreed strategic

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.

² For text of communique, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 895.

concept of a forward defense posture. They accepted in principle the introduction of new procedures designed to improve the annual process of reviewing the defense efforts of member countries and agreeing upon their force contributions. These procedures, by projecting Alliance force goals and country plans five years ahead each year, are designed to enhance the capacity of the Alliance to adapt its defense plans to changes both in military technology and in the international situation.

11. The Ministers instructed the Council in permanent session to review the organizational and financial basis of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force.

12. The Secretary General, as chairman of a Special Committee of Defense Ministers, made a progress report to the Council. The Ministers had a discussion on this report.

13. The Ministers approved a resolution inviting the Council in permanent session to set up a program for defense assistance to Greece and Turkey for 1965 with the participation of the greatest possible number of member countries, and to ensure that the commitments taken in this respect are implemented with the least possible delay. At the Ministerial meeting in the Spring of 1966, the Council in permanent session will report on the implementation of this program, and submit proposals for a program for 1966 in the light of relevant defense planning studies.

14. The Ministers heard a report from the Secretary General on his activities under the "watching brief" in regard to Greek-Turkish relations entrusted to his predecessor by the Council at their meeting in The Hague in May 1964.³ They confirmed their support for the activities of the Secretary General under his "watching brief" mission and agreed that they should continue. They also reiterated their support for the efforts of the United Nations to reduce tension in Cyprus and reaffirmed their determination to contribute to bringing about a peaceful, agreed and equitable solution of the problem

in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Council endorsed the Secretary General's plea for an early resumption of constructive discussions between Greece and Turkey. The Ministers expressed their confidence that the parties concerned would refrain from any action prejudicial to such a solution. Against this background, the Council stressed the importance of a speedy solution to the financial and other problems involved in the continuation of the United Nations peace-keeping operation.

15. The Ministers approved a report on civil emergency planning. They noted that a reappraisal of civil emergency planning is being conducted and reaffirmed the importance of such planning for the protection of the civil population.

16. The next meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial level will be held, on the invitation of the Belgian Government, in Brussels at the end of May or beginning of June, 1966.

U.S. DELEGATION

Press release 284 dated December 8

REPRESENTATIVES

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, *chairman*
Henry Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Harlan Cleveland

MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION

Department of State

Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France
Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador at Large
James L. Greenfield, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Ronald I. Spiers, Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs
Samuel T. Parelman, *secretary of delegation*, Deputy Director, Office of International Conferences
George S. Vest, Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs

³ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1964, p. 850.

C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Robbins P. Gilman, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs
Richard W. Boehm, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs

Department of the Treasury

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
Charles A. Sullivan, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
Douglass Hunt, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury

Department of Defense

Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
Adm. Alfred G. Ward, U.S. Representative to NATO Military Committee and Standing Group
Lawrence Finkelstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
Brig. Gen. Russell Dougherty, Director, European Region, Office of Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Philip J. Farley, Deputy U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council
John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Representative
John I. Getz, Office of Political Affairs

Letters of Credence

France

The newly appointed Ambassador of the French Republic, Charles Lucet, presented his credentials to President Johnson on December 15. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated December 15.

Tanzania

The newly appointed Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania, Michael Lukumbuzya, presented his credentials to President Johnson on December 15. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated December 15.

U.S.—Italian Exchange on North Viet-Nam Contacts Released

Following is a statement read to news correspondents on December 17 by Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News, together with the texts of a letter to President Johnson from Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani, President of the U.N. General Assembly; a reply to Mr. Fanfani from Secretary Rusk; and a response to Secretary Rusk from Mr. Fanfani.

STATEMENT BY MR. McCLOSKEY

You will have seen the texts of three letters: One is from Foreign Minister Fanfani to the President; one is from the Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister in acknowledgment; and the third is from the Foreign Minister back to the Secretary of State.

Over those letters, and by way of explanation, the facts are as follows:

On November 20, 1965, the President of the U.N. General Assembly, who is also Italian Foreign Minister, Amintore Fanfani, transmitted to President Johnson, through Ambassador Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations], that letter in your hands. This letter was given urgent and careful study.

A few days later, Ambassador Goldberg was requested to inform Mr. Fanfani that the letter was being studied carefully and that a prompt reply would be forthcoming. In the same conversation Mr. Fanfani informed Ambassador Goldberg that one of the two persons who had reported talking in Hanoi was Professor [Giorgio] La Pira, a former mayor of Florence.

On December 4, the United States, in a letter from Secretary Rusk to Mr. Fanfani, responded.

Now, the United States has rejected no proposal. As will be seen from the attached letter, the United States, consistent with the President's desire to engage promptly in unconditional talks, asked Foreign Minister

Fanfani to pursue this matter further. And I will cite quickly for you the pertinent paragraphs in that letter.

[Here Mr. McCloskey read numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of Secretary Rusk's letter.]

On December 13 Foreign Minister Fanfani informed Ambassador Goldberg that the substance of the United States reply had been delivered into the hands of qualified representatives in order to be forwarded to Hanoi.

On this same date Foreign Minister Fanfani also informed Ambassador Goldberg of his belief that our reply had already reached Hanoi.

It is now up to Hanoi to determine whether it wishes to move this question from the battlefield to the conference table. We would welcome a straightforward expression of Hanoi's view. We await Hanoi's reaction.

TEXTS OF LETTERS

Mr. Fanfani to President Johnson

NEW YORK, *November 20, 1965*

MR. PRESIDENT: In the interview which you graciously accorded me at the end of May you repeated anew your firm intention to seek assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam.

In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of this noble purpose, I bring to your attention the following:

On Thursday, November 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and the President of the Council, [Pham] Van Dong, expressed to two persons (known to me) the strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam and, in summary, stated—according to what they wrote me—that “in order for the peace negotiations to come about, there will be necessary (a) a cease-fire (by air, by sea, by land) in the entire territory of Vietnam (north and south); the cessation, that is, of all belligerent operations (including therefore also the cessation of debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration according to which the Geneva Agreements of 1954 will be taken as

the basis for the negotiations—a declaration made up of the four points formulated by Hanoi, points that are in reality the explanation of the Geneva text and which, therefore, can be reduced to a single point: application, in other words, of the Geneva Accords.”

The text of the communication which I have received adds that “the Government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring actual withdrawal of the American troops.”

To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: “I am prepared to go anywhere; to meet anyone.”

These are the essential points that one of the two interlocutors of Ho Chi Minh and Van Dong sent me in writing last night and which, in this letter of mine—confided to Mr. A. Goldberg, the U.S. representative to the UN, so that he can deliver it promptly and confidentially—I bring word for word to your attention.

You surely have other elements by which to judge the importance of the above. As President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United States and of yourself, I hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution, always more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I am at your disposition for any step that you consider opportune in the matter.

With sincere pleasure at your recovery and with best wishes for your high mission, I send my respectful greetings.

Yours,

AMINTORE FANFANI

Secretary Rusk to Mr. Fanfani

DECEMBER 4, 1965

DEAR MR. FANFANI: My government is most grateful to you for your help and cooperation in transmitting views attributed to the North Vietnamese Government on negotiations to deal with the problem of Viet-Nam. We have carefully examined the suggestions you have conveyed, and I wish to make the following comments:

1. As it has repeatedly stated, the United States is prepared to enter into discussions or negotiations with any government at any time without any preconditions whatsoever. We reaffirm this willingness.

2. Although there is some ambiguity in the statement of Hanoi's position, your source seems to indicate that Hanoi would agree that negotiations might be undertaken on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 without any qualifications or conditions. We for our part would be willing to engage in negotiations on this basis without any qualifications or conditions.

3. The United States does not, however, agree with the contention that the "four points" advanced by Hanoi constitute an authentic interpretation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Elements in the four points, notably the political program of the so-called National Liberation Front, have no basis in the Geneva Agreements, and Hanoi's apparent insistence on a prior declaration accepting the four points thus appears both to be inconsistent with the Agreements and to require a substantive condition to negotiations. Nevertheless, we are prepared to include these four points for consideration in any peace talks along with any proposals which the United States, South Viet-Nam and other governments may wish to advance.

4. Your sources also mention another apparent Hanoi condition calling for a ceasefire and other measures prior to negotiations. The United States would be prepared for negotiations without the imposition of any conditions of this nature. However, if a reduction or cessation of hostilities were to be arranged prior to negotiations, it seems self-evident that it would have to be on an equitable and reciprocal basis. If there were a cessation of certain military activities on the one side, there would have to be an equivalent cessation of military activities on the other. The formulation proposed by Hanoi's leaders does not appear to meet this test, for example, in that it imposes no restraint on the continued infiltration of forces and equip-

ment from North to South Viet-Nam.

5. The United States Government notes the message conveyed that North Viet-Nam would not insist on the actual withdrawal of American forces prior to the initiation of negotiations. However, the clarification of this point, though not without significance in the light of conflicting public statements by Hanoi on the subject, still leaves the questions discussed in 2 and 3 above.

We are thus far from persuaded that statements by Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong quoted by your Italian sources indicate a real willingness for unconditional negotiations. We would be pleased, for our part, however, on the basis of the considerations set forth above and perhaps in light of any further soundings your sources may make with Hanoi to discuss this matter further with you. I have asked Ambassador Goldberg, who bears this letter, to make himself available to you at any time for this purpose.

Further, if it develops following such discussions, or further contact by you with your sources, that a direct discussion with your Italian sources is deemed fruitful, a representative of the United States would be authorized to meet with them privately.

Finally, let me make it clear that you are free to draw on the contents of this letter, in any way you may desire, in communicating with your sources. We would welcome your continuing assistance on this important matter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

Mr. Fanfani to Secretary Rusk

DECEMBER 13, 1965

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I received on 6th December your letter which Ambassador Goldberg had previously announced to me on November 29.

The same day I summarized in a document of mine essential observations made by you on various points and I have just

received word that on Wednesday last—8th December—said document has been confidentially delivered into the hands of a qualified representative in order to be forwarded to Hanoi. I think, as of today, said document has already reached its final destination.

I would like to add I desire, Mr. Secretary, to thank you very much for the confidence and trust in my person you and the

American Government have confirmed in your letter. I can assure you that, as soon as I receive any reaction on the points contained in the letter, I will inform you immediately.

Anticipating the pleasure of meeting you next week in Washington, I remain, Mr. Secretary,

AMINTORE FANFANI

U.S. Outlines Interests in Southern Rhodesia

by G. Mennen Williams

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

In recent days I have encountered some misunderstanding about what is happening in Southern Rhodesia. Today, therefore, I would like to give you some facts about the illegal seizure of power in Southern Rhodesia by a white minority regime.

There has been some feeling in this country that the Southern Rhodesian rebellion, important as it is in its own right, is not of direct interest to the United States in view of our many other important world involvements.

Let me say flatly that nothing could be farther from the truth.

We naturally have a stake in what is happening in Southern Rhodesia because of our traditional beliefs that government should be based on the consent of the governed and that all men are created equal. These principles are of great importance to us, but they are not the only matters of concern to the United States.

In addition to those historic beliefs, we have other vital U.S. interests at stake in Africa. We have, therefore, taken a hard-headed, realistic position against continuance of the illegal Southern Rhodesian regime because we have an important self-interest in the likely consequences that may flow from the rash action of a white minority in Southern Rhodesia.

If the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia successfully maintains control of 4 million black Africans by 220,000 whites without being brought down, a whole chain of critical consequences could be set in motion—all of which would affect the United States directly and indirectly.

These are some of those probable consequences:

This act of illegal rule by a selfish minority of 220,000 whites could jeopardize the rights, prestige, and good relations built up and enjoyed by some 1½ million other whites of European origin—a term that includes Americans—who live in areas of Africa other than southern Africa. It would put the white man in Africa in the same po-

¹ Address made before Department of State Post No. 68 of the American Legion at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 16 (press release 291).

sition, in effect, that we would be in in this country if we had given Governors Barnett and Wallace complete freedom of action in Mississippi and Alabama to suppress Negro Americans and to flout the law of the land—except that in Southern Rhodesia it would be a small minority imposing its control over a large majority.

Unchecked, the Southern Rhodesian situation could well lead to the downfall of responsible, friendly African governments—whose leaders recognize the desirability of continuing black-white cooperation—and their replacement by radical elements whose hands would be strengthened by white Southern Rhodesian actions.

The failure to halt illegal minority rule in Southern Rhodesia could lead to our closest ally, Britain, losing its influence in Africa and to a waning of British power throughout the world. It almost certainly would cause the loss of African and other nonwhite members of the Commonwealth.

A further significant consequence of a runaway Southern Rhodesia lies in the fact that Southern Rhodesia now controls the electric power, the coal, and the exit route for the 700,000 tons of copper which Zambia exports to the world annually. Britain imports about one-third of Zambia's copper. Zambia and the Congo's neighboring Katanga region account for 25 percent of the free world's copper supply and consequently have an important effect on the world market.

Successful maintenance of illegal minority rule in Southern Rhodesia would have additional adverse effects on our own numerous and specific interests in Africa. The simple fact is that our entire posture in Africa rests squarely on the strong moral and material support we give African nations on issues of vital importance to them—and, obviously, the question of independence and majority rule in Southern Rhodesia is such an issue. You can readily see, therefore, that it would be a poor political risk to pander to Southern Rhodesia's white minority regime for any reason—and certainly not for investment reasons, as has been suggested in

some quarters, when only \$56 million of our \$44.34 billion worldwide investment total is involved—and \$56 million is only about one-twentieth of our investment in black and Arab Africa.

And, finally, the situation in Southern Rhodesia could trigger a bitter war along racial lines in southern Africa—a struggle that could spread swiftly to other continents. This could be the gravest consequence of all.

The tragedy of the current situation in Southern Rhodesia is that it didn't have to happen. Under British rule, black Southern Rhodesians had confidence that their political rights would flow normally, as such rights have done in other former British colonies.

While the British did not plan to initiate "one man, one vote" overnight, they did propose to bring majority rule—with appropriate safeguards for the rights of minorities—to Southern Rhodesia in what they considered a reasonable time. And in the months and years before the illegal seizure of power last November 11, the British devoted strenuous efforts and much time to attempts to direct white and black Southern Rhodesians toward a path of reasonableness.

White Southern Rhodesians also had seen the successful transition from white minority rule to nonracial societies that had been accomplished in other parts of Africa. In fact, groups of prominent white citizens of Kenya and Tanzania sent telegrams to the Southern Rhodesian regime to try to dissuade Southern Rhodesians from their collision course.

But to no avail. The white minority was convinced it could hold back the tide of African nationalism by a selfish and ill-considered seizure of power.

But at best the Southern Rhodesian whites have bought only a few fleeting hours in which they can continue to deny black Africans their rights. They cannot long escape the inevitability of majority rule any more than they can halt the passage of time.

The measures the Southern Rhodesian regime is taking to keep in power and control

its people are reminiscent of those adopted by the totalitarian regimes of the 1930's, against whom we fought in World War II.

Heavy press censorship has been put into effect, and Rhodesian papers have appeared with large blank white spaces. Public group listening to so-called "subversive" broadcasts—the BBC and the Voice of America, for example—is illegal. And the Rhodesia Herald no longer can print BBC schedules.

Parliamentary supporters of the regime have shouted down and suspended opposition. A state of emergency was proclaimed that permits police to arrest people without warrants.

The principal African nationalist leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole—along with some 1,800 of their supporters—are under detention, mostly without trial.

A former white Prime Minister, Garfield Todd, is under house arrest for opposing the regime.

Leo Baron, the white legal adviser to one of the two principal African political parties, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, has been put into prison.

All of these actions are the trappings of a police state.

Today, the misguided white Southern Rhodesians have all but cut themselves off from the rest of the world. British Prime Minister Wilson has said of them: "We cannot negotiate with these men nor can they be trusted, after the return of constitutional rule, with the task of leading Rhodesia in paths of freedom and racial harmony."

Looking to the future, we believe that Britain, as the sovereign power in Southern Rhodesia, has the primary responsibility for halting the rebellion in its colony. Britain has, in fact, applied a broad range of sanctions—political, fiscal, economic—against Southern Rhodesia to see if the situation can be rectified by such drastic expedients.

Speed is a critical factor in the situation, however. African nations already are impa-

tient with Britain's choice of measures. Many of them are pressing for direct military action. And a few would consider turning to the Communists for help, on the grounds that the West is not moving fast enough. Obviously, the Communists would be happy to rush into this situation if they get a chance.

Under normal circumstances, it would seem that the extensive British sanctions would be strong enough to bring down the Southern Rhodesian regime. But three intangibles remain. Whether these sanctions will have the opportunity of exerting their full impact on Southern Rhodesia may depend upon the amount of cooperation received from South Africa, upon the predatory tendencies of modern-day private buccaneers looking for quick profit, and upon the amount of patience and restraint exhibited by African nations.

Because of our own important interests in this matter, the United States fully backs the British Government in its actions. We believe Britain will continue to apply measures that will be adequate to resolve the situation, and we will support those measures.

In conclusion, then, the continued existence of the illegal Southern Rhodesian regime is not a phenomenon isolated to a remote section of southern Africa. Important as it is, it is not solely a question of whether 220,000 whites can maintain a "Governor Wallace type" of racial supremacy over 4 million black Africans. Rather, it is a situation that can have serious repercussions for the future of freedom in Africa, for other whites in Africa, for independent African governments, for Britain, for the United States, and for the whole world.

Clearly, the United States has only one course to follow—and that is to help halt the maintenance of an illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and to assist the British in their efforts to achieve an orderly transition to majority rule.

"... the United States seems to come through to Europe as a great big supermarket in the sky ..."

The View From the Other Side

by Patricia Roberts Harris
*Ambassador to Luxembourg*¹

During a luncheon at the White House last summer, the guests were invited to go out on the terrace. Looking south, across the Mall, an area which I have known for 16 years, I was struck by the beauty of the scene. What I saw as I stood there was the panorama stretching from the Jefferson Memorial to the White House, a view which one can never see unless one stands at that spot. I turned to the person standing beside me and said, "I have stood at that iron fence on many occasions, and I know very well this area, but I did not know that the view from the other side was so spectacular."

I understood then what Lawrence Durrell sought to convey in his *Alexandria Quartet*: that the character of men and things and places is a matter not only of the men and the things and the places but also of the perspective from which they are seen. Thus one knows a scene only in terms of one's vantage point.

It is quite possible that I will alter my judgments about the places I have seen in the last 2 months as I change the perspective from which I view them. Therefore, I wish to make it very clear that the comments I make today are the comments from a very new and very brief view and that I

reserve the right to change my opinion when the perspective changes.

What, then, is the view from the other side?

One entering Europe as a diplomat is conscious from the moment of that entry that one enters both countries and an idea. For while we speak of Luxembourg or of France or of Germany, we also speak of Europe. We speak of Western culture, and when we do so, we speak of European culture.

Today, perhaps as never before, the concept of Europe, apart from the individual countries, stirs men's hearts and minds and is, in fact, the basis for the present concern and soul-searching which agitates the Western part of the European Continent and which also causes us, the heirs of that continent, great concern. For we Americans, though we are Americans, feel both an intellectual and an emotional attachment to this continent from which came so many of our forebears and so many of the seminal ideas which have shaped us as a nation and as a people. Ours is the heritage of Rousseau and Verdi and Beethoven and Rembrandt and others too numerous to name.

What does Europe look like to this American after 2 months? First of all, as I have suggested, it is very much an extension of the world from which one came. There are, of course, some significant differences and some major cultural shocks. When one

¹ Address made before the Women's National Democratic Club at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 23.

passes an Esso station, one reads, *Mettez un tigre dans votre moteur*. And when rock and roll singers seem to be singing in a foreign language, it may be a foreign language. But other than that, and the existence of several languages which everyone else seems to speak and understand, life is very much the same.

But as an American, one realizes how well Hamilton and Madison wrought when they insisted upon an interstate commerce clause in the United States Constitution, and how important is the provision for a uniform system of currency. Because Europe is still a series of nations; unity is but a concept. One understands, even as one sees the similarities, the tremendous problems of moving from a concept of Europe to the reality of Europe. And in the simple things—the language differences, the borders (even with their easier access of today), and the multiple currencies—one understands the tedium of detail and the problems of habit that must be overcome before the concept of unity and union can become reality.

And what of Luxembourg? Luxembourg is clearly an ideal place to sit and contemplate Europe. 999 square miles, a half hour from any of three bordering countries, and a matter of a few hours to all the others, it is a nation 1,002 years old, set among its neighbors with an ease and an integrity of personality which respects the rights of others and demands no more than the same for itself.

It is a country which remembers with quiet gratitude and enduring affection the role of the United States in liberating it after two great wars. As a consequence, the people of Luxembourg love and respect the United States and see in each American a representative of a country to which Luxembourg owes a great deal, a debt which, I suspect, they will never forget.

In many ways Luxembourg is an asset for the United States deep in the heart of Europe. Luxembourgers respect what we are and love us for it, without any wish to imitate us and without any hostility or

jealousy. Luxembourg has been blessed with leaders who are extraordinarily able persons who exert an influence on European affairs far beyond what one would expect from the size of the country. Luxembourg and its people are kindly, pragmatic, and democratic. In many ways Luxembourgers are very much like Americans, which may explain why there are between 200,000 and 400,000 Luxembourgers in the United States.

The Reality Is Not Believable

And what of the United States from the other side? How do we look from abroad?

The thing that has surprised me most has been the paucity of news about the full range of American life in European communication media; in short, the lack of a full view of the United States in Europe. It appears to me that it is the unusual, the bizarre, and the dramatic which tend to be reported in European newspapers and on European television. I have seen very little of day-to-day American activity in politics, in the arts, in the sciences, or in education.

We readers of the Washington Post and of the Washington Star and of the New York Times are, in my judgment, infinitely better informed about European politics and politicians, and of European arts and science, than is the average European citizen about the United States. As a result, the United States seems to come through to Europe as a great big supermarket in the sky with some outstanding unresolved problems and with inexplicable conflicting points of view.

Those things which call the attention of Europe to the United States are those which seem to demonstrate our inability to solve our own problems. I suspect that one of the reasons for this is that the reality of the United States seems to be too good to be true. Most Americans—four-fifths by our own figures—live extraordinarily well, with an automobile or two, a television set or two, a bathroom or two, clothes beyond number, and enough money to travel to Europe, not

by the hundreds but by the thousands. The reality apparent to Europe on the affluence of Americans is not believable. Therefore, there must be a joker in the deck, and understandably, with the usual human skepticism, Europe looks for the joker. Europe looks for that which proves that the United States is, in fact, too good to be true.

In a sense, although the Europeans themselves do not understand this, our racial problems, our continuing poverty, yes, even our very discussion of what our role should be in international affairs, show that we are not quite what we say we are, that we do have problems which make us human and which prove our system fallible. I have discovered this to be true particularly on the racial question, which is one which stirs Europe, not because Europe does not understand the problem but because, under the theory of our system, we should not have it. Its continued existence seems to prove that our system does not work, that it is too good to be true.

I am beginning to believe that it is not American problems which confuse Europeans, because our problems are similar. It is the inability to solve them which they cannot understand.

The answer, in my judgment, to the racial question and to similar questions is to present the view that cannot be ignored, that of the solution of our problems. Appointments such as my own help. So successful has it been, in my case, that some newspaper reporters are a little embarrassed about raising the question of United States racial problems with me. The presence in Europe of integrated American troops is another answer. The continued good health of our economy, the improvement of objective conditions of life of our people, are the proof that our system works for everybody.

I may be wrong, but I have the sense that, at this moment, there is understanding and approval of our foreign policy. Viet-Nam troubles those to whom I have talked, but as it troubles those of us, the majority of us who are committed to it: They are concerned that those with whom we are locked

in battle understand our determination to meet our commitments.

And I think, too, that today there is basic understanding and approval of the way we are handling our troublesome domestic problems.

After 2 months I am convinced that the appropriate posture for the United States in convincing Europe and the rest of the world that we are believable, and that the reality of America is a reality and not a promise, is to continue, with as much vigor as we can marshal, to work to solve our problems at home. For underneath all of the concern and the criticism, I suspect, is a deep wish that we in the United States in fact be able to solve our problems, because if we do there is hope that the rest of the world can solve its problems too.

For we Americans have had a unique experience as a nation. As I said at a meeting of youth groups at the Embassy a few weeks ago, there is in American experience an empathy for the experience of all other nations, for, wherever they are, we have been there too within the last 300 years.

We started as colonies, dependent upon and under the command of a great metropolitan nation. Therefore we can sympathize with all colonies and all people wishing to be free.

We went through a period as an underdeveloped nation seeking its industrial revolution, its place in the sun. We had our own dissent as a new nation—what I might call our Katanga—in the Civil War. We thus understand the growing pains of new nations.

We have had also our relationship to dependent territories, and we have understood the need to divest ourselves of the terrible responsibility of a colonial power, as, for instance, with the Philippines.

We are now a great and mighty industrial power, a world political leader. We have had, in fact, all the experiences of nationhood which history has provided.

And yet with it all we have kept as the transcendent value our belief in freedom, freedom as a general concept and as it spe-

cifically relates to the right of individuals to realize the best that is within themselves. This is the promise of the United States, a promise which has been kept for many of us. This is the promise sought today by most of the world.

As I have lived for 2 months away from the United States and yet representing it, I have realized more and more that it is the quality of the decisions made in this country that will determine the quality of life for the whole world, not because we wish to impose these decisions upon others but rather because of the exemplary value of a nation "so conceived and so dedicated," with its diverse peoples, races, and religions demonstrating their ability together to solve their problems, both as a nation and as an aggregate of human beings.

A Diplomat's Wish

As a diplomat, after 2 months, I would wish for the following:

First, for more ways, as a person, to stay deeply related to this experience, even as I am, for the moment, outside it. I am convinced that the greatest representational job to be done for the United States is that of explaining our American experience, both yesterday and today.

Second, I would wish that we would apply all the vigor we possess as a people to the solution of our deeper problems. I am convinced that any hesitation that the world has about the validity of our way of life is due almost entirely to the gap between our promise and our reality. While I believe that this gap is, in terms of the behavior of other peoples of other places, a small one, it is important that we close it as rapidly as possible.

And third, I wish that we would lose our self-consciousness about telling the story of the reality of the United States. This reality is indeed unbelievable, but it is true. The open society in which the poor man of talent and the descendant of the disadvantaged

may in fact move forward to full service of his nation and to the rewards that go with it, is the story of achievement which is greater than any promise of any manifesto and is more useful to the achievement of world peace than any military deterrent force.

From the other side, we in the United States indeed present for those who know us a picture of which to be proud and an example in fact for emulation. My husband and I have said many times in the last 2 months that it has been good to get away because in many ways we have felt very proud to be Americans—proud as we visited our military bases of the fact that our commanders in fact understood that they are there to preserve the peace, proud of the example of diversity of race and of religions represented by these armed forces, proud of the sacrifice that we make at the moment in order to protect the peace of the world, but proudest of the fact that what we are protecting is the reality of a belief in the right of individual human beings to life and to personal fulfillment, and an understanding that we in America really believe in this as a goal. This is also the goal of the Vietnamese soldier in the rice paddies of Viet-Nam and, I suspect, of the Chinese commune worker, and of the Russian peasant, and of the French garcon.

Our job is to convince them that the way of democracy which we have demonstrated is the best way to achieve it. From the other side of that wide ocean, which daily grows smaller, it seems to me that we can do so if we continue to make our democracy work and deny the claims of those who say we have done enough or that we can do no more.

The one thing that is crystal clear on the other side, and on this side, is that we can make our system work fully when we want to. The question which arises, from whatever the point of view, is, will we? At this moment, the answer seems to be that we will.

Science and International Cooperation

by Donald F. Hornig

*Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*¹

It is a very great pleasure to be with you today. All of us can take pride in the magnificent effort displayed at this White House Conference on the part of national organizations and private individuals, who have sought out improved methods of promoting peace and international understanding through international cooperation.

It is particularly appropriate that the subject we are discussing today—international cooperation in science and technology—be taken up under the auspices of the United Nations. One of the areas in which the United Nations has been making steady but unspectacular progress has been that of strengthening science and technology in many countries around the globe. This conference itself is a tribute to the constructive role the United Nations is playing in this field.

As you know, the President has been following the work of the National Citizens' Commission for International Cooperation with a lively interest. I have a special message which he has asked me to deliver to the members of the Citizens' Committee on Science and Technology, who have served under the distinguished leadership of Dr. Detlev Bronk and Dr. Harrison Brown. The President says:

¹ Remarks made before the Panel on Science and Technology at the White House Conference on International Cooperation on Nov. 30. For texts of the major addresses made at the conference, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 966.

I commend the members of the Citizens' Committee on Science and Technology for devoting their talents to the cause of international understanding. The broad net of personal contacts among scientists of many nations, contacts brought about by shared efforts to solve common problems, has brought men closer together. These contacts—and the cooperation achieved by international scientific organizations—have led to understanding among scientists which has often preceded and paved the way for political understanding.

The language of science—and the deeds of science—continue to offer fruitful and still unexplored opportunities for constructive cooperation with other countries in the cause of peace. We must not rest in our efforts to develop cooperative programs which unite the talents of our scientific community with those of other nations in advancing knowledge and promoting the welfare of all mankind.

Now I should like to say a few words on my own behalf. It is difficult not to be trite on the subject of international cooperation in science. All of the generalities have been spoken many times, but yet I doubt whether the depth and degree of this cooperation is understood.

The World Scientific Brotherhood

I can think of no creative scientist, no matter what his area of inquiry, who is not acquainted with a net of scholars throughout the world, principally through their publications. This net consists of some people who are working on the same problem in friendly competition, of others who contribute relevant ideas and experiments from

related fields. Most of them he knows and respects from what they have written—and to carry on his own work he reads the scientific journals of many countries. He keeps closely acquainted with the experiments carried on throughout the world.

Soviet scientific journals were read in the United States throughout the 1930's and 1940's, as were American journals in the Soviet Union. Scientists in both countries knew of the progress—and the problems—of many individuals on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain long before there was a formal exchange program. This has been much more true of our friends in Western Europe and Japan, and in recent years the contacts have become closer and closer with scientists in India, Pakistan, and many other nations.

The world scientific brotherhood has been formally joined through the scientific literature. But most scientists not only read the literature of foreign countries but engage in active correspondence with their coworkers. This permits them to share more subtle details of evolving ideas, and experiments in progress, than can be recorded formally in scientific journals. Scientific pen pals are common.

But even the letter does not suffice, for the subtleties of creative work are not always written down easily—the interplay of active minds and the comparison of related experiences are not so easily achieved in writing. So scientists are a well-traveled lot. Through attendance at international meetings—of which there are large numbers—and at each other's national meetings or specialized symposia, through visits to each other's laboratories, they have met each other face to face and formed innumerable personal friendships.

In the chemistry department at Princeton, for example, I cannot think of a single faculty member who has not been abroad at least once in the last 2 or 3 years, and many have crossed the oceans several times.

Outstanding scientists have roots in many countries. Let us consider, for example, the

career of your distinguished chairman, Dr. Bronk. As a member of scientific and learned societies of many nations—of the Royal Society of London, of the French Academy of Sciences, of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, of the Royal Danish Society of Sciences and Letters, of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences, and of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences—he is an honored and welcome guest in countries of both hemispheres.

The internationality of science is not, therefore, a statistic of international scientific organizations, of fellowships, of multilateral and bilateral intergovernmental arrangements; it is a brotherhood of people, whose bonds in science cross political and ideological frontiers. This is more than a personal matter. The rate of advance of science depends heavily upon the strength of these relationships.

Government and Science

The role of governments in promoting international cooperation in science is comparatively recent and, as President Johnson observed, largely unexplored.

Indeed the acts of governments have more often been to impede rather than to facilitate the free movement of scientists and of scientific knowledge. Surely one of our goals must be to break down these barriers to progress and try to form contacts which will benefit us all and expand both the intellectual horizons and the practical possibilities for men everywhere. It is the personal and private relationships which lend real meaning and substance to international cooperation in science.

Of course, much remains to be done. There are large areas of the world today where gifted men of science are still cut off from contacts with scientists in other countries. There are many places where scientific journals and books are not available because they cost too much. There are many universities and laboratories which have not had the stimulus of foreign visitors. Our

contacts with some countries such as Communist China are still limited, even in areas such as the health sciences, where cooperation would be mutually beneficial.

More and more problems are the common concern of all nations. Disease knows no national boundaries. The problems of an overpopulated globe with deficient food supplies will afflict us all. We all need more fresh water supplies, and we all need to deal with the progressive pollution of our environment.

In the past, cooperation in the personal sense I have mentioned has been largely between the scientifically advanced nations. But now it has become imperative that cooperation be extended to the less advanced countries as well. One of our major goals must be to find new ways to bring the benefits of modern science and modern technology based on science to the less developed countries. We must learn to assist them not only with financial capital but with the intellectual capital which will enable them to become working partners in a 20th-century world. We have only made the barest start in the direction of offering American talent as well as American dollars.

Finally, as science has grown we now face questions which are not only universal in the sense that the basic laws of physics, chemistry, and biology are universal but which literally encompass the globe and require the joined efforts of many nations for their solution. I have in mind the large-scale study of the atmosphere, the oceans, and the structure and dynamics of the earth itself. I am pleased to see that the committee has given careful thought to these matters and produced recommendations which I hope can be taken up. And other committees have produced recommendations with respect to cooperative efforts in the exploration of space and the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

This and the other committees have made an important beginning. We must all work to make international cooperation progressively more fruitful, and in this no area holds more promise than that of science.

Balance-of-Payments Program To Be Intensified in 1966

Following are three documents relating to the 1966 balance-of-payments program which were released by the White House on December 5. They were part of a packet which also included a statement by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler describing the new program; a Department of Commerce press release summarizing Secretary Connor's letter to businessmen; a Commerce Department "Progress Report on the Voluntary Program With the Business Community To Improve the Balance of Payments"; a Federal Reserve Board release on the Federal Reserve share of the new program; statements by David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; and other related materials.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO SECRETARY FOWLER

DECEMBER 2, 1965

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have reviewed the report of the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments and approve its recommendations for action. I would like you, Secretary Connor, and Chairman Martin [William McC. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] to announce, explain, and put into effect the proposed changes in Government policy, and specifically the improvements in the Voluntary Program of February 10, 1965.¹

In explaining the changes in the Voluntary Program, I would like you, and all other responsible officials of the Government, to make it clear that:

1. The February 10 program has worked. During the first three quarters of this year, the overall deficit ran at an annual rate of

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282, and Mar. 8, 1965, p. 335.

\$1.3 billion—less than half the deficit in 1964.

2. A large measure of the credit must go to the bankers and businessmen of America who have taken part in the program. At the White House last February, I asked them "to join hands with me in a voluntary partnership . . . to show the world that an aroused and responsible business community in America can close ranks and make a voluntary program work."² They have answered that call.

3. We have done well, but we must do even better. The deficit has been much smaller since February 10 than for several years past. At its peak, in 1960, it reached \$3.9 billion, three times the rate so far this year. But the present deficit is still too large. To assure that the dollar will remain as good as gold, we have to show the world that we can bring our accounts into sustainable balance, and keep them in balance.

4. To do the job, we propose not a new program, but an improved and strengthened version of the Voluntary Program that we tested in 1965. The improvements reflect the experience since February 10, and have been worked out in close consultation with Secretary Connor's senior business advisors and with the banker advisors of Chairman Martin and Governor [J. L.] Robertson of the Federal Reserve.

5. The Government will continue to do its part. Since 1960, Secretary McNamara has reduced the balance of payments cost of military spending abroad by about 40%—despite the increase in spending on Viet Nam. Administrator Bell has reduced the balance of payments impact of foreign assistance by 50%. I have instructed both of them, and all other senior officials of the Government, to spare no effort in reducing the dollar drain of their spending still further. But I reject the counsel of those who would have the Government do the entire job, at whatever cost to American security and leadership. It is private outflow that has grown so sharply since 1960. Some fur-

ther reduction in that outflow is essential if we are to solve this problem without crippling our economy at home, or compromising our leadership abroad.

6. I know that this will involve some pain and sacrifice. But the stakes are great. What is at issue is whether we can meet our critical responsibilities abroad, and maintain the expanding prosperity of the past four years at home—the decline in unemployment, the rising profits, the improving standard of life for all our people—by relying on the voluntary cooperation of business, labor, and government. This is a test which America has met with dramatic success during the past few years. I am confident that we will continue to meet it in the future.

You and the other members of the Cabinet Committee are to be congratulated for your work in the preparation of the revised program for 1966.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

REPORT OF CABINET COMMITTEE ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

DECEMBER 3, 1965

At the request of the President, his Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments has made an intensive examination of the United States balance-of-payments situation and progress during 1965 in order to determine where changes could be made to improve the President's program announced on February 10, 1965.

The Committee recommended that the program of voluntary cooperation announced by the President at that time be continued in 1966.

The Committee noted that the results achieved during 1965 clearly indicate that the program is working. However, the Committee also concluded that there is need for the program to work with increased effectiveness if the United States is to achieve its goal of equilibrium in 1966.

Therefore, the Committee recommended that:

1. *The present voluntary Commerce program to reduce the outflow of business capital be reinforced by the establishment both of an overall target, similar to that of 1965, and a new target specifically applicable to direct investment*

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 8, 1965, p. 335.

calling upon corporations to limit direct investments during the two-year period 1965-1966 to 90 per cent of the amount invested during the three-year period 1962-1964. For this purpose, direct investment is defined to include net outflows from the United States plus the undistributed profits of subsidiaries abroad. The new target will permit an average annual level of direct investment during 1965 and 1966 combined equal to 135 per cent of the annual average during the 1962-1964 period. The targets will apply to direct investment in countries now subject to the Interest Equalization Tax, including Canada, and Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone, Libya, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

In addition to its expanded geographical coverage, the Commerce program will utilize more detailed reporting and forecasting procedures than in 1965, and the reports and forecasts in question will be requested of 900 corporations, about 400 more than at present. All corporations, of course, are expected to participate in the efforts called for under the program.

The new direct investment measures are expected to result in balance of payments savings of more than \$1 billion in 1966. In addition, corporations will be asked to make every effort to repatriate excess cash balances abroad—a measure which is expected to result in some further savings.

2. *The Interest Equalization Tax on purchases of foreign securities and acquisitions of other long-term claims on foreigners by Americans be made applicable to Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone, Libya, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.*

3. *The present ceiling for bank lending to foreigners under the Federal Reserve program be raised from 105 per cent of the December 31, 1964 base, in stages of 1 percentage point per quarter to a new ceiling of 109 per cent in the final quarter of 1966.* In addition, certain smaller banks which have been effectively precluded from foreign lending under the Federal Reserve program because they had little or no such lending on their books as of December 31, 1964, will each, in appropriate circumstances, be permitted to make foreign loans up to a total of \$450,000—provided the excess of such lending over the 109 per cent ceiling covers U.S. exports financed for its regular customers or extends credit to developing countries. These revisions will assure an adequate margin for the financing of increased export trade in 1966.

4. *The ceiling for lending by nonbank financial institutions to foreigners under the Federal Reserve program be increased, in the case of credits with maturities of 10 years or less, from 105 per cent of the December 31, 1964 base in stages of 1 percentage point per quarter to a new ceiling of 109 per cent in the final quarter of 1966.* In the

case of acquisitions by such institutions of foreign securities with maturities of more than 10 years, a ceiling of 105 per cent of the September 30, 1965 amount would be set for securities of developed countries other than Canada and Japan.

5. *The basic arrangement with Canada regarding Canadian access to the United States capital market and exemption from the Interest Equalization Tax for an unlimited amount of new Canadian security issues both be continued.* In accordance with an understanding between our two governments, the Canadian Government will take action to insure that the net flows of capital funds to Canada will be combined with an appropriate use of Canada's foreign exchange reserves to meet the total requirement of its balance-of-payments deficit on current account—arising from trade, tourism and other non-capital transactions. This arrangement will enable U.S. investors to buy new issues of long-term Canadian securities on the basis of market considerations, while at the same time the U.S. balance of payments is appropriately safeguarded.

6. *The current efforts by all government agencies to reduce to a minimum the balance-of-payments impact of their operations be intensified.* The importance of vigorous effort in this area is all the more important in the light of unavoidable increases in the balance-of-payments costs of economic aid and military operations in Vietnam.

7. *Legislation to encourage foreign investment in the United States now before the Congress be enacted as soon as possible.*

8. *Present efforts to encourage both foreign and domestic tourism in the U. S. be stepped up, and efforts by the Government to encourage and expand the activities of the private sector in this area be increased.* These efforts should include additional appropriations for the Commerce Department's U.S. Travel Service, which is currently operating at a marked competitive disadvantage in relation to its foreign counterparts. All-inclusive chartered tours of the U.S. should be encouraged, and this program should be coordinated with other private efforts to promote foreign tourism in the U.S.

9. *Present efforts both by government and by private enterprise to expand U.S. export trade should be sharply stepped up.*

LETTER FROM SECRETARY CONNOR TO BUSINESSMEN

DECEMBER 6, 1965

The President has again called upon American industry to make an extra effort during 1966 to help reduce further the deficit in our balance of payments. At his direction, I am again writing to you personally to ask your assistance.

The voluntary program in which you and other corporate executives have cooperated has been a major factor behind the substantial improvement in our balance of payments during 1965. The evidence clearly indicates that the program is working well. However, because it is necessary to continue our efforts to bring our balance of payments into equilibrium, the voluntary program must be strengthened.

In making our program more effective, it will remain *voluntary*. The President is convinced that the voluntary approach adopted this year was the correct way to proceed, and it will continue during 1966.

In the year ahead, we will also continue the basic strategy followed in 1965 under which each chief executive is asked to maximize his company's contribution to the balance of payments through a variety of means—including export expansion, repatriation of income from abroad, repatriation of short-term foreign financial assets, and the maximum use of funds obtained abroad for investment purposes. The result of these efforts should be a considerable overall improvement by American industry as a whole compared with 1965.

In addition, we must ask each company to make a special effort to restrain the outflow of funds from the United States for direct investment abroad. To help achieve this objective, we are recommending a separate target for direct investment for business corporations as a group. The basic aim is not to restrain expenditures by U.S. companies on plant facilities abroad. Rather it is to minimize the impact of the outflow of funds on the United States balance of payments.

We are also suggesting to individual companies a separate formula for direct investment which will enable them to fix their own direct investment targets in a meaningful way and yet permit companies to continue their business abroad in an orderly fashion.

We are modifying the geographic coverage of the program, but it will still apply primarily to developed countries. We still wish to encourage American private enterprise to help raise standards of living in the developing countries of the free world.

To assist us in the administration and appraisal of the program through the year ahead, we are making some improvements in the voluntary reporting system adopted for 1965.

The revised worksheet and some instructions to aid your technical people in its preparation will be sent to you in the very near future. In the meantime, I can describe the principal features of the general program for 1966.

It is estimated that the business community may improve its net contribution to the balance of payments by \$1.3 billion in 1965 compared with 1964. During 1966, we are hopeful that this overall improvement can be raised to \$3.4 billion—if the

business community is successful in restraining direct investment, maximizing export shipments, repatriating income and foreign financial assets—along with other measures. I am asking you and other corporate executives to review the situation of your company and determine your own best estimate of the overall improvement which you think is possible during 1966 compared with 1965.

I am recommending the following target to American industry in planning its direct investment for 1966: Direct investment during the two-year period 1965-66 combined should be limited to 90 per cent of the amount during the three-year period 1962-64. For this purpose, direct investment is defined to include the net outflow of funds from the United States plus the undistributed profits of subsidiaries abroad. For industry as a whole, this target would permit a rate of direct investment during the two years 1965 and 1966 combined approximately 35 per cent above the annual average during the 1962-64 base period. This rate of increase should result in a level of direct investment outflow of about \$2.4 billion in 1966—roughly the same as in 1964, following an expected substantial rise in 1965 compared with the previous year. The expected result can also be expressed as a projected increase of more than \$1.0 billion in the surplus of total direct investment income over direct investment outflow in 1966 compared with the level anticipated in 1965.

I am also recommending that each company head use the above formula in estimating his own target for direct investment during 1966. In calculating the target, companies should use the same base period of 1962-64. In defining direct investment, they should add together the net outflow from the United States and the undistributed profits of their subsidiaries. (This is the same definition used in Line "D" of the 1965 worksheet.) They should make the same calculations for 1965-66. For the latter two years combined, direct investment as defined should not exceed 90 per cent of such outflow during the three-year base period. In suggesting this formula, I realize fully that it will catch individual companies in different circumstances. For some it would undoubtedly place a severe strain on their ability to carry out projects abroad already in the advanced stages of planning or actual construction. For others, it may result in a target considerably in excess of what the companies would actually need to fulfill their plans, and we hope they would use only the minimum amount necessary. But in all of these cases, we are fully prepared—and would want—to discuss particular situations with individual companies.

The overall industry improvement target of \$3.4 billion in 1966 would include the balance of payments savings expected through the restraint on direct investment. For the individual company, the estimated improvement for the next year should also include the savings on direct investment out-

flow which corporate executives think they can make during 1966.

The target as formulated for direct investment has several advantages. In the first place, the three-year base period allows companies to account for direct investment activities in a way which reduces the influence of numerous aberrations which might occur in a single year, and it puts individual companies on a more equal footing. Secondly, by combining direct investment flows for 1965 and 1966, there is greater flexibility allowed companies who have been the most cooperative under the 1965 voluntary program. Those companies which have repatriated a substantial share of their earnings and have restrained capital outflow this year will have considerable headroom in 1966. Those companies whose situations did not permit them to make a similar contribution in 1965 would be called upon to make a correspondingly greater effort next year. Thus, the two-year planning period seems to be desirable from the point of view of equity. Moreover, the target essentially permits companies on the average to invest in two years up to 90 per cent of the amount they invested during the previous three years. Thus, it allows an average annual rate of investment during the two years 35 per cent higher than the average for the three years 1962-64.

The geographical coverage of the program in 1966 will again apply principally to developed countries. However, the list of developed countries will be expanded. The new list will be the same as that prepared for the application of the Interest Equalization Tax. The targets will apply to direct investment in countries defined as developed for the 1965 program together with Canada, Abu-Dhabi, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone, and Saudi Arabia.

We are asking for moderation on direct investment in Canada during 1966. This was not the case in 1965. However, this year we did ask companies to expand exports to Canada and to repatriate income and short-term financial assets held with Canadian institutions. We are repeating this request for 1966. In view of the large prospective increase in direct investment in Canada by American firms next year, we think it is desirable to ask for moderation on the outflow of direct investment funds to that country along with other developed areas. At the same time, we realize that U.S. companies, partly because we did not ask for restraint in 1965, have underway firm investment commitments in Canada (for example those incurred under the U.S.-Canadian automotive parts agreement) which they will find it necessary to carry out. But it is our impression that companies will have ample opportunity within the direct investment target to fulfill these commitments, and we are certain they would want to give them the highest priority.

The other countries included in the expanded geographic coverage of the program possess large reserves of internationally traded natural resources in which U.S. direct investment is substantial. We think it is reasonable and equitable to include the substantial flows of investment funds to these countries in the base and target for balance of payments improvement during 1966.

This year between 500 and 600 companies co-operating in the program are submitting quarterly reports on their progress. In 1966 we are asking an additional 400-odd companies to do the same. We are particularly interested in expanding the list of companies to include more firms with direct investments abroad although the individual amounts involved may not be large. Initially, I am asking each company to report if it had direct investments abroad of \$2 million or more at the end of 1964 (and if it is not currently reporting under the voluntary program).

During this year we have found the statistical information submitted by companies each quarter to be helpful in administering the program. However, we have also found that the lack of somewhat more detailed information has made it difficult for us to appraise the progress of the program and to chart the contributions which the cooperating companies are making compared with developments in the balance of payments as a whole. For this reason, we have adopted several improvements in the reporting system. The specific types of information requested will be detailed in the revised worksheet and the instructions which will accompany it.

We will repeat this year's request for a quarterly report on the amount of short-term financial assets held abroad by the parent company and by its foreign affiliates. This year we requested that parent companies reduce these assets at least to the level outstanding at the end of 1963. Many companies have responded, and a large number have cut their holdings even below the 1963 level. We are hopeful that other companies will make the reduction as soon as possible, consistent with the maintenance of orderly conditions in money markets abroad, and that others will not rebuild previously reduced holdings. I also asked companies in 1965 to economize on holdings of short-term assets by their foreign affiliates. I hope they will continue this effort in 1966.

During the year ahead, we will want to work closely with individual companies in the management of the voluntary program. During 1965, I have communicated periodically on an informal basis with the chief executives of the cooperating companies. I plan to continue this procedure in 1966. However, experience this year has also demonstrated that the management of the program would have been facilitated by an additional level of communication. I am now recommending that such a level of contact be established and main-

tained during 1966. Consequently, I am asking you and other principal officers of each company to name an alternate who is familiar with company policy and yet who may be somewhat more available for periodic discussions of the company's progress. Commerce Department officials who are assisting me in the management of the program would maintain liaison with your designee in those matters not requiring your personal attention.

I am requesting that the chief executive of each company continue to review the worksheets reported each quarter to the Department of Commerce. It would be helpful if you could give me each quarter your *personal* appraisal of the extent to which your company is making progress toward achieving its overall target forecast for 1966. I am also requesting company officials to enclose with their quarterly statistical report a commentary on their company's experience during the quarter from the point of view of the main items reported in the worksheet.

In making the revisions in the voluntary program for 1966, I have worked closely with the leaders of American business—particularly with the Balance of Payments Advisory Committee of the Department of Commerce. In administering the program in 1966—as in 1965—I will continue to benefit from the advice and counsel of this distinguished group of American businessmen. As you will recall, this Committee is chaired by Mr. Albert L. Nickerson, Chairman of the Board, Socony Mobil Oil Company. The other members are: Carter L. Burgess, Chairman of the Board, American Machine and Foundry Company; George S. Moore, President, First National City Bank; Elisha Gray, II, Chairman, Whirlpool Corporation; Sidney J. Weinberg, General Partner, Goldman, Sachs and Company; Carl J. Gilbert, Chairman, The Gillette Company; Stuart T. Saunders, Chairman, Pennsylvania Railroad Company; J. Ward Keener, President, B. F. Goodrich Company; and Fred J. Borch, President, General Electric Company.

These members of our Advisory Committee have approved the revisions in the voluntary program for 1966. They join me in asking the continued support of the business community in our efforts to improve the balance of payments.

This year I have also benefited from the advice and counsel of many other leaders of American industry; I am certain they will continue to volunteer such guidance in the year ahead and it will be welcomed.

Finally, I am personally confident that the leaders of American business fully understand the seriousness of the foreign situation which we face. Furthermore, the increased military effort in Viet Nam will put further pressure on our balance of payments. To help compensate for the added drain, we have found it necessary to strengthen the voluntary program for 1966.

But I am confident that the business community appreciates the urgency of the task to reduce further the deficit in our balance of payments. I also have no doubt whatsoever that they will cooperate on a voluntary basis in our extraordinary effort to achieve this vital national goal.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN T. CONNOR

U.S. Supports British Decision To Halt Oil Imports to Rhodesia

Department Statement

Press release 296 dated December 17

The United States Government welcomes and supports the British decision to prohibit oil imports into Rhodesia. The United States fully recognizes the authority of Her Majesty's Government in this matter and therefore is advising all U.S. citizens and enterprises to comply with the terms of the British order.

The United States Government will assist the British Government with all appropriate support to make the airlift of oil to Zambia effective.

We hope these economic measures, together with those already taken by the United Kingdom, the United States, and other members of the United Nations, will bring a prompt end to the rebellion in Rhodesia, in accordance with the objective of the Security Council resolution of November 20.¹

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916.

Nuclear Power and Proliferation

by Henry D. Smyth

*U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency*¹

Twenty years ago last summer the use of atomic bombs marked the closing phase of World War II. Those explosions were the first public demonstration of the immense power of nuclear energy. Since that time the world has concerned itself constantly with both the sinister and the beneficent implications of that event. We have discussed how to limit the use of nuclear weapons and how to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is not possible to separate these questions entirely. Today I shall discuss some measures aimed at promoting nuclear power without at the same time proliferating nuclear weapons.

Let me begin a brief historical review by quoting a printed document [*Bond Bulletin*, a house organ published by Horner and Co., Inc.] dated April 15, 1940, a document which has recently been brought to my attention and which, I suspect, has never been seen by any member of this audience. The quotation runs as follows:

Our Department of Scientific Research has, during recent years, been following with interest various scientific experiments tending towards the release of atomic energy. From time to time during the past few months certain important advances in this procedure have been announced in the newspapers. We are now informed that during recent weeks certain American research workers have made unreported but important new findings in this field and it is suggested that these discoveries *may* soon make the systematic and controlled release of atomic energy from available raw materials a practical proposition.

¹Address made before the American Nuclear Society at Washington, D. C., on Nov. 17.

The next paragraph which I will quote will give you a key to the nature of the document in which these statements occur.

As humdrum bond men, we have always kept our noses in yield books and know little about these vast fields of scientific conjecture, and would prefer not to have to think about them. However, it is obvious that, if this information which our Department brings us is correct, we may be on the threshold of new and tremendous sources of very cheap energy for our machines. Judging by precedent, such discoveries will not become practicable for many years, but the possibility is suggested that such a long span of time may not, in this instance, be involved.

The question of economic practicability which the last sentence I have quoted foreshadows is one that has concerned us since 1940, and still concerns us.

May I give you another quotation 5 years later than the first, which touches on this question. It is from the official report of the Manhattan District activities which are possibly more familiar to many of you. Speaking of the deliberations of a committee appointed in 1944 to look into the possibilities of peaceful uses of atomic energy, the following statement is made:

While there was general agreement that a great industry might eventually arise, comparable, perhaps, with the electronics industry, there was disagreement as to how rapidly such an industry would grow; the consensus was that the growth would be slow over a period of many years. At least there is no immediate prospect of running cars with nuclear power or lighting houses with radioactive lamps although there is a good probability that nuclear power for special purposes could be developed within ten years

In fact, significant amounts of nuclear power were generated within 10 years. Specifically, that power was generated in the prototype of the reactor for the first nuclear submarine, and that submarine, the U.S.S. *Nautilus*, commenced its sea trials in 1955. We can say, therefore, that the technical feasibility of nuclear power was clearly demonstrated in 1955. But we all know that the U.S. Navy can afford to pay far more for power in a submarine than a public utility company can afford to pay in a central power station that has to compete with hydroelectric power or fossil fuel steamplants.

In 1959 the Soviet Union put the nuclear-powered icebreaker *Lenin* into service. Here again normal economic considerations were not relevant.

In the 10 years since 1955 great efforts have been made to reduce the cost of nuclear power to the point where it was competitive with conventional power. In this country, in Canada, in Britain, in France, in the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, a large amount of research has been directed toward this goal. Many of you have participated in this work and are more familiar with it than I am.

In the first great Geneva conference in 1955 a spirit of optimism prevailed. The second conference, 3 years later, came during a period of disillusionment. The technical problems were tougher than we had thought. At the third conference, a year ago, the mood was of cautious confidence. Such a mood seemed justified at the time by the solid achievements of the previous years. Several big power reactors existed in North America and in Europe. True, none of them were clearly as cheap as conventional plants, but they had operated safely and reliably and had pointed the way to possible economies.

In the past year the confidence of 1964 has been further bolstered by the reduction of cost estimates and the multiplication of plans for building nuclear powerplants in many parts of the world. The choice of

nuclear reactors as heat sources for these new plants has been based for the most part on hardheaded judgments of comparative costs. In short, nuclear energy is already important in meeting the energy needs of the world and in the next 10 or 20 years will become a major factor in meeting these needs.

I could review the basis for the statement I have just made. I could cite the operating experience with nuclear powerplants currently in existence, the cost estimates for specific proposals such as Oyster Creek, the plans for building other new plants in this country and in other countries. I shall not do so because there are other speakers here this week better qualified than I to discuss such matters. Furthermore, most of this material has been adequately discussed in the technical journals.

Efforts To Control Nuclear Weapon Production

So, 26 years after the discovery of nuclear fission, we find the world ready to use it on a large scale for peaceful purposes. This should bring satisfaction to all of us who have been involved in this great enterprise. It does. We are happy. On second thought, we are also frightened. We are frightened because it is impossible to produce nuclear power without producing material usable in nuclear weapons.

I need hardly remind this audience that the fission of U-235 in normal uranium produces plutonium in U-238, the most abundant isotope in natural uranium. After all, the first big reactors in this country, in Britain, in France, and in the Soviet Union were built solely for this purpose. Most big power reactors use natural or slightly enriched uranium as fuel. Consequently operation of such a reactor will produce plutonium in the fuel. This plutonium can be extracted from the spent fuel and converted into weapons.

Nor are the amounts of material involved trivial. A big power reactor running for a year will produce enough plutonium for a significant number of nuclear bombs.

The dilemma is clear. The world needs new sources of energy. Nuclear fission can supply that energy. Nuclear powerplants produce plutonium. As we build and operate more and more nuclear powerplants, we are automatically and inescapably producing material that can be made into nuclear weapons. The world emphatically does not need more nuclear weapons. In fact, we have been trying for years to control and eventually eliminate those that already exist.

Let me review briefly these efforts at control.

At the close of the Second World War in 1945 the U.S. Government recognized that nuclear weapons added a new dimension to war. The explosive power of these weapons was so vast as to dwarf even the largest scale bombings by conventional aircraft carrying conventional explosives. The existence of nuclear weapons added strength to the notion of an international organization that might be powerful enough to prevent future wars.

As a corollary to this idea, it was evident that international control, at least of nuclear weapons, would be a great step forward. To this end a committee of distinguished men with a panel of advisers were appointed. The report of this committee, commonly known as the Acheson-Lilienthal report, proposed a bold scheme for placing the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as military uses, under international control.

These proposals in modified form then became the basis for the Baruch plan submitted to the United Nations in 1946.² As most of you will remember, this plan was debated at length in the U.N. for several years but was moribund by the end of 1948.

Although the Baruch plan had been shelved, many people in the U.S. Government continued to hope something might be done. Such hopes were dampened by the explosion of the first Russian nuclear device in the fall of 1949.

In the years following 1950 there was little discussion and no progress on the question of control of nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. built up their stockpiles of nuclear weapons energetically. Both developed H-bombs. The British and French also embarked on nuclear weapons programs.

Toward the end of that decade talks on general disarmament were resumed. It is difficult to assess the degree to which these negotiations were sincerely aimed at disarmament and to what extent they were used for propaganda advantage. It did become clear that even with the best will in the world on all sides the question of general disarmament was extraordinarily complex technically and politically.

Toward the end of that decade tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. began to lessen. The possibility that a new approach to disarmament might be fruitful led to the establishment of the 18-nation group at Geneva in 1962. Miraculously, one great step forward was made in the test ban treaty of 1963.³ But the nuclear powers are still making more and more nuclear weapons, and the problems of general disarmament still seem to be nearly insuperable.

Granted that the ideal of general and complete disarmament is a utopian dream for the future, can we search for steps that may be useful, however small? Can we reduce the dangers which the world faces? Clearly we would like

(1) To make sure that no additional nations make nuclear weapons, that is, to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons,

(2) To have the nuclear test ban accepted by all countries,

(3) To extend the ban to underground tests,

(4) To stop the manufacture of nuclear weapons by the countries already having them,

(5) To reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons already in existence.

² BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The first item in this list, proliferation, brings me back to the dilemma posed by the impending spread of nuclear powerplants. Can we enjoy the benefits of nuclear power without running the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons? I do not believe we can, but I do believe we can minimize that risk. To do so we must inspect and control the materials used in such plants and produced by them. We must make sure that no materials ostensibly used for peaceful purposes are diverted to military purposes. I believe we have the means available to do this in the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The IAEA owes its origin to a speech made to the U.N. by President Eisenhower in December 1953.⁴ This speech, commonly known as the Atoms for Peace speech, inaugurated a major effort by the U.S. Government to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to spread the benefits of such uses around the world. It appealed to other nations to do likewise. It suggested an international organization to further such purposes.

As seems inevitable in international affairs, it took several years of planning and negotiation to set up such an organization. Finally the IAEA came into being in 1957. Vienna was chosen as its headquarters. It was to have a Director General and an appropriate secretariat. It was to be guided and controlled by a Board of Governors, 23 in number. Certain countries were permanent members of the Board, others were to be chosen in terms of regions, stage of technical development, capacity to supply raw materials, and other considerations. No member had the power of veto. The Board of Governors would meet as necessary. Once a year there was to be a general conference, where every member could have delegates and which would review the Agency's program and make whatever suggestions might be appropriate.

The basic statute of the Agency⁵ states clearly that it has two principal functions: to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to prevent their diversion to military use. In the words of article II of the statute:

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

I have often said that the Agency was founded on two assumptions, both of which proved to be wrong. The first assumption was that uranium was scarce and therefore its supply could be easily controlled. The second assumption was that nuclear power was going to be immediately competitive and would spread rapidly.

In any case, for the first several years of the Agency's existence the demand for nuclear material was trivial since so few of its members other than the nuclear powers wanted to build reactors. Probably this was just as well, for the problem of setting up a system of safeguards and inspection to prevent diversion proved difficult both politically and technically. I shall return to this question presently.

In spite of the deferment of its two principal objectives—the spread of nuclear power and the control of nuclear materials—the Agency found many useful things to do. I need do little more than mention some of them.

The Agency has worked on standard codes for safety and health, regulations for shipment of radioactive materials, for disposal of radioactive wastes. It has set up a small laboratory to establish standards of measurement and calibration. In that laboratory and through contracts it conducts a small but vigorous research program. It has arranged many international scientific conferences and symposia, as well as disseminating information in other ways. It has a

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 820.

fellowship program, arranges for visiting experts to developing countries, and promotes technical assistance to such countries in other ways.

Finally, in the fourth year of its existence—1960—the Board of Governors came to grips with the question of control of materials and equipment. In spite of the opposition of several important countries, a safeguards system was devised, approved by the Board of Governors, and accepted by the General Conference.

It is easy to poke fun at that document. It had most of the bad features of a committee production. I am not sure that I ever really understood it, and I presume others felt the same way. It was limited in application to reactors of less than 100 megawatts thermal, which made it irrelevant to power reactors of significant size. And so on.

Yet I doff my hat to those who framed it and carried it through to acceptance. They understood the technical problems. Faced with opposition, with ignorance, and with the need of compromise, they set up a system that was workable and effective. They established guidelines in an uncharted and turbulent sea.

By the time I became U.S. Representative to the Agency in May 1961, the Director General had begun to organize a small corps of inspectors and to prepare to send them out to the few countries that automatically fell under the system. The first inspection occurred in February 1962. In the summer of 1961 the United States offered to put four of its small reactors under the system, both as a gesture of approval and to test the system. At the time I thought this an empty gesture; so did many others. We were wrong. Both reasons for it proved important.

Before bringing you up to date on the present status of the IAEA safeguards system, I think I should remind you of what the technical problems are and how they might be solved so that you will understand more clearly what I am talking about. To do so I shall describe an ideal system which

would give the maximum possible protection.

As you all know, the series of steps involved in producing nuclear power starts at the mines. Then comes the processing of ore into some form of uranium concentrate. Then the concentrate is purified and converted to uranium metal, or a suitable compound. If no change in the proportions of the isotopes is contemplated, the next step is fabrication of fuel elements. If enriched fuel is desired, the purified uranium compound, probably uranium hexafluoride, is run through an isotope separation plant, then converted to the appropriate chemical form, metal, oxide, or whatever, and then fabricated into fuel elements.

Once the fuel elements have been fabricated, they go to the reactor to be stockpiled ready for loading. Once they are in the reactor, the chain reaction and consequent production of plutonium begins. After the reactor has operated for the optimum time, as determined by its design and purpose, the fuel elements are removed and stored. The period of storage depends on many factors, but eventually the fuel elements will be reprocessed, i.e., the plutonium and fission products will be separated from the remaining uranium. The question then is what happens to the plutonium and the remaining uranium. More specifically, how do we make sure that they are not used for military purposes?

Ideally the greatest assurance of control would be by inspection and recordkeeping at every stage of this series of processes. The control agency would follow the material from its origin in the ground to its ultimate consumption for the production of power. I am assuming that the plutonium itself will eventually be used as fuel for powerplants.

Conceivably such a control agency might have been set up in 1946 if all the countries of the world had agreed then to stop any production of uranium for military purposes and to turn over ownership of uranium mines, processing plants, et cetera, to

an international agency. Of course, such an agency would also have had to carry the responsibility for research and development leading to economical nuclear powerplants.

Granted the existence, now, of many national atomic energy programs, might it still be possible to set up and administer a control program covering every step of every process from the ground to the end product of valueless radioactive waste? My own feeling is that so extensive a system would not presently be possible. Nor do I believe it necessary.

Even if we had an ideal system, would it be 100 percent effective? Of course it would not. You all know that even the most elaborate safety system in factories, in laboratories, in transportation, or wherever, is not 100 percent effective. We still have accidents even though it's to everyone's interest to obey all the rules and in fact everyone does so. Also we still have power failures.

If even the ideal system is not completely effective, is there a less complete system that might be acceptably effective? After all, the only point of inspecting every step of the process is to make assurance doubly sure. Complete control at a late stage should be effective. Natural uranium is not weapons material; neither is the slightly enriched uranium used in the big power reactors in the United States and elsewhere. Separating the isotopes of uranium is an expensive process. Separation of plutonium from spent fuel is much cheaper and is certainly the most obvious place to look for diversion.

It appears that the reactors are the most feasible and effective place at which to establish control. Here the incoming fuel elements can be counted and sampled; here the power level of the plant can be checked and the consequent production of plutonium estimated. Here the spent fuel elements can again be counted and sampled and their subsequent destination followed.

There is a further practical point that favors reactors as a sensible point to begin control. The fuel going into a reactor is

expensive, and the spent fuel coming out is both valuable and hazardous to health. Furthermore the safe and efficient operation of a reactor requires complete and continuous knowledge of the number of fuel elements in the reactor, their original composition, and the amount of uranium and plutonium in them at any given time. Therefore prudent operation of a reactor requires extensive and accurate recordkeeping and instrumentation. The kinds of material inventories and operating records necessary for prudent management have in them all or most of the information required for materials control from the point of view of safeguards. In a well-run plant visiting inspectors have little more to do than to verify the accuracy of existing records and make spot checks of samples of material.

These remarks about reactors could be applied equally to plants for processing spent fuel. However, such plants do not yet exist, except one in the United States just going into operation, two of small capacity abroad, and those which are involved in military programs.

Under the circumstances it seemed best to aim the IAEA system of safeguards at reactors at least as a first step. The system first set up in the IAEA in 1961 and the revised system now in effect both are based on this view. Obviously I believe the system is effective. Otherwise I would not be talking about it here today. I would not claim that it could never be evaded, but the risks of detection would deter any attempt at evasion.

Advantages of International Safeguards

If some say that the present IAEA system of safeguards is a compromise between effectiveness and acceptability, you may ask whether too high a price has to be paid for international safeguards. As many of you know, every bilateral arrangement which the United States has made with another country to supply reactors or reactor fuel has contained provisions for inspection to

assure there is no diversion to military purposes. The United States has been making inspections under such arrangements since 1957. EURATOM also has a similar system for the reactors built in member countries with EURATOM help. Could not we persuade other supplier countries to insist on bilateral safeguards like ours? Wouldn't that be simpler than trying to use an international agency?

The advantages of an international system of safeguards have been discussed so often that I think I need only summarize them here. They are credibility, uniformity, economy, and acceptability.

For the reasons I have sketched, the U.S. Government in January 1963 adopted a policy of transferring the administration of safeguards to the IAEA as various bilateral arrangements came up for renewal. As a corollary, new agreements also provided for IAEA safeguards.

At the same time our representatives to the IAEA began to press for removal of the 100-MW thermal limit on the then existing IAEA safeguards system. In June of 1963 the Board of Governors provisionally approved such an action, which was accepted by the General Conference in September 1963 and put into effect at the next Board meeting.

The June Board meeting just cited was marked by a striking change of attitude toward safeguards. The Governor from the Soviet Union and several other Board members voted for the proposed action instead of opposing it. This vote was conditional on a review of the whole system. Such a review was certainly appropriate and was approved.

It was decided that this review should be undertaken by the Board functioning as a working group under the chairmanship of Dr. [Gunnar] Randers of Norway. Between February 1964 and January 1965 the group convened several times for a total of 32 sessions. The revised safeguards system which they recommended was approved by the Board in February 1965 by a vote of 21 in favor, including the Soviet Union, none against, and 2 abstentions. It then came to

the General Conference of the IAEA in September 1965. There it was approved, first in committee by a formal vote of 54 in favor, 1 against, and 2 abstentions, then in plenary session by consensus.

I am reporting these votes to you, not because I expect you to be interested in procedural details of IAEA meetings, but because I know you will realize that a system of control like the safeguards system is not likely to be successful unless it receives nearly unanimous support.

As further background, I would like to make some remarks about the objections to the safeguards system in general, or to specific provisions of the previous system. Such matters were discussed at length in the working group. That they were resolved to the satisfaction of nearly all members of that group seems to me remarkable. It shows that representatives of some 20 countries from all over the globe can have fruitful discussions when their goal is obviously of interest to all concerned.

Curiously enough, one of the issues often raised before, the question of "invasion of sovereignty," did not come up in that general form. The fact that Japan had already accepted IAEA safeguards and the United States had put the Yankee powerplant under IAEA safeguards helped. Principal points that were raised were:

- (1) Danger of compromising trade secrets,
- (2) Danger of interfering with efficient and economical operation,
- (3) Reluctance to accept inspectors who might be unwelcome because of their nationality,
- (4) Objection to resident inspectors,
- (5) Objection to payment of costs of inspection by the IAEA,
- (6) Objection to using the supply of hardware as a reason for invoking safeguards.

I shall not take the time to explain how (1), (2), and (3) were handled. They were not too difficult. The question of resident inspectors was met by agreeing that the IAEA had the right of access at all times to reactors above a certain power level. This

was the essential point. The question of payment—(5)—was not part of the document and was therefore deferred. It is a serious question, which I will discuss later. The "hardware" question greatly concerned some of the developing countries. Since it has to do with the justification for invoking safeguards rather than the system itself, I won't try to explain it.

How IAEA Safeguards Are Applied

So now the IAEA has a system of safeguards and inspection whose principles are spelled out in a fairly detailed document that has been approved almost unanimously by the members of the Agency. This does not mean that any reactors are automatically under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is a statement of principles and proposed practices that serves as a basis for formal agreements between the Agency and member states for the administration of safeguards. Only after such agreements have been negotiated and signed do safeguards actually go into effect.

There are three ways in which this system can be applied:

(1) If the Agency itself substantially assists a country to build a reactor, that reactor must by statute be under Agency safeguards;

(2) If one country helps another to build a reactor, the two can ask the Agency to administer safeguards;

(3) A country can unilaterally request the Agency to safeguard one or several of its reactors.

At present the Agency is safeguarding several small research reactors under (1).

Under (2) it has agreed to administer safeguards transferred by the United States and its bilateral partners in some 13 cases, all involving moderately small reactors. Similarly, the Agency is taking over safeguarding of the U.K.-built small reactor in Denmark and the power reactor at Tokai-Mura in Japan, also the Canadian-Japanese power reactor. Other such arrangements are being negotiated.

Under (3) certain small reactors in the United States have been under IAEA safeguards for several years and the Yankee power reactor for about a year. Also the United Kingdom last June asked the IAEA to safeguard a big power reactor at Bradwell.

There is nothing to prevent members of the Agency supporting the safeguards system in principle but not using it. The question of who pays the cost of inspections is dangling. The cost is small, probably less than 1 percent of the cost of the power produced. In principle it should be paid by the Agency, but there is strong opposition to this in practice and the Agency's budget is small—\$10 million to \$12 million a year.

Yet I am reminded of the development of nuclear power. In the 20 or 25 years we have been working to reduce the costs of nuclear power, there have been no "break-throughs," no spectacular inventions. We have reached our present favorable cost situation by a series of small steps which have added up to a significant advance.

I believe we are making similar steps in our effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons that might accompany the proliferation of nuclear powerplants. The principle of international control has been accepted by most of the countries of the world. We have had inspectors from the IAEA carrying out their tasks in a considerable number of countries, large and small, scattered around the globe. Nor should we underestimate the intangible deterrent effects of the existence of the whole system and its general acceptance in principle. Nor should we underestimate the effect of any report from the Agency to its members and to the United Nations citing an attempt to divert materials to military use.

What we have accomplished is pioneering and preliminary. It is solidly based. Every big powerplant that comes under IAEA safeguards in the next few years will strengthen the structure of international cooperation and control. Every one that stays out of the system will weaken it.

We can block this most obvious path to proliferation of nuclear weapons. By doing so, we may help to solve the more difficult problems of nuclear and general disarmament. Success will require the help of wise men everywhere, particularly of men who are both technically and politically sophisticated and idealistic.

IJC Recommendations Approved for Rainy River Pollution Control

Press release 288 dated December 13

The Department of State announced on December 13 that the United States Government has considered the report of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada (IJC), on pollution of the Rainy River and Lake of the Woods, dated February 24, 1965, and has approved the recommendations contained in the report. A similar approval of the Commission's report was announced by the Government of Canada. Pursuant to article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the Governments of the United States and Canada on May 30, 1959, had requested the IJC to investigate and report on pollution and possible remedial measures for those waters.

The Commission recommended the adoption of specified water quality objectives as the criteria to be met in satisfactorily maintaining the waters of Rainy River in accordance with the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which provides that boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on

the other. The Commission further recommended that the appropriate authorities require the industries and municipalities concerned to initiate, at the earliest possible date and pursuant to a definite time schedule, construction of the pollution abatement facilities necessary to achieve and maintain the objectives. The Lake of the Woods was found by the IJC to be in satisfactory condition.

In approving the recommendations, the two Governments authorized the Commission to establish continuing supervision over water quality in Rainy River. In its letter of approval, the Department stated that the Commission's report was a significant contribution to the knowledge in the field of water pollution control. The Commission was assured that action would be taken by the authorities concerned to implement the recommendations.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

- Review of Market Promotion Activity of Foreign Agricultural Service. Twentieth report by the Government Operations Committee. H. Rept. 1165. October 14, 1965. 98 pp.
- Tariff Filing Requirements for Hardwood Lumber. Report to accompany H.R. 10198. S. Rept. 873. October 14, 1965. 5 pp.
- Sugar Act Amendments of 1965. Report, together with minority views, to accompany H.R. 11135. S. Rept. 909. October 18, 1965. 43 pp.
- Expansion of Beef Exports. Interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business on ocean freight rates and other barriers to expanding exports of U.S. beef and beef products. S. Rept. 939. October 22, 1965. 22 pp.
- Authorizing the Loan of Naval Vessels to Friendly Foreign Countries. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7812. H. Rept. 1208. October 22, 1965. 3 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences¹

In Recess as of January 1, 1966

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed Geneva Mar. 14, 1962–
Sept. 16, 1965; to be resumed Jan. 27, 1966).

Scheduled January Through March 1966

ECAFE Conference on Commercial Arbitration: Committee on Trade.	Bangkok	Jan. 5–8
UNCTAD Working Group of Government Experts on Manufactures.	Geneva	Jan. 5–13
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to Trade.	Geneva	Jan. 8 (1 day)
ECA Industrial Symposium	Cairo	Jan. 8–11
OECD Committee for Invisible Transactions: Study Group II .	Paris	Jan. 10–12
OECD Energy Committee: Special Committee	Paris	Jan. 10–12
OECD Committee for Scientific Research: Wear of Engineering Materials.	Paris	Jan. 10–14
U.N. Development Program: Governing Council	New York	Jan. 10–21
ECE Rapporteurs on Gas Pipelines	Geneva	Jan. 11–12
ECE Rapporteurs on Safety Belts	Geneva	Jan. 11–13
U.N. ECOSOC Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 11–31
OECD Ministers of Science: 2d Meeting	Paris	Jan. 12–13
ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin.	Phnom Penh	Jan. 12–17
ECE Inland Transport Committee: Plenary Meeting	Geneva	Jan. 17–20
U.N. Working Group on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . .	New York	Jan. 18–21
Inter-American Cultural Council: 4th Meeting	Washington	Jan. 18–22
WHO Executive Board: 37th Session	Geneva	Jan. 18–Feb. 1
OECD Economic Development and Review Committee: Denmark Review.	Paris	Jan. 20 (1 day)
ECAFE Committee on Trade: 9th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 24–Feb. 2
OECD Economic Development and Review Committee: Portugal Review.	Paris	Jan. 25 (1 day)
ILO Preparatory Technical Conference on Maximum Weight To Be Carried by One Worker.	Geneva	Jan. 25–Feb. 5
OECD Economic Development and Review Committee: Greece Review.	Paris	Jan. 27 (1 day)
OECD Working Party III	Paris	Jan. 28–29

¹ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Dec. 10, 1965, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period January–March 1966. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these are referred to the *World List of Future International Meetings*, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; CID, Committee on Industrial Development; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled January Through March 1966—Continued

ECE Gas Committee and Working Group: 12th Session	Geneva	Jan. 31-Feb. 2
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 12th Session	London	Jan. 31-Feb. 4
U.N. Committee of 24 on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.	New York	January
OECD Working Party on the Adjustment Process	Paris	January
ECA Subregional Meeting on Economic Cooperation in Central Africa.	Leopoldville	January
Special Meeting on Inter-American Ports and Harbors	Washington	January
GATT Committee on Trade and Development: Committee III	Geneva	January
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 17th Ministerial Meeting.	Karachi	January
FAO Study Group on Jute, Kenaf and Allied Fibers: 2d Session of the Consultative Subcommittee.	undetermined	January
OECD Working Party II	Paris	Feb. 1-2
CENTO Economic Experts	Ankara	Feb. 1-4
ICAO Special Meeting on Limits of Liabilities for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.	Montreal	Feb. 1-18
5th ICAO Meeting on European Regional Air Navigation	Geneva	Feb. 1-26
OECD Economic Development and Review Committee: Italy Review.	Paris	Feb. 3 (1 day)
ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources	Bangkok	Feb. 4-14
ECE Rapporteurs on Handling Operations in River Ports	Geneva	Feb. 7-8
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	Feb. 7-9
WMO Regional Association V: 4th Session (Southwest Pacific)	Wellington	Feb. 7-18
OECD Export Credits Group	Paris	Feb. 9-11
ECE Symposium on New Techniques in Inland Navigation	Geneva	Feb. 9-11
OECD Economic Development and Review Committee: Switzerland Review.	Paris	Feb. 10 (1 day)
ECE Subcommittee on Road Transport: Special Session	Geneva	Feb. 14-25
ILO Governing Body: 164th Session	Geneva	Feb. 14-Mar. 5
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North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 9th Annual Meeting	Ottawa	Feb. 21-25
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women	Geneva	Feb. 21-Mar. 11
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 40th Session	New York	Feb. 23-Mar. 4
ECLA Subcommittee on Building and Urban Planning	San José	February
IBE Executive Committee: 43d Meeting	Geneva	February
5th Inter-American Statistical Conference	Venezuela	February
SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee	Bangkok	February
ECA Conference on Central African Industrial Harmonization	Leopoldville	February
OECD Working Party on the Adjustment Process	Paris	February
Contributors to International Organizations (Geneva Group)	Geneva	February
FAO Codex Alimentarius Committee on Meat and Meat Products: 2d Meeting.	Kulmbach, Germany	February
FAO Study Group on Bananas: 1st Session	Rome	February
FAO Meeting of Tea Statisticians	Rome	February
ECE Rapporteurs on Benchmark Statistics Relating to Transport	Geneva	Mar. 1-4
GATT Contracting Parties: 23d Session	Geneva	Mar. 1-25
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OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	Mar. 2-4
OECD Trade Committee	Paris	Mar. 3-4
IMCO International Conference on Load Lines	London	Mar. 3-Apr. 5
Inter-American Energy Commission: 6th Session	Washington	Mar. 7-12
UNICEF/ECAFE Asian Conference on Children and Youth in National Development.	Bangkok	Mar. 8-15
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 4th Session	Wiesbaden	Mar. 8-Apr. 3
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights	Geneva	Mar. 8-Apr. 4
FAO Group on Grains: 10th Session	Rome	Mar. 10-17
BIRPI Advisory Group: International Committee on Novelty Examining Patent Offices.	Geneva	Mar. 11-12
CENTO Economic Committee: 14th Session	London	Mar. 14-18
ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Mar. 14-18
ECLA/CID Latin American Symposium on Industrialization	Santiago	Mar. 14-25
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Aeronautical Radio Conference	Geneva	Mar. 14-May 7
OECD Economic Policy Committee	Paris	Mar. 15-16
OECD Economic Development and Review Committee: Sweden Review.	Paris	Mar. 17 (1 day)
OECD Working Party III	Paris	Mar. 17-18

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 10th Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Bogotá	Mar. 21-27
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 5th Meeting of Board of Directors.	Bogotá	Mar. 21-27
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 22d Plenary Meeting.	New Delhi	Mar. 22-Apr. 4
U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science and Technology to Development.	New York	Mar. 22-Apr. 4
ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin.	New Delhi	Mar. 22-Apr. 5
ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Possible Revision of the Rome Convention.	Oxford	Mar. 24-Apr. 5
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U.N. Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression . . .	New York	March
U.N. Committee of 24 on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.	New York	March
ECLA Committee of the Whole: 11th Meeting	Santiago	March
ECLA/UNESCO Latin American Seminar on Investment in Education.	Santiago	March
GATT Committee on Trade and Development: Committee III . .	Geneva	March
5th IA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Expert and Ministerial Level . .	Buenos Aires	March
OECD Working Party on the Adjustment Process	Paris	March

U.S. Participates in Meeting of Migration Committee

*Statement by Abba P. Schwartz*¹

It is a pleasure to be present at this 24th session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

As we all know, the Migration Committee is approaching its 15th year. It had a membership of 16 governments when it was formed; today there are 30. Since it was founded in 1951, the Committee has transported over 1,400,000 persons to overseas countries of resettlement, including more than 600,000 refugees. This record of accomplishment speaks for itself. It is one of which this Council should be proud.

We all recognize that economic developments in Europe since 1951 have necessitated certain adjustments in the program of the Committee. However, ICEM's traditional role of providing assistance to refugees continues, in our opinion, to be the fundamental and certainly one of the most

important elements in its operations. And, in this connection, I would like to emphasize my country's concern in the importance of maintaining liberal asylum policies for refugees, and for ICEM's essential role in facilitating the resettlement of refugees out of asylum areas.

For some time the United States Government, which historically has followed a liberal policy of asylum to refugees, has been deeply concerned about the deterioration of asylum policies in certain areas. We found it particularly significant that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at a recent meeting passed a resolution urging governments to adopt a more liberal asylum policy. It is equally significant that the International Council of Voluntary Agencies at a recent conference here in Geneva deemed it necessary to pass a similar resolution.

I would emphasize that if the doors of asylum are tightened or closed there will be no need for ICEM to seek resettlement opportunities for refugees, nor will there be any need to seek material assistance for such refugees because, without a place of asylum, the future of the refugee is not in the country of asylum but in the country to which he is thrown back.

As Dr. Haveman [ICEM Director Baastien W. Haveman] pointed out in his open-

¹ Made before the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration at Geneva, Switzerland, on Dec. 1. Mr. Schwartz is Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs; he was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the ICEM meeting.

ing statement to the Council, ICEM is the only international organization which has the responsibility for moving European refugees. It is vital that this mechanism be firmly maintained.

In connection with ICEM's traditional program on behalf of refugees, I know that this Council will be interested to learn that the new United States immigration law which becomes effective today [December 1] makes permanent provision for the admission of 10,200 refugees annually under a broad definition of "refugee." This refugee provision in our basic law is over and above the action which my Government is now taking in granting asylum to many thousands of Cuban refugees.

I was very interested in the discussion which took place in this Council on November 29 on refugee problems, and particularly gratified to hear the statement of the representative of the Holy See and his announcement of a special contribution to ICEM for the benefit of refugees and family reunion cases.

The statement of the representative of Luxembourg regarding fund-raising efforts in his country for the benefit of refugees is a further source of encouragement.

My delegation would also like to pay special tribute to the program which is being initiated by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands to raise funds to finance the transportation of refugees by ICEM through the issuance of a special stamp bearing the Queen's signature. As Mr. Warren [George L. Warren, Adviser for Refugees and Migration to the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs] informed the Executive Committee last week, we recognize that this action by the Queen of the Netherlands is in the finest tradition of the Netherlands Government and is just another expression of the concern of the people of the Netherlands for the fate of refugees. My delegation feels that it would be most appropriate if the money received from various fund-raising efforts in the private sector were to be established in a special fund known as "The Queen Juliana

Fund," provided, of course, that this suggestion meets with the approval of the Queen of the Netherlands.

The extensive discussion which has taken place during this session dealing with the Director's efforts to improve and expand ICEM's program for providing semiskilled workers for Latin America is also a matter of vital concern to my Government. It is my hope that all governments will agree in principle to the efforts which are now underway and will also find it possible to provide the essential financial assistance which is required so that this program to benefit Latin America will be carried forward successfully.

Mr. Chairman, I know that many members of this Council are aware that, since the initial meeting of ICEM in Brussels in 1951, the United States has always included in its delegation distinguished members of the Congress of the United States. Neither Mr. Warren nor I, who were both present at Brussels, recall that the United States delegation has ever included a more distinguished group of Members of our Congress than are present here today. They are Congressman William McCulloch of Ohio, Congressman Peter W. Rodino of New Jersey, Congressman Arch A. Moore, Jr., of West Virginia, Congressman Clark MacGregor of Minnesota, Congressman Byron Rogers of Colorado, and Congressman Harold D. Donohue of Massachusetts, and Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts. The Department of State, which bears the principal responsibility for the United States participation in ICEM, attaches great significance to the presence of Members of Congress in our delegation, because they give added representation of the American people and by their presence express the concern of the American people for the basic objectives of ICEM, which are resettlement of refugees, reuniting of families, assistance to our sister Latin American Republics in selective migration, and the movement of national migrants to new homes overseas where they can enjoy a good and productive life.

It is especially gratifying to us that the Members of Congress in our delegation are with us today because this is a very important day, affecting not only the lives of many American families but of many nationals of other countries represented at this Council session. This day, December 1, 1965, is important because our new nondiscriminatory immigration law becomes effective today. The Members of Congress who are present here are in great measure responsible for the enactment of that legislation.

Current U.N. Documents

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Reports by the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan. S/6710/Add.10, November 19, 1965, 9 pp.; S/6710/Add.11, December 4, 1965, 19 pp.; S/6710/Add.12, December 13, 1965, 15 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General on compliance with the withdrawal provisions of Security Council resolutions concerning India and Pakistan. S/6719/Add.4, November 25, 1965, 2 pp.
Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Dominican Republic. S/6975, November 25, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6991, December 3, 1965, 1 p.
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus for the period June 11 to December 8, 1965. S/7001, December 10, 1965, 56 pp. and map.

General Assembly

Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Note by the Secretary-General. A/6121, November 29, 1965, 3 pp.
The Korean Question: Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Letter dated December 7, 1965, from the representative of the U.S.S.R. transmitting a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A/C.1/925, December 8, 1965, 9 pp.
World Food Programme. Notes by the Secretary-General. A/6149, December 8, 1965, 7 pp.; A/6150, December 8, 1965, 2 pp.

Economic and Social Council

15 Years and 150,000 Skills: An Anniversary Review of the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. E/TAC/153/-Rev.1, October 5, 1965, 309 pp.
Continuation of the World Food Programme. Note by the Secretary-General. E/4127, November 8, 1965, 3 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations;
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes.
Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹
Ratification deposited: Philippines, November 15, 1965.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Maldives Islands, November 5, 1965.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578.
Accession deposited: Malawi, November 3, 1965.
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.
Accession deposited: Malawi, November 3, 1965.
Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹
Accession deposited: Malawi, November 3, 1965.
Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639.
Accession deposited: Malawi, November 3, 1965.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), relating to measures of control;
Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), relating to entry into force of proposals adopted by the Commission.
Done at Washington November 29, 1965. Open for signature at Washington November 29 through December 13, 1965.¹
Signatures: Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, December 13, 1965.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva

¹ Not in force.

from February 8 until December 31, 1965.¹
Signatures: Czechoslovakia, November 5, 1965;
 Sierra Leone, November 18, 1965.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Protocol modifying and supplementing the income tax convention of October 28, 1948, as amended (TIAS 2833, 4280). Signed at Brussels May 21, 1965.¹

Ratified by the President: November 22, 1965.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Protocol amending convention for avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income of July 22, 1954 (TIAS 3133). Signed at Bonn September 17, 1965.¹

Ratified by the President: November 15, 1965.

Italy

Agreement amending agreement concerning exportation of velveteen fabrics from Italy to the United States of July 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5186, 5628). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 16, 1965. Entered into force November 16, 1965.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Belgrade November 22, 1965. Entered into force November 22, 1965.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.

International Cooperation: Assignment of the Century. Pamphlet describing the objective of the International Cooperation Year, commemorating the 20th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. Included are a few of the stories of our government's activities which focus attention on the things that men do to help one another to solve their mutual problems and to further development in every field of human endeavor. Includes brief bibliography. Pub. 7948. General Foreign Policy Series 206. 20 pp., illus. 20¢.

¹ Not in force.

The Dominican Crisis . . . The Hemisphere Acts. Official statements of President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker outlining U.S. policy and how the crisis was met. Pub. 7971. Inter-American Series 92. 37 pp., illus. 30¢.

Educational and Cultural Diplomacy—1964. Annual report on the educational and cultural exchange program in its 15th year, 1963/64. Statistical data given in appendixes. Pub. 7979. International Information and Cultural Series 89. 144 pp., illus. 45¢.

The Unseen Search for Peace. Text of address by Dean Rusk at Johns Hopkins University, October 16, 1965, in which he characterizes the unheadlined, manifold cooperative international activities in which the United States participates. Pub. 7985. International Organization and Conference Series 69. 26 pp. 25¢.

Statute of The Hague Conference on Private International Law. Statute with Other Governments—Formulated at the Seventh Session of the Conference held at The Hague October 9-31, 1951. Entered into force with respect to the U.S. October 15, 1964. TIAS 5710. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia—Signed at La Paz May 12, 1965. Entered into force May 12, 1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5866. 15 pp. 10¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to December 13 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 284 of December 8.

No.	Date	Subject
288	12/13	IJC report on pollution of Rainy River and Lake of the Woods.
*287-A	12/15	Program for visit of President of Pakistan.
*289	12/15	Eilts sworn in as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (biographic details).
*290	12/15	Program for visit of President of Pakistan.
291	12/16	Williams: Department of State American Legion Post.
*292	12/16	Program for visit of Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany.
293	12/17	NATO communique.
*294	12/17	Rountree sworn in as Ambassador to South Africa (biographic details).
*295	12/17	Program for visit of U.K. Prime Minister.
296	12/17	Embargo on oil imports to Rhodesia.

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American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1961

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents is an annual, one-volume collection of the principal messages, addresses, statements, and reports, and of certain of the diplomatic notes exchanged and treaties made in a given calendar year which indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States.

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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1385



January 10, 1966

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President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard Hold Talks at Washington

Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany visited the United States December 19-21. He met with President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and other Government officials December 20 and 21. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard at a dinner at the White House on December 20 and the text of a joint communique released at the conclusion of their talks on December 21.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated December 20; as-delivered text

President Johnson

Mr. Chancellor, distinguished members of your party, ladies and gentlemen:

The great German writer, Goethe, once said that the formula for a happy life was each day to read a beautiful poem, listen to beautiful music, look at a beautiful painting, and, if possible, say some reasonable thing.

Today, Mr. Chancellor, we may have

lacked the beauty of poem, painting, and music. But we have, I believe, said reasonable things to each other.

We are privileged tonight to have in our country and in the first house of our land one of the world's most reasonable and versatile leaders. He is a man of many talents: educator, author, amateur musician, economist, politician, and statesman.

As a politician, he can look with great satisfaction to the vote of confidence that the people of West Germany gave him in last September's national election.

As a statesman, he can look with great pride to nearly 20 years of dedicated and effective service to the Federal Republic. The miracle of Germany's economic recovery following World War II stands as a towering monument to his service.

So, Chancellor Erhard, we welcome you this evening not only as a politician and as an economist but really, most of all, as a friend. You are aware, I am sure, of the high regard and the deep affection in which I personally hold you. That regard and that

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ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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affection are reflected throughout America.

There is no truth to the rumor that your reputation as an economist prompted us to invite you here to visit us at budget time.

In other areas, however, we will not be so reticent in seeking your advice.

We live in a world of change. In that world, nations have much to gain from an open exchange of information, and we have much to lose by ignoring the potential contributions of other peoples.

We have already begun a mutual adventure in space. Only last summer our two Governments worked out an agreement whereby we would launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts.

Now we would like to discuss with you—and with others—an even more ambitious plan to permit us to do together what we cannot do so well alone. Examples would be two projects which stand high on the space agenda. Both are very demanding and both are quite complex. One would be a probe to the sun and another a probe to Jupiter. To cooperate on such a major endeavor would contribute vastly to our mutual knowledge and to our mutual skills.

So I propose, early in the year, to send a commission—headed by our able Administrator of NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], James Webb—to consult with you and other governments of Europe wishing to participate in a joint exploration of space.

In all our efforts we seek to learn as well as to contribute.

We are now watching with great interest the pioneer work that you in Germany are doing to make your cities more livable. We are especially interested in your antipollution programs, which are said to be among the most effective in all the world. So I propose sending a working group, headed by our distinguished Secretary of the Interior, Mr. [Stewart L.] Udall, to West Germany next month to discuss with your own Minister of Science and Education and to view some of your accomplishments firsthand.

I am told that some of your air pollution experts feel that the only thing that now

stands between them and final success is the daily quota of their Chancellor's cigars.

Mr. Chancellor, in welcoming you to these shores during our Christmas season, we are aware that we have much to be thankful for: a stable political system and healthy economies in both our countries; a North Atlantic alliance that has met every challenge of the past; and an effective relationship that binds our countries together within the framework of an Atlantic partnership. We applaud the role of Germany in these great affairs.

And for our part the United States is especially grateful for the support which your Government has given to the common cause in Viet-Nam and which you may give in the days ahead.

The great effort which my country is making tonight in Viet-Nam is in fulfillment of the clear commitment of the American people, the American Congress, and three American Presidents. The people of South Viet-Nam need our support, and they are getting it. The credible commitment of the United States is the foundation stone of the house of freedom all around the world. If it is not good in Viet-Nam, who can trust it in the heart of Europe? But America's word, I can assure you, is good in Viet-Nam, just as it is good in Berlin.

Our object in Viet-Nam is not war but peace. There will be peace in Viet-Nam the very moment that others are ready to stop their attacks. We will push on every door for peace. We will go anywhere to talk. We set no conditions. We neglect no hopeful step. But, as all of you know, it takes two to talk and it takes two, as well, to stop the fighting.

Meanwhile, we are going to keep this country moving in the spirit of the Great Society and the Formed Society. Though we are defending freedom abroad we must continue to enlarge freedom at home and around the world.

In Europe much remains to be done. The reunification of Germany in peace and freedom is a major goal. We share your hopes for a continued development of a united

Europe. The strength of the Atlantic partnership will require the best efforts of both sides of the Atlantic. A just solution to the crisis in Viet-Nam just must be found, and the entire fabric of world peace must be strengthened. As we agreed today, there is work to be done by your country and by ours.

There are no easy answers to any of these questions. They will require a new spirit of trust and cooperation among all the nations of the world. That spirit, Chancellor Erhard, is embodied in the friendship of our two great nations.

And so, ladies and gentlemen, in honor of a country whose people and whose future are represented here tonight by my old and dear friend, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, I now ask you to join me by raising your glasses to the President of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Chancellor Erhard¹

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and gentlemen:

It is certainly a very great honor for me to be your guest tonight, Mr. President, at such a festive occasion, and I would like to thank you for this reception on behalf of all my fellow countrymen who are here tonight. And we had a very valuable, very enjoyable day today. I consider it always to be a very great distinction to be here, and I am fully aware of what the friendship with you, Mr. President, means to me personally, to my country, and to all my fellow countrymen.

Looking back on the past, on the time during which I had to accept and bear political responsibility—and that nearly covers a period of 20 years—on thinking back of the moment when we were completely broken down, facing the collapse of our country, and there the Americans were the first in their generosity to extend to us a helping hand. And this, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, is a deed we will never forget.

When we then had to start building up and reconstructing the economy of our

country, and I had to take over responsibility for that job, I was looking around for a model. Where was the country adhering to the same ideals, to the same principles, living by these principles and ideals which we now needed, which I felt we had to live by after the tragedy through which we had gone? And here again the generosity and the cooperation, the help of the United States and the Americans proved itself so immensely helpful. And it was quite obvious that this should become the basis of real friendship.

In those years we have won friends, and I say, with the feeling of pride and with the feeling of satisfaction, that the friendship that exists between you and me, and our personal relations, is the coronation—it is the crowning of this friendship between our two countries.

You do not know, Mr. President, how much that means to me, and I am not speaking from vanity. I speak sincerely and honestly. And because this is so, because of this friendship, we know how much we still have to do together, our two countries, how much is still to be done.

We have discussed a number of problems today. You have mentioned some of them. We cannot live in a peaceful world unless we stand together, formally and resolutely. We are living in a world economically, socially, politically, where so great demands are made on all of us, but particularly on the United States of America and particularly on you, Mr. President. And all these principles and ideals by which you and the Americans are living are indivisible. No country, however great it may be, is any longer an end in itself. No country, however great it may be, is self-sufficient today. It is necessary today to rely on one's neighbor, to rely on one's friends. And that is one more reason why we have to get more closely together in order to make this world more peaceful.

I think this is a particularly appropriate idea in this Christmas season, which should inspire us with glad and happy hope.

Today and tomorrow, we will have an-

¹ As translated from the German.

other opportunity to continue our talks, and I hope we will be able to bring our talks to fruitful conclusion, to fruitful results.

You, Mr. President, mentioned one particular project which is very close to my heart, and that is: How can the industrialized society of a highly developed country be given a new shape, a new form?

It is perhaps no accident that at the same time when you, Mr. President, developed your concept of the Great Society, I put forth another concept, that of the Formed Society.

It may be difficult here tonight to explain in detail what we have in mind with these two new concepts. But I think what we have in common, both of us, is the feeling that all the isms of the 19th century, be it capitalism, be it socialism, are no longer enough to solve the problems of today. These won't do any more. But what we require is something new.

These two concepts are perhaps not fully identical, but there is this common desire to create something new, which would not lead people astray but would make people live together with their neighbors, with their friends, would establish sound relationships between the people and their environments. And I would particularly welcome close cooperation between our two countries in this particular field, in developing these new concepts.

You also included, Mr. President, in the enumeration of subjects we discussed, cooperation in the field of space research. Of course, we, the Germans, would not like to get too close to the sun because we wouldn't like to burn our wings, but I think such ambitious plans would serve us well because it has been my experience that, when you try to achieve only little things, you are very often bound to fail, but if you have a great objective which will fascinate the imagination of the people then you will very often succeed, because it arouses the enthusiasm, the support, and the imagination of the people.

Mr. President, we are also in agreement that we need integration, economic coopera-

tion, a sound economy, sound currency, as a basis for our policies. This has become evident again and again in our talks, in our meetings. And this may perhaps constitute the real, the inherent value of the friendship of the alliance to which we both belong.

You also mentioned Viet-Nam, Mr. President. We know that the United States of America is making great sacrifices in Viet-Nam in order to defend the security of the people there. But that is also our security, and if you appreciated our contribution we are making to that effect, I must confess, quite frankly, I feel ashamed, because what we can contribute is very modest compared with what you do.

Mr. President, I am very proud of our friendship, and in going back to Germany, I'll tell the German people that the United States of America is a reliable ally.

You may be convinced that we, on the other hand, will also be ready not to betray this confidence and this trust. The measures and criteria may be different, but the spirit is identical: We must stand together; we must unite.

What would our future have been, what would our faith have been had not the United States and the Americans, in their generosity giving us hope after our collapse, had they not shown the way to us?

It is perhaps not only incidental that for the second time we have met in this Christmas season. Two years ago we had the pleasure of being your guest after Christmas at the ranch in Texas. Today we are meeting here under the Christmas tree, so to speak, the shine of the candles—Christmas tree and candles, a symbol of peace, symbol of charity. In all we do, we should be inspired by these auspicious ideals.

If we have to undertake efforts in the military fields, some people may incline to believe that this would be an end in itself and that we wanted to disturb the peace. But this is not true. The fact that we are getting together in this Christmastime, that we are aware of the Christian ideals, is evidence to the contrary. Because we want to serve peace, we want to maintain peace, so

that the old message, the tidings, may come true—peace on earth and good will to men.

In this spirit, Mr. President, I wish you and Mrs. Johnson Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.

Let me thank you once again for this wonderful reception, for this wonderful evening you have prepared for us here.

To your health, sir.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated December 21

President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard have completed two days of intensive, cordial and candid conversations in Washington. They were accompanied by Secretaries Rusk, Fowler and McNamara; Ministers Schroeder and von Hassel and other advisers. They discussed all major matters of joint concern to the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and of general import for the Free World.

The future of the Atlantic Alliance was a central topic in the conversation. The President and the Chancellor agreed that close political and military co-operation among the nations of NATO was necessary. They affirmed the determination of both Governments to maintain and to strengthen the Alliance and its political and military institutions.

The President and the Chancellor gave close attention to the nuclear problems confronting the Alliance. They agreed that the Federal Republic of Germany and other interested partners in the Alliance should have an appropriate part in nuclear defense.

In this connection the Chancellor emphasized that the Federal Republic of Germany neither intended nor desired to acquire national control over nuclear weapons, that it had in 1954 given an undertaking to its allies not to produce such weapons in Germany, and that, finally, it is the only State in the world to have subjected itself to international supervision of such an obligation.

The President and the Chancellor noted with satisfaction that the Defense Ministers of a number of NATO countries have started discussions on the possibility of improving present nuclear arrangements within the Alliance.

The President, after noting that the deterrent power of the Alliance had proved completely effective and was being constantly modernized, stated the views of the United States that arrangements could be worked out to assure members of the Alliance not having nuclear weapons an appropriate share in nuclear defense. The President and the Chancellor agreed that discussion of such arrangements be continued between the two countries and with other interested allies.

The President and the Chancellor were in agree-

ment in upholding the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons into the national control of States. They were of the view that Alliance nuclear arrangements would not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons and in fact should contribute to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. They stressed the importance of continuing efforts to reduce the threat of war and bring about effective arms control.

The President and the Chancellor voiced mutual satisfaction at the arrangements worked out, and already successfully under way, between the United States Space Agency and the German Ministry of Scientific Research for a joint project to launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts. The President suggested several other possible cooperative projects, including a probe to the sun and a probe to Jupiter. He also indicated his intention to send a Commission to Europe early in 1966 to consult with the German Government and other European Governments which wish to join in the cooperative exploration of space.

The President and the Chancellor had an intensive exchange of views on the question of Germany's reunification. They reaffirm their strong determination to pursue all opportunities for attaining as soon as possible the common objective of the peaceful reunification of Germany on the basis of self-determination. The President and the Chancellor reject malicious allegations designed to cast doubt on the peaceful intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany. The exchange of views between the two Governments on the German problem and related questions will be continued.

The President and the Chancellor emphasized that pressures on Berlin would continue, as in the past, to be met with firmness and determination. They underlined that a lasting solution of the problems of Berlin can only be found in a peaceful solution of the German problem on the basis of self-determination.

The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed the view that a lasting relaxation of tension in Europe and in West-East relationships will require progress toward the peaceful reunification of Germany in freedom. Both leaders restated their intention to continue to seek improvement in relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.

The Chancellor reaffirmed Germany's fundamental commitment to European unity and his confidence in the ability of the effective institutions already created to contribute to its achievement. The President assured the Chancellor that the United States remained convinced that a united Europe is important to the achievement of an effective Atlantic Partnership.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations is of major importance to the progress of the Free World, for developed and developing countries alike. They also agreed that, to attain

their full promise, these historic negotiations must move forward as rapidly as possible with the active participation of the EEC [European Economic Community].

Recent developments in other parts of the world, particularly in the Far East, were also examined. The President described the situation in Viet-Nam and the efforts of the Governments of South Viet-Nam and the United States, together with their allies, to bring about a peaceful and just settlement. He expressed his appreciation for the support of the Federal Republic of Germany in the struggle to deter Communist aggression against South Viet-Nam. The Chancellor stated the determination of his Government to continue to assist in this effort for the cause of freedom.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the aid programs of their governments and emphasized the great importance of effective aid to developing countries. In this connection, they noted that over 90 percent of all external resources flowing to these countries is provided by the Free World. They agreed that there was need for increased effort on the part of developed countries to provide funds to assure that adequate levels of aid are maintained. At the same time, they emphasized the need for greater self-help by the developing countries. The President was pleased to hear the Chancellor's description of the progress of the German Development Aid Service (German Peace Corps).

The President and the Chancellor welcomed the establishment of the Asian Development Bank,² to which their governments would make substantial contributions. They reemphasized the value of economic and social development in Southeast Asia as a way of promoting peace in that region.

They also discussed the arrangements between the two governments whereby United States military expenditures in Germany entering the balance of payments are offset by the Federal Republic through its purchase of United States military equipment and services. It was agreed that these arrangements were of great value to both governments and should be fully executed and continued.

The President and the Chancellor discussed social developments in the United States and in Germany. They expressed the view that their concepts of the "Great Society" and the "Formierte Gesellschaft" have much in common and that a joint discussion of experiences should take place as soon as possible.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the tradition and practice of effective consultation between their governments—reflecting the friendship and trust which has grown up between the people of the United States and Germany—would lead to even closer and more fruitful relations in the future between the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and their partners.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1015.

Peace, Our Most Compelling Task

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Vice President, my fellow countrymen:

Once again it is Christmas.

Once again that time has come when the heart of man opens to the holiness of life.

Once again we tell the ancient story of a baby, born into poverty and persecution, whose destiny it was to lift the iron burden of despair from His fellow men.

In the 20 centuries that have transpired since the sacred moment of His birth, mankind has never been wholly free of the scourge of war and the ravages of disease, illiteracy, and hunger. Yet the star of Bethlehem burns in our hearts on this December evening with the warmth that is not diminished by the years or discouraged by our failures.

It reminds us that our first and our most compelling task is peace.

As in other Christmas seasons in the past, our celebration this year is tempered by the absence of brave men from their homes and from their loved ones.

We would not have it so. We have not sought the combat in which they are engaged. We have hungered for not one foot of another's territory, nor for the life of a single adversary. Our sons patrol the hills of Viet-Nam at this hour because we have learned that though men cry "Peace, peace," there is no peace to be gained ever by yielding to aggression.

That lesson has been learned by a hundred generations. The guarantors of peace on earth have been those prepared to make sacrifices in its behalf.

On this platform with me this evening is the very distinguished and very great Prime Minister of Great Britain. He speaks for a people who have made such sacrifices in behalf of peace. On the battlefield and at the conference table, his countrymen have

¹ Made at the lighting of the national Christmas tree on Dec. 17 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

fought and have labored to create a just peace among the nations.

The distinguished Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and I have spoken of this task this afternoon. We have spoken not only of the security of mankind, but we have spoken of the countless opportunities for cooperation that are the true works of peace.

He has told me that his Government will renew the quest for peace as cochairman of the Geneva conference. I have told him that any new way that he can find to peace will have a ready response from the United States.

We know, too, that peace is not merely the absence of war. It is that climate in which man may be liberated from the hopelessness that imprisons his spirit.

In this strong and in this prosperous land there are many that are still trapped in that prison where hope seems but a dream. We shall never rest until that dream becomes a reality.

But hope cannot be our province alone. For we shall never know peace in a world where a minority prospers and the vast majority is condemned to starvation and ignorance. This evening, inspired once more by Him who brought comfort and courage to the oppressed, we offer our hand to those who seek a new life for their people.

Above all things, we dedicate ourselves to the search for a just settlement of disputes between nations. We declare once more our desire to discuss an honorable peace in Viet-Nam. We know that nothing is to be gained by a further delay in talking. Our poet Emerson once said that "The God of victory is one-handed—but peace gives victory to both sides."

So in the name of a people who seek peace for their brothers on this earth—that we may be the children of our Father which is in heaven, "for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust"—I turn on

the lights of this tree and pray that the Spirit that we revere this evening may illuminate the heart of every man on earth.

U.S. Forces Act With Restraint After Christmas Cease-Fire

*Department Statement*¹

United States forces in Viet-Nam have been under orders not to be the first to resume hostilities after Christmas. The Government of South Viet-Nam has given similar orders.

Unfortunately there were a number of incidents of firing by Communist units during the 30-hour Christmas period. The Vietnamese and American units have replied effectively to this fire. No Americans are reported killed, but several are reported wounded. The evidence thus indicates that the Communists have not stopped their attacks, but our forces continue to act with great restraint.

Letters of Credence

Cameroon

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, Joseph Owono, presented his credentials to President Johnson on December 16. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated December 16.

Viet-Nam

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Vu Van Thai, presented his credentials to President Johnson on December 16. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated December 16.

¹ Released to the press on Dec. 25.

The Roots of American Foreign Policy

by George C. McGhee

*Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany*¹

My topic this evening is American foreign policy. Let me begin by stressing that activities such as those you sponsor are more closely related to the formulation of policy than many people suppose. My country relies on Germany as a partner in international affairs. The Federal Republic reciprocally relies upon the United States. Such a relationship is possible only because Germans and Americans know each other well enough as human beings to be certain that we both are, as countries, the collective counterparts of real friends—seeking goals in common. Your society, by promoting understanding between us, helps to create that certainty. Hence your programs underpin our international partnership.

In these remarks I shall talk about places far from Germany. I do not believe, however, that they are remote from German interest—any more than they are from ours. One of the clearest lessons of this century's history is that distance no longer insulates countries from the impact of events. We Americans have learned it the hard way—by being drawn, against our will, into two world wars. It has become clear to us that a major power cannot choose whether or not to be a participant in the general effort to assure a peaceful world order. The strength of such a power weighs willy-nilly in the balance of decisive events. Trying to with-

hold that weight is a decision no less fateful than supplying it—and far less likely to lead to an acceptable outcome.

This, then, is the starting point of American foreign policy: a conviction that power entails responsibility and a determination to discharge actively the responsibilities which fall upon the United States because of its position in the world. The end of American policy can also be stated in a few words: to contribute to the emergence of a stable world order in which nations, living at peace with one another, can determine their futures for themselves while working cooperatively toward objectives that they share. The means by which we believe such an order can best be achieved—the strategy, if you like—is through the development of the strength and unity of the free world.

An order such as we seek has, unfortunately, not yet come into being. However, here and there, and especially within the Atlantic community, there have been planted seeds from which it may in time grow. If we look backward, we observe that there has been no settled order in the world since the collapse of the peace made in Vienna in 1815; nor, I believe, can one be expected in the foreseeable future. We live in an age of turmoil—and foreign policy must be formulated in the light of this fact, even as it reaches out toward a more orderly future.

Yet turmoil means change, and change re-

¹ Address made before the German-American Society of Essen, at Essen, Germany, on Nov. 9.

flects an environment in which foreign policy can often work most constructively. We have, for example, witnessed since the war the liquidation of the colonial system and the consequent emergence of more than 50 new nations. This change—adverse for some—has been a godsend to hundreds of millions. We have seen the formation of an increasingly effective world peace organization—the United Nations. We have experienced the development of a strong sense of community in the Atlantic world. We have seen Europe begin the long process of unification.

Because the tide of change sweeps us along with it, we are sometimes less conscious of its forward movement than of events which move in a different direction—or at a different rate. On the one hand, we see such events in crises which emerge to threaten the peace of the world. On the other, stubborn obstacles remain seemingly immovable, like rocks resisting the tide. Foreign policy must cope with both. However, this is not all it must do. Crises make headlines. Steady, quiet work to direct the forces of change into constructive channels often is overlooked. It is no less important than crisis management, and no less a concern of foreign policy. In crisis and in calm, whether German or American, foreign policy tries to achieve progress, within the limits of the possible, toward a consistent objective.

Contest for Possession of the Future

What are the limits of the possible? Over against the free world there is set the world of communism, which seeks to manipulate change in order to destroy freedom. The contest between these two worlds for possession of the future overshadows our times. There are some who believe that the issue will be decided in one cataclysmic confrontation, in which one or the other will suddenly yield. The task of the free world, to this way of thinking, is to exert maximum pressure on its opponents at all times in an

effort to impose a solution. The trouble with that theory is that pressures short of military conquest have seldom in history led to an imposed settlement of major issues. You may read that lesson, in its reverse application, in the failure of Stalin's policy toward Western Europe. Long on risk, short on chances of positive results, such a policy does not, I believe, lie within the limits of the possible courses of action available to the members of the free-world community.

A much wiser course lies in an unremitting effort to render the free world impervious to Communist disruption, while developing a pattern of order within the free world toward which the peoples who now live under coercion will inextricably be drawn. The Sino-Soviet split—and the cautious reassertion of national interest in recent years by the countries of Eastern Europe—provide evidence that the Communist world, too, feels the tug of change. Indeed, change can in time so alter the environment of international relations that countries within the Communist orbit will find it in their interest to negotiate seriously on issues whose resolution on acceptable terms they now refuse.

In carrying out our strategy of seeking to increase the strength and unity of the free world, one necessity is to demonstrate, over and over again, that our commitment to defend freedom—for others as for ourselves—is indivisible. Those imperiled will see little advantage in an association which does not assure them security from Communist aggression and subversion. The Communists have tested us many times—in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Constantly, the Communists probe for some weak spot—some situation in which it will be difficult to act in a measured fashion. This may well have been one of the motives behind Khrushchev's attempt to establish rocket bases in Cuba. Once again the United States had to prove that it would not tolerate a blatant challenge to the free world. Once again the Communists broke off the action. We may

hope that the Soviet Union has drawn some conclusions from the outcome of that confrontation, but we would not be justified in relaxing our vigilance.

Berlin has, as you know, been a testing point over many years. Along with our British and French allies, we have shown in each test that we will do what is necessary to protect freedom in Berlin under all contingencies. The present situation in Berlin indicates that we have succeeded in making this clear. The Soviet Union has desisted from attempting to interfere with our rights. Should it resume, it will meet a firm response. A growing awareness of that fact makes a miscalculation on the part of Soviet policy planners less likely. This is a clear gain for the free world. However, the mere deterrence of an adversary from reckless actions settles no issues. We remain far indeed from our objective of reestablishing Berlin as the capital of a Germany reunited on the basis of self-determination. For our part, we shall continue to seek that goal as we have always sought it—by means other than a forced solution.

A second necessity is to insure that freedom, in the long run, keeps the promise of fulfillment it makes to those who embrace it and are willing to endure sacrifices for its sake. Crusts and water in liberty are a better diet than rich meats at a master's table. However, this is acceptable only on the assumption that crusts are not all to which a free man may aspire. Outside Western Europe and North America, most of the people who belong to the free world have as yet but a small share of well-being to show for it. That share must increase—and we must all contribute to the increase—in order to validate the proposition that freedom is indivisible, not only in what it demands but in what it gives.

I would like now to illustrate these two considerations: the need to defend and the need to build. Let me describe how the United States strives to do both in two widely separated parts of the world, Asia and Latin America.

U.S. Objective in Southeast Asia

At the present moment the greatest challenge to our commitment to defend free nations is in Viet-Nam. Here we find both of the necessities we have previously identified. Our policy is to help a threatened people maintain their independence in the face of external interference. At the same time we seek peace through negotiation. More than 50 times we have proclaimed our willingness to discuss a solution that would leave South Viet-Nam free to determine its own future. We would be glad to withdraw our military forces when that is achieved, and stand ready—as President Johnson has announced—to assist in a program for economic development of the entire area, under United Nations sponsorship.²

At the same time, we are trying to help the Vietnamese people meet their economic and social problems, problems faced by former colonial areas everywhere. Our economic aid program in Viet-Nam began in 1954, before the Communists began their attack on South Viet-Nam. Since then we have spent over \$2 billion in developing Vietnamese agriculture, industry, education, housing, and public health. In this period, to mention just a few statistics, rice production has doubled, pig production has doubled, and many animal diseases have been entirely eliminated. More than 12,000 medical centers have been established. In 10 years school enrollment has increased from 300,000 to 1,500,000.

Our efforts in Viet-Nam are, however, but a part of a broader objective. This is to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia as a whole—through a coordination of efforts being made there by the indigenous free-world nations and those outside who seek to help them. We must defend against Communist aggression. However, we must do more. We must strengthen the fragile economies of the Southeast Asian nations and provide hope for a better life for the future to their inhabitants.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

The United States is a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO, the Far Eastern counterpart of NATO. We have defensive military arrangements with Australia and New Zealand. Our ties with Japan, too, commit us to aid that country in maintaining its independence. All these arrangements are purely defensive, threatening no one. All are necessary to safeguard the right of Asian countries to develop independently in freedom.

Viet Cong operations in Viet-Nam are but one aspect of a policy of Communist aggression proclaimed by Communist China without concealment. Communist China has waged war in Korea, subdued Tibet, attacked India. It has just condemned the United Nations for reestablishing peace in Kashmir. It is encouraging violence and subversion in almost every part of the globe. In particular, it openly asserts a right not only to influence events in Asia but to dominate its neighbors. Our weight is essential to keep the scales in Asia from tipping against the Asian defenders of freedom.

But this is not enough. President Johnson last spring proposed a massive cooperation development effort for all of Southeast Asia. Since that time rapid progress has been made. A meeting has just been concluded at Bangkok at which the charter of a new Asian Development Bank was debated and accepted.³ The capital subscription is to be \$1 billion, to which not only the regional members of the Bank are contributing but also Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, the U.K., Canada, and the United States, to name some of the nonregional members. In addition, the United Nations' Mekong Committee, established to coordinate international efforts to develop the vast resources of this great river valley, today numbers more than 20 countries. Their efforts will do much to improve the lives of millions of inhabitants in Laos, Cambodia, Viet-Nam, and Thailand. I am happy to note that Germany is also a member, as is the United States, of this international program.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1015.

Defending and Building in Latin America

Let us now turn to another part of the world—Latin America. Here we are faced by a less threatening but nevertheless difficult and demanding situation. Here, too, free nations must be helped to defend themselves against Communist subversion while they seek to better the lot of their people.

The Castro regime in Cuba has demonstrated itself to be not just a nuisance to the United States but a hostile body within the Western Hemisphere. If it has no achievements of subversion to show, it is not for want of trying. Today 19 of 20 members of the OAS no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. The free nations of Latin America have taken, in cooperation with the United States, measures to reduce Castro's opportunities to disrupt civic order and economic progress in the region by the devices of infiltration and guerrilla warfare. The net effect has been to strengthen political stability in Latin America and to encourage still further the interest of its leaders in economic development.

Precisely the same considerations guided the course of the United States in the Dominican crisis. We did not act to impose a regime of our choosing. Our action preserved, until the OAS was able to undertake the responsibility, sufficient stability to permit the reestablishment of conditions in which the people of the Dominican Republic can choose their destiny for themselves.

But let us look on the other side of our dual goal of defending and building. Latin America has resources, both natural and human, potentially more than able to meet the region's economic needs. It has leaders who are determined to set their countries firmly on the path to self-sustaining economic growth. These men seek to enhance the weight of Latin America in hemisphere and world affairs. However, countries that must depend essentially on one crop or one commodity are especially vulnerable in developing a viable economy. Poverty and illiteracy stunt a nation's growth.

United States economic policy toward Latin America therefore is designed to en-

courage diversification of economies, more equitable distribution of income, expansion of social welfare benefits, and improvement of educational opportunities. The resources of the Alliance for Progress help to make it possible for governments to take measures which are not always easy but which are essential for effective growth. The handicaps to be overcome on Latin America's road to economic development are huge. We are, however, working together with our Latin American neighbors through the Organization of American States to make the Alliance for Progress a great motive force for progress in this decade.

Through programs of the Alliance 25 million people—more than half of them children—are receiving food. New classrooms for more than a million children have been built and 10 million textbooks produced. More than 1½ million people have new homes. More than 850 hospitals, health centers, and health units have been put into operation to relieve sickness and protect health. Measures against malaria have protected more than 100 million people. Roads, powerlines, wells, and water systems are other evidences of progress that the Alliance has brought to the Latin American scene.

Last year Latin America as a whole achieved an increase of 2½ percent per capita in gross national product—the rough target set in 1961. Chances that the target will have been achieved again in 1965 have been estimated by an inter-American committee as fair. The task for the future remains large, however, and to accomplish it Latin America will need all the outside help that can be mobilized.

European nations, including the Federal Republic, already are contributing. Germany has joined with the United States and the Inter-American Development Bank in providing financial assistance for the rehabilitation of the tin mines of Bolivia. The Federal Republic early this year extended a development loan of 80 million deutsche marks to Peru for an irrigation project which ultimately will bring more than 80,000 hectares of farmland into fruitful cultiva-

tion. These are examples of the kinds of projects for Latin America for which the United States will continue to welcome European participation to the maximum extent possible.

The basis of our policy toward Latin America is exemplified in President Johnson's recent statement that the present treaty governing the operation of the Panama Canal is to be replaced by a new, mutually satisfactory treaty.⁴ Elements of the new treaty would be:

- a sincere effort to recognize the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Republic of Panama in the Canal;

- recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and participation by both Panama and the United States in its administration;

- adequate integration of the zone with the rest of the territory of the Republic of Panama;

- and finally, protection of the proper interests of users of the Canal.

I emphasize this recent development because I am convinced that it marks the opening of a new era in our relations with Latin America. The New World is discovering, as many in the Old World have learned, that they need make no choice between their national integrity and their cooperation with us and the other nations in our hemisphere. The principle of partnership makes it unnecessary to sacrifice either. I believe that the concept on which the proposed new treaty is based goes far to prove the good faith of the United States in wishing to develop with its neighbors to the south a hemisphere-wide community of free and equal members.

These are some of the aspects under which the United States sees its responsibilities in other parts of the world. We pursue the double task of defending and building the free world—by means that vary according to the diverse circumstances which must be met. It is a mistake to judge the

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1965, p. 624.

depth of an American commitment by the drama which attends its fulfillment. Europe is a good illustration. As it happens—in large measure because we have met our obligations here—the current situation in Europe requires us neither to fire off guns nor to mount an aid program. That does not mean that Americans are less committed. Rather, it confirms our commitment by proving that it has had a positive effect.

Germans know well that if NATO were to relax, if the Western alliance were to weaken its defenses, if Western cooperation were to diminish, this would be an open invitation to the Soviet Union to renew its pressures against the eastern front of the Atlantic area. Americans know that equally well. That is why, despite the other calls on us, our forces in Germany will remain here while they are wanted and needed. Fortunately, a Europe more prosperous than ever before no longer needs any economic help as it continues to strengthen its economy.

Responsibilities of Free Nations

There is a final point. I have talked of the duties of the United States. If, however, it is true that a nation has responsibilities in proportion as it has strength, then the truth cannot apply to the United States only. It must be equally true for the nations of Europe—and of that Europe which is striving to become an entity. Germany has acted upon this fact. Its program of economic assistance is the only one, other than that of the United States, which is worldwide in scope. Through the extension of substantial nonmilitary aid, it is one of 30 countries which are participating in the free world's effort in Viet-Nam. It is a staunch supporter of NATO.

Yet the contribution of Europe as a whole, of which Germany is a member, is another question. This Europe, if united, is fully capable of matching the United States in

strength, of becoming an equal partner in the unfinished task of building a free-world community. I submit that, by objective criteria, Europe has potentialities which are still unrealized. To realize them is not only a possibility; it is a responsibility.

The United States does not believe that it has a mission to remake the world in its own image. Our impulses toward reform are directed first of all upon ourselves. That is the meaning of President Johnson's call upon Americans to make their society great. We do believe, however, that the building of a free world is a task which can be likened to the building of a pioneer community in a wilderness. Each man must clear his land, cut the sods or hew the timbers for his house, provide his own livelihood for himself and his family by his own toil. Each, however, has a right to expect his neighbors to help with the house raising and the harvest—heavy work that a man laboring alone cannot accomplish or cannot do fast enough to meet his urgent need. Each has a duty to participate in community undertakings—and, upon call, to come to his neighbor's aid.

To strengthen and unify the free world in Europe is the responsibility of Europeans; in Asia, of Asians; and so on in all the other continents. Liberty's promise is one that every people must fulfill primarily by their own efforts. Others can, however, set an example—indeed, they cannot erase the example they have created. Free nations can also lend one another that margin of strength which can make the difference between failure and success in meeting the challenges that freedom confronts.

We give of our strength to increase that margin for others because we believe that we have an obligation to do so. It is an obligation in which we welcome—and ask—the continued participation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Our mutual efforts are helping to refashion a troubled world into a true world community of free nations.

Harmonizing East-West Trade With U.S. National Interests

by Alexander B. Trowbridge

*Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business*¹

My task today is to review the recent efforts of the Government to harmonize our regulatory controls over East-West trade with developing U.S. trade policies and practices which are aimed at encouraging and responding to the changes that are going on in the East European Communist countries and the U.S.S.R.

I am limiting my review to that part of the so-called "East" which comprises what used to be called the European Soviet bloc. Our trade embargo toward Communist China, North Korea and North Viet-Nam, and Cuba continues, for reasons well known to us all.

The East European Communist countries are a different matter. So many of them are showing a national interest in resuming and strengthening their once traditional ties with the Western World that it is each day becoming more difficult to use the words "bloc" and "satellite" with any agreed understanding of their meaning.

This area is no longer monolithic as it once was. Yugoslavia broke away in 1948. Poland since 1957 has, despite occasional episodes of backsliding, generally shown a determination to reduce the level of Soviet domination. More recently, Romania has opposed Soviet efforts to freeze it into the mold of a raw-material producing country and has sought the aid of the free world to enable it to develop a modern industrial

economy. Since 1964 we have been broadening the areas of peaceful trade and other contacts with that country. Now Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Bulgaria appear to be making efforts to develop their national identities and to improve their relations with the West.

It is the U.S. Government's belief that our national interests will be best served by encouraging these countries of Eastern Europe in their desires to build bridges to the West. As President Johnson has put it, we, in response, "wish to build new bridges to Eastern Europe—bridges of ideas, education, culture, trade, technical cooperation, and mutual understanding for world peace and prosperity."²

The U.S.S.R., of course, presents a more complex and difficult problem. The Soviets are a formidable antagonist. They want to preserve their hegemony over the East European Communist countries. They remain committed to the encouragement of Communist movements everywhere. They still appear to be devoted largely to their ideal of economic self-sufficiency. At the present time, they are apparently torn between the conflicting desires of increasing peaceful ties with our country and of decreasing the size of their conflict with Communist China.

We see nothing in the U.S.S.R.'s actions that would warrant relaxing our controls over exports of our truly strategic goods and

¹ Address made before the Manufacturing Chemists' Association at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 23.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876.

technology to them. However, we do consider it in our national interest to try to "build bridges" of peaceful trade to the Soviets also. Providing them with the kinds of free-world goods and technology that will help to improve the living conditions of the Russian people can, in your Government's judgment, have the beneficial effect of increasing their leaders' incentives to channel their antagonisms in the directions of peaceful competition.

Commerce in Peaceful Goods

In sum, therefore, it can be stated that your Government regards commerce in *peaceful* goods with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, *including* the Soviet Union, as completely compatible with our national interest. We regard such commerce as embracing both exports to and imports from those countries to the fullest extent that the individual economic interests of the trading participants cause it to take place.

There can be no doubt that this U.S. policy of encouraging export and import trade in peaceful goods with the East European countries will tend to increase our annual earnings from foreign trade. It is also very likely that U.S. firms having those goods and technology the Communist countries need most will stand to profit substantially.

However, I would not want to predict that U.S. foreign trade will significantly increase because of our encouragement of East-West trade, or that such trade will prove a source of profits to a large segment of the American business community. There are a number of reasons why we will *not*, despite the hopes of some, take over a substantial portion of the trade which Western Europe has been carrying on with the East European countries in recent years.

One has only to compare the list of the various kinds of goods sold each year to Eastern Europe by our West European COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls] friends to perceive that in theory there is considerable room for our exports to that area to grow. Of the \$2 billion they

sold to Eastern Europe in 1964, over three-fourths of the commodities involved would have been approved by the United States if those Communist countries had chosen to buy them from us. To avoid the mistake of comparing our exports with those of the combined exports of the 12 nations that comprise the West European element of the COCOM, we should note that their individual exports in 1964 included over \$800 million by West Germany (of which a substantial part was interzonal trade with East Germany); nearly \$300 million by the U.K. and Italy; about \$200 million by France; then downward to so little an amount as \$7 million sold by Portugal. In contrast, we sold Eastern Europe about \$170 million in 1963 and nearly \$340 million in 1964. In both years farm products made up the bulk of our commodity exports.

To move from theory to reality, however, one must also look at the list of kinds of goods that made up the \$2.4 billion which our West European friends *bought* from the East European Communist countries in 1964. They consisted almost wholly of agricultural products, crude materials, mineral fuels, chemicals, machinery, and manufactured goods. Many of those items our businessmen are apparently not interested in buying from those countries. Considering the Communist practices of bilateralizing and balancing their trade, it is obvious that our businessmen will have to purchase much more of such items from them before we can expect them to buy heavily from us.

We can, of course, hope to sell more if we guarantee credits. We can also expect that they will buy greatly needed items with their gold and the \$400 million surplus generated by their favorable trade with Western Europe. We can look forward to increasing our imports from them somewhat if we are empowered to grant MFN [most-favored-nation] duty privileges to their goods. But until they decide to make a variety of goods tailored to the U.S. market, and adopt many new marketing techniques, we must consider MFN more as a symbol of a discrimination removed than as the foundation for

a large, diverse, and profitable movement of their goods into our market.

Currently we buy much less from the East European Communist countries than we sell them: \$80 million in 1963 and \$100 million in 1964. Most of this was in meat, furs, iron and steel, platinum group metals, glass and glassware, and chrome ore.

Miller Committee Report

If all we can reasonably expect from our policy of encouraging peaceful trade with the East European Communist countries is a modest increase in our export and import business, why then should we take any risks that may be involved in relaxation of our East-West trade controls? One answer is to be found in the recent Report to the President by the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations With the East European Countries and the Soviet Union.³

This group, generally known as the Miller Committee, was appointed by President Johnson last February to explore all aspects of expanding peaceful trade in support of the President's policy of widening constructive relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. Headed by J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the board of Cummins Engine Company, the committee included among its members such leading chemical manufacturers as Crawford H. Greenwalt of DuPont and Charles W. Engelhard, Jr., of Engelhard Industries. Their report to the President, issued April 29, sets forth recommendations for the encouragement of peaceful trade in nonstrategic goods which are being sympathetically reviewed by the administration. It is a report that deserves the careful study of all Americans.

According to the Miller Committee, "peaceful trade in nonstrategic items can be an important instrument of national policy in our country's relations with individual Communist nations of Europe. Political, not commercial or economic considerations,

should determine the formulation and execution of our trade policies."

First, the Miller Committee recommends that we modify our own controls *selectively*, on a *country-by-country* basis, in the context of *bilateral trade negotiations*. In exchange for agreements to relax our trade restrictions we should, by hard bargaining, secure their assurances to remove commercial obstacles arising from differences in our economic systems, settlements of outstanding financial claims, and, as appropriate, understandings on a variety of cultural, informational, and other matters at issue.

Secondly, the Miller Committee recommends that the President be given by Congress discretionary authority to grant and withdraw most-favored-nation tariff treatment to and from individual Communist countries. MFN tariff privileges can provide a "quid" of symbolic, and to some extent economic, value to those countries, to be offered in exchange for agreements and understandings in our national interest, as part of our bargaining for trade agreements with them.

Third, the Miller Committee recommends Government guarantees of commercial credits up to 5 years' duration, when such terms are normal to the trade and in our national interest. The committee opposes lengthy and unduly large credits as creating the conditions for a credit race which would be commercially detrimental and politically undesirable to the interests of the West.

Our 1965 trade expansion mission to Romania and Poland,⁴ just completed, is an excellent demonstration of the efforts of your Government and of the representative American businessmen who took part in that mission to build bridges of trade and understanding to Eastern Europe, and of the great interest that the Governments and peoples of Romania and Poland have shown in the development of friendly relations with us.

Our mission found the representatives with whom they talked avid to learn about the U.S. industrial economy and what it can

³ A limited number of copies of the report, dated Apr. 29, 1965, are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1965, p. 553.

offer to them to improve their own industrial and economic development. They found that both countries desire to expand their sales in the U.S. market, mainly in order to earn the foreign exchange needed to finance additional purchases they wish to make in the United States. They found opportunities for U.S. firms in both countries to conduct profitable business, provided the American firms are willing to pioneer, to visit the areas, to obtain the proper understanding of the technical problems important to the countries, and to establish a proper foundation for continuing relationships.

They found among Romanian and Polish officialdoms a realization that what can be obtained in the United States by expanded trade is so important to their countries that special efforts and considerable flexibility in the operations of their trading enterprises and financial institutions would be justified. In short, our trade mission found in Poland and Romania fertile fields for the use of peaceful trade to influence and encourage the leaders of those countries in a view that both sides can benefit from such exchanges and that military confrontations are not inevitable.

Review of Commodity Controls

In keeping with the recommendations of the Miller Committee, we are at this time actively reviewing with our COCOM friends the list of strategic goods which all have agreed to restrict. Our aim is to make certain that items that no longer have a high strategic importance are removed and that this list continues to be an up-to-date coverage of those things that are truly important to the security of the free world and ourselves.

In addition, we are about to undertake another view of that additional list of commodities which *we* have considered strategic, though our COCOM partners have not. Of course, we have no intention to release for indiscriminate export anything that would be really detrimental to our national security and welfare. However, as I am sure

you recognize, there are various items that have peaceful uses in time of peace, though they could potentially be useful for military purposes in time of war. This so-called "gray area" needs reexamination periodically, especially with respect to any items that have their counterparts in those manufactures of our friends which they are willing to sell freely to the East European Communist countries.

In conducting our review of the goods we unilaterally control, we will certainly endeavor to be realistic about this question of foreign availability which so often seems to turn on a comparison between our goods and those of other free-world countries. It obviously does not contribute to the building of bridges of peaceful trade if we limit our potential East European customers to those U.S. products which are no better than those they can obtain in Western Europe. If we are to sell them anything, we must be able to offer things that we make best. The basic question ought to be whether either our superior product or the foreign-made product would materially contribute to the military or economic potentials of the Communist countries in some way that is detrimental to our security and welfare.

This question of whether we should deny goods to Eastern Europe which would contribute to their economic growth has, of course, developed controversy ever since the concept of "economic potential" was written into the Export Control Act by Congress in 1962. Of course, it does not mean that we should deny everything that contributes to the economic growth of the Communist countries or even everything that contributes "significantly" to that object. To be denied on this ground, an item must be further found to contribute significantly to the economic potential of the Communist world *in a way that would be detrimental to our security and welfare*. We have, since that provision was adopted by Congress, generally interpreted it as not calling for denial of an item if a comparable item is available to the Communist countries from the free world.

Technical Data Control

We are not only reviewing our commodity controls, as I have indicated, but we are also taking a fresh look at our controls over exports of technology and know-how. Here, we have had for a long time two kinds of controls: First, we have requirements for licensing exports of unpublished technical data to the Communist countries. Secondly, there are our rules relating to exports of unpublished technical data to the free-world countries, designed to prevent the unauthorized reexport of the data itself to the Communist countries and also to prevent those kinds of goods which we would deny to the Communist world from the United States from being shipped there indirectly as the foreign-made products of U.S. origin technology. Each of these two areas of technical data control has its own problems which we are trying very hard to solve.

There is no doubt that our advanced industrial technology and know-how constitute what is likely to be for some time to come our most important export to the East European Communist countries and the U.S.S.R.

In the first three quarters of 1965 we approved over 200 such technical data applications and denied about 12. We do not know how many of these licenses were used only to make what turned out to be an unsuccessful bid to supply a plant or process and how many ripened into full-fledged sales or licensing agreements. We also do not know the value of the technology thus approved, as our firms apparently find difficulty in putting value figures on these intangible assets.

However, I believe we can safely presume that a substantial number of our technical data licenses do result in profitable ventures and that their value in comparison with the value of the commodities we sell to the Eastern European Communist countries is very substantial. To this extent, of course, our published statistics of exports to Eastern Europe are significantly undervalued.

The importance of this point cannot be

minimized when one reflects on the potentialities for further growth of our peaceful trade with this area. We have found in many of our cases that the technical data our business enterprises have to sell is all that Eastern Europe desires to buy from the United States. The machinery, equipment, and other tangible items that go to make up the fertilizer plant or pulp and paper mill, for example, will be sold by Western Europe or designed and constructed by the Communist countries themselves, though the process and design technology will come from the United States. One reason for this is, of course, the matter of credits to pay for the machinery and equipment, but there are other reasons as well. They include such elements as comparative costs, freight, availability of parts, and even the availability of identical items from foreign licensees and subsidiaries of U.S. firms.

The Miller Committee has dealt extensively with this question and takes the position that:

The importation of technology involves much the same calculation as the decision to import anything else. Whether technology seems worth purchasing depends on the price. Whether it turns out to be advantageous depends on the efficiency with which it is injected into the system. . . . the United States should treat the trade in nonstrategic technology in the same way as other trade. The President should use his authority to permit the sale of nonstrategic technology in support of U.S. trade negotiations with individual Communist countries. The decision to *permit* the sale is a Government decision to be made on foreign policy grounds. The decision to *sell* and the terms of sale . . . should be left to the individual U.S. business firm.

Our present controls over exports of unpublished technical data to the free world have been proving more and more difficult to administer. We meet the same objection here as we do with respect to American equipment and component parts, whenever we seek to use our legal power to refuse export of an item from the United States as the basis for insisting on assurances from the intended foreign recipient that he will not export products made from our technology, equipment, or components, to make

things and sell them to the Communist countries which we would refuse to license for direct sale from the United States. Foreign buyers of our technology raise claims of "invasion of national sovereignty," assertions that we are "exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction," and so on, to explain their refusal to take U.S. technology on our terms.

We have taken a number of steps to reduce the competitive disadvantage which our technical data regulations impose on U.S. business. We have already adopted the policy that we will not require "product" assurances from a free-world recipient as the condition for allowing U.S. technology to be shipped to him when there is evidence that like products would be available to the Communist world from other free-world sources without resort to U.S.-origin technology. Moreover, as an interim measure and subject to certain conditions, we have deferred until April 30, 1966, a requirement for written assurances respecting the products of certain foreign plants produced from U.S. technology. This moratorium period is being devoted to a reexamination of our regulations and procedures in an effort to simplify them and ease the burdens that American businessmen face in their efforts to conform to our controls while trying to maintain the flow of technology and know-how that needs to go on back and forth between the United States and Western Europe, if industrial progress is to continue. We expect to be calling on members of your association and other businessmen for advice and guidance in this effort.

Administration of Export Permits

I'd like to briefly comment on the administration of the application for export permits.

A 1965 study of a group of applications processed for the Soviet bloc, including Poland and Romania, showed that 60 percent of those applications were processed within 10 working days and 95 percent within 30 working days.

The remaining 5 percent were difficult to complete expeditiously. They presented policy or technical problems of varying complexity. To determine the appropriate licensing action for such "gray area" applications, it may be necessary to request prelicensing checks from our embassies abroad. Intelligence reports are prepared and technical inquiries are addressed to government, industrial, and academic research centers. When the data has been assembled, meetings with representatives of other Government agencies are held to discuss at length technical and policy considerations involved in the particular cases. Agency differences have to be reconciled. Unresolved questions must be referred to higher Government levels, and on occasion these issues receive Secretarial consideration.

In short, it is often difficult and time consuming to determine whether the shipment of a commodity is likely to make a significant contribution to the military or economic potential of a bloc country which would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States. This is not to say that excessive delays are to be condoned. Quite the contrary! I assure you that all of us who are charged with the responsibility of administering the export control program in the national interest are fully mindful of the problems caused by delayed cases and that we will continue our efforts to reduce our processing time to the minimum.

I have been talking about what our Government is doing and planning to do to improve our trading relationships with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. I would not want you to think that I, or any other official of the Government, regard these efforts as free of controversy and agreed to by all. On the contrary, we know that there are considerable differences of opinion, in highly responsible quarters, including various Members of Congress and members of the business community.

There is a case against expanding peaceful trade which boils down to the proposition that those countries are hostile to us

and we should not strengthen them through peaceful trade. There is, on the other hand, a case for peaceful trade which rests on the premise that we can use trade to influence the internal evolution and external behavior of Communist countries. In the words of the Miller Committee,

There are persuasive elements in each of these cases. No one policy is wholly right or wholly wrong, and any course chosen has its risks. Taking into account both gains and risks, the Committee feels that the national interest clearly lies on the side of a more active use of trade as an instrument of foreign policy.

In this and in other talks and writings by officials of the executive branch of our Government, as well as by Members of Congress and by businessmen, an effort is being made at this time to give the American people and the business community a thorough understanding of the pros and cons of this problem, the opportunities and risks that such trade affords, and the U.S. national objectives in this field.

Your Government stands ready to help American businessmen who conclude to undertake the pioneering tasks of exploring trade with the East European Communist countries. As was stated last month by Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, and Connor, in a letter to the major American cigarette manufacturers who were faced with economic intimidation by certain organized pressure groups to discontinue their purchase of Yugoslav tobacco:⁵

... your Government regards commerce in peaceful goods with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, as completely compatible with our national interest. No American business enterprise should be penalized for purchasing or selling such goods. In fact, any individuals or groups that seek to intimidate, boycott, blacklist, use or threaten economic reprisals against such American enterprises for carrying on lawful trade with Eastern European countries act harmfully and irresponsibly. To yield to such groups is to encourage capricious interference with the vital processes of our Constitutional Government—interference that could at the end of the road make it impossible for our country to conduct a coherent foreign policy.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1965, p. 700.

I hope that my review has included some meaningful additions to the comments of my colleagues on this panel. I very much appreciate this opportunity to join with you in a discussion of this complex and fascinating area of national policy.

President Johnson Congratulates President-Elect of Philippines

Following are the texts of messages from President Johnson to President-elect Ferdinand Marcos and President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines, which were delivered at Manila on December 18.

White House press release dated December 18

Message to President-Elect Marcos

DEAR PRESIDENT ELECT: I extend to you warmest congratulations on your election to the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. I send the good wishes of the American people for your success in leading the Philippine people in continued progress. Our two nations are bound by friendship and alliance, and you may be assured of our enduring support and good will.

It is with genuine pleasure that I look forward to continued close partnership between our peoples, and cooperation between my administration and yours. We have much work to do both in our own countries and together to further the hopes of our peoples for dignity, well-being and peace.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Message to President Macapagal

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you prepare to relinquish the duties and responsibilities of your high office, I send you my warm good wishes. I know that you must take great satisfaction in having served your country with such distinction in its highest office. The friendship of our two nations has grown even closer under your leadership.

Mrs. Johnson and I recall with great pleas-

ure the State Visit which you and Mrs. Macapagal made to our country¹ and send you now our sincere affirmation of friendship and good will.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Ryukyu's Legislature To Elect Chief Executive

Statement by President Johnson, December 20

White House press release dated December 20

I have today signed an amendment to Executive Order 10713,² as previously amended, which provides for the administration of Okinawa and other Ryukyu Islands. The new amendment specifies that the Ryukyuan Chief Executive, heretofore appointed by the U. S. High Commissioner, shall henceforth be elected by the legislative body of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, as the popularly chosen representatives of the Ryukyuan people.

This amendment is another forward step in the continuing policy of the United States to afford the Ryukyuan people as great a voice in managing their own affairs as is compatible with the essential role of the Ryukyus in maintaining the security of Japan and the Far East.

I am happy to announce this change at this time so as to insure that the Ryukyuan Chief Executive for the next term can be elected directly by the representatives of the Ryukyuan people.

Executive Order 11263³

FURTHER AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10713,
PROVIDING FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU
ISLANDS


By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, subsection (b) of Section 8 of Execu-

tive Order No. 10713 of June 5, 1957, as amended by Executive Order No. 11010 of March 19, 1962, is further amended to read as follows:

"(b) (1) The Chief Executive shall be elected by a majority of the entire membership of the legislative body and shall serve until the end of the term of the legislative body that shall have elected him.

"(2) In the event the legislative body does not, within a reasonable time as determined by the High Commissioner, elect a Chief Executive to succeed an incumbent or to fill a vacancy, the High Commissioner may appoint a Chief Executive who shall serve until a successor is elected by the legislative body.

"(3) The incumbent Chief Executive at the end of the term of a legislative body shall continue in office until a successor takes office pursuant to either of the foregoing paragraphs."



THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 20, 1965.

Instruments of Ratification of Japan-Korea Treaty Exchanged

Following is the text of a statement by President Johnson regarding the exchange at Seoul on December 18 of instruments of ratification of the Basic Relations Treaty between Japan and the Republic of Korea.¹ The President's statement was read to news correspondents at the White House on December 18 by Bill D. Moyers, Press Secretary to the President.

As a friend of Japan and the Republic of Korea, we welcome their exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Basic Relations and its associated agreements.

We believe that this final step in the establishment of normal relations between these two neighbors will bring important and lasting benefit to both peoples and will strengthen the community of free nations.

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 2, 1964, p. 628.

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1957, p. 55.

³ 30 Fed. Reg. 15777.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1965, p. 76, and Sept. 13, 1965, p. 448.

U.S. and Canada To Negotiate for Development of Saint John River

Press release 297 dated December 21, for release December 22

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

By exchange of notes between the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin and the U.S. Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth on December 18 at Ottawa, the United States and Canada agreed to enter into negotiations for a mutually beneficial arrangement on the cooperative development of the Saint John River in Maine and New Brunswick.

The agreement follows informal discussions and joint studies by officials of both countries concerning possible mutual advantages in joint development of the hydroelectric resources of the river. These included proposed construction by the United States of a storage and associated power project at Dickey, as well as a reregulation and power project at Lincoln School, both located on the river in Maine. Agreement with Canada is necessary inasmuch as construction of the dams would result in flooding into Canada. Furthermore, storage on the United States side would result in increased power generation downstream in Canada, the benefits of which would be shared.

As a related matter, the two Governments agreed to continue studies of the benefits of interconnected operation of the power systems of New England and the Maritime Power Pool in Canada, the further strengthening of which could make a significant contribution to both New England and the neighboring Canadian provinces.

The hydroelectric potential of the Saint John River has been studied for many years. On July 12 of this year President Johnson transmitted to Congress with his approval a report prepared under the general direction of Secretary of the Interior Udall which recommended immediate authorization for the Saint John River projects, contingent on the necessary arrange-

ments with Canada.¹ On October 20 of this year the Congress authorized construction in the amount of \$227 million.

The United States negotiators will include representatives of the Departments of State and Interior and the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. The Canadian negotiators will include representatives of the Canadian federal government and the Provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick. The first negotiating session is expected to be held early in January.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

United States Note

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, December 18, 1965

No. 254

SIR, I have the honor to refer to the recent informal discussions and joint studies by officials of the United States and Canada concerning possible mutual advantages in joint development of the hydroelectric resources of the Saint John River. These discussions and studies included the proposed construction by the Government of the United States of a storage and associated power project at Dickey, as well as a power development at Lincoln School, both located on the Saint John River in Maine. In the opinion of the United States Government the proposed construction at Dickey and Lincoln School would be useful to both countries and it, therefore, proposes that the Governments of the United States and Canada enter into negotiations for a mutually beneficial arrangement on the cooperative development of the Saint John River. This arrangement would necessarily include provision for the flooding in Canada resulting from the construction under reference, as well as stipulations regarding the filling of the Dickey storage reservoir. The agreement would also have to include provision for the determination of downstream benefits and their division between the two countries.

I have the honor also to refer to recent discussions between officials of the two governments concerning the collection of basic data necessary for studies of the benefits of interconnected operation of the power systems of New England and the Maritime Power Pool. The further strengthening of the interconnections between our two countries could make a significant contribution to both New England and neighboring Canadian provinces. The

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 215.

United States, therefore, further proposes that the two Governments continue their studies of the benefits of interconnected operation of the power systems of New England and the Maritime Power Pool.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH
United States Ambassador

Canadian Note

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
Ottawa, December 18, 1965

No. 237

EXCELLENCY, I have the honour to refer to your note of December 18, 1965, proposing that the Governments of the United States and Canada enter into negotiations for a mutually beneficial arrangement on the co-operative development of the Saint John River. I also have the honour to refer to the further proposal that the two Governments continue their studies of the benefits of interconnected operation of the power systems of New England and the Maritime Power Pool.

I wish to advise you that the Government of Canada concurs with these proposals and agrees to proceed on the basis set out in your note.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

PAUL MARTIN
Secretary of State for External Affairs

USIA To Perform All Information Functions Abroad for Foreign Aid

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10973 OF NOVEMBER 3, 1961, PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 424), and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 10973² of November 3, 1961, be, and it is hereby, amended by substituting for Section 304 thereof the following:


"SEC. 304. *United States Information Agency.* (a) The United States Information Agency shall perform all public information functions abroad with respect to the foreign-assistance, aid, and development programs of the United States Government.

"(b) There are hereby delegated to the Director of the United States Information Agency the func-

¹ No. 11261; 30 *Fed. Reg.* 15397.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 900.

tions conferred upon the President by sections 221 and 222 of the Act to the extent that those functions relate to informational media guaranties authorized by section 1011 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (68 Stat. 862), as amended."



THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 11, 1965.

U.S.-Austrian Civil Aviation Negotiations Concluded

Department Statement

Press release 298 dated December 22

Delegations representing the United States and Austria have concluded civil aviation negotiations which began in Washington on December 6. Negotiations were conducted in a spirit of complete harmony and resulted in the initialing of a text of a new air transport services agreement to govern air services between the two countries and to provide for air routes for the airplanes of both countries.

The new agreement will be submitted to the respective Governments for approval and signature at an early date.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

Treaties and Other International Agreements Containing Provisions on Commercial Fisheries, Marine Resources, Sport Fisheries, and Wildlife to which the United States Is Party. Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for the Senate Commerce Committee. January 1965. [Committee print]

Why Vietnam. Document containing letters, statements, and addresses by Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, and Eisenhower, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara defining America's role in the Vietnam conflict. H. Doc. 311. October 21, 1965. 32 pp.

Report on Examination of Financial Statements, Export-Import Bank of Washington, Fiscal Year 1965. H. Doc. 354. November 30, 1965. 10 pp.

United States Expresses Views on 1966 U.N. Budget Estimates

*Statement by Congressman Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Before setting forth the general comments of my delegation on the budget estimates for 1966, I should like to express to the Secretary-General our appreciation for his personal appearance before this committee and for the thoughtful statements he has made to us, both here in the committee on October 11² and in the foreword to his 1966 budget estimates.³ We are also grateful to the Controller, the Director of the Budget Division, and all their associates for the detailed manner in which the text and tables in the estimates have been prepared, particularly with respect to section 3. We recognize the magnitude of the effort which has gone into the production of the documents now before us.

I should also like to express the appreciation of the United States delegation to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for a series of important recommendations to this committee. We owe a special debt of gratitude to the chairman of that committee for the very important statement he made in this committee on October 11. That statement reflected the independence and integrity of

approach which have always been characteristic of the chairman of the Advisory Committee.

Turning now to the substance of the matter before us, let me say frankly that the United States delegation finds it more difficult this year than in the past to formulate its position on the annual budget estimates of the United Nations.

Our concern arises from several sources. First, the Secretary-General in his statement to the committee on October 11, 1965, stated that, for the first 9 months of 1965, only about one-half of the organization's estimated 1965 expenses under the regular budget and the Special Account for UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force] have been covered by the advance payments received pursuant to Resolution 2004 (XIX). Moreover, the Secretary-General further pointed out that of the approximately \$100 million which he estimated would be required to enable the organization to liquidate its past debts, to restore the Working Capital Fund to its authorized level, and to cover amounts due to member states as adjustments on assessed contributions for UNEF and ONUC [United Nations Operation in the Congo], to date only 15 member governments have made voluntary contributions totaling \$20 million to assist in meeting this \$100 million requirement.

These financial facts are extremely dis-

¹ Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on Oct. 19 (U.S. delegation press release 4668).

² U.N. doc. A/C.5/1037.

³ U.N. doc. A/6005.

turbing. Later in this statement, I shall comment further on this matter.

The second cause for our concern is the very significant increase in the 1966 estimates over the estimated expenditures for 1965. A large part of this increase is attributed to the fact that there is proposed for 1966 the largest staff increase in the history of the United Nations. We note that virtually all of the speakers to date have expressed concern about the magnitude of this increase and where it will lead.

The size of the proposed budget increase—from \$107,642,800 gross to about \$120,000,000 gross—and particularly the magnitude of the proposed staff increase, require that the estimates be screened this year with special care to be certain that all proposed expenditures are absolutely essential. Also, in a number of areas of expenditure we must await further explanations from the Controller and his associates before we can take a final position concerning them.

Items U.S. Supports

Let me begin by dealing with those items on which we do not have reservations.

First of all, there is the budget increase proposed for 1966 as a result of the recommendations made by the International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB) for raising the professional salaries of employees of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Despite the generally reserved attitude which the United States delegation believes must now be taken toward proposed budgetary increases for 1966, we will support the recommendations of ICSAB—which we regard as a single package—for the following reasons:

First, if member states wish—as they surely do—this organization to continue as an effective international instrument, we believe it must have staff of the highest efficiency, competence, and integrity. In order to insure this, we must make certain that staff members are properly and fairly compensated. This we consider to be vital. Second, we recognize that the proposed

salary increases have been recommended not only by the ICSAB—a highly competent independent body established to deal with problems of this kind—but also by the Secretary-General and the heads of all the specialized agencies. The increases also have the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Finally, we consider it essential that the integrity of the common salary system to which the United Nations and the specialized agencies adhere be preserved, and we recognize that the specialized agencies will undoubtedly be guided by the ICSAB recommendations in fixing salaries for their staffs.

Accordingly, we are prepared to vote for the budgetary increase proposed for professional salary adjustments.

For many of the same reasons which apply to the professional salary increases, the United States is prepared to vote for the proposed adjustments, recommended by the Joint Staff Pension Board more than a year ago, of pensions being paid to former staff members.

One further matter to which we give our full support is the proposal by the Advisory Committee for revised travel standards. We in the United States have established economy travel standards for all governmental travel. We consider that it is essential in this organization to adopt a similar policy. Given the vast needs of member governments, which we are all trying to meet through contributions to the United Nations and through bilateral aid, it does not seem sensible to provide United Nations funds for luxury-class travel. The several hundreds of thousands of dollars proposed in the estimates for this nonproductive expenditure can clearly be better spent.

Another proposal which has our full approval is the recommendation by the Secretary-General that we not increase—that indeed we seek to decrease—the conference program of this organization. The Secretary-General has pointed out that the available conference and supporting facilities

are already overwhelmed by the present program. He has said in the introduction to the 1966 estimates:

I would therefore once again appeal most strongly to Member States to reconsider the need and desirability of maintaining a conference program as heavy as is currently envisaged for both 1965 and 1966. I for my part believe that some rationalization and curtailment is a real necessity not only in the interests of economy but to yield more qualitative and constructive results.

We fully endorse this statement.

New Posts and Upgrading Questioned

As I mentioned at the outset, the major area of proposed expenditure which gives rise to serious question is that involving staff costs resulting from the proposed establishment of so many new posts. There are also the questionable proposals, referred to by the Advisory Committee in its report,⁴ for the upgrading of so many existing posts.

On the matter of establishing new posts, the remarks I am about to make are addressed only in small part to the Secretary-General, who has prepared the budgetary estimates for 1966. It is true that we find several areas in the 1966 budget in which it appears that the estimates go beyond the bounds of prudence and let down the bars to demands for expansion which are unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General has prepared these estimates on the basis of what member states have asked—and indeed demanded. I recognize that he has been forced to reflect in his budget the will of member states that old programs be expanded or new ones initiated, and I also recognize that in many areas he has courageously pointed out the need for retrenchment.

As we understand it, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary-General has requested in his 1966 budget estimates the establishment of 455 new posts. Of these, 368 are requested and described in section 3 of the budget, 14 are requested in section 18 (High Commissioner for Refugees), and 73 are requested under

section 20 (UNCTAD) [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development]. For its part, the Advisory Committee has recommended the establishment of 277 new posts under section 3, has reserved its position on the new posts requested under section 18, and while recommending some reduction under chapter I (Salaries and Wages) of section 20 (UNCTAD), has not recommended any specific reduction in the UNCTAD posts. Thus, the Advisory Committee appears to have approved for 1966 the establishment of 350 posts of the total of 455 posts requested.

This, however, is not the whole story. The new posts proposed for 1966 are, as we understand it, to be in addition to the established posts proposed by the Secretary-General and recommended by the Advisory Committee for 1965. The documents before us would seem to indicate that, of the posts recommended by the Advisory Committee for establishment in 1965, 134 posts remain to be established, and that it is intended to establish these in 1966 in addition to the 350 posts to which I have referred in the preceding paragraph. If we are correct, this would mean the establishment in 1966 of 484 new posts.

It is likely that we will be told that, while it is true that 134 posts recommended by the Advisory Committee for 1965 have not yet been established, nevertheless there are already individuals "on board" who are destined to fill those posts and who are presently being financed from temporary assistance funds. Thus, it may be said that the establishment of these 134 posts in 1966 should not be viewed as a net addition to the staff. We would, of course, be interested in knowing what the actual situation is with reference to the employment on temporary assistance funds of individuals recruited for these posts. Whatever that situation may be, we note that there is in the 1966 estimates an even larger amount of money (about \$2.5 million) for temporary assistance than was contained in the original 1965 estimates. Thus, we believe it would be sound to consider the 134 posts

⁴ U.N. doc. A/6007.

as a net addition to the staff if they are established in 1966.

The mere mention of the number of new posts intended to be established in 1966 should make clear to most members of this committee why we are concerned about this feature of the estimates. We cannot remember that ever before was a proposal of this magnitude made. Further, we believe that during 1965 the organization continued to function at a reasonably efficient level, despite the fact that only 66 of the 200 professional posts recommended by the Advisory Committee under section 3 of the 1965 budget were established in that year. It is difficult to conceive that it is really essential for the efficient functioning of this organization that all 484 new posts be established and filled during 1966.

As a matter of fact, we have considerable doubts about the wisdom of attempting to establish so many new posts. First of all, it is difficult to imagine how the proposed number of new posts could possibly be absorbed and integrated into the existing Secretariat by the end of 1966. It would seem that such an influx of new staff would require so much of the attention of existing staff for briefing and training purposes that the efficiency of the operations would undoubtedly be adversely affected. Apart from that fact, there is the even more serious question as to the possibility of recruiting within 1 year such a large number of qualified staff. Is it not likely that an attempt to recruit so many individuals in such a short period of time would either fail or would result in the acceptance of individuals without proper and adequate qualifications to do the job efficiently?

We have said enough, Mr. Chairman, to indicate that, while we are not yet prepared to take a final position concerning proposed staff increases for 1966, we are far from convinced as to the need for even those posts recommended by the Advisory Committee. We will await further explanations from the representatives of the Secretary-General on this matter. Meanwhile, we will reserve our position.

I should add, Mr. Chairman, with respect to section 3 of the budget, that we share the misgivings of the Advisory Committee, set forth in paragraph 181 of its report on the proposed reclassification of posts. We would be glad to hear further explanations from the representatives of the Secretary-General on this matter but at the present time are not prepared to go beyond the Advisory Committee recommendation to the effect that only 50 percent of the funds required for the proposed reclassifications be approved.

U.N. Bonds Financing

Before leaving the budget estimates for 1966, I should like to refer briefly to a proposal made to this committee on October 15 by the distinguished representative of Argentina. He proposed to remove from the expenditure section of the budget chapter V of section 12, which provides for the financing of the interest and principal of United Nations bonds. We assume that the distinguished representative of Argentina will elaborate more fully on his reasons for making this proposal at subsequent meetings of this committee, and accordingly the United States delegation will limit its comments at this time. We might point out, however, that we were pleased to note that this proposal is not intended to prejudice the financial obligations represented by the bonds and that it does not envisage financing based on voluntary contributions.

Mr. Chairman, the General Assembly authorized the sale of United Nations bonds in order to raise essential working capital and permit this organization to meet its obligations. Sixty-four governments bought bonds for this purpose. These bonds represent solemn obligations of this organization to repay those who loaned money to it at a time of financial crisis. As a Member of Congress, and a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, let me add that Congress authorized purchase of these United Nations bonds by the United States on the clear understanding that they would be paid off in a normal and regular manner. Any at-

tempt to alter their terms and the conditions of repayment would destroy the confidence of governments and peoples in the financial integrity of the United Nations. Thus, while not attempting now to evaluate the specific proposal of the distinguished representative from Argentina, let me say simply that we are not prepared to accept any proposal which would destroy confidence in the financial integrity of the United Nations or lessen in any way the assurance that the bonds will be repaid.

Critical Financial Situation

Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation would now like to speak about the critical financial situation and the financial prospects facing this organization.

We must all ask ourselves two questions about the finances of this organization: (1) "Where are we today?" and (2) "Where are we going?" In dealing with both questions, the United States delegation will be completely frank. It is essential at this stage in the life of the United Nations that we face up squarely to the situation which confronts us.

Let me start with the present financial situation. The Committee of 33, on August 31, 1965, arrived at a consensus⁵ in the spirit of the Afro-Asian proposal which included the following elements:

(a) That the General Assembly will carry on its work normally in accordance with its rules of procedure;

(b) That the question of the applicability of Article 19 of the Charter will not be raised with regard to the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo;

(c) That the financial difficulties of the Organization should be solved through voluntary contributions by Member States, with the highly developed countries making substantial contributions.

On September 1 the committee's report was adopted by the General Assembly. Accordingly, voluntary contributions should have been forthcoming promptly from appropriate quarters in sufficient magnitude to achieve solvency. Yet the sad fact is that

no real progress has been made toward solvency.

The Secretary-General informed us on September 3, 1965,⁶ that of the \$100 million required to restore the solvency of this organization, only \$18.4 million had been contributed. What has happened since that report? The Secretary-General informed us on October 12 that only about \$1.6 million additional has been contributed. In other words, about \$80 million must still be raised to restore United Nations solvency.

In fact, instead of an improvement in the financial situation, there has been a worsening. In statements to this committee at this session several member states have reiterated their past objections to making full contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations. This means that, in financial terms, we are going even further downhill.

To the United States delegation the present situation is one which calls for a sober appraisal on the part of all members. Can and should our organization continue to go forward with new programs—no matter how desirable—unless and until we can put our house in order? The United States delegation finds it difficult to justify an affirmative answer.

I do not believe that anyone can challenge the propriety of this position. The United States has paid its share—and considerably more—of all United Nations expenses ever since this organization was established. We have contributed almost \$21½ billion to the United Nations family of organizations in the last 20 years. We are clearly entitled to demand—as indeed are most members of this organization—that the United Nations as a whole face up to the necessity of financing its existing obligations before it embarks on new endeavors.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that in the course of this session, and indeed in the near future, the situation will so develop that the financial integrity of the organization will be restored. It is vitally important to all of

⁵ U.N. doc. A/5916.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/5917.

us that the United Nations be placed once again in a sound position not only to finance essential peacekeeping operations but also to support the desirable and important new economic and social programs which we all favor. The United States has done its best. Now it is up to others to assume their share of the burden.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations; Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning compulsory settlement of disputes.

Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratification deposited: Philippines, November 15, 1965.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptances deposited: Ivory Coast, December 2, 1965; Korea, December 8, 1965.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.¹

Accession deposited: Iceland, November 17, 1965.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend annex I. Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva from February 8 to December 31, 1965.²

Ratification deposited: Peru, November 30, 1965.
Signature: Ivory Coast, December 7, 1965.

War, Prevention of

American treaty on pacific settlement (Pact of Bogotá). Signed at Bogotá April 30, 1948. Entered into force May 6, 1949.¹

Ratification deposited: Brazil, November 16, 1965.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

BILATERAL

Canada

Interim agreement relating to the renegotiation of schedule XX (United States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Washington December 17, 1965. Entered into force December 17, 1965.

Germany

Protocol amending convention for avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income of July 22, 1954 (TIAS 3133). Signed at Bonn September 17, 1965.

Ratifications exchanged: December 27, 1965.

Entered into force: December 27, 1965; effective for taxable years beginning on or after 1st day of January in year exchange of ratifications takes place.

Guinea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of June 13, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5668, 5701, 5712). Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry October 27 and 28, 1965. Entered into force October 28, 1965.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Health—Additional Regulations Amending WHO Regulations No. 2—Adopted by the Eighteenth World Health Assembly at Geneva May 12, 1965. Date of entry into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5863. 6 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations—Facility on Ascension Island. Agreement with the U.K., relating to the agreement of June 25, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at London July 7, 1965. Entered into force July 7, 1965. TIAS 5864. 3 pp. 5¢.

Telecommunication—Radio Broadcasting Facilities. Agreement with the Philippines, implementing the agreement of May 6, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila September 10, 1965. Entered into force September 10, 1965. TIAS 5865. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vietnam, amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon August 16, 1965. Entered into force August 16, 1965. TIAS 5867. 2 pp. 5¢.

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298	12/22	Civil aviation negotiations with Austria.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1961

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents is an annual, one-volume collection of the principal messages, addresses, statements, and reports, and of certain of the diplomatic notes exchanged and treaties made in a given calendar year which indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States.

The 1961 volume is notable for documentation of the principles and objectives of the new administration of President Kennedy, the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, the Soviet-American confrontation regarding the Berlin wall, the situation in the Congo, Laos, and efforts to attain disarmament and a cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

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January 17, 1966

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Despite overwhelming mutual interests that bind the United States to the other major maritime nations, there is a root difference of psychology, history, law, and administration concerning international shipping cartels which on occasion places these nations on one side and the United States on the other. In this article, written especially for the Bulletin, Paul F. Geren, Economic Counselor at the American Embassy in Libya and former Adviser on Telecommunications and Transportation, describes the problems resulting from this difference and the diplomatic efforts which have been made to solve them.

Diplomatic Adjustment by the Maritime Nations

by Paul F. Geren

During the last 2 years the United States has been involved in almost continuous discussion and negotiation on maritime problems with 11 maritime nations: Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The interests which bind these nations and the United States are stronger than their differences. All are interested in the freedom, efficiency, and safety of ocean transportation. Each gives expression to this interest through membership in the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Or-

ganization (IMCO) and the Maritime Transport Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). All favor port development, since as much as 60 percent of the cost of a voyage may be incurred in ports. Each opposes discrimination against the ships which fly its flag.

Nevertheless, there are differences which on occasion place the Eleven on one side and the United States on the other. These differences are real, and they challenge diplomats to explore the extent to which they may be adjusted.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1386 PUBLICATION 8018 JANUARY 17, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10, foreign \$15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The root difference is one of psychology, history, law, and administration concerning ocean freight rate conferences. There are economic characteristics of cargo liners operating regular common carrier service on a given route which incline them to form such conferences. Oceangoing ships usually involve a large capital outlay and operating costs which are high and in large measure fixed. Certain costs of a voyage are joint costs for all the cargo carried and, except for loading, unloading, and special handling, cannot be easily apportioned to each item of cargo. Certain costs must be met whether or not the ship sails. If it does sail, the shipowner is interested in filling any empty space at rates above the cost of loading, unloading, and special handling.

The ensuing tendency toward rate wars, instability, and harsh competition has inclined owners over the last century to form ocean freight rate conferences. These are international cartels, having the object of limiting competition by fixing rates and other conditions of service and offering stability of rates and regularity of sailings as their economic and moral justification.

The tendency toward cartelization does not operate with the same force on the tramp carriers, defined as ships which carry a bulk cargo, dry or liquid, from one port to another, typically from one shipper to one consignee, and typically scheduled on an as-needed basis. Bulk carriers are obtained on a ship charter market, where the thousands of ships in this category, owned by hundreds of operators, may all bid if they like. The charter market for tramp carriers may be described as highly but imperfectly competitive, while the conference of a dozen cargo lines operating on a specific trade route may be regarded as an oligopoly. In such an oligopoly, competition between conference members is confined to features other than rates; rate competition comes from nonconference cargo liners and, at the fringes, from the tramps.

While more by volume of the United States foreign trade is carried in bulk carriers than in cargo liners—139.5 million to

47.2 million tons in 1963—the cargo liners carry most of the higher valued commodities, and they span the freight rate structures for the tens of thousands of commodities which move in lots and parcels. The cargo liner trade is the focus of the differences with the Eleven in the regulation of international shipping.

Great Britain and the United States have both had their historic investigations of conferences. The reports on these investigations agreed that conferences limit competition but differed on what should be done about them.

The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings in its majority report of 1909 recommended collective bargaining between conferences and shippers' associations and submission to the British Board of Trade of certain conference agreements.

U.S. Position on Regulation

In the case of the United States, the investigation was held by the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The Alexander Report, named after the committee's chairman, issued in 1914, unequivocally stated that conferences and like arrangements should be permitted only under "Government supervision and control." The Shipping Act of 1916, as amended in 1936 and 1961, predicates the necessity of Government regulation. The regulation has as its subject the oceanborne foreign commerce of the United States, whether imports or exports, whether carried in United States or other flag vessels. As the report of the Attorney General's Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws (1955) made clear, combinations and conspiracies which substantially affect U.S. foreign commerce are unlawful whether such combinations are wholly among American firms, among American and foreign firms, or wholly among foreign firms.

The Federal Maritime Commission is the United States Government agency charged with carrying out regulations. While the Commission has been in existence under

various names for 50 years, it was not until 1958 that its regulatory actions began to affect other nations. The Shipping Act provides that each conference as well as each independent common carrier engaged in the foreign commerce of the United States must file its rates with the Federal Maritime Commission, that rate increases are permitted only after notice to the public, and that the Commission may find any rate either so high or so low as to be detrimental to the foreign commerce of the United States.

With regard to the ocean freight rate conferences, the Shipping Act provides immunity from the antitrust laws provided the Federal Maritime Commission approves the conference operating agreements. In order to approve a conference agreement, the Commission must be satisfied that the agreement (a) is not unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors; (b) does not operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States; (c) is not contrary to the public interest; and (d) is not in violation of the Shipping Act of 1916 as amended.

There are some 120 conferences and rate-making bodies operating in the United States foreign trade, divided approximately equally between inbound and outbound, each operating on a particular trade route, for example, from the U.S. North Atlantic to the British Isles and the reciprocal trade from the British Isles to the U.S. North Atlantic. Each inbound conference has a separate and autonomous existence as contrasted with the outbound conference on the same trade route. The reciprocal conferences have separate rate tariffs, membership, lists of ports served. Typically the outbound conference is headquartered in the United States and the inbound conference abroad. The lines holding membership in the conference may run from 2 to 15, and the flags from 2 to 8. United States flag lines are usually a minority in any conference. Conferences based in the United States are

required to admit qualified lines seeking membership but this is not true of some foreign conferences. The oceanborne commerce of the United States thus involves more than 100 other countries, sails under many flags, and is inherently international in character.

Differences Between U.S. and Eleven

Here is a point at which the difference in principle between the 11 maritime countries and the United States comes into sharp focus. The Eleven hold that, inasmuch as the foreign trade of one country is in each case the foreign trade of another nation, any attempt to regulate automatically becomes unilateral regulation. The United States holds, on the other hand, that it has a concurrent jurisdiction over its international trade which cannot be vetoed by the choice of a trading partner not to exercise its own concurrent jurisdiction.

In the background for discussion of jurisdiction is the law of the port. Shipowners universally attest that they must abide by the laws and regulations of the nations whose ports they use, and modern nations are well aware that reciprocity and mutuality are lively considerations for a maritime country whose ships by definition use ports other than its own.

Several overtones of this jurisdictional difference between the United States and the Eleven can be discerned. The United States emphasizes the public interest in oceanborne shipping, while the Eleven are skeptical that there is any interest involved which cannot be classified under the interest of the shipper, consignee, and shipowner. The Eleven are champions of shippers' councils, defined as permanent associations of importers, exporters, and manufacturers organized to consult and negotiate with shipping conferences on problems of mutual interest. Shippers' councils, the Eleven contend, could be the means of settling 95 percent of the disputes and difficulties in this realm.

The United States is not prepared to

abandon the concept of the public as an interested party in oceanborne transportation. The balance of payments is a massive manifestation of such interest in our view, and significantly the concern with ocean freight rates in recent years has come as a derivative of concern for the adverse balance-of-payments position. A group of American exporters, the consignees to whom they ship, and the owners of the ships which carry the goods may all be happy with existing arrangements. Nevertheless, in the United States view, the public interest requires continuous surveillance to insure that the prevailing rates do not unfairly discriminate against a potential export which would better the balance-of-payments position.

The Eleven hold further that the United States treats the ocean shipping industry as a public utility to be regulated, whereas they regard it as an industry which should not in any way be subordinated to trade and commerce. The United States does not regard its ocean shipping industry as a public utility. We do have a candid regard for our situation, just as the Eleven speak from an appraisal of where they stand.

At mid-1964 the United States ranked second in the world in size of its merchant fleet, with 20.4 million gross registered tons (g.r.t.)—behind the United Kingdom with 21.5 million g.r.t. and before Norway with 14.5 million g.r.t. In the volume of its oceanborne international trade the United States' paramount position is unchallenged, with 341 million long tons in 1964 valued at more than \$28 billion. Nevertheless, in 1963, only 8.5 percent of our foreign trade by volume was carried in U.S. flag vessels, as compared with the following percentages of their respective foreign trade by certain other countries in 1962: France, 59 percent; United Kingdom, 52 percent; Greece, 47 percent; Norway, 43 percent; Japan, 46 percent. By volume, 17.3 percent of U.S. foreign trade in 1963 moved on Norwegian flag vessels, more than twice the volume which moved on U.S. flag ships. Thus, while the United States acts several parts in maritime

affairs, it plays the unquestioned leading role as a user of shipping services.

A reinforcing factor to the predominant user interest is the cost status of the United States merchant marine as compared with the merchant marines of the Eleven. The United States has achieved its present position in the cargo liner trade, where its vessels carry almost 30 percent of the U.S. foreign trade moving in that type of vessel, by subsidizing both the construction and operation of most of the cargo liner fleet. However, the 30 percent represents only 12 percent of commercial liner cargo, the remainder being Government cargo which must be carried in U.S. flag ships by virtue of cargo preference arrangements. All the maritime countries offer various encouragements to their merchant marines, and several of them offer building subsidies, but the subsidy is massive in the case of the United States, amounting to more than half of the cost of building ships and more than 70 percent of wages for ships' crews, currently totaling in all forms some \$380 million annually.

Consequently, while the U.S. merchant marine strengthens our balance-of-payments position, it is a heavy burden on the Federal budget. This contrasts sharply with the position of most of the 11 maritime countries, whose merchant marines typically contribute to the national budget through taxes exceeding any subsidies granted them and contribute powerfully to the national income account in wages and profits for their nationals. Norway's merchant marine currently accounts for 55 percent of that country's gross foreign exchange earnings. The Netherlands, which carries only 16 percent of its own foreign trade in its own vessels, is nevertheless able from the net earnings of its merchant marine to finance most of a heavily adverse trade balance.

The relationship of the United States and the Eleven in maritime affairs can be summarized in a very simple way: The United States is the world's leading user of shipping services. The Eleven together supply more than half the world's shipping services. We

are in this field their largest customer, and all parties, if not self-conscious, are conscious of that fact.

So much for differences of principle between the United States and the Eleven. Let us consider now two cases which demonstrate the practice of attempted adjustment.

Investigation of Dual Rate Contracts

The first concerns the dual rate contracts which are used by the conferences to insure exclusive patronage by quoting a rate up to 15 percent lower for the shippers who agree to be bound to give all or a specified percentage of their shipments to the conference. The statutory exemption for conferences from the antitrust laws was undermined wherever dual rate contracts were employed by the Supreme Court decision in the *Isbrandtsen* case in 1958 (*Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co.*, 356 U.S. 481, 1958). Congress first extended the validity of the existing dual rate contracts until June 30, 1961, and then passed Public Law 87-346, known as the Bonner Act, which authorizes conferences serving the foreign commerce of the United States to enter into dual rate contracts fulfilling the requirements of the act and approved by the Federal Maritime Commission. On March 30, 1964, the Commission announced that only its approved contract could be used in the U.S. trade after April 4, 1964.

The Eleven protested this requirement as an infringement of their respective jurisdictions, since the contracts covering the U.S. inbound trade would typically bind conferences and shippers in their countries without involving a party in the United States. The subject became a lively one for diplomats. The Commission granted a series of delays, agreed to delete all but one of the offending jurisdictional clauses, and showed the capacity to permit some variation in the commercial clauses of the model contracts according to the commercial practice obtaining in a given trade.

In the United Kingdom the affected conference and the shippers' councils negotiated

the dual rate contract, and, while the completed document contained the clauses which were essential from a United States point of view, the contract could realistically be presented as their own work. This enabled the country to avoid being placed in a position of acknowledging the jurisdiction of the United States in contracts made between its own nationals and companies domiciled within its own borders. The Federal Maritime Commission was likewise satisfied, since its intent is to secure the purpose of U.S. legislation and not to flaunt a jurisdictional red flag in the faces of the Eleven.

By early 1965, practically all the conferences in the U.S. foreign trade which employ the dual rate contract had filed contracts which met the Federal Maritime Commission's specifications. The episode could be described as one of partial internationalization of a model contract.

Voluntary Exchange of Rate Information

The second illustrative case concerns the charge made by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress that, on the major trade routes, conference freight rates on exports moving from the United States are higher than conference freight rates on imports moving into the United States and that, unless sound economic justification can be found, the freight rate structure should be pronounced discriminatory and remedial steps taken. Having been charged with the investigation of this matter, the Federal Maritime Commission in November 1963 issued orders under section 21 of the Shipping Act calling upon 16 conferences, 8 inbound and 8 outbound, and their member lines, regardless of flag, to produce information and documents on traffic and earnings.

The 11 maritime nations jointly presented a note to the Department of State asserting that these orders violated their respective jurisdictions, and reserved the right to restrain their nationals from compliance. U.S. courts sustained the right of the Federal Maritime Commission to order the out-

bound conferences to produce information and documents, fines began to accrue against the outbound conferences, and the British Parliament enacted a law in August 1964 forbidding disclosure of information by British companies and nationals under certain conditions.

Under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, representatives of the Federal Maritime Commission, the Department of State, and the governments of the Eleven met in Paris on this problem in February and again in June 1964. At the June session Adm. John Harlee, Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, proposed a plan for voluntary exchange of the information utilizing a government-to-government basis if the maritime countries desired. The exchange would be voluntary even with the eight conferences headquartered in the United States, where no jurisdictional problem arose.

Agreement was eventually reached on December 15, 1964, and embodied in an Agreed Minute of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.¹ Each of 14 governments (the Eleven plus Spain, Ireland, and Finland) and the Government of the United States agreed to use their good offices to facilitate an exchange of information on total revenue tons of cargo carried and total gross freight revenue earned by each of the 16 conferences, as well as the same statistics on a number of individual commodities in each conference. The channel of exchange was described as from the conference to the government of the state in which it was headquartered, to the OECD, and thence to all governments party to the Agreed Minute.

The United States agreed not to proceed with the enforcement of the section 21 orders obtaining, not to publish the information for purpose of criminal prosecutions or assessing fines or penalties against ship-owners or conferences, and not to use the information in formal proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission without hav-

Mr. Geren's article is one of a series being written especially for the Bulletin by officers of the Department and the Foreign Service. Officers who may be interested in submitting original bylined articles are invited to call the editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton, extension 5806, room 5536.

ing first consulted the governments of the maritime nations concerning alternative methods of solving the problem.

The exchange of data was completed in April 1965, but revisions continue. Following consultations begun in late May, the totals for all conferences and for the 20 specific commodities in the United States-United Kingdom conferences were published in the proceedings of the Subcommittee on Federal Regulation and Procurement of the Joint Economic Committee on August 11, 1965. The maritime nations opposed publication on the grounds that it would transfer prematurely the discussion of rate disparities into legislative bodies and newspapers. Some of the maritime nations also maintained that publication would reveal commercial secrets, contrary to the pledge given in the Agreed Minute. The position of the United States is that the aggregation of data guards against revelation of commercial secrets, that the Agreed Minute and the negotiations leading to it envisaged the eventual publication of the data, and that the United States has discharged its obligation of consultation before publication.

Consultation has also begun on the meaning of the data exchanged: Do they reveal a disparity? If so, are there economic justifications? If there are not adequate economic justifications, are there ways of solving the problem alternative to formal proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission?

The data exchanged gives an answer to the first question. In seven of the eight sets of reciprocal conferences, the per ton revenue is higher by from 6 to 75 percent for outbound than for inbound cargo. The data which yield this answer have never before

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 188.

been available to one government, not to speak of 15.

As is true of any breakthrough, one question is answered but several new ones are raised. Many of these questions concern the concept of the "revenue ton," which derives from conference usage and is defined as a unit of one ton by weight or up to 40 cubic feet by measure. The rate is charged on the basis of such a unit, which will vary from commodity to commodity. Weight, measurement, and value are involved as variables, but, if they combine according to any fixed principle, it has not been possible thus far to discover that principle nor to state it mathematically. The shipowners have long held that ratemaking is an art, not a science, but it should be possible to illumine the art in the direction of science.

The second question of whether rate disparities are economically justified thus continues to be the subject of consultation between the United States and the other maritime countries. A new chapter is being written. The end of the book is not in sight. It seems sure to be long and heavy reading.

New Approaches to International Adjustment

Having set out the differences in principle between the United States and the Eleven, and having noted two cases of attempted adjustment by diplomacy, we may now conclude with three observations.

The first: The differences between the United States and the Eleven persist, but the effort at diplomatic adjustment likewise persists. It is a process which continues, a process in which principles encounter every day's necessity to keep oceanborne commerce moving. The dramatic fraternity vows that the show must go on, the postmen are devoted to their appointed rounds, and the maritime community, though interrupted by strikes or hurricane Betsy, is committed that the ships must sail. Neither the United States nor the Eleven will desert their principles, but together they may find possibilities of adjustment in the process of moving oceanborne commerce efficiently, safely, and economically.

The second observation is that, for better or worse, the subjects of freight rates and conference activities are moving into a more public view. Some of the maritime nations will hold this worse and the United States will regard it for the better, but all might agree that it is inevitable. Both the anti-competitive nature of conference agreements and their complexity have enhanced the conferences' early reputation for secrecy. Many governments, however, now assert an inalienable right to ask questions concerning freight rates. The questions need not have a punitive edge, they need not presume that conferences are guilty until proved innocent, but they are sure to increase.

Finally, it is possible to see in the contemporary discussion the intimations of new approaches and forms for the international adjustment of differences in national maritime policies. This does not necessarily imply that new international organizations must be formed nor that every nation must have its Federal Maritime Commission. The Agreed Minute on the Exchange of Shipping Information is an illustration of the manner in which an existing organization, the OECD, may engage in this area. The experience leads one to paraphrase Voltaire: If we did not have the OECD, we would have had to invent it.

It is in the realm of method and temperament rather than in the specific organizational forms that we profess to see the outlines of an era of international adjustment of maritime problems. Evidences are perhaps no larger at present than Elijah's cloud on the horizon, no larger than a man's hand. They include the notable cases of the dual rate contracts, the Agreed Minute, the continuing desire to maintain a posture of adjustment rather than to stage a quarrel in newspapers, the statement by the Eleven that *laissez faire* is not a tenable policy for governments respecting shipping conferences, and the affirmation by the United States that it exercises a concurrent, not an exclusive, jurisdiction over its foreign commerce.

The safety aspects of maritime affairs are

infinitely less complex and less affected with particular interest than are the economic aspects. Nevertheless, the multilateralization and the internationalization of standards of safety at sea are a parable of what may be attempted in the economic aspects of maritime problems.

Nations have long had their separate codes of safety for ships of their own flag and for ships using their respective ports. An International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was signed in 1948, and a new convention was drawn up in 1960 under the auspices of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Since 1948 there has been a continuing action and reaction between the international convention and the regulations of particular countries. National regulations usually make some reference to the SOLAS. There is a medium of international discourse on matters of safety of life at sea by virtue of the convention and the international conferences which drew it up and amended it. Without ceasing to be a national concern of states, safety of life at sea is a matter for international cooperation.

A parallel development in the economic aspects of maritime affairs will be enormously more difficult, but here also necessity may be the mother of invention.

U.S. and Zambia Hold Talks on Rhodesian Situation

Joint Communiqué

Press release 301 dated December 27

The Zambian ministerial mission to discuss the Rhodesian situation visited Washington from December 22 to December 27. The mission was composed of the Honorable Simon Kapwepwe, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Honorable A. G. Zulu, Minister of Mines. During this period the Ministers conferred with Secretary Rusk as well as with other senior officials of the United States Government.

The Secretary expressed the admiration of the United States for the success Zambia has had in achieving a democratic society and racial harmony in Zambia. Both sides agreed that the undemocratic regime now installed in Rhodesia was a threat to human rights and that all concerned should aid the people of Rhodesia to find a solution to their present problems along lines which respected the rights and legitimate interests of all sections of the community.

Actions by various nations to cooperate with the U.K. in implementing its economic measures against the rebel regime and in conformance with the November 12 and 20 resolutions¹ of the United Nations Security Council were reviewed. The United States Government described the details of its recent measures to apply economic sanctions to Rhodesia,² especially the action being taken by American oil companies in implementing the recently announced oil embargo against Rhodesia.

Secretary Rusk expressed the hope that the success achieved so far in obtaining broad international assistance for the U.K. economic measures and the United Nations resolutions directed against the rebellious Rhodesian authorities would soon achieve the stated U.N. objective of "bringing the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end" and would provide a constitutional basis for progress toward majority rule in the British colony. He expressed the willingness of the U.S. Government to consider additional measures in the event the present program should appear to need reinforcement.

Secretary Rusk reviewed the investigations made by American experts of the requirements for improving various alternative land transportation routes into Zambia and promised to examine ways by which the United States could assist in meeting these requirements. He confirmed that the United

¹ For texts, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, pp. 915 and 916.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 914, and Jan. 3, 1966, p. 27.

States during the first week in January, hopefully by January 2, plans to begin to make a significant contribution to the airlift of oil supplies to Zambia in cooperation with the U.K. and Canada. He agreed that the objective of the airlift should be to permit Zambia to end rationing of petroleum products as soon as possible.

Secretary Rusk assured the Zambian Ministers of the deep interest of the U.S. Government in minimizing the effect of the crisis on Zambian economic progress and in continuing to consult with the Zambian Government on the measures needed to achieve this goal.

Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam on Canadian TV Program

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by James Minifie and Knowlton Nash of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation which was filmed December 23 for use on a Canadian television program December 30.

Press release 307 dated December 30

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Pope's Christmas message warned that perhaps the world was on the wrong path again and urged all nations "to modify the direction of your steps, stop, think." What's your reaction to that, sir?

A. Well, I think that those words of His Holiness must be taken with the utmost seriousness by everyone concerned because the world is in a turbulent and indeed a very dangerous situation. Viet-Nam, of course, is the overriding problem in establishing the peace. Our objective there is peace.

The elementary facts are that tens of thousands of armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam to impose a political solution on South Viet-Nam by force. Large quantities

of arms have been sent in behind these men.

Now we, I think, sometimes overlook what has been said from the United States point of view about peace in Southeast Asia. Let me remind you that we have said that the agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. We have said that we would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or any part of it—Cambodia, Laos, Viet-Nam. We have said that we would engage in negotiations without preconditions, as the 17 nonaligned nations phrased it,¹ or unconditional discussions, as President Johnson phrased it.² We have said that the cessation of hostilities can be the first item on the agenda of a conference, or it could be the subject of preliminary discussions. We have said that Hanoi's four points could be discussed at such a conference, along with the points that others may wish to put forward. We have said that we want no bases in Southeast Asia. We have said that we do not wish to retain U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam if there is peace.

We have said that there can be elections in South Viet-Nam and that the question of reunification is something which the Vietnamese themselves can decide on their own free choice. We have said that we would much prefer to use our own resources in the economic, social reconstruction in Southeast Asia rather than military action, and we have indicated that there could be peace in North Viet-Nam if they would become a part of a regional effort to which we are prepared to contribute a billion dollars. We said that the bombing could be stopped. As a step toward peace, we have asked the other side, both publicly and privately, to give us some indication what they would do if the bombing stopped.

Now, that doesn't leave very much. The thing that it does leave is the third of

¹ For text of the 17-nation appeal of Apr. 1, 1965, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 611.

² *Ibid.*, p. 606.

Hanoi's four points, namely, the imposition of the program of the Liberation Front upon the people of South Viet-Nam, whether the people of South Viet-Nam want it or not. In other words, that leaves the simple question of appetite and of aggression and what do we do about it? We feel that, since we have a commitment to South Viet-Nam and our commitment in similar situations all over the world is a major pillar of peace in this world situation, we must meet our commitment. But there could be peace very promptly if this appetite were withdrawn.

Q. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that the Christmas truce could be developed or picked up again and made into a longer truce?

A. Well, we'll see. We have said on many occasions that as far as the bombing is concerned, the fact that it could be stopped is a step toward peace, but we do not have from the other side any indication they are prepared to abandon their attempt to take South Viet-Nam over by force. Now, this is the heart of the matter. One has sometimes heard of "peace feelers." Actually these have arisen on the initiative of someone else. I don't know of any initiatives taken by Hanoi to seek peace. Others—third parties, other governments, perhaps private citizens—have had conversations with Hanoi, and when some of these are made public, these are translated into something called peace feelers by Hanoi. Hanoi has denied that they have made any peace feelers. I am not aware of any peace feelers initiated by Hanoi.

Q. On the question of bombing or a pause, would the United States be prepared to initiate another unilateral pause as you did last spring?

A. Well, I think that we need to find out from the other side more about that. We have not excluded any possibilities here as a step toward peace, but we have had no indication from the other side that they would respond in any way.

Q. You want that indication before—?

A. Well, why don't we just wait and let the future take care of itself.

Q. The National Council of Churches, or its General Board in all events, has suggested that a declaration in favor of a commitment to withdraw U.S. troops when and if an international force could replace them would be extremely helpful. What is your reaction to that?

A. Well, there is no problem with us on that. We have said many times that our troops could come home when this aggression stops, and I don't believe an international force is likely to be moved into South Viet-Nam until the aggression does stop. This causes us no problem.

Q. Would the United States favor a truce now beyond the 30-hour truce at Christmas, with both sides staying as they are and peace talks beginning?

A. Well, these are matters we have indicated can be discussed with the other side. If there are problems about how cessation of hostilities can be arranged, all right, let's talk about it. We've indicated that we will be at Geneva within hours if anybody else is there from other governments to talk about peace in Southeast Asia. These are things that can be discussed—that can't be just organized on a unilateral basis.

Q. There was a rather disturbing suggestion the other day in Evans and Novak's column that the United States wasn't really interested in negotiations until an adequate political structure in Viet-Nam could be created.

A. That is not true, and if anyone wants to test us on that, let them turn up at Geneva tomorrow. I'll be there. Just let them be there—I'll be there. If anyone doubts the bona fides of the American interest in negotiation, let them come to the table and find out. We tried on many occasions to see that a conference is convened in the situation.

Q. If there were representatives of the National Liberation Front that came to Geneva, would you also be there, sir?

A. Well, there are 14 million people in South Viet-Nam. There are the Buddhists, and the Catholics, and the sects, and the *montagnards*, and the million Cambodians, and there are the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong do not represent the people of South Viet-Nam, but we have indicated that ways can be found to let their views be known in a conference. But that is not the problem. The problem is whether Hanoi wants to impose the program of the Liberation Front upon the South Vietnamese, whether the South Vietnamese want it or not.

Q. How long do you think that the war, as we have to call it, is going to last, then, before they come to the conference table?

A. Well, I am not a prophet—I'm not a prophet.

Q. Broadening the question of Viet-Nam a bit, Mr. Secretary, what's your judgment on the future course that China might take, especially if there were no intention or pickup of the truce, the Christmas truce, and the American commitment increases more than it is at present?

A. Well again, I don't want to predict what someone else might do. This depends upon what maybe 6 or 8 or 10 people in Peiping are saying to themselves. We don't know what that is. What they must understand is that we have a commitment in South Viet-Nam. We shall make good on that commitment, and we would hope that they would change their policy and throw themselves in support of peace instead of preaching a doctrine of militancy—it is so harsh that it has caused great problems even inside the Communist world, quite apart from the problems that it causes us, all of us, in the free world.

Q. What's your attitude toward those who—and some in this country—who advocate and who were at least not opposed to

a fight with China now, growing out of Viet-Nam—before China develops their nuclear capacity?

A. We haven't wanted a single man in uniform shooting a rifle in Southeast Asia. We don't want a war. The purpose there is peace, and if small countries can have a right to live their own lives without being molested by small or great powers that are nearby, then we can have peace in this world. But there are a hundred small countries around the world who have a fundamental stake in the ability of a small country to live at peace and pursue its own policy.

Q. Referring back again, Mr. Secretary, to that resolution of the National Council of Churches, they suggested that it be made explicit, that in the event of South Vietnamese independence being established, they should, in fact, be free to opt either to go into SEATO or North Viet-Nam to admit the National Federation people into a coalition or not, to become a neutral state or to become part of a buffer region. Is that a possibility?

A. We have said repeatedly that what happens in South Viet-Nam is for the South Vietnamese people themselves to determine. It isn't easy to organize free elections with so much terror and so much assassination throughout the countryside, but if the Viet Cong would lay down their arms, accept amnesty, engage in free elections, these questions can be answered. Let the South Vietnamese decide what their attitude is toward such questions as reunification or nonalignment. We're not out looking for more allies. We have quite enough, thank you, for the moment. We have over 40. They can be nonaligned. The problem is, can they be safe, can they be safe from aggression? And that's something that all of us have a stake in. We neglected that problem when Japanese militarists went into Manchuria in 1931, when Mussolini went into Ethiopia, when Hitler started on his course of action.

Now we dare not neglect that problem, because if aggression builds up momentum and if appetite grows through success, then we are just headed for a catastrophe that the human race cannot yet comprehend.

Q. You're taking, it seems to me, sir, a unilateral stand, however, in South Viet-Nam. Why hasn't the matter been formally submitted to the United Nations?

A. It has been discussed in the United Nations and has been brought there formally from time to time. On the last occasion in which it was formally presented to the Security Council, in August 1964, the Soviet representative moved that Hanoi be invited to the Security Council table. We voted for that resolution and supported it. Hanoi refused to come. Now the general feeling in New York is—and I think the Secretary-General shares this view—that a harsh, divisive debate in the Security Council, which could lead only to no effective results, would not be useful but that attempts ought to be made privately, and quietly, to see whether or not there is a basis for peace. In other words, the charter itself anticipates that debate is a rather drastic remedy, that all of the other possibilities ought to be exhausted before questions are brought there for deeply divisive and cutting debate. Now, those who are interested in peace in Southeast Asia should understand, I think, that it's easy to take it to the Security Council, debate it bitterly for 2 or 3 days, and then have no result. But that doesn't move us toward a solution of the problem.

Q. You feel that all avenues of exploration have not yet been taken up?

A. No, I think that all of them have been taken up, but those channels and those avenues ought to continue alive and alert and active, and it is not necessarily true that debate is a constructive contribution toward that total effort.

Q. Public opinion around the world, and

in Canada too, Mr. Secretary, has not entirely backed the United States in Viet-Nam, as you know. Do you feel that public opinion, this particular public opinion element—that people are simply wrong or that the United States hasn't sufficiently, effectively, explained what it's doing in Viet-Nam?

A. I think that there're a lot of people around the world who have not faced the fact that a harsh aggression is in process in Southeast Asia. Had formal, organized divisions moved across the demarcation lines, say in 1961, the issue would have been much clearer. This has been by process of infiltration. It is not impossible, therefore, for many people just to hope somehow that this problem would go away or that, whatever the problem is, the United States would take care of it. I think that this is inattention due to distance, and perhaps also to failure to reflect upon the experience of the last 40 years and the question of how you deal with aggression. Do you let it grow until it is unmanageable and leads to a general war, or do you try to stop it at its very beginning? We've had a lot of experience in this since 1945.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just one last question. With the holiday season upon us, or in the midst of it, are you more hopeful or less hopeful than you were, say a month ago, in relation to Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I think that one must always work on the basis of optimism. Certainly that is the professional commitment of diplomacy, and our problem here is not lack of contact with the other side. Those are clear, easy, and frequent. The problem is that with contact we have not yet found a basis for peace. We shall continue to explore that possibility through every channel that is open, and we would hope that somehow the New Year can open up possibilities that we have not seen during 1965.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Travel Controls Relaxed for Doctors and Medical Scientists

Department Statement

Press release 304 dated December 29

The President in his speech at the Smithsonian Institution September 16, 1965,¹ referred to the desire of the United States to increase the free flow of ideas and of works of science and imagination. Secretary Rusk on November 4 this year told a White House Conference on Medicine and Public Health that the field of health and of medicine is close to the consciousness of every man and every family in every country and that problems in these fields were "not problems which ought to be governed by political process but ought to be governed by the elementary interest of man in his health."

There are diseases and infections, of plants and animals as well as humans, which are of great concern to all countries. These diseases and infections are no respecters of frontiers, as many examples have shown. It is of utmost importance that every country be informed, both of the dangers of epidemics of all kinds and of improvements in the ways of dealing with them.

For these reasons, many prominent American doctors have expressed strong interest in sharing their knowledge and in gaining experience from their colleagues in other countries. The eminent American doctor and heart specialist Dr. Paul Dudley White has written a personal letter to the Secretary of State asking that unrestricted passports be issued for individuals devoted to the care of the health of all the peoples of the world.

In the light of these considerations of policy and humanity, the Department of State announced today [December 29] that it is expanding the categories of citizens who may receive passports validated for travel to countries for which travel controls now exist to include doctors and scientists

in the fields of public health and medicine who desire to travel to such countries for purposes directly related to their professional responsibilities. Heretofore, passport validations have been given to persons in these fields of activity only when unusual circumstances existed.

Income Tax Protocol With Germany Enters Into Force

Press release 302 dated December 28

On December 27, 1965, the United States and German Federal Republic instruments of ratification were exchanged at Bonn, bringing into force the protocol of September 17, 1965, modifying the convention of July 22, 1954, between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.¹

The protocol gives effect to a number of modifications in the 1954 convention in order to reflect changes in the Federal Republic's tax system and experience in the application of the convention since its entry into force. The modifications relate principally to dividends, interest, and capital gains and would add certain German taxes to those mentioned in the 1954 convention and to which the convention would apply.

A major feature of the revision effected by the protocol is a change in the taxation of dividends. Under the provisions as amended by the protocol, dividends passing from one country to the other will be subject to a reduced withholding tax of 15 percent. An exception to this rule is provided in respect of dividends paid by a Federal Republic company to a United States company having an interest of 10 percent or more in the Federal Republic company paying the

¹ For a message of Sept. 29 from President Johnson transmitting the protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 722.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

dividends. The Federal Republic tax on dividends in such case will be withheld at the full rate of 25 percent, whenever the dividends are reinvested in the Federal Republic company. In this connection, reinvestment in any calendar year totaling less than 7.5 percent of the dividends received will be disregarded. On the other hand, any reinvestment made by the United States company in the year prior to or following the year in which the dividends are paid will be taken into account for purposes of imposing Federal Republic withholding tax at the full 25 percent rate.

Another important change effected by the protocol in the convention relates to know-how payments. Such payments will be treated as royalties and as such will be exempt from tax in the country of source as from January 1, 1963.

The definition of the term "permanent establishment" and the rule governing industrial and commercial profits are brought into line with the definition in other recent income tax conventions of the United States. Other changes effected by the protocol relate to the taxation of interest and capital gains. Double taxation of dividends from portfolio investments in the United States will be avoided by crediting United States tax against Federal Republic tax. The convention is extended to include the Federal Republic trade tax and capital tax. The protocol provides for a broadening of the exemption with respect to personal service income and the provisions dealing with governmental salaries, wages, and pensions. American nonprofit institutions are accorded exemption from Federal Republic tax comparable with that accorded Federal Republic nonprofit institutions under United States law.

Except as otherwise indicated in the protocol, the convention as amended is to apply as of January 1 of the year in which the exchange of instruments of ratification takes place. The article regarding taxation of dividends has effect with respect to dividends paid on or after January 1, 1965.

Tax Convention With Honduras To Continue in Force for 1966

Press release 305 dated December 29

In accordance with the terms of the convention of June 25, 1956, between the United States and Honduras for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income,¹ the Government of Honduras gave notice to the United States Government for the termination of the convention so that the convention would cease to be effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1966.

The Government of Honduras has given formal notice to the United States Government of its desire to withdraw the notice of termination and to allow the convention to continue in force through the year 1966.

The convention of 1956 will, therefore, remain in full force and effect during 1966.

U.S. and Netherlands Sign Supplementary Tax Convention

Press release 306 dated December 30

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Netherlands Ambassador, His Excellency Carl W. A. Schurmann, on December 30 signed a supplementary convention modifying and supplementing the convention of April 29, 1948, between the United States and the Netherlands,² for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes.

The primary purposes of the supplementary convention are to make it possible for the Netherlands Government to impose withholding tax on dividends derived from Netherlands sources by United States citizens, residents, and corporations; to modernize the existing convention by bringing

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3766.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1855, 3366, 3367, and 5665.

it more closely into line with more recent income tax conventions concluded by the United States; and to reflect certain principles expressed in the model income tax convention proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Article 1 amends the definitions of "United States" and "permanent establishment." Article 2 amends the provisions dealing with taxation of industrial and commercial profits derived in one of the countries by an enterprise of the other country. Article 3 modifies the rule authorizing allocation of income among related enterprises. Article 4 modifies the provisions regarding income derived from real property so as to exclude from their application interest from mortgages secured by real property and to provide that mineral royalties may be taxed in the country where the mine, quarry, or natural resource giving rise to the royalty is located.

Article 5 revises the provisions dealing with the taxation of dividends, including a provision whereby the Netherlands may impose withholding tax on dividends paid by a Netherlands corporation to a United States resident or corporation at rates corresponding to those presently provided for in the convention with respect to dividends paid by United States corporations to Netherlands residents or corporations. The "force of attraction" rule with respect to dividends is abandoned; dividends received by a company of one of the countries from sources within the other country which are not "effectively connected" with a permanent establishment in the country from which the dividends originate will qualify for the reduced treaty rate.

Article 6 amends the provisions regarding interest by providing for a reciprocal exemption of interest. Article 7 revises the provisions dealing with royalties by expanding the definition of what constitutes royalties for purposes of the article. Article 8 provides for reciprocal tax exemption, except in limited instances, for capital gains other than those arising from the sale of real property. The "force of attraction" rule

is abandoned also in the cases of articles 6, 7, and 8. Article 8A modifies the "governmental salaries" provisions by limiting the exemption for compensation and pensions paid by one of the countries or its political subdivisions to an individual in the other country so as to apply only to compensation and pensions paid to a citizen of the paying country for services rendered to that country or political subdivision in the discharge of governmental functions. Article 9 makes certain drafting changes in the provision dealing with personal services and expands the class of persons for whom the employee may work and be able to take advantage of the exemption provided. Article 10 expands the scope of the provisions relating to exemptions for professors or teachers.

Article 11 expands the scope of the provisions relating to students and business apprentices. Article 12 revises the provisions dealing with the relief afforded by each of the countries against double taxation. Article 13 amends the provisions under which a taxpayer can initiate consideration of his case if a problem of double taxation is involved. Article 14 broadens the nondiscrimination provision by making it applicable to a permanent establishment which a citizen or corporation of one of the countries has in the other country as well as to corporations the capital of which is wholly or partly owned by citizens or corporations of the other country. Article 15 provides that the supplementary convention shall apply only to that part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands situated in Europe.

Article 16 provides for ratification and for entry into force of the supplementary convention on the exchange of instruments of ratification, to be effective, with certain exceptions, for taxable years beginning on or after January 1 of the year following that in which the exchange takes place. Special provisions are included regarding the effectiveness of the revised provisions on dividend taxation as set forth in article 5 of the supplementary convention.

The supplementary convention will be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

U.S. Urges Better U.N. Machinery for Peaceful Settlement

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

The item before us, the comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping, is surely one of the key items before this General Assembly.

Peacekeeping is at the heart of this organization's work. For if the United Nations failed to fulfill its responsibilities under the charter for the maintenance of peace and security, there would be little hope for the other noble aims of the charter. Prospects for peace in the world and a better life for men everywhere would be immeasurably darkened.

It might be well at this point to define exactly what the term "United Nations peacekeeping" means.

The Secretary-General has provided us with a useful definition. Peacekeeping forces, he told the Harvard alumni in 1963, "are of a very different kind and have little in common with the forces foreseen in Chapter VII, but their existence is not in conflict with Chapter VII. They are essentially *peace* and not fighting forces and they operate only with the consent of the parties directly concerned."

The United Nations has a long history of establishing such peacekeeping forces—in Greece, in 1947; in Kashmir, in 1948; along the borders of Israel, in 1949; in the Gaza Strip, in 1956; in Lebanon, in 1958; in the Congo, in 1960; in West Irian, in 1962; in Yemen, in 1963; in Cyprus, in 1964; and in India and Pakistan in 1965.

The report of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly to the Committee of 33,² and the discussion in that Committee, have helped to define the nature of these peacekeeping operations. Unlike enforcement actions, they are voluntary in two fundamental respects:

—They do not place obligations on member states to contribute personnel, materials, or services.

—They are introduced into the territory of a country only with the consent of that country.

Such operations have taken various forms—observers on a frontier; supervision of a cease-fire line; factfinding and observation to clarify a factual situation or to investigate charges of interference and infiltration from the outside; and assistance to a country to maintain or restore law and order where requested by that country and in conditions in which international peace and security might otherwise be threatened.

It is remarkable—and heartening to my Government—that U.N. peacekeeping operations of all these kinds have gone forward even in the face of deep differences over issues of principle. This is a tribute to the diplomatic and executive talents of the Secretary-General and to the generosity and dedication of participating countries. Above all, it is a tribute to the underlying good sense of the overwhelming majority of member states, which have insisted that the U.N. carry out its responsibilities though none of us may have been fully satisfied with all the arrangements for initiating, supervising, and financing a particular operation.

Mr. Chairman, this success, this partial success, is instructive for our deliberations

¹ Made in the Special Political Committee on Nov. 24 (U.S. delegation press release 4719).

² U.N. doc. A/AC.121/4.

on the peacekeeping issue. We must avoid the fallacy of assuming that total agreement on all issues of principle is a precondition of cooperating in U.N. activities. Here, as elsewhere, the pragmatic adaptation of arrangements on a case-by-case basis may offer the best hope of progress.

In any event, we must not allow our search for new and improved ground rules to impair the procedures and arrangements that we already have.

Nor should we permit the considerable progress already made in developing peacekeeping procedures to be frustrated by a small minority. As we said to the Committee of 33 on August 16:³

My Government . . . is not prepared, to accept a situation in which the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace could be stopped by the negative vote of a single member. Nor should the effectiveness of this organization be determined by the level of support forthcoming from its least co-operative members.

The Principal Ground Rules

What are the ground rules for authorizing, supervising, and financing peacekeeping operations which have developed in the past—and which can guide us in the future?

From the statements of delegations in this and recent General Assemblies, from the deliberations in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, from the report jointly submitted to that Committee by the Secretary-General and the President of the 19th General Assembly, and from the comments of governments on that report, there appears to be widespread support for the following major principles:

First, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for initiating and supervising peacekeeping operations—and everything should be done to enable it to exercise that responsibility.

Certainly there is widespread agreement—in which my Government strongly concurs—that the maximum possible use should be made of the Security Council.

Recent experience—in the Congo, in Cyprus, in Kashmir—has demonstrated that the Council *can* meet its responsibilities for dealing with threats to international peace and security. The enlargement of the Council to make it more representative of the membership as a whole should encourage the further strengthening of its peacekeeping work.

The United States continues to favor the suggestion we submitted in September 1964 to the Working Group of 21 that all proposals to initiate peacekeeping operations should be considered first in the Security Council.⁴ The Assembly would not authorize or assume control of such operations unless the Council had demonstrated its inability to act.

Second, the General Assembly has authority to initiate and supervise peacekeeping operations where the Security Council is unable to act.

Everyone apparently agrees that the General Assembly can make recommendations to the Security Council with respect to peacekeeping in the event the Council is unable to act. But the real question is whether, in the face of veto by a permanent member, the Assembly can authorize the establishment of such operations.

From the comments made by member states in recent months, it appears that the overwhelming majority of U.N. members answer this question in the affirmative. Only a small minority of members continue to insist that the negative vote of one permanent member can prevent 116 other members of the organization from initiating voluntary action to protect their common interests in the maintenance of peace.

I will not repeat here all the arguments—fully confirmed by the International Court of Justice—in support of the complementary powers of the Assembly pursuant to various articles of the charter. I wish only to emphasize, as so many others have already done, that the acceptance of the minority

³ BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 454.

⁴ For texts of a U.S. statement and working paper of Sept. 14, 1964, see *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1964, p. 486.

view on this subject would be absurd in theory and intolerable in practice.

All of our countries, in accepting membership in the U.N., agreed to refrain from the use of force save in self-defense, in support of U.N. action, and pursuant to chapter VIII of the charter. These charter restraints were undertaken on the assumption that the United Nations could act successfully when peace and security—and hence our common interests—were seriously threatened. It would be unreasonable to expect members to entrust peacekeeping responsibility to a U.N. which could be rendered impotent by the intransigence of a single member. Such an interpretation would do violence to the charter and would disappoint the legitimate hopes in this organization of the peoples of the world.

The United States, though itself a permanent member of the Security Council, has never considered that any one member should have the power unilaterally, and without recourse, to frustrate the initiation of peacekeeping operations not involving enforcement action. Some have argued that, on a narrow calculation of our interests and having regard to the fact that we have but one vote of 117 while paying 32 percent of the regular budget, we should be disposed to do so.

Nevertheless, we have defended the authority of the Assembly to undertake peacekeeping operations free from veto by ourselves or others because we recognize the long-term interest of all mankind in developing this means of containing violence in the nuclear age. We have not considered that our interests require us to have a veto over recommendations to members that they contribute to U.N. operations taking place on the territory of a state with its consent. We appeal to others to take the same long view of their own interests.

Third, the General Assembly has the exclusive authority under the charter to apportion the expenses of peacekeeping operations among the members of the United Nations.

This principle, like those I have mentioned

earlier, is supported by a large majority of United Nations members. It is fully confirmed by the language of article 17, by 20 years of practice in the United Nations, and by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice accepted by the General Assembly.⁵ With respect to financing as well as authorization, the powers of the Assembly should be preserved. No member should have the right to veto a financial plan accepted by everyone else.

Fourth, the expenses of U.N. peacekeeping operations should be, so far as possible, the collective financial responsibility of the entire membership.

This principle, asserted without any qualification in General Assembly Resolution 1874 (S-IV),⁶ has been supported by the United States and a majority of other members for very practical reasons:

—It offers the best way of sharing the financial burden fairly among the membership.

—It recognizes that every member has an interest in the preservation of peace and should therefore pay something—no matter how little—toward its preservation.

—It takes account of the fact that member states will be more likely to contribute military contingents for an operation when it has broad political support as reflected in widely shared financial participation.

Many, to be sure, have expressed optimism that voluntary financing of peacekeeping can do the job. The voluntary method of financing certainly offers one possibility to be considered on a case-by-case basis. But experience indicates that it often places unfair burdens on troop-supplying countries and may even fail to produce sufficient funds to assure the continuance of the operation.

At this very moment the Secretary-General is short some \$7 million for the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Those who believe voluntary financing is the answer have

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30, and Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 182.

an obligation to demonstrate that it can work in specific situations. As Ambassador Stevenson once said, it would be irresponsible for the members to sit back while the Secretary-General has to search for funds like a beggar on the street.

Fifth, the cost of peacekeeping operations should be shared fairly among the members in accordance with their capacity to pay and with due regard for the international character of these operations.

General Assembly Resolution 1874 (S-IV) included two propositions on which there is broad support—that economically developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions than countries that are economically less developed, and that the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council should be borne in mind in connection with their contributions to financing. There is widespread support for the concept of a special scale of assessment for peacekeeping operations which could give effect to these propositions.

The United States has already expressed support for a special scale. We reaffirm that support today.

Sixth, General Assembly procedures for authorizing, supervising, and financing peacekeeping operations should provide an appropriate voice for those members which bear the principal responsibility for supporting them.

With this in mind, we included in our submission to the Committee of 21, in September 1964, a proposal for a Special Finance Committee of the General Assembly. This committee would include the permanent members of the Security Council and a relatively high percentage of those member states in each geographic area that are large contributors. The General Assembly, in approving financial arrangements for peacekeeping operations, would act only on recommendations from this committee passed by a two-thirds majority of the committee's membership.

The United States is not irrevocably wedded to this particular proposal. We

note that other proposals addressed to this same problem have been put forward by the delegations of Nigeria and France. Here, as in the case of other principles I have mentioned, we are prepared to consider any reasonable procedure for implementing the overall objective.

Seventh, the Secretary-General is the most appropriate executive agent for managing peacekeeping operations and should be given every support within the scope of his mandate.

As the chief executive officer of the United Nations, the Secretary-General has the right and the duty to implement the directives of the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other organs. At various times in the past two decades he has carried out this responsibility under broad mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, the Congo, Cyprus, and Kashmir. We are of the firm conviction that he should continue to exercise this responsibility in the best interest of effective United Nations peacekeeping.

These, then, are the general principles which we believe should guide this organization in dealing with the peacekeeping problem. These principles are broadly compatible with the guidelines set forth in paragraph 52 of the report submitted by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations—guidelines which have had the widespread support of the members of the United Nations.

The tide of historical evolution of this organization which is reflected in these principles cannot be reversed by a few recalcitrant members. The peacekeeping work of the United Nations must continue, and it will continue.

The Irish Proposal

I turn now to the concrete proposal put forward initially by the Government of Ireland.⁷

First, I should like to express our ap-

⁷ U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.117 and Add. 1 and 2.

preciation to the Irish Government and, in particular, to Foreign Minister [Frank] Aiken, for taking the initiative in this vital area. Theirs is a concrete proposal, carefully worked out. It is designed to preserve and strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to undertake peacekeeping operations. It makes a sincere effort to do this while accommodating the legitimate interests of all members.

This proposal is a challenge to every member of this Assembly to rethink its position on peacekeeping operations in precise detail. How we respond to this challenge—what we say in this debate on peacekeeping—what we do at the end of it all—will profoundly affect the future capacity of our organization to perform its principal responsibility under the charter.

As for the United States, we have a number of reservations about the proposal. We expect that other delegations may have reservations as well. It would be surprising if this were not the case, since at this point in the history of the United Nations no proposal would be fully consistent with the viewpoints of every member.

Turning to specifics, we note with satisfaction that some of the principles I have outlined are reflected in the proposal put before us by the delegations of Ceylon, Ghana, Ireland, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Nepal.

The proposal recognizes the special responsibility of the Security Council to initiate and supervise peacekeeping operations. It affirms the authority of the General Assembly to initiate and supervise such operations where the Council is unable to act. It maintains the right of the General Assembly to assess the membership for the expenses of peacekeeping operations.

It also calls for collective fiscal responsibility, subject to a right of opting out to be accorded by the General Assembly to the five permanent members of the Security Council, which right is coupled with certain increased financial responsibilities by the permanent members.

We believe that full collective fiscal re-

sponsibility is the first choice. But we have also to recognize that it cannot be achieved in practice until there is a change in the attitudes of certain permanent members.

For these reasons, we are prepared to accept such an opting-out arrangement for permanent members as an interim measure if that is the wish of the majority of the Assembly. If we cannot have full collective responsibility, let us achieve as much shared responsibility as we can. We certainly do not believe that, simply because some permanent members are not prepared to be assessed against their will for peacekeeping operations, no member should be assessed at all.

As we stated before the Special Peacekeeping Committee on August 16:

We look forward . . . to the not too distant day when the entire membership will resume its full range of collective responsibility for maintaining world peace. In the meantime, it is all the more important for the membership, though unready to apply article 19, to solve the United Nations financial problems and to continue to support in practice the sound principle of collective financial responsibility, and to adopt practical and equitable means by which those willing to share the responsibility for peace can act in concert to maintain and strengthen the indispensable peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations.

The proposal also embodies the concept of a special scale of assessment. I must make certain observations, however, on the way it seeks to implement that concept.

The resolution seeks to apply a fixed scale to all operations regardless of their size and regardless of the special circumstances that may be involved. We believe, in accordance with the practice of the United Nations, that the regular scale of assessment is appropriate for relatively small peacekeeping operations and for a small portion of larger operations.

The United States also has reservations about a proposal that one country might have to pay as much as 50 percent of the cost of any operation for which it cast an affirmative vote. Under existing legislation, the United States delegation is not authorized to vote for an assessment in which the

United States share is more than 33½ percent.

The proposal now before us would also lay down new procedures for the initiation of peacekeeping operations by the General Assembly. My delegation reserves the right to return to a discussion of the proposal after other delegations have had an opportunity to be heard.

At this point I shall simply express our reservations on that procedural change which would have the effect of counting abstentions as a negative vote. Such a change could result in the failure of a peacekeeping operation favored by a very substantial majority of members—by a vote, for example, of 77 in favor, 10 against, and 30 abstentions.

Need for Advance Planning

These remarks have concentrated on the vital issues of initiating, supervising, and financing of peacekeeping operations. But our review of peacekeeping operations would not be comprehensive if we stopped here.

Recent experience has revealed a number of shortcomings in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Some of these shortcomings are inherent in any international peacekeeping system. But others may be remediable by better advance planning. We need to consider additional steps which can be taken now to enable the United Nations to carry out future peacekeeping missions with greater speed and effectiveness.

The Secretary-General has urged United Nations members to earmark military units which they might make available on request to the United Nations. Such earmarking has already been undertaken by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and New Zealand.

Earmarking has very practical advantages. It signifies a serious intention by nations to participate under certain circumstances; units or resources are identified; they prepare and train in terms of probable United Nations needs. The availability of units is,

of course, subject to a national decision to participate in each particular case. But there is more than a psychological advantage to the United Nations in having identified, trained, and committed units available for United Nations service.

This flexible United Nations callup system could be strengthened in a number of different ways:

Within the Secretariat itself, there should be contingency planning on how to meet possible future peacekeeping emergencies. Based on such planning, the United Nations could identify the personnel, equipment, and services which peacekeeping operations might require. It could also solicit the earmarking of the necessary personnel, equipment, and services from various member states—encouraging contributions from countries in all geographic areas.

The units thus earmarked could be trained in the specialized skills and unique problems involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations could prepare training manuals and encourage standardized equipment and military procedures.

Some countries may be unable to assume the full burdens of training and equipping units for United Nations service. A program might be organized to train officers and those types of specialized personnel—for example, communications specialists—whose scarcity has hampered previous peacekeeping operations. Aid to earmarking countries could be made available through the United Nations or through members.

Of course, Mr. Chairman, the crucial ingredient in the United Nations' capacity to keep the peace does not lie in particular arrangements. The crucial ingredient is political and moral. It is our determination to rely on the United Nations, to use the United Nations, to have confidence in the United Nations' operating capacity. The stakes are so high that we should be willing to take chances on the United Nations' capacity to act and to back it up even when some of its particular decisions go against our immediate national desires. For the risks of a United Nations without the capacity

to act are far greater than the risks of a United Nations with that capacity.

Let us put our faith in this organization's ability to take on increasingly difficult peacekeeping tasks around the globe. It will make mistakes. It will annoy all of us some time and some of us all the time. Despite these frustrations, we should be willing to risk reliance on United Nations peacekeeping, because the alternative—of immobilizing the United Nations in one of its key areas of activity—is too great a risk for us to take. It conjures up the specter of uncontained disorder and violence which could escalate into a world holocaust.

For this reason we share the view already expressed by other delegations that this Assembly should seek to crystallize the broad measure of agreement that already exists on the initiating, supervising, and financing of peacekeeping operations. We cannot permit the interests of the cooperative many in a workable system of peacekeeping to be frustrated by the demands of a reluctant few.

This committee bears a special responsibility at this critical period in the life of our organization to preserve and strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to discharge its principal responsibility contained in the charter. As Ambassador Adlai Stevenson put it less than 1 year ago in his address to the General Assembly:

“... I, for one, cannot escape the deep sense that the peoples of the world are looking over our shoulder—waiting to see whether we can overcome our present problem and take up with fresh vigor and renewed resolution the great unfinished business of peace. . . .”⁸

⁸ In plenary session on Dec. 15 the General Assembly adopted two resolutions (combined in A/RES/2053 (XX)) on the peacekeeping item: The first requested the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to continue its work and report to the next session of the Assembly, and called upon all member states “to make voluntary contributions so that the future may be faced with renewed hope and confidence”; the second took note of the Irish proposal and invited the Special Committee to “give it its careful consideration.”

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Strongly Recommended by U.S.

Following are statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative William C. Foster.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 25

U.S. delegation press release 4722

A comprehensive test ban is among the most important and, logically, should be among the more feasible of the related collateral measures to which so much attention was given in our earlier discussion of non-proliferation.¹ A ban on the underground testing of nuclear weapons, following the limited test ban treaty of 1963 banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, would fulfill an almost universal desire to ban all nuclear testing, in all environments and for all time. In halting all testing of nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers would be taking a significant step paving the way to other measures for halting and turning back the nuclear arms race. Nuclear and non-nuclear states alike, in subscribing to a comprehensive test ban, would be making an immensely valuable contribution to the efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We are also not unmindful of the salutary effects a comprehensive test ban could have in contributing to further easing of international tension and to the betterment of relations among governments.

In view of these general considerations, it is not surprising that the delay in achieving a comprehensive test ban agreement has given rise to a sense of frustration and even of irritation in many quarters. But it is not enough to will an agreement. We cannot simply overlook the technical obstacles.

There is certainly no other subject in the history of disarmament during the past decade that has received more study and at-

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873.

tention than this problem of a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. My Government has played a key role in these developments and discussions, beginning with President Eisenhower's initiative of January 1958,² which resulted later that year in Soviet agreement to a technical conference on the question of cessation of nuclear testing. Throughout that conference on the discontinuance of testing, throughout the negotiation of the limited test ban, and to this day, my Government has given exhaustive study to this problem. It is because we attach great value to a comprehensive test ban that we have continued to devote sizable resources to seismic research in order to improve our capability of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests. Those of you who were among the representatives of U.N. member states invited last month to the inauguration of our large-aperture seismic array in Montana were able to see and to judge for yourselves one direction our research activity is taking.

With the committee's permission, I might briefly outline in more detail some of the aspects of the question of detection of underground tests—its promise and its limitations.

I shall avoid going into too much technical detail at this time. For those delegations interested in a fuller description of the technical aspects, I might refer them to my statement to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament on September 2, 1965, contained in document ENDC/PV 229. However, it will perhaps help make my subsequent remarks clearer if I make one or two general observations at the outset.

What we are detecting by seismic means are simply earth tremors. It is by a complex process of interpretation of the data from seismometers recording these earth tremors that we seek to determine whether the tremor resulted from natural causes—that is, an earthquake—and therefore could not

be a manmade explosion. There is considerable variation in the geographic distribution of earthquakes, but some of the areas with the greatest number of earthquakes are located in a belt surrounding the Pacific Ocean, and another belt extends from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Black Sea. Moreover, there is considerable variation from year to year in the number and size of earthquakes. This compounds the problem of singling out and positively identifying nuclear explosions from among those earth tremors that we can detect. Furthermore, some earthquakes produce seismic signals which cannot be distinguished from those produced by nuclear explosions. The strength of the seismic signal generated by a nuclear explosion also varies with the nature of the soil in which the underground nuclear explosion is contained. These are some of the factors that complicate efforts at detection and identification of underground nuclear tests.

Since the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958,³ the United States has been conducting a broad program of research in seismology, the primary objective of which has been to develop improved techniques for detecting seismic events, for locating them, and for identifying whether they are of natural origin. Our research program has led to substantial increases in our knowledge of these matters which are basic to the problem of verifying a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

We have found that the use of large arrays of seismometers will improve our capability to separate out the background "noise" caused by continuous vibrations of the earth from the true signal emitted by a seismic event. Such an array comprises some 525 seismometers distributed in a certain pattern over a large area. This is the kind of array which is now in operation in Montana.

As I have said, seismic background noise tends to mask the signal emitted by a seis-

² For text of a letter of Jan. 12, 1958, from President Eisenhower to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, see *ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

³ For background and text of report, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.

mic event and, in the past, has prevented us from detecting the smaller seismic events. If a system of 10 to 12 such large arrays were established on a worldwide basis, then it would be possible to detect events which produce signals equivalent to nuclear detonations in the range of hundreds of tons.

Yet after an event has been detected, it is necessary that we attempt to identify its cause. Identification requires the recording of a larger seismic signal than is needed for detection purposes alone. By reducing the background noise and thus making the seismic signal clearer and more distinct, large arrays will aid in identifying seismic events. But unfortunately the recordings of some earthquakes are like those of manmade explosions. No technique is known at present which will permit the identification of explosions as such by seismic systems at remote locations, that is, at distances which might be involved with strictly national systems. However, a variety of techniques have been developed which allow us to identify those earthquakes which have characteristics most distinguishable from those of explosions. It appears to us that by using these techniques, it will be possible to identify about 80 percent of the natural earthquakes which produce seismic signals that correspond to yields above a few kilotons.

In the case of the Soviet Union, for example, the remaining 20 percent of the natural events which could not be distinguished from possible explosions would amount to an average of about 45 events each year. While some of these might be further identified using ocean-bottom seismometers, which would more accurately reveal the location and characteristics of the event, even with the use of these sophisticated techniques there would remain a substantial number of unidentified events in any year.

We know of no way to identify these remaining events short of some inspection at the site of the event. If the scientists of the Soviet Union, or of any other country, could demonstrate to us any satisfactory techniques for identifying these events without on-site inspection, they would be making a

great contribution to our objective.

I have dwelt on these points in order to demonstrate why it is not possible to dispense with some on-site inspections. However, as I indicated at Geneva and reiterated earlier in this committee, we are prepared to take current scientific capabilities fully into account in discussing the numbers and modalities of on-site inspections for verification of a comprehensive test ban. We warmly welcome the suggestion of eight of the ENDC members in their joint memorandum⁴ that the nuclear powers exchange scientific and other information to facilitate agreement on a comprehensive test ban. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom stated the case for such talks convincingly when he spoke on November 24. If there is disagreement on the technical potentials of seismic detection and identification methods between the Soviet Union and the United States, and there appears to be, then let our scientists sit down together and discuss the problem objectively. We regret that the Soviet Union has shown no interest whatsoever in doing so.

The Soviet Union has argued that we must follow the principle of the limited test ban treaty, which contains no explicit provision for international control. We suggest, on the contrary, that the limited test ban indeed has vindicated the position that international obligations in the arms control and disarmament field should be accompanied by appropriate measures of verification. The nature of the measures will depend on what is to be controlled. Such measures may be national or international, but the point is that verification is clearly necessary.

The limited test ban applied to those environments where means of verification could be developed adequately on a national basis. This is unfortunately not so in the case of underground testing, where some other form of verification must be devised. It need not be unacceptably intrusive. And, contrary to

⁴ A memorandum submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the U.A.R. is annexed to U.N. doc. A/5986.

continued Soviet allegations, it would not have any purpose for espionage, notwithstanding the seemingly chronic sensitivity of the Soviet Union on this point.

What is involved is permitting a small inspection team to go to a given site and to determine whether an unidentifiable event was due to a nuclear explosion or to natural causes, that is, an earthquake. The Soviet Union, which a few years ago was prepared to agree to a certain number of on-site inspections, has since refused to agree to any inspections at all, claiming that national control measures alone were adequate.

Yet some on-site inspections are essential if parties to a comprehensive test ban are to have adequate assurance that all parties are also fully complying with it. It would seem to be in the interest of all parties to insure that a comprehensive test ban is a lasting and viable agreement. Any agreement that could not allay—and might even stimulate—distrust and suspicion would be a tenuous and potentially short-lived agreement.

Mr. Chairman, we believe these difficulties are surmountable and that an effective comprehensive test ban agreement can be achieved. It is always tempting to look for shortcuts. One such shortcut is the suggestion for an unverified moratorium on underground tests. We have already had one understanding regarding the suspension of underground testing, and the Soviet Union started testing again in spite of official statements that they would not be the first to do so. We are not inclined to repeat that unfortunate experience.

Moreover, a moratorium might diminish pressure for the stable and permanent comprehensive test ban we all seek. The breaking of a moratorium would hardly create conditions conducive to subsequent negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. For these reasons a moratorium on underground testing is unacceptable to the United States.

Where, then, does the path to agreement lie? In our view it lies in demonstration of flexibility on both sides—the U.S. and the Soviet Union. My Government, as I have

stressed, has expressed its willingness to exercise flexibility regarding the position it took in the past and remains prepared to negotiate. We call on the Soviet Union to do likewise.

Mr. Chairman, in a previous statement before this committee I noted that only last month President Johnson stated: ⁵

The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 represents real progress, and we are continuously trying to move forward to a comprehensive and lasting ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

My Government does not take lightly the commitment it subscribed to in the preamble to the limited treaty, wherein parties thereto vowed to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. The United States delegation will return to Geneva with the strong determination and hope that renewed negotiations will prove possible and will lead to early agreement on a verified, comprehensive test ban.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 26

U.S. delegation press release 4723

I shall be very brief in my remarks on the draft resolution before us.⁶ As I stressed to the committee yesterday, my Government continues actively to seek agreement on a comprehensive test ban. We are, therefore, in complete accord with the overall aim of the draft resolution even though we would have preferred to see the language of certain sections improved. If time were not at a premium, we would be tempted to suggest various changes in the text which is now before us. We have decided to refrain from doing so in order not to protract discussion and to permit this committee with its crowded agenda to move on promptly to the next agenda item. I shall, therefore, limit myself to a few comments in explanation

⁵ In a message sent to the dedication of the large-aperture seismic array installation at Billings, Mont., on Oct. 12.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.345/Rev. 1.

of my country's vote.

In the third preambular paragraph, it is noted with regret that nuclear weapon tests have continued to take place. We share the regret that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on a verified comprehensive test ban that would halt all testing. But, in the absence of such agreement, the United States finds it necessary in the interests of its security to continue underground testing as permitted by the limited test ban treaty. The Soviet Union also is conducting such tests.

We are pleased to note that in the final preambular paragraph, as well as in operative paragraph 3, the draft resolution takes cognizance of the importance progress in seismic detection and identification techniques could have in facilitating agreement on a comprehensive test ban. We regard this as the key to reaching agreement on such a comprehensive treaty.

As regards the first operative paragraph, let me say that we can accept the wording as it now appears as an expression of the almost universal desire which we strongly share to bring about a permanent cessation of all testing as soon as possible. We believe this can and must be accomplished by means of an adequately verified agreement. For the reasons that I gave yesterday, Mr. Chairman, an unverified moratorium would be wholly unacceptable to the United States. We strongly endorse the call on all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the limited test ban treaty as stated in operative paragraph 2. Universal compliance with this treaty would, in itself, mark a major advance toward disarmament and international stability.

Finally, we welcome the call in the final operative paragraph for prompt renewal of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. In returning to Geneva, it is in the spirit of that paragraph that we shall with determination seek to achieve agreement on an adequately verified treaty. It is on this basis, Mr. Chairman, that the United States is pleased to be able to join in supporting this resolution.⁷

The Denuclearization of Africa

Statement by William C. Foster

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

At the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and during the last session of the Disarmament Commission, the United States welcomed the initiatives of the states of Latin America and Africa in undertaking studies with a view to achieving and maintaining a nuclear-free status for these regions. The objectives sought by these initiatives are in harmony with our policy to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore have our enthusiastic support. With regard to arrangements to be made to achieve the denuclearization of Africa we must, of course, reserve our position until we can examine the specific provisions which will appear in the convention yet to be developed in order to give legal effect to the declaration of the African heads of state or government.

The fact that the initiative is being taken by the states concerned, however, fully satisfies one of the criteria which we believe should govern the establishment of nuclear-free zones. We shall examine the legal instruments which are to be developed also in the light of our other criteria, namely, (a) that a denuclearized zone should preferably include all states in the area, especially any whose failure to participate might render the agreement ineffective or meaningless; (b) that no state or group of states should

⁷ In a resolution adopted by Committee I on Nov. 26 and in plenary session on Dec. 3 (A/RES/2032 (XX)), the Assembly urged that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended; called upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the treaty on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; and asked the 18-Nation Committee "to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection . . ."

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 1, 1965 (U.S. delegation press release 4730).

derive military advantage from the creation of the zone; and (c) that provision should be made for adequate verification, which would include procedures for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance both to states included in the zone and to those outside the zone who have undertaken to respect it. In this connection, we strongly hope that the African states will find it possible to include in their convention provisions for the acceptance of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards similar to those under consideration by the states of Latin America.

With these general considerations in mind, I can say that the United States views with sympathy the draft resolution before us in document A/C.1/L.346 revised. We are in full agreement with most of its provisions and with the spirit of others, even though they contain some ambiguities and raise possible difficulties. Some of these difficulties may be resolved in time or by the convention which the African states have stated they intend to conclude.

Turning now to certain provisions of the draft resolution, I wish to remind the committee that the United States abstained in the vote on resolution 1652 (XVI), which is mentioned in the second preambular paragraph. We found part of that resolution premature and other provisions created possible difficulties because of their ambiguity.

We understand the reference to "various other areas of the world" in the fourth preambular paragraph to refer to those areas where, as in the case of Africa, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone would not upset the military balance. As we have stated on other occasions, we believe that the goal mentioned in the fifth preambular paragraph can only be achieved with assurance and safety as the result of the implementation of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

We welcome the revised text of operative

paragraph 1, which removes the main difficulty we found in the draft originally proposed.

Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 would have the Assembly endorse the declaration of the African heads of state or government and call upon all states to respect it. That declaration is in fact a statement of intention. It states the readiness of the states concerned to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control nuclear weapons. The United States is pleased to support that statement of intent as being fully consistent with our policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

As for operative paragraph 4, we have on other occasions made clear why the United States cannot, outside the framework of general and complete disarmament, subscribe to declarations or pledges concerning the nonuse of nuclear weapons. I shall not take the time to reiterate our reasons. I stated them fully most recently in the Disarmament Commission, on May 17 of this year.² I should like to stress, however, that it is the concept of pledges of nonuse which we find unsound, in general, and not its application to Africa. I am certain that our inability to support this concept on general grounds will in no way be misunderstood by the states concerned and that it will in no way hinder them in the development of a convention on the denuclearization of Africa.

Although there seems to be some ambiguity in the drafting, and apart from the reference to "using" nuclear weapons, on which I have already commented, we find that operative paragraphs 5 and 6 appear to be generally consistent with basic United States policy as expressed in the United States draft of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.³ We wholeheartedly endorse operative paragraphs 7, 8, and

² Not printed here.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474.

9 and wish the African states Godspeed in their further efforts to achieve the denuclearization of Africa.

With this explanation of our position we shall be able to give our support to this draft resolution. Despite the problems raised by the provisions to which I have referred, we shall vote for this resolution in order to underscore our conviction that a soundly conceived and appropriately implemented nuclear-free zone in Africa would help to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, contribute to world peace and stability, and facilitate progress toward general and complete disarmament.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Policy of various countries toward Southern Rhodesia: Japan, S/6990, December 3, 1965, 1 p.; Denmark, S/7005, December 14, 1965, 1 p.; Norway, S/7008, December 13, 1965, 1 p.; Sweden, S/7012, December 14, 1965, 3 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on his efforts to give effect to Security Council resolution 210 of September 6, 211 of September 20, and 215 of November 5 relating to the India-Pakistan dispute. S/6699/Add. 11. December 15, 1965. 3 pp.

Letter dated December 14 from the permanent representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the dispute with Pakistan. S/7014. December 15, 1965. 4 pp.

Note verbale dated December 7 from the permanent mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia. S/7015. December 15, 1965. 2 pp.

Note verbale dated December 13 from the permanent mission of Italy addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia. S/7016. December 15, 1965. 1 p.

General Assembly

Pattern of conferences. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5979. December 13, 1965. 51 pp.

United Nations Emergency Force: revised cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force in 1964, cost estimates for 1965, and revised cost estimates for 1966. A/6171. December 15, 1965. 6 pp.

Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Report of the Secretary-General. A/6174. December 16, 1965. 9 pp.

Letter dated December 14 from the permanent representative of the U.S.S.R. addressed to the Secretary-General concerning implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. A/6179. December 17, 1965. 2 pp.

Permanent missions to the United Nations. A/6178. December 17, 1965. 3 pp.

Credentials of representatives to the 19th and 20th sessions of the General Assembly. A/6208. 7 pp.

Administrative budget estimates for the secretariat of the U.N. Development Program for the year 1966. A/6213. December 20, 1965. 8 pp.

Question of South West Africa. Letter dated December 21 from the permanent representative of South Africa addressed to the President of the General Assembly. A/6219. December 21, 1965. 3 pp.

Reports of the First Committee (Political and Security).

Question of Cyprus. A/6166. December 16, 1965. 14 pp.

Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighborly relations among European states having different social and political systems. A/6207. December 18, 1965. 3 pp.

International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. A/6212. December 20, 1965. 5 pp.

The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the protection of their independence and sovereignty. A/6220. December 21, 1965. 10 pp.

The Korean question. A/6221. December 21, 1965. 7 pp.

Reports of the Second Committee (Economic and Financial)

Population growth and economic development. A/6197. December 10, 1965. 6 pp.

Reports made by the Economic and Social Council. A/6188. December 18, 1965. 17 pp.

Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. A/6189. December 18, 1965. 13 pp.

Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries. A/6190. December 18, 1965. 10 pp.

Activities in the field of industrial development. A/6191. December 18, 1965. 14 pp.

Role of the United Nations in training national technical personnel for the accelerated industrialization of the developing countries. A/6192. December 18, 1965. 4 pp.

Role of patents in the transfer of technology to developing countries. A/6193. December 18, 1965. 6 pp.

Decentralization of the economic and social activities of the United Nations. A/6194. December 18, 1965. 2 pp.

Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament. A/6195. December 18, 1965. 4 pp.

Permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A/6196. December 18, 1965. 7 pp.

Progress and operations of the Special Fund and on U.N. programs of technical cooperation. A/6198. December 18, 1965. 7 pp.

The world food program. A/6199. December 18, 1965. 15 pp.

U.S. and Canada Sign Agreement Updating U.S. Tariff Concessions

Following is an announcement made by the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations on December 17 regarding the Interim Agreement Between the United States and Canada Relating to the Renegotiation of Schedule XX (United States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which was signed at Washington that day, together with annex II of the agreement, which sets forth U.S. compensatory concessions.

STR ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States and Canada on December 17 signed an agreement which reestablishes in the language of the revised U.S. tariff schedules the trade agreement concessions which the United States had previously granted to Canada. The agreement also grants new concessions to offset the impairment in those previous concessions incidental to bringing the revised tariff schedules into force.

The negotiation with Canada was one of some 30 negotiations authorized by the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to bring the United States tariff concessions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in bilateral trade agreements into conformance with the language of the revised Tariff Schedules of the United States. The change in 1963 from a tariff based on the Tariff Act of 1930 to a tariff based on the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (recently amended by the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965) resulted in numerous incidental rate changes. On the whole, reductions offset

increases, but for Canada there were more rate increases than decreases, and compensatory U.S. tariff reductions were required.

Canada and the United States have agreed that new concessions on 23 tariff items covering U.S. imports valued at \$11.5 million from Canada (based on trade in 1961, the reference year of the negotiations) would offset the net rate increases of the new tariff. Total imports from Canada in 1961 were about \$3 billion. Included in the new concessions are aircraft parts, vegetable fiber building boards, certain hand-operated taps and valves, pulleys, and game machines.

The agreement will be made effective on January 1st through a Presidential proclamation.¹

The present agreement resolves issues between the two Governments arising from the U.S. tariff revision. Other negotiations on mutual tariff reductions and other trade restrictions are continuing between the two Governments at Geneva as part of the multilateral Kennedy Round of trade negotiations.

ANNEX II

UNITED STATES COMPENSATORY CONCESSIONS TO CANADA

General Notes

1. The provisions of this Schedule are subject to the pertinent notes appearing at the end of Schedule XX (Geneva-1947) annexed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as authenticated at Geneva on October 30, 1947.

2. The bracketed language in the description column of this Schedule has been inserted only in order to clarify the scope of the numbered concession items, and such language is not itself intended

¹ For text of Proclamation 3694, dated Dec. 27, 1965, see 30 *Fed. Reg.* 17147.

to describe articles on which concessions have been granted.

3. For the purpose of applying the one-year intervals provided for in the rate columns in this Schedule:

(a) The rate of duty specified in any rate column relating to an item shall be considered as being in

effect even though there is being applied to an article provided for under such item either no duty or a lower rate of duty; and

(b) There shall be excluded any time during which a rate of duty higher than that specified in a rate column relating to an item is being applied to an article provided for under such item.

TSUS Item	Description	Rates of duty, effective January 1, —				
		1966	1967 ¹	1968 ¹	1969 ¹	1970 ¹
	Lumber and wood siding, drilled or treated; and edge-glued or end-glued wood not over 6 feet in length or over 15 inches in width, whether or not drilled or treated: [Softwood lumber and siding, drilled, or pressure treated with creosote or other wood preservative, or both, but not otherwise treated] [Hardwood, edge-glued or end-glued, not drilled or treated]					
202.54	Other	9% ad val.	8% ad val.	7% ad val.	6% ad val.	5% ad val.
	Hardboard, whether or not face finished: [Not face finished; and oil treated, whether or not regarded as tempered, but not otherwise face finished]					
245.30	Other	28% ad val.	26% ad val.	24% ad val.	22% ad val.	20% ad val.
	Building boards not specially provided for, whether or not face finished: [Laminated boards bonded in whole or in part, or impregnated, with synthetic resins]					
245.90	Other boards of vegetable fibers (including wood fibers)	4% ad val.	4% ad val.	3% ad val.	3% ad val.	2.5% ad val.
	Crepe paper, including paper creped or partly creped in any manner: [Creped as a secondary converting process after paper has been made]					
253.20	Other	1.35¢ lb.+3% ad val.	1.2¢ lb.+3% ad val.	1.05¢ lb.+3% ad val.	0.9¢ lb.+2% ad val.	0.75¢ lb.+2% ad val.
	Iron compounds: [Sulfide (pyrites)] [Sulfate (ferrous) (copperas)]					
418.94	Other	9% ad val.	8% ad val.	7% ad val.	6% ad val.	5% ad val.
	Nickel compounds: [Chloride] [Oxide] [Sulfate]					
419.76	Other	9% ad val.	8% ad val.	7% ad val.	6% ad val.	5% ad val.
	Selenium compounds: [Dioxide] [Salts]					
420.54	Other	9% ad val.	8% ad val.	7% ad val.	6% ad val.	5% ad val.
	Stone chips and spalls, and stone, crushed (otherwise than merely to facilitate shipment to the United States) or ground:					
513.34	Limestone	18¢ short ton	16¢ short ton	14¢ short ton	12¢ short ton	10¢ short ton

¹ Subject to General Note 3(b) to this Schedule.

	Ferroalloys:					
	Ferrosilicon:					
607.50	Containing over 8 percent but not over 60 percent by weight of silicon	0.76¢ lb. on silicon content	0.72¢ lb. on silicon content	0.68¢ lb. on silicon content	0.64¢ lb. on silicon content	0.6¢ lb. on silicon content
607.51	Containing over 60 percent but not over 80 percent by weight of silicon	0.92¢ lb. on silicon content	0.84¢ lb. on silicon content	0.76¢ lb. on silicon content	0.68¢ lb. on silicon content	0.6¢ lb. on silicon content
	Locks and padlocks (whether key, combination, or electrically operated), luggage frames incorporating locks, all the foregoing, and parts thereof, of base metal; lock keys: [Padlocks] [Cabinet locks] [Luggage locks, and parts thereof, and luggage frames incorporating locks]					
646.92	Other	18% ad val.	17% ad val.	17% ad val.	16% ad val.	15% ad val.
	Hangars and other buildings, bridges, bridge sections, lock-gates, towers, lattice masts, roofs, roofing frameworks, door and window frames, shutters, balustrades, columns, pillars, and posts, and other structures and parts of structures, all the foregoing of base metal: [Of iron or steel:] [Door and window frames] [Columns, pillars, posts, beams, girders, and similar structural units]					
652.98	Other	17% ad val.	15% ad val.	13% ad val.	11% ad val.	9.5% ad val.
660.10	Steam and other vapor generating boilers (except central heating hot water boilers capable also of producing low pressure steam), and parts thereof	13% ad val.	13% ad val.	12% ad val.	12% ad val.	11% ad val.
	Producer gas and water gas generators, with or without purifiers; acetylene gas generators (water process) and other gas generators, with or without purifiers; all the foregoing and parts thereof: [Apparatus for the generation of acetylene gas from calcium carbide, and parts thereof]					
660.22	Other	13% ad val.	13% ad val.	12% ad val.	12% ad val.	11% ad val.
661.20	Air-conditioning machines, comprising a motor-driven fan and elements for changing the temperature and humidity of air, and parts thereof	11% ad val.	11% ad val.	10% ad val.	10% ad val.	9.5% ad val.
	Parts of the foregoing machines [i.e., machines for making cellulosic pulp, paper, or paperboard; machines for processing or finishing pulp, paper, or paperboard, or making them up into articles]:					
668.04	Bed plates, roll bars, and other stock-treating parts for pulp or paper machines	12% ad val.	11% ad val.	10% ad val.	8% ad val.	7% ad val.
	Taps, cocks, valves, and similar devices, however operated, used to control the flow of liquids, gases, or solids, all the foregoing and parts thereof: Hand-operated and check, and parts thereof: [Of copper]					
680.22	Other	20% ad val.	18% ad val.	16% ad val.	13% ad val.	11% ad val.
	Gear boxes and other speed changers with fixed, multiple, or variable ratios; pulleys, pillow blocks, and shaft couplings; torque converters; chain sprockets; clutches; and universal joints; all the foregoing (except parts of agricultural or horticultural machinery and implements provided for in item 666.00 and parts of motor vehicles, aircraft, and bicycles) and parts thereof:					

680.50	Pulleys, pillow blocks, shaft couplings, and parts thereof	17% ad val.	15% ad val.	13% ad val.	11% ad val.	9.5% ad val.
680.54	Chain sprockets, clutches, universal joints, and parts thereof	17% ad val.	15% ad val.	13% ad val.	11% ad val.	9.5% ad val.
	Radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic transmission and reception apparatus; radiobroadcasting and television transmission and reception apparatus, and television cameras; record players, phonographs, tape recorders, dictation recording and transcribing machines, record changers, and tone arms; all of the foregoing, and any combination thereof, whether or not incorporating clocks or other timing apparatus, and parts thereof: [Television cameras, and parts thereof] [Radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic transmission and reception apparatus; radiobroadcasting and television transmission and reception apparatus, and parts thereof] [Radio-phonograph combinations] [Record players, phonographs, record changers, turntables, and tone arms, and parts of the foregoing] [Tape recorders and dictation recording and transcribing machines, and parts thereof] Other: ²					
685.42 ³	Radio-television-phonograph combinations ..	14% ad val.	13% ad val.	12% ad val.	11% ad val.	10% ad val.
692.60	Vehicles (including trailers), not self-propelled, not specially provided for, and parts thereof ..	14% ad val.	13% ad val.	11% ad val.	10% ad val.	8% ad val.
	Aircraft and spacecraft, and parts thereof: [Balloons and airships] [Gliders] [Kites, and parts thereof] [Airplanes] [Spacecraft]					
694.60	Other parts	9% ad val.	9% ad val.	8% ad val.	8% ad val.	7.5% ad val.
734.20	Game machines, including coin or disc operated game machines and including games having mechanical controls for manipulating the action, and parts thereof	11% ad val.	10% ad val.	10% ad val.	9% ad val.	9% ad val.

² Existing TSUS item 685.50.

³ New item carved out of existing TSUS item 685.50.

Current Actions

Entered into force August 1, 1963.¹

Adherence deposited: Cuba, August 30, 1965.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.

Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia (with a statement), November 2, 1965.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratification deposited: Venezuela (with reservation), March 16, 1965.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with annex, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.

Acceptance deposited: Jamaica, December 29, 1965.

Aviation

Protocol to amend convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, November 30, 1965.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Accession deposited: Venezuela, December 30, 1965.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Signature: Ministry of Communications of Venezuela, December 30, 1965.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the international sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Open for signature at London November 1 through December 23, 1965.*

Signatures: Colombia, November 22, 1965; El Salvador, November 26, 1965; Peru, November 1, 1965; United States, December 23, 1965.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959.

Entered into force January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Bolivia, November 3, 1965.

Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington December 2, 1946. Entered into force November 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.

Notification of withdrawal: Brazil, December 29, 1965, effective June 30, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II.

Acceptance deposited: Mexico, December 29, 1965.

Accession deposited: Libya, December 30, 1965.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement amending tracking station agreement of February 26, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4435, 5291, 5447, 5763), to provide for an additional facility at Cooby Creek, Darling Downs, near Toowoomba. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra De-

* Not in force.

cember 7, 1965. Entered into force December 7, 1965.

Canada

Agreement concerning the establishment, operation and maintenance of certain ground-to-air communications facilities in northern Canada, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa December 1, 1965. Entered into force December 1, 1965.

Ethiopia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Addis Ababa December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 14, 1965.

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi December 10, 1965. Entered into force December 10, 1965.

Italy

Agreement relating to United States Government liability during operation of *NS Savannah* by a private company. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome December 16, 1965. Entered into force December 16, 1965.

Netherlands

Convention modifying and supplementing the convention of April 29, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1855, 3366, 3367, and 5665), for avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes. Signed at Washington December 30, 1965. Enters into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of April 12 and June 7, 1948 (TIAS 1767), for the exchange of official publications. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila December 2 and 20, 1965. Entered into force December 20, 1965.

Switzerland

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, with appendix. Signed at Washington December 30, 1965. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of August 27 and September 1, 1954 (TIAS 3086), relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok December 22, 1965. Entered into force December 22, 1965.

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*300	12/27	Manila schedule of Vice President Humphrey and party.
301	12/27	U.S.-Zambia joint communique on Rhodesian situation.
302	12/28	Entry into force of income tax protocol with Germany.
*303	12/28	Taipei schedule of Vice President Humphrey and party.
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305	12/29	Income tax convention with Honduras continues in force.
306	12/30	Supplementary income tax convention with Netherlands.
307	12/30	Rusk: interview on Canadian TV.
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* Not printed.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1387



January 24, 1966

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Vice President Humphrey Returns From Far East Mission

Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey returned to the United States on January 3 from a trip to the Far East during which Mr. Humphrey represented President Johnson at the inaugural ceremonies at Manila on December 30 for Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. They also visited at Tokyo December 28-29, at Taipei January 1, and at Seoul January 1-2. Following are remarks made by the Vice President at the White House on January 3 after he had reported to the President, together with the text of an outline of the U.S. position on Viet-Nam which he made available to the press.

REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

I have just reported to the President on the mission he assigned me. We have returned from the inauguration of the sixth President of the Republic of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos. I also visited Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, where I had frank, constructive, and encouraging talks with their leaders.

I reported to the President that the future in Asia is full of hope.

There are new leaders in Asia, intelligent, competent, and realistic.

At the same time, we found everywhere a growing spirit of national independence and, perhaps more important, a growing understanding of the interdependence of the free nations of Asia, a new determination to find ways to plan and work together for regional economic development and for their mutual security.

We found in Japan a representative government that is ever stronger and an economic growth that is almost startling in its vitality.

In the Philippines strong new leadership—determined to improve the lives of the Filipinos—is also taking a broad view of the world that can only bode well for all of Southeast Asia.

In Taiwan the Republic of China has given other developing nations an extraordinary example of what can be accomplished by the wise and prudent use of technical and economic assistance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1387 PUBLICATION 8028 JANUARY 24, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

And in Korea I found a new spirit of confidence and optimism, determination and competence. The alliance between our two countries has never been stronger.

There is a unanimity among the leaders of these four nations that the course President Johnson has been pursuing in the search for an honorable and just settlement in Southeast Asia is both wise and needed.

I found friendship, understanding, courage—but most of all I found agreement with our objectives, the aims of peace and of building a new quality of human life.

The United States is interested in Asia—not solely because we oppose the aggressive and brutal thrust of communism in that area, but mainly because it is impossible to talk about the future of man on earth without giving full weight to the hopes and needs of the overwhelming majority of the world's peoples.

The essential question of our generation is, as President Johnson has put it, how to make this planet safe and fit for mankind.

And finally, I told the President, I come home heartened by the warmth of affection in which the people in these countries hold the United States and the American people.

Mrs. Humphrey and I are glad to be home. There is work to be done, and as I told the President, we are ready to be about it.

OUTLINE OF U.S. POSITION ON VIET-NAM

THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN VIET NAM

I. The Fact of Aggression

The simple fact is that tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Viet Nam for the purpose of imposing Hanoi's will on South Viet Nam by force. It is this external aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South Viet Nam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression from the outside were removed,

U.S. combat forces would not be needed.

II. The U.S. Commitment

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Viet Nam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Viet Nam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Viet Nam, upon the policy expressed in such Congressional action as the August 1964 resolution,¹ and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just South Viet Nam, nor even Southeast Asia: there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.

III. Initiatives for Peace

A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past five years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. Reports of "peace feelers" have to do with initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers." We ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted that its four points must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Viet Nam. The third of these four points would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Viet Nam, whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not.

B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments, would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy's talk with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives have been multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public record, however, are the following instances:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961;

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

2. Geneva Conference on Laos;
3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the U.N. Security Council in August 1964;
4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Co-Chairmen and the three members of the ICC (India, Canada and Poland) to take up the question of Laos;
5. The call of 17 non-aligned nations for negotiations without preconditions;
6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping;
7. President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions;
8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Viet Nam;
9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (MP), and Ghanaian Delegation.

IV. *U.S. Contributions to the Basket of Peace*²

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U.S. believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet Nam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Viet

Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Viet Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said³ "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Viet Nam.

January 3, 1966

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Salt Lake City

The Department of State announced on January 7 (press release 1) that a foreign policy conference will be held at Salt Lake City on February 9, cosponsored by the University of Utah and the Utah State League of Women Voters. Eighteen other State and community organizations in the West are cooperating in the conference. Invitations will be extended to organizational leaders and to members of the press, radio, and

³ At a press conference on July 28, 1965.

² The following covering statement and the 14 numbered paragraphs were released separately by the Department of State on Jan. 7 (press release 4) under the heading "United States Official Position on Viet-Nam."

television in the States of Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, and Colorado.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and news media representatives with Government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials participating in the conference will be Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs; Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; Richard W. Reuter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Food for Peace); Mrs. Charlotte M. Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; and Ambassador Robert McClintock, State Department adviser, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

U.S. Peace Efforts Reported to Members of U.N.

Following is the text of a letter from U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.

U.S./U.N. press release 4781

JANUARY 4, 1966

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: My Government has during the past two weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace which flow in part from our obligations under the United Nations Charter, of which we are most mindful, and in part from the appeals which His Holiness the Pope and you addressed just before Christmas to us and to others. I believe it would be of interest to you, in addition to what we have already communicated to you privately, and to all States Members of the United Nations to know more precisely what we have done, and what we have in mind.

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President Johnson dispatched messages, and

in several cases personal representatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to a considerable number of Chiefs of State or Heads of Government, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. In this connection, our bombing of North Vietnam has not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

Among the points made in our messages conveyed to a number of Governments are the following: That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.¹ I should urge them in examining it to recall President Johnson's letter of 28 July 1965 to the Secretary General² in which the President invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, and my letter of 31 [30] July, 1965 (Document S/6575)³ to the President of the Security Council in

¹ U.N. doc. S/7067.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 16, 1965, p. 275.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

which I said, *inter alia*, that the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what they might do to help achieve these ends.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

U.S., Mexico Announce Proposals on Rio Grande Salinity Problem

White House press release (Austin, Texas) dated December 29, for release December 30

President Johnson joined with President [Gustavo] Diaz Ordaz of Mexico on December 30 in announcing recommendations made by the International Boundary and Water Commission for a proposed agreement between the United States and Mexico for solution of the salinity problem of the lower Rio Grande. The problem is caused by the discharge of the highly saline drainage of a Mexican irrigation project from El Morillo drain into the Rio Grande near the cities of Mission, Texas, and Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The drainage at times causes the waters of this international river to become so saline that their use for irrigation threatens serious damage to crops in the United States and in Mexico.

To solve the problem, the International Commission recommends that a canal or drain be constructed through Mexican territory to convey practically all El Morillo drain waters directly to the Gulf of Mexico so that they would not enter the river. The waters would be diverted from the drain by means of a gated control structure and then flow by canal or drain southeasterly for a total

distance of about 23 miles to discharge into existing waterways, finally emptying into the Gulf of Mexico.

Mexico would construct, operate, and maintain the facilities under the supervision of the Commission. The United States would share equally with Mexico in the cost of construction, estimated at about \$1,200,000, as well as in the costs of operation and maintenance.

Early next year President Johnson will ask the Congress to authorize collaboration with Mexico in the proposed project. As soon as this legislation is enacted, the International Commission is expected to conclude an agreement for construction of the necessary works. They would probably be placed in operation during 1967.

Matthew Welsh Chairs U.S. Section of International Joint Commission

The Department of State announced on January 7 (press release 2) that Matthew E. Welsh, former Governor of the State of Indiana, was sworn in on that day as the Chairman of the United States Section of the International Joint Commission.

The International Joint Commission has jurisdiction over cases involving use, obstruction, or diversion of boundary waters between the United States and Canada; waters flowing from boundary waters; and waters at a level lower than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary.

Correction

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to an incorrect identification in the issue of January 3, 1966, p. 4. The Foreign Secretary of Pakistan is Aziz Ahmed; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is the Pakistan Foreign Minister.

The Immigration Act of 1965

by James J. Hines

*General Counsel of the Visa Office*¹

I am very grateful for the opportunity to be with you this morning and to discuss the role of the Visa Office and the U.S. Consular Service in the implementation of the Immigration Act of October 3, 1965.

Long before the dramatic signing of H.R. 2580 at the Statue of Liberty on that beautiful Sunday afternoon in October,² the Visa Office was in constant communication with our 200 immigrant visa issuing posts abroad, keeping them abreast of developments in the Congress. The consuls in the field were well aware of the contents of H.R. 2580 by the time the President affixed his signature on October 3. The duty of the Visa Office to instruct and advise the consular service on the technical aspects of the new law is a continuing process, and it will carry on for many months to come. The Department in my opinion has responded to the challenge of Public Law 89-236 in a very responsible and creditable manner.

One of our major responsibilities under the new law, as in the past, is that of controlling the distribution of quota numbers. The process has not been substantially changed, but the dimensions of the task are more expansive. Any discussion of the quota-control process may seem unduly involved and technical, but I think there is a public interest in the mechanics of quota

control. There certainly are some misconceptions about where the quota-control function is centered.

Actually, the determination is made by the quota-control unit in the Visa Office of the Department of State, on the basis of reports received monthly from some 200 visa issuing offices throughout the world. These reports reflect the qualified demand for visas within each of the preference categories as well as within the nonpreference category. It is on the basis of these reports that the requested numbers are allocated, subject of course to the availability of sufficient numbers to meet the demand and subject to the statutory ceilings.

Heretofore, intending immigrants have competed for the limited supply of quota numbers within their respective national quotas. It made no difference to the fourth-preference Greek or Spanish registrants how many fourth-preference Italians were on the waiting list. They were not competitors prior to December 1, but they are today.

The competition for the 55,000 visa numbers constituting the immigration pool for this fiscal year is now worldwide. These numbers will be allotted to qualified preference immigrants, without regard to country of birth, strictly in the order in which the approved petition was filed with the Attorney General and in the order in which the immigrants otherwise qualify for a visa, provided they cannot promptly obtain an immigrant visa under the national quota to

¹ Address made before the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 7.

² For remarks made by President Johnson on signing the bill, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 660.

which they would normally be chargeable.

In other words, the filing date of the petition is not necessarily controlling. The consul does not request a visa number until the alien has qualified in all respects, and this depends to a large extent on how promptly he assembles the supporting documents and forwards them to the consul.

During the remaining 7 months of this fiscal year, we will have sufficient numbers to meet all qualified demand in the first four preferences, and this being so, priority dates will not be too important. But they will be important so far as concerns fifth preference, where we anticipate a qualified demand in excess of the available numbers. Some adjustments have had to be made in order to make numbers available for the sixth preference (labor in short supply) and the seventh preference (refugees). Otherwise, the first five preferences might preempt all available numbers.

This will not happen after July 1, 1968, when the maximum authorization of 170,000 numbers could as a practical matter be fully utilized. But as for this fiscal year, we are limited by the 55,000 numbers in the pool plus the numbers which will be made available from the national quotas, and the latter allotments have normally not exceeded 100,000 in any one year. It is estimated that we may not exceed 150,000 visa numbers for this year, and yet the preference ceilings are geared to the higher figure of 170,000. This explains why we have had to be realistic and have reserved a portion of the numbers for the sixth and seventh preferences.

So far as concerns the United States consul abroad, his duties certainly are not diminished by the passage of Public Law 89-236, although with the repeal of the Asia-Pacific triangle restriction, he is relieved of the task of determining the ancestry of intending immigrants in order to charge them to the proper Asian quota. The consul is assuming new duties in connection with the more restrictive labor safeguard, which, with the possible exception of those provisions phasing out the national-origins

quotas, is the most significant aspect of the new law.

How much additional workload will devolve upon the consul by reason of the published lists of skills and occupations in short supply or oversupply remains to be seen, but it could be very substantial. If the alien's particular skill or occupation appears on the short-supply list as compiled by the Department of Labor, this will constitute the Secretary of Labor's certification and relieve the applicant of the necessity of securing an individual clearance. On the other hand, where Labor's short-supply list does not include the applicant's profession or occupation, or where the applicant does not clearly qualify in any profession or occupation on the short-supply list, the responsibility for further action will revert to the Department of Labor. In the circumstances, the consul will suggest that the applicant seek an individual clearance, or he may request an advisory opinion from the Department of Labor on the question of the alien's qualifications.

The Department of State will, of course, cooperate fully to minimize the number of individual clearances, but the consul's primary responsibility is not changed by the new law, that is, to examine visa applicants in relation to grounds of ineligibility such as crimes involving moral turpitude, moral character, public charge, fraud, draft evasion, and security. Responsibility for the enforcement of the labor safeguard is entrusted solely to the Secretary of Labor.

Meaning of Term "Labor"

In the visa regulations which were published in the Federal Register of November 30, 1965 (22 CFR 42.91(a)(14)), we used the expression "gainful employment" in implementing section 212(a)(14) of the act, whereas the statute refers to "aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor." Obviously, the executive branch cannot expand the meaning of the statutory language. The more general words "gainful employment" merely serve the purpose of indicating a broad interpretation of the

term "labor." When we consider that members of the professions, as well as the arts and sciences, are made subject to the Secretary of Labor's certification under section 212(a)(14), it seems quite apparent that the legislative purpose was to give the term "labor" a rather broad meaning.

In an opinion rendered by the Attorney General on September 20, 1963, on the question of whether airplane pilots and flight engineers perform "labor" within the purview of section 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it was observed that not every occupation involves "labor." I quote from that opinion: "No one would suggest that the work of a college professor, concert pianist, doctor, consulting engineer, or corporate officer, for example, could fairly be described as labor." Nonetheless, I think that the labor provisions of Public Law 89-236 override any such limited meaning of the term "labor" as expressed in the 1963 opinion of the Attorney General. Since the third-preference professionals, artists, and scientists are subject to the labor certification, we could hardly contend that the same individuals are not coming here to perform labor when they apply for a visa as a Western Hemisphere "special immigrant" or as a nonpreference immigrant.

Labor Safeguard Provision

The language of the new immigration law, if read literally, would subject every nonpreference immigrant and every Western Hemisphere "special immigrant" to the Secretary of Labor's certification regardless of whether he or she would be employed in the United States. We are indebted to Senator [Edward] Kennedy of Massachusetts for what I consider the most helpful legislative history of the entire debate on H.R. 2580. In his opening statement, he explained the new labor safeguard as follows:

Mr. President, this provision was included in this bill to further protect our labor force during periods of high unemployment. But it was included with the intent that it be meaningful only where it has some meaning. Section 212(a)(14) of the act which is amended here relates only to those aliens who

come here for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor. Hence one would not expect a nonpreference housewife to be forced to seek a specific case clearance from the Secretary.

Also the amended section 212(a)(14) expressly subjects third- and sixth-preference immigrants to the Secretary of Labor's certification. I have difficulty understanding why this was necessary.

The fact is that third- and sixth-preference petitions are approved by the Attorney General only after consultation with the Secretary of Labor. What is the purpose of this consultation if it is not to determine possible displacement of American workers and adverse effect on American wages and working conditions? Furthermore, a sixth-preference petition cannot be approved except for labor in short supply, and yet the regulations will require the prospective employer (sixth preference) first to apply for the certification and then, if he obtains it, file a petition with the Immigration Service.

The only purpose thus served by the first step is to determine adverse effect, a fact which could be ascertained in the process of approving the petition. In third-preference cases, I understand that Labor's certification and the approval of the petition will be handled in a single action. In other words, the procedures are more involved for employers who desire to import skilled or unskilled labor in short supply, and, as a consequence, the labor safeguard is rendered even more restrictive by administrative action.

I wish to make an observation as regards present thinking on the matter of prearranged employment in the cases of nonpreference immigrants and Western Hemisphere "special immigrants." The newly published regulations clearly imply that a specific offer of employment will be a prerequisite to any certification under section 212(a)(14) with respect to these two classes of immigrants. It may be that the Labor Department officials feel that this is a necessary condition to any favorable certification. I want to make it clear that the

Department of State has never imposed any such requirement on immigrants with respect to the public-charge provisions of the law. As a matter of fact, the third-preference professional need no longer have prearranged employment, and this was done for reasons which are explained in the section-by-section analysis which accompanied the administration's bill, S. 500. I quote as follows:

... Under present law, skilled specialists may qualify for preferred status only when a petition requesting their services is filed by a U.S. employer. This requirement unduly restricts our ability to attract those whose services would substantially enhance our economy, cultural interests, and welfare. Many of these people have no way of contacting employers in the United States in order to obtain the required employment. Even if they knew whom to contact, few openings important enough to attract such highly-skilled people are offered without personal interviews, and only a few very large enterprises or institutions have representatives abroad with hiring authority. Thus many such skilled specialists cannot obtain the employment presently required for first preference status.

If the alien of high education, exceptional ability, or specialized experience had difficulty locating an employer, you can imagine how much more difficult it will be for non-preference immigrants and Western Hemisphere "special immigrants."

Another far-reaching change effected by the act of October 3, 1965, is the elimination of the Asia-Pacific triangle. This restrictive provision, designed to limit immigration from Asia, unquestionably created an unwholesome atmosphere in our foreign relations. Although the act retains the national quotas until June 30, 1968, and provides that the annual quota of any quota area shall be the same quota which existed for that area on June 30, 1965, I believe that the abolition of the Asia-Pacific triangle implicitly terminates the Chinese persons quota which the Congress authorized in 1943 for the exclusive use of Chinese immigrants regardless of their country of birth.

The Chinese persons quota is part and parcel of the triangle philosophy, and its retention after December 1, 1965, would stand in contradiction to any assertion that

the last vestige of racial discrimination had been stricken from our immigration laws. Fifty percent of this quota was mortgaged to the year 2028, and this represented a total of 2,664 numbers. These mortgaged numbers were canceled with the expiration of the Chinese persons quota on December 1, 1965. The quota of China, first established under the Immigration Act of 1924, will continue in effect until June 30, 1968. Consular officers will henceforth be relieved of the responsibility for determining the ancestry of visa applicants in order to charge them to the proper Asian quota, no simple task at best.

Problem of the "Mala Fide" Nonimmigrant

As with all major legislation effecting basic reforms, the Immigration Act of October 3, 1965, presents a challenge to those charged with the responsibility for its administration, but at the same time it poses no insurmountable problems. We anticipate that the new labor restriction will tempt some intending immigrants to misrepresent their skills, or lack of them, in order to bypass the noncertification lists as compiled by the Department of Labor. If this occurs, a serious question of visa eligibility will arise. One of the basic exclusion provisions of existing law bars aliens who willfully seek to procure a visa by fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact.

The criteria for determining materiality are well established, but the unresolved question is whether a misrepresentation made directly to an official of the Department of Labor in attempting to obtain a section 212(a)(14) certification will support an adverse finding under section 212(a)(19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This question will inevitably arise and will require serious consideration. Also we expect that the more stringent labor safeguard will cause certain intending immigrants to pretend to be temporary visitors and use the nonimmigrant visa as a means of entering the United States.

At a recent visa conference held in London one of the consuls asked me how the

Department could successfully pursue a loose nonimmigrant policy and a tight immigrant policy at the same time. He had in mind, of course, our current policy of waiving personal appearance and issuing non-immigrant visas by mail in about 70 percent of the cases and a policy of strictly enforcing the labor restriction in immigrant cases. We recognize that this will present a real problem.

In the past the *mala fide* nonimmigrant generally was one who sought to circumvent quota limitations by posing as a temporary visitor or possibly a student. In the future, I suspect, it will be the Secretary of Labor's certification which he will attempt to evade, now that the quota situation has been considerably eased. This will call for greater vigilance on the part of the consular officer, and where he has reason to doubt the good faith of the nonimmigrant applicant, the consul's discretion to waive personal appearance will not be exercised. In any event, the *mala fide* nonimmigrant will encounter the labor restriction in attempting to regularize his status in the United States, but this may not deter him.

Western Hemisphere Immigration Commission

As to the future, we look forward to the recommendations of the Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration. There are incongruities in the law which deserve attention.

The Western Hemisphere has no preference system; it has no provision for refugees and will have no "foreign state" limitation if and when the 120,000 ceiling takes effect on July 1, 1968. Moreover, the new labor restriction does not apply equally to the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. For example, brothers and sisters of United States citizens who happened to be born in the Eastern Hemisphere are exempt from the restriction, but their counterparts in the Western Hemisphere are subject to it. This is likewise true of the adult sons and daughters (married or unmarried) of United States citizens. If born in the Eastern Hemisphere, they do not require a labor certifi-

cation but do require it if born in the Western Hemisphere. Also, as regards immigration from the Western Hemisphere, no distinction is made in the law between the skilled and the unskilled; between the immigrant of exceptional ability or specialized experience and the immigrant who lacks ability and experience in any field of endeavor.

If family unity and needed skills are important in relation to immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere, surely they are no less important in relation to immigration from the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps the more stringent labor safeguard will compensate in some degree for the lack of preferences in the Western Hemisphere because the immigrant who is educated, skilled, or talented in some particular line of work will have a better chance of getting the labor certification. It is the unskilled worker in the main who will be found among the non-certified.

These are matters which the Commission will doubtless consider in formulating its recommendations. What is emerging, I suspect, is a single immigration system uniformly applied to both hemispheres, a system which places all nations on equal footing, and which distinguishes in the selection of our prospective citizens solely on a basis of individual merit and national interest.

Sales of Surplus Foods to U.A.R.

Following is the text of a memorandum from President Johnson to Secretary Rusk dated December 29 which was read to news correspondents at Austin, Tex., that day by Assistant Press Secretary Joseph Laitin.

In accordance with your recommendation of November 17, I hereby determine, pursuant to section 107 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended, that it is essential to the national interest of the United States to finance export sales of surplus agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic under Title I of the Act.

The Question of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg on December 10 in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly, together with the text of a resolution adopted in plenary session on December 21.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S. delegation press release 4744

This has been a most instructive debate, and I congratulate the many distinguished representatives who have provided us with stimulating ideas and have given us a better understanding of the vital subject of non-intervention.

I regret extremely that the Soviet Union and its ideological allies have been the exception to this rule. Frankly, we found reason for some hope, when the Soviet Union took the initiative in bringing this matter before the Assembly, that it had a constructive purpose and looked to a constructive result. I must state with equal frankness that our hopes have given way to a disappointment as it has become obvious that the motive behind the Soviet initiative has been to provide a platform for attacking my Government and other members of this committee.

What purpose is served by the Soviets' reintroducing the cold war into this chamber is for its representatives to say. For myself, I can only say I had particularly hoped that we could avoid stale polemics at this General Assembly, which has been marked by constructive contributions, particularly in

the field of disarmament under the auspices of this committee, and a remarkable display of unity of purpose and resolve in the other committees and throughout the other organs of the United Nations.

I said when I first came to the United Nations I do not choose to curse anyone, and I will not do so now. I will confine what I have to say only to the record. In doing so, I will follow the rule once enunciated by my illustrious predecessor at a time when he was running for public office. In responding to a complaint by his political opponents, he suggested a truce in political polemics and agreed that if his opponents would stop telling lies about him, he would stop telling the truth about them.

Viet-Nam, a Prime Example of Subversion

For the moment, however, I am left with no alternative but to continue to speak the truth about the Soviet Union and to set the record straight. And I shall start dealing with the subject of Viet-Nam, about which there have been so many distortions and misrepresentations by the representative of the Soviet Union and others ideologically allied with it. I take this up first because the conflict in Viet-Nam is a prime example of the use of subversion, terrorism, and now overt military intervention by one government, North Viet-Nam, to overthrow another government, South Viet-Nam.

First and foremost, let me repeat that my Government has no national military objective in South Viet-Nam, or anywhere else in Southeast Asia. My Government has no de-

sire to acquire bases or any other territory in that area for any reason whatsoever; nor does my Government have any desire to secure special privileges or a special sphere of influence—be it political, economic, or military.

Second, our only desire and objective is the deterrence of aggression, the discouragement rather than the promotion of armed conflict, the establishment of peaceful conditions so that the peoples of Southeast Asia, including South Viet-Nam, can go about their business in their own way under their own flags with whatever associates or friends they may freely choose for themselves—peaceful conditions, in short, which will enable these peoples to make and carry out their own decisions concerning their own political status in accordance with the principle of self-determination which the charter and many resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council have enunciated.

Third, the United States will continue to explore on its own and in conjunction with others, both within and outside the United Nations, all possible paths to a peaceful settlement which will be both durable and honorable. We have repeatedly reiterated our readiness—as 17 nonaligned nations urged earlier this year¹—to enter into unconditional negotiations. Let me say categorically in this regard that my Government stands ready to accept the proposal made by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom [Michael Stewart] in Moscow only last week, a proposal that there be called a conference of all governments concerned, that this conference as speedily as possible arrange a cease-fire, that the conference then make arrangements so that both North and South Viet-Nam could be left in peace with assurances that they will not be attacked by each other or anyone else.

If the Soviet Union, as one of the Geneva cochairmen, could see fit to respond to

rather than spurn this suggestion, all interested parties, including my Government, would be at the conference tomorrow.

Fourth, there would be no need for United States military presence in South Viet-Nam if North Viet-Nam had abided by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam signed on July 20, 1954, article 19 of which provides: “. . . the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them . . . are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.” There would be no need for United States military presence in South Viet-Nam if North Viet-Nam had not intervened first by infiltration and subversion and overtly—if, starting as far back as 1959, it had not sent tens of thousands of armed personnel, which have come to include regular units of the North Vietnamese army, into the territory of South Viet-Nam with orders from Hanoi to overthrow and to destroy the Government of South Viet-Nam.

However, as long as North Viet-Nam remains adamantly opposed to negotiations, so long as it remains determined to pursue its aggression, to impose its system and control upon South Viet-Nam by force, so long will the United States remain determined to do all that is necessary at the call of the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to assist the people of South Viet-Nam to turn back that aggression.

Fifth, and finally, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of Southeast Asia—under the leadership of the Asian nations themselves and the United Nations—and we will continue to explore all possibilities for turning our energies and efforts to enriching an area and people too long ravaged by death and destruction.

Yesterday the President of the United States said this, and let me repeat his words:²

All over the world, in every capital where we are represented, our Ambassadors are waiting for some word that those men, too, want peace and are willing

¹ For text of a 17-nation appeal delivered to Secretary Rusk on Apr. 1 and a U.S. reply of Apr. 8, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1014.

to talk about it. I have given the Secretary of State special instructions to make sure that no one is uncertain about our purpose.

Our devotion to freedom is unyielding. So, too, is our hope for peace. Those who insist on testing either will find us earnest in both.

Intervention and the U.N. Charter

Although it has become clear to all that the Soviet Union's purpose in introducing this item was to attack the United States and many of its friends, an attack which we categorically reject as unfounded, unwarranted, unproductive, and contrary to the spirit of this Assembly, the fact remains that a profoundly important issue has been raised. The question of nonintervention, as the discussion before this committee demonstrates, is a very serious and important one.

Perhaps no other question is as tightly intertwined with the problems of war and peace.

Perhaps no other idea is as important to the standards of behavior imposed upon all of us by the charter.

Perhaps no other problem merits closer deliberation by this body. With the development of techniques of indirect intervention, perhaps no other question is as complex as this one.

We need have no doubt as to what our charter requires of us. Article 2(4) states that states ". . . shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Article 2(6) commits the organization to insure that this principle, as well as others, is followed by states not members of the United Nations. And we term intervention under the charter anything that violates that standard.

When a government sends its army across a frontier and attacks a neighbor whose only desire is to live in peace, such action is in violation of the charter. When a government promotes and organizes armed guerrilla bands, inspires terrorism, and even clandestinely employs its own troops, all with the

purpose of subverting and overthrowing another government, we know that such a government cannot doubt that its actions contravene the charter and are in violation of all accepted standards of international behavior. Because this new type of intervention is often disguised and because it represents perhaps the greatest threat to peace today, it is not surprising that the major focus of this debate has been upon intervention in the form of subversion, terrorism, and indirect aggression.

Most certainly, we should not be taken in by the fraud which communism has sought to perpetuate by pasting a label of "wars of national liberation" on the guerrillas and terrorists, some of them sent against newly independent countries in many parts of the world—or if they do not send them they encourage them. I think that most of us see through this hoax and know that for "wars of liberation" one should read "intervention," plain and simple. There are, of course, real liberation wars. We once fought one ourselves. But most of us know that some in the Communist world use wars of liberation to describe efforts to overthrow real national governments in newly independent countries.

We do not lack examples. We are talking about the military activity by North Vietnam against Laos, a neutral government in Laos, described for us eloquently by the distinguished representative of Laos. By intervention we mean the type of action taken against Thailand, a member state, by Communist-inspired liberators which the distinguished representative of Thailand has brought to our attention so forcibly. The distinguished representative of Malaysia has provided us with the experience of his country in resisting armed intervention from the outside. The distinguished representatives of Upper Volta and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have indicated to us that the continent of Africa is not free of efforts by states, some of them outside of Africa, designed to bring down the new countries of that continent. And in recent years we have

seen, as has been commented on by several speakers, a sharp increase in intervention in Latin America, where the Cuban government of Castro, aided and abetted by its Communist masters, has attempted, but has failed, to subvert its neighbors.

It was barely 2 years ago that the Cuban government was caught redhanded and condemned by the Organization of American States when Cuba sought to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela by indirect aggression, employing that prime vehicle of intervention—a so-called national liberation movement. Finally, Mr. Chairman, if we are looking for an example of intervention which has shattered the peace of an area and endangers the peace of the world, we need only look to South Viet-Nam, where the Government of North Viet-Nam deliberately, as a conscious policy and in violation of an explicit provision of the Geneva agreement, began years ago to train, support, infiltrate, and encourage guerrilla bands and personnel in order to destroy the Government of South Viet-Nam and to impose its own system and ideology.

These are the examples of intervention which threaten world peace. The issue we face in this committee and in this Assembly is whether the world can permit the continuation of this modern type of intervention. Such intervention is encouraged when we permit it to succeed. Such intervention is encouraged when through our failure to act, through our failure to speak out, we give the interveners the impression that they can act with impunity. On our part and in company with many others who have spoken here, we challenge this doctrine of indirect intervention, and we should make it crystal clear through our actions and our words that the world community cannot and will not tolerate such activity.

The Soviet Union has introduced this item, and therefore it must take direct interest in the record of this type of intervention. And while we cannot erase the record of the U.S.S.R. history of intervention, we can and we do hope that the Soviet's espousal of

peaceful coexistence and its current championship of nonintervention will be reflected in a new page of Soviet history. We, on our part, speaking for my Government, would welcome a proper movement forward in this direction by the U.S.S.R. We must, however, recognize as a simple fact of present life—a most regretful and dangerous fact of present life—that the Soviet doctrine of Soviet coexistence does not renounce and, in fact, permits subversion and terrorism; and, indeed, there is another country, Communist China, which not only rejects the very idea of peaceful coexistence but also proclaims its right to intervene in every and any way necessary through force, subversion, terrorism, to promote and impose upon other sovereign states its own rigid social and economic system. It is such intervention, prohibited by the charter and employing force and indirect aggression, which is keeping the world most regretfully in turmoil today. My delegation believes we should pronounce ourselves firmly on the subject and against this type of aggression.

How People Vote With Their Feet

The United Nations today marks the 17th anniversary of the adoption of that great document of human liberty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in a very real sense our debate is concerned with a very basic human right, the right of a nation and its people not to be subjected to aggression, be it military or political or under the guise of slogans which menace its sovereignty and security.

Sometimes it is not obvious—indeed too often this is the case—that intervention is taking place. But I would suggest one criterion of how people really feel, and that criterion is how they vote with their feet. When the ballot is too often denied them, where political decisions are made by states, where systems of government are imposed, where military action is taken, where no elections in a real sense are held, how do the populations concerned indicate their preferences by their movements? In Ger-

many, where have the refugees gone? Have they gone east or west? In Africa, when persons have been permitted to indicate their preferences, have refugees chosen to return to colonial status or have they acted to move toward freedom, independence, and self-determination? Many thousands of Cubans have seized every available means of transportation which will take them from Cuba to the United States and freedom. But no crowds are pounding on Cuba's gates and seeking admission.

And today and for a long time past in Viet-Nam, in what direction are the great majority of refugees going? Have the hundreds and thousands of homeless peasants tramped the highlands of Viet-Nam and submitted themselves to the Viet Cong, or have they moved by the hundreds of thousands by whatever means available to those areas controlled by the Government of South Viet-Nam, where these refugees at least know that there is a promise for the future and a hope for freedom and peace?

We in this hall know the answers to these questions. We all know why the Germans prefer the West to the East, why the Africans prefer freedom to colonialism, why Cubans prefer exile to dictatorship, and why the Vietnamese prefer peace, stability, and freedom to terror and subjugation to an alien ideology. If we are honest with ourselves and if we apply the tests I have suggested, those of intent, consent, and results, we will have made a start in providing standards for assessing state action in the area of intervention.

There are also, of course, other forms of interference in each other's internal affairs which are heinous. And we have indeed been impressed with the earnest desire of many countries here to protect themselves, their sovereign identity, and their integrity from such forms as well. If there is anything fundamental in our own traditions as a country, it is our belief that each sovereign state should be left free to decide its own destiny in its own sovereign way and on the basis of the self-determination of its own people. In

so doing, they are, of course, also free to cooperate fully, again through their own choice and in their own manner, with other states to be good neighbors in the words of the charter. Such concepts would, we believe, be useful to add in whatever action we take, as one of the United Kingdom's amendments has suggested.³

Mr. Chairman, as from this Assembly room we look beyond this immediate debate on this particular item, we are constantly and acutely aware that peace, peace which is the goal and pledge of the charter, is an illusive condition. We are not now at peace throughout the world because there are some countries in the world which will employ any device, subversion, violence, and naked aggression, against a neighbor. And this philosophy is our enemy, and this is why this item is relevant today.

To combat that menace to peace, expressions of resolution and principle are needed. But actions are needed as well and not only actions to directly confront this modern intervention. The type of action necessary is the type of action that would stem from a basic decision by each state so to conduct itself as not to harm its neighbors. In other words, to quote a great American President, "for each state to adopt a good neighbor policy towards its fellow state and towards all states." Such resolve and such action would inevitably lead to a world community where peace is real, not a slogan, and where the principles of our charter would not be distant goals but in fact reflect the behavior of all of us.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁴

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the gravity of the international situation and the increasing threat soaring over universal peace due to armed intervention and other direct or indirect forms of interference threat-

³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.351.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/2131(xx); adopted in plenary session on Dec. 21 by a vote of 109 to 0, with 1 abstention.

ening the sovereign personality and the political independence of States,

Considering that the United Nations, according to their aim to eliminate war, threats to the peace and acts of aggression, created an Organization, based on the sovereign equality of States, whose friendly relations would be based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and on the obligation to its Members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Recognizing that, in fulfilment of the principle of self-determination, the General Assembly, by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in resolution 1514 (XV), stated its conviction that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory and that, by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,

Recalling that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the Assembly proclaimed that recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, without distinction of any kind,

Reaffirming the principle of non-intervention, proclaimed in the charters of the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States and of the Organization of African Unity and affirmed in the Conferences of Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Chapultepec and Bogotá, as well as in the decisions of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, in the "Programme for Peace and International Co-operation", adopted at the end of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, and in the Declaration on subversion adopted in Accra by the Heads of State or Government of the African States,

Recognizing that full observance of the principle of the non-intervention of States in the internal and external affairs of other States is essential to the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Considering that armed intervention is synonymous with aggression, and as such is contrary to the basic principles on which peaceful international co-operation between States should be built,

Considering further that direct intervention, subversion, as well as all forms of indirect intervention are contrary to these principles and, consequently, a violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

Mindful that violation of the principle of non-intervention poses a threat to the independence and freedom and normal political, economic, social and cultural development of countries, particularly those

which have freed themselves from colonialism, and can pose a serious threat to the maintenance of peace,

Fully aware of the imperative need to create appropriate conditions which would enable all States, and in particular the developing countries, to choose without duress or coercion their own political, economic and social institutions,

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declares:

1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently armed intervention as well as all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned;

2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed to the violent overthrow of the régime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State;

3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principles of non-intervention;

4. The strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that the nations live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security;

5. Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State;

6. All States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

7. For the purpose of this Declaration, the term "State" covers both individual States and groups of States;

8. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as affecting in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular those contained in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.

U.N. Extends World Food Program

*Statement by James Roosevelt
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

Several days ago, a number of members of this committee, including myself, referred to this session of this committee as an historic one. This was in connection, as you know, with the adoption by acclamation of the resolution on industrial development, in which developed and developing countries alike agreed upon the establishment of a new organization within the U.N. to carry out the U.N.'s important work in industrial development. At that time we also referred to the committee's action in combining the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund into the new U.N. Development Program.

In the view of my delegation the action which we are about to take on extending the World Food Program is a third reason for calling this an historic session, and I hope that the fact that we will take this action without overlong negotiations, which were involved in the two other items I have just mentioned, will not obscure the importance of our present deliberations.

In spite of its small size thus far, the World Food Program is in our view one of the most constructive undertakings ever launched by the United Nations and its related organizations. It is an imaginative and resourceful use of voluntary contributions of surplus foods, shipping services, and financing. The resulting program has promoted economic and social objectives and effectively served the cause of development.

During the 3-year experimental period in which this program has been in operation, it has proved that it is possible to carry out, on a multilateral basis, food assistance programs directed not only at meeting emergency food needs and assisting in preschool and school feeding but also to stimulate economic and social development. Just over

3 years ago, at the first pledging conference for the World Food Program, the United States Secretary of Agriculture, the Honorable Orville L. Freeman, at what he called "a momentous occasion," described the program in terms which we may well recall today.² He said in part:

We all know and appreciate the tremendous seriousness of the problem that faces us. It can be stated simply. In some countries food supplies are abundant. In others, accounting for over half of the world's population, people are undernourished or malnourished. These contrasts cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely. Most of the food-deficit countries of the world are politically independent or are in the process of gaining their independence. With independence has come impatience—impatience not only with a generally unsatisfactory standard of living but especially with a lack of the fundamental needs of life, above all, food.

In a very real sense there is no surplus of food anywhere as long as food can be sent to those who do not have enough to eat. To me, it is a moral imperative that we make maximum effective use of our God-given abundance. The World Food Program will help us do that. Today we serve notice, as we pledge resources and cooperation, that we stand together in the fight to banish hunger from the world. It can be done. . . .

When we speak of hunger, we must also speak of its causes. Food deficits have many causes. Among them are land resources, climatic conditions, farm techniques, population trends, trade policies. A very important cause of food deficits is economic underdevelopment—in other words, poverty. The World Food Program will help us attack hunger directly, and it will also enable us to buy some of the time needed to promote the economic growth projects which, in the final analysis, are the only cure for poverty.

As the distinguished Deputy Director General [Oris V. Wells] of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the competent and distinguished Executive Director of the program [A. H. Boerma], and Under-Secretary [Philippe] de Seynes have just told us, during its 3-year experimental period the program has used the pledges by some 70 countries amounting to just under \$100 million. \$68,700,000 was in the form of pledges of foodstuffs, \$5,400,000 in services, principally shipping and handling, and \$19,600,000 in

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Dec. 10 (U.S. delegation press release 4746).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1962, p. 534.

the form of cash, to meet the administrative costs of the program.

One important feature of the program is that it involves such a close degree of cooperation among so many parts of the U.N. family. Not only was it jointly created by the United Nations and FAO; it is being jointly executed by them with the help of the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Moreover, the regional economic commissions have been involved in its planning. This joint action is a feature which may well become an example for other U.N. activities.

The pledges of food consist principally (or about 60 percent) of cereals and cereal products, followed by dairy products, protein foods in the form of canned fish and meat, vegetable oils, and even some coffee and tea. These contributions have been used to assist in some 29 emergency situations in 22 countries. In addition, over 114 projects in more than 50 countries have been approved. In all of these, food is being and will be used to feed preschool-age children or to assist in development activities. 36 of the projects are in Africa, 43 in Asia, 20 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 15 in Europe. More than 17 different types of projects are included in the total. Some of these are projects to provide better nutrition for expectant mothers and for school lunches. There is a wide variety of projects in which food is being used for partial wage payments, while other projects involve land reform, land reclamation and development, afforestation, and a variety of public works projects and industrial projects.

We should not overlook the value of the WFP efforts that include assistance to refugee settlement, community improvement, and support to public health programs.

An important function of the World Food Program is to supply food to countries that have experienced disasters such as earthquakes or prolonged drought. Here food can be used not only to feed hungry people but as partial wages during periods that they

are working to rebuild their homes and replanting their farms. This is indeed a momentous record for a small, new program.

Speaking for my delegation, Mr. Chairman, I want to express our congratulations to the able Director of the World Food Program for the imaginative uses of the slender resources of the program for such a rich variety of activities that are contributing so directly to economic development. It is our hope that, when the program is extended and when, as we hope, its size is substantially increased by increased contributions in response to the new target of \$275 million which will be established, it can go on to greater, more useful, and more varied activities.

Origin of World Food Program

Before turning to the future of the program, let me touch briefly on its origins. The details of the beginning of the World Food Program are described in E/4015, the report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Early in 1960, the World Food Program resolution was adopted unanimously by the 15th General Assembly.³ This resolution appealed to member governments to take adequate measures to make their food surpluses available in support of economic development, especially stressing that any action under this resolution should proceed in accordance with FAO's principles of surplus disposal and guidelines and with, of course, adequate safeguards against dumping and against adverse effects upon the economic and financial position of those countries which depend for their foreign exchange earnings on the export of food commodities.

This resolution invited the FAO to study the problem of the use of food surpluses in economic development and submit its report and its recommendations to the Economic and Social Council. The FAO Council in October 1960 established a 13-member Intergovernmental Advisory Committee to advise

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1960, p. 800.

the Director General on the task. When the Committee met in April 1961, my Government submitted a proposal suggesting a 3-year experimental program with a target for voluntary contributions of \$100 million in cash and commodities.

The Director General's report on the proposed experimental program was considered by the FAO Council in June 1961 and by ECOSOC in July 1961, together with a report from the Secretary-General on "The Role of the United Nations and its related agencies in the use of food surpluses for Economic Development." ECOSOC adopted a resolution during its 32d meeting requesting the Secretary-General and the Director General of FAO to consult with one another and other agencies and to formulate more detailed proposals. It was the result of these consultations and studies which culminated in General Assembly Resolution 1714 (XVI) adopted December 19, 1961.

The crux of this resolution was the recognition, which I want to stress, that the ultimate solution to the problem of food deficiency lies in self-sustaining economic growth of developing countries, in order that they would find it possible to meet their food requirements from their food-producing industries or from the proceeds of their expanding export trade, and that the utilization of surplus foodstuffs therefore represented an important transitional means of helping these countries in their economic development.

I speak at length about the origins of the World Food Program because I am unashamedly proud of the role that my Government has had in making its food surpluses available to further the goals of economic development, not only through its own Food for Peace program but by helping in the establishment of this international effort. The U.S. contribution represents \$50 million, or about half of the budget of the experimental 3-year period. This \$50 million consisted of \$40 million in foodstuffs and \$10 million in cash and services.

U.S. Food for Peace Program

Mr. Chairman, I want to digress briefly to mention the U.S. bilateral Food for Peace program, of which our contributions of food to the World Food Program are a part. The U.S. program, under the well-known Public Law 480, has now completed its first decade. Total Food for Peace exports are now annually over \$1.5 billion, and in the 10-year period they had a total value of \$12.3 billion. A large part of this total was paid for in the currency of the receiving country. About one-third of the total is a gift either for relief in emergency situations or for use to assist work projects for development, irrigation projects, reclamation, railroad improvement, and the like. Through this program U.S. farm products are supplementing the food resources of over 100 countries having a combined population of over 1.3 billion. During the first decade of our bilateral program we have learned of the many ways in which surplus foods can be used to improve the lives of people and to assist in the economic and social development of their countries.

To help meet the immediate food crisis, the President yesterday morning [Dec. 9] authorized prompt extension of the existing Public Law 480 agreement with India to cover an additional 1½ million tons of food grains.⁴ The entire amount will be made available for early shipment. This allotment is equal to the present monthly allocation on a 3-month basis.

We believe that all nations in a position to do so should join international efforts to help India meet the grave food problem it confronts at this time. The United States is fully prepared to participate in such an effort.

In my statement in the general debate of this committee,⁵ I said that the United

⁴ For a statement made on Dec. 9 by Presidential Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers, see *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1009, footnote 2.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 798.

States is prepared to contribute up to 50 percent of the required commodities and up to 40 percent of the needed cash and services. I would like now to be a little more specific with regard to the second part of that offer: Insofar as administrative costs are concerned, the United States is prepared to pledge up to \$6 million over the 3-year period 1966-68, subject to the necessary congressional action. The shipping services additionally included in this part of the offer will be sufficient to cover the ocean freight on the commodities provided to the program by the United States.

While my Government would like to see some experiment with the program approach if the studies now underway suggest its feasibility and if the resources are available, we must appeal to the sponsors of the amendment to the resolution to withdraw it.⁶ This is a joint program, jointly authorized, and in order to avoid any doubts as to the legality of its extension it should be approved in the same form by both parent organizations. It would be impractical to send the proposed interpretive amendment to the FAO for its concurrence, since the governing body, the FAO Conference, has adjourned. Passage of the proposed amendment would, in the opinion of my delegation, delay the extension of the program to the detriment of the developing countries it is intended to serve.

Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I should like to take a few minutes to sum up. As Mr. Boerma, the Director of the World Food Program, pointed out in Geneva this summer, the final answer to the problem of hunger is increasing the food production of the developing areas to a point where they can meet their own basic needs and in the success of all of our efforts to assist development so that the countries concerned can

pay for any food imports they might require. No one, Mr. Boerma continued, is more anxious than he to see a world in which food aid is unnecessary, but, until that time came, food aid would have to be given on a much vaster scale than at present.

In closing, let me repeat that hunger and malnutrition continue to be a major problem in large areas of this world. During the short period since the World Food Program was established by the General Assembly and FAO Conference resolutions of 1960 and 1961, it has done truly great work in using available food to relieve this hunger and contribute to the development efforts throughout the world. We hope that the program will not only continue this good work but that it will give increasing emphasis to using food to improve the agricultural production of developing countries since, as we all know, food aid in itself is not the permanent solution. It can, however, assist greatly in progress toward freedom from hunger by encouraging increased agricultural production in the hungry nations themselves.

My delegation, Mr. Chairman, supports wholeheartedly Resolution L.839, authorizing the continuation of the World Food Program. We will of course look forward to further discussion of L.841, introduced by the delegation of Argentina and other delegations, and we appreciate the openminded willingness of the distinguished representative of Argentina to consider certain changes viewed as important by some delegations, including my own.⁷

⁷ Both resolutions were adopted in Committee II on Dec. 13 and in plenary session on Dec. 20. A/RES/2095 (xx) (A/C.2/L.839) extended the United Nations/FAO World Food Program "on a continuing basis for as long as multilateral food aid is found feasible and desirable"; A/RES/2096 (xx) (A/C.2/L.841/Rev.1) requested the Secretary-General to undertake a program of studies on multilateral food aid.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1; withdrawn by the representative of Argentina on Dec. 13.

Third-Year Major Review of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement

*Statement by George R. Jacobs*¹

The United States comes to this, the third-year major review by the Cotton Textiles Committee of the operation of the Long-Term Arrangement,² with a sense of pride that the international community has been able to accomplish so much to find a practical, livable solution to the difficult and persistent problems surrounding trade in cotton textiles. These have been good years for both the exporters of cotton textiles to the United States market and for the United States industry, which from all indications is adjusting to the vast changes that have occurred in production and trade in cotton textiles over the last decade.

These changes are evident to us from the GATT secretariat's study on cotton textiles.

¹ Made before the Cotton Textiles Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva on Dec. 7. Mr. Jacobs is Director of the Office of International Commodities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State; he was cochairman of the U.S. delegation, along with Stanley Nehmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resources, Department of Commerce, at the meeting of the Committee.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. The governments participating in the Long-Term Arrangement are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Republic of China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom (including Hong Kong), and United States. For statements made by the U.S. representative before the Committee on Dec. 3, 1963, and Dec. 1, 1964, see *ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 96, and Jan. 11, 1965, p. 49.

The United States would like to take this opportunity to offer its congratulations and appreciation to the secretariat for its fine job in preparing the study for this meeting of the Committee. We feel the study is a useful contribution to a better understanding of the forces at work in world cotton textile production and trade.

Historical Review

The accomplishments under the Arrangement—and there are many—should be viewed in the perspective of the situation that existed prior to 1962. That situation convinced all major textile importers and exporters of the need for international action.

The pertinent facts are described in the secretariat study. It brings into focus the changes that have taken place in the cotton textile industries of the world since the early 1950's. It describes how the export trade has shifted from the industrialized countries to the developing countries and Japan. It examines in the case of various countries the policies and practices that have tended to expand or contract the flow of international trade in cotton products. Finally, the study helps us grasp the nature of changes taking place in the industry through adjustments in industrialized countries and through the establishment of new plants in the developing world.

The data show that the decade of the fifties witnessed an unprecedented burst of

activity in the cotton textile industry. The annual increase in production was 4 percent as compared with an average rate of 1 percent for the preceding 40 years.

Augmented production in the fifties was accounted for largely by an extremely rapid increase in capacity among many developing countries. The developing countries not only supplied an increasing volume of textiles and clothing for their own populations but also entered strongly into the export field. Exports of cotton textiles by the developing countries—largely to Western Europe and North America—almost doubled from 1953 to 1960, whereas exports from the developed countries remained static or declined.

Since per capita consumption of cotton textiles, particularly in the developed countries, is fairly fixed and adjusts but slowly to changes in supply and price, the heavy imports of low-price apparel and other cotton textiles were quickly felt in the markets of the industrialized countries. The resulting problems were too massive to be handled through existing mechanisms.

Results of the Long-Term Arrangement

The LTA was devised to deal with these problems on a cooperative, multilateral basis. The LTA makes it possible to assure that growth of world trade in cotton textiles proceeds in an orderly manner. The LTA has permitted expansion of world trade in cotton textiles while providing the necessary safeguards for the industries of the importing countries.

In the view of the United States, a most encouraging aspect of the GATT study is the fact that under the LTA world trade in cotton textiles has grown faster than production of cotton textiles. In the same period exports from the developing countries participating in the LTA have increased at a faster rate than have total exports. This larger participation of the emerging nations is in itself convincing evidence that the LTA has, in fact, led to expanded market opportunities for the developing countries.

The statistical record clearly shows that

the LTA has sheltered the cotton textile industries of participating countries—both importers and exporters—from unrestrained and destructive competition. The Arrangement has given industry the new assurance and confidence that encourage technological change and adjustment. The cotton textile industry has been able to respond to more exacting consumer requirements at prices the consumer is willing to pay. The growing health and efficiency of the world cotton textile industry as a whole is indicated by the sharp rise, in almost all countries, in the rate of machinery utilization and in output per spindle and loom.

Imaginative marketing, especially of newer cotton products, in major world consuming centers such as the United States has stimulated consumer interest and developed sales opportunities for producers of all countries.

U.S. Imports of Cotton Textiles

The United States recognizes that, as the largest single importer of cotton textiles, its record is of particular importance. U.S. imports of cotton textiles increased sharply during the third LTA year to a new all-time high. Imports totaled 1,233 million square yards equivalent, valued at \$354 million. Compared with the second LTA year, this was a most remarkable increase: 19 percent in quantity and 20 percent in value. It is also interesting to compare the quantity and value of imports during the third LTA year with the first LTA year and to note that the value increased by 19 percent while the quantity increased by 10 percent.

I may interject here that in the first month of the fourth LTA year, October, U.S. imports have reached a level of 127 million square yards, as compared with the average monthly level in the third LTA year of 103 million square yards. Less developed countries were responsible for 66 percent of these imports in contrast to their average share of 60 percent during the third LTA year.

The developments of the third LTA year

were not unexpected. A year ago the U.S. representatives to this Committee indicated that the drop in imports of cotton textiles during the second year had been halted and reversed. The rapid increase in imports since then confirms that the drop was attributable to a lull in the U.S. textile market which affected both domestic textile activity and imports.

An additional factor was a temporary uncertainty created by the extended legislative consideration of one-price cotton. Thus the overall drop in imports was not due to the operation of the LTA. Now, the one-price cotton program is in effect at least until 1970 by the terms of the Agricultural Act of 1965. This is a development that has made cotton available to U.S. mills at the same price as to foreign buyers of U.S. cotton. As a result the market has stabilized and gained new confidence. Even more, the generally prosperous economic situation and high consumer income in the United States have contributed to an increasing demand for cotton textile products, both domestic and imported.

Although these observations on the developments of the past year are important, it is of even greater significance for this meeting to note the changes that have occurred in the textile trade and industry of the United States since the advent of the LTA.

Imports in the third LTA year represent an increase of 420 million square yards over those in the year ending June 1961, the base period of the Short-Term Arrangement.³ The growth in imports, amounting to 52 percent, has been several times the growth in U.S. consumption. On a value basis, the increase in imports has been even greater, 56 percent.

In reviewing the breakdown of trade by commodity groups, one is struck by the persistent upward trend in imports of apparel. In the third LTA year the volume amounted to 438 million square yards, valued at \$177 million, a sharp increase from 297 million

square yards valued at \$113 million for the year ending June 1961. Apparel imports have constituted 35 percent of all cotton textile imports by quantity and 50 percent by value. Apparel represents the most attractive export of all cotton products because the high value added maximizes employment opportunities and dollar earnings. Nevertheless, of all cotton textile products, the apparel categories are among the most susceptible to disruption.

Importing countries like the United States that have well-developed domestic apparel industries, employing large numbers of workers, must necessarily be concerned by disruptive apparel imports. The apparel industry of the United States consists of thousands of intensely competitive firms, generally small, often with limited working capital. These firms, together with those in the mill sector, are the innovators of new products and are at the forefront of sales promotion, but at the same time they are particularly sensitive to competition from low-price imports. Their ability to continue to innovate and to promote is essential to the welfare of textile industries in foreign countries that export to the U.S. market as well as to the health of the U.S. industry.

Changing supply and market conditions have produced some fluctuations in imports of other cotton textile products. Yarn imports, after rising from 57 million square yards in the year ending June 1961 to 130 million in the STA year, declined to 69 million in the third LTA year. Nevertheless, yarn imports have recently shown a strong upward trend. From March through September 1965, imports increased 36 percent over those in the same period of the previous year.

Fabric imports, except for the dip in the second LTA year that paralleled the decline in the domestic industry, have been gaining consistently both in absolute terms and in relation to total imports. In the third LTA year fabric imports were 64 percent above those in the year ending June 1961. The made-up and miscellaneous groups also reached new highs in the third LTA year,

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337.

in both cases exceeding previous records set in the STA year.

The past 4 years have also witnessed greater sophistication and diversity in the imports of specific categories within the groups. This trend is reflected, as an illustration, by a decline in the proportion of relatively inexpensive carded sheeting and substantial gains in imports of more expensive fabrics such as poplins, broadcloth, printcloth, twills, and miscellaneous yarn-dyed fabrics.

The relative position of suppliers in the U.S. market is a subject of special interest to many of you in this meeting. About 92 percent of total cotton textile imports into the United States during the third LTA year came from developing countries and Japan. The developing countries alone accounted for about 60 percent of the total. In contrast, imports from the developed countries of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and North America accounted for only 8 percent of the total. Furthermore, the quantity imported from these developed countries has held closely to the level for the year ending June 1961. Thus the entire import gain of 420 million square yards since that time is accounted for by increased shipments from the developing countries and Japan. Imports from the developing countries increased by 60 percent during this period. The developing countries earned \$174 million in foreign exchange earnings through their exports to the United States in the third LTA year. We consider it probable that their exports to the United States will increase further during the fourth year of the Arrangement.

A number of new suppliers have shipped in quantity to the American market since 1961. We are pleased that several of these countries are represented at this meeting as participants in the LTA. With most of the others also, the United States has entered into various types of arrangements to permit equitable and nondisruptive sharing of our market.

Imports have increased in the U.S. market not only in quantity and value; imports

have also gained a larger share of the market. The imports of 1,233 million square yards accounted for 7.4 percent of the total domestic market in the third LTA year, as compared to 6.8 percent in the second LTA year, and 5.2 percent in the year ending June 1961. The LTA itself is a factor in this increased share. Our bilateral agreements provide for an annual growth rate of 5 percent, whereas domestic consumption is increasing at the rate of 3 percent. As the secretariat's report shows, U.S. production of cotton textiles has not increased materially during the 3-year term of the LTA. The growth in the market has been taken up mainly by imports.

The United States would like to caution that, while import/consumption ratios are useful and interesting, they do not tell the story of the disruptive impact that imports may have in the market for individual products or groups of products. We will not take the time to review import trends into the United States in individual categories but only note that about 50 percent of total cotton textile imports during the third LTA year were concentrated in nine categories. This concentration creates particularly heavy price pressures on the market for similarly produced domestic goods. Six of these categories are in the apparel group.

U.S. Policies Under Long-Term Arrangement

U.S. actions under the Long-Term Arrangement are predicated on the general governmental policy that trade and competition are healthy for industry. Cotton textile imports are permitted without quantitative limitation except for actions taken under the Long-Term Arrangement to avoid disruption to markets for particular products. The United States requests restraint on imports of cotton textiles only when circumstances clearly show such action is required. It does so sparingly and in accordance with the specific provisions of article 3 of the Arrangement. Restraints are eliminated when no longer needed.

Article 3 restraints are currently in effect on seven categories from three countries.

Only one of the countries is a participant in the Arrangement. The United States did not resort to the procedures of article 3 with respect to imports from any participating country during the third LTA year. Seven article 3 restraints were dropped during that period. The restraint levels now in effect total 16 million square yards.

Where necessary to resort to the provisions of the Long-Term Arrangement to prevent market disruption, the United States has found that bilateral agreements under article 4 offer exporting countries more favorable conditions to develop their exports of cotton textiles to the United States because of the assurances of stability and growth.

The United States now has multiyear bilateral agreements on cotton textile trade with 17 exporting countries. Four of these were concluded during the third LTA year. The manner in which the United States can cooperate under bilateral agreements is illustrated by these four instances. The aggregate ceilings in the four new agreements total 97 million square yards, compared to actual imports from these countries during the first year of the Geneva arrangements, the STA year, of 39 million square yards.

Even though bilateral agreements are designed to meet specific trade requirements, the United States, in its administration of the bilaterals, tries, to the extent possible, to accommodate particular problems that the exporting countries encounter thereafter. During the third LTA year the United States agreed to changes in bilateral agreements with eight exporting countries. There were 22 separate actions involved. The United States observes its obligations under article 6(c) to insure that exports of participants are not restrained more severely than are exports of nonparticipants.

The figures show that the United States has successfully complied with this equity commitment. Imports from participants have remained above 90 percent of total imports throughout the course of the LTA. The United States has attempted to encourage nonparticipating countries to join the Long-

Term Arrangement in order both to receive its advantages and to assume a share of the responsibility for working out world cotton textile trade problems.

Impact of LTA on U.S. Industry

The Long-Term Arrangement has helped to restore confidence in the future of the U.S. cotton textile industry, including the apparel sector. While imports into the United States have grown, the threat of disruption in the market has been reduced. The industry has responded by increasing its investment in new plants and in more modern equipment.

The output of U.S. firms has increased in recent months, though at a lesser rate than the increase in imports. As a result, the long-term decline in employment has been halted, at least temporarily, and profits of the industry have shown improvement.

The industry in the United States is nonetheless confronted with several serious problems:

—It has always been subject to cyclical fluctuations.

—Textile industry profits, although rising, are still among the lowest in industry.

—Cotton textile wage rates continue to lag behind the average for manufacturing industries.

—Unemployment rates, particularly in the apparel sector, continue to be well above the level for all manufacturing industries.

—Per capita consumption of all fibers in the United States has not grown since 1953, and cotton's share in the total has been declining steadily for the past 15 years.

It is natural and healthy that the U.S. industry and the U.S. Government should be concerned with those problems.

Underlying Problems Requiring Consideration

In reviewing the record to date under the LTA, and especially in considering the facts portrayed in the secretariat's study, we note several developments that are directly relevant to trends in world cotton textile trade and that will require careful attention. We

would like to mention these briefly and suggest that the Committee consider them in its discussions.

1. Production of cotton textiles has been increasing rapidly in the developing countries although world consumption has been stagnant. The growth in production has occurred both in developing countries that are participants in the LTA and in those that are not. This situation is contributing to significant overcapacity in production facilities.

2. The number of cotton textile exporting countries, most of which are developing countries exporting under great pressures to earn foreign exchange, has increased. The secretariat's study refers to these efforts and describes export incentive schemes operating in some countries. Overzealous stimulation of exports intensifies depressive price effects in the limited and highly competitive world markets. In this connection, more attention needs to be paid to the apparent disparity between export prices and higher domestic prices for similar goods in some of the highly protected markets of the exporting countries. High consumer prices, especially in low-wage countries, hold down internal consumption and the world demand for cotton textiles.

3. The growing competition from man-made fiber textiles requires some new thinking about how to stimulate demand for cotton products. The cotton-growing countries are already at work to improve cotton's position in interfiber competition. Countries which are large exporters of cotton textiles might wish to join in these efforts. The competition is keen in this field, and those who wish to maintain and develop their export markets for cotton textiles must be aggressive, competent merchandisers of cotton goods.

I should like now to present the views of the United States on the future of the Long-Term Arrangement. My remarks will be brief since the concept is simple: This international instrument has been successful in

coping with an unprecedented and difficult economic crisis; it has led to the orderly development of trade in a highly sensitive section of industry.

Fortunately we have the opportunity to think about these and other problems in cotton textile trade in an atmosphere of optimism based on our immediate past experiences and the outlook for the coming year. The optimism of today is in large measure due to the wisdom of our arrangements for the orderly development of cotton textile trade. For no commerce can prosper or long survive in the chaos and confusion which characterized the markets for cotton textiles prior to the negotiation of the LTA.

Differences in point of view among participating countries still exist and will in the future. This is perfectly natural. Negotiations for the Arrangement involved the compromising of many different points of view. We have no reason to believe that the countries now participating in the Arrangement could find a better basis for mutual agreement than the terms of the Arrangement as it now stands.

In contemplating the future it is important that we keep in mind the need to settle upon policies for cotton textile trade after September 30, 1967. We should do so early enough to avoid confusion and apprehension in the market. If doubts on the future are permitted to occur, normal trade patterns will undoubtedly be adversely affected.

The United States supports efforts presently under way to extend the LTA in its present form. But it is necessary that policy decisions on this matter be reached soon if, as our chairman [GATT Director-General Eric Wyndham White] has said, we are to bring about "a higher degree of liberalization in trade in cotton textiles." The United States, as you have been told, is already engaged in talks with the Government of Japan. We are ready to consult similarly with other exporting countries prepared to work within the framework of the initiative taken by the Director-General of GATT.

New Air Transport Agreement To Be Signed With Canada

Joint Statement

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 31

Agreement has been reached in principle between the Governments of the United States and Canada on a new Air Transport Agreement to replace the Agreement dated June 4, 1949, as amended December 20, 1955, and April 9, 1959.¹ It is expected that minor drafting and other formalities will be completed in the near future and that the Agreement will be signed at an early date.

The Agreement is the result of lengthy negotiations carried out over the past 2 years. Routes now operated under the existing Agreement will be retained. The new Agreement also provides for a significant expansion of routes and will make possible a marked improvement in air services.

It will be seen from the attached route lists that airlines of both countries will be permitted to operate direct services between Montreal and Toronto on the one hand and Tampa and Miami on the other, and also between Toronto and Los Angeles. Canada will be granted rights permitting non-stop service from Montreal to Chicago and a new direct route from Vancouver to San Francisco. The United States will be granted a new route from Chicago to Toronto and a new route from Los Angeles and San Francisco to Vancouver. Certain other route adjustments are also made.

In order to be able to meet flexibly the needs which may emerge in the future for air services of a regional or local nature

which have not been provided for under the new Agreement, the two Governments have also agreed upon arrangements which will permit consideration of such services without the necessity for formal renegotiation and amendment of the Agreement.

The two Governments have also agreed on the desirability of formally reviewing from time to time the routes established under the new Agreement in order to ensure that, consistent with an equitable overall exchange of economic benefits for the two countries, the routes meet the changing requirements of the public. It is planned that the first such review will take place early in 1969.

The two Governments believe that the Agreement constitutes a constructive development in relations between the United States of America and Canada and that it will contribute to rapid achievement of a more modern and efficient air transportation network serving the interests of the airline industry and the needs of the public.

SCHEDULE I—UNITED STATES

1. Seattle-Vancouver
2. Los Angeles/San Francisco-Vancouver
3. Denver/Great Falls-Calgary
4. Chicago-Toronto
5. Detroit-Toronto (Local service airline only)
- *6. Tampa/Miami-Toronto
- *7. Tampa/Miami-Montreal
8. Los Angeles-Toronto
9. New York-Montreal/Ottawa
10. New York-Toronto
11. Boston-Montreal
12. Washington-Ottawa/Montreal
13. Buffalo-Toronto
14. Minneapolis-Winnipeg
15. United States-Gander-Europe and beyond
16. a) Spokane-Calgary
- b) Duluth/Superior-Fort William/Port Arthur
- c) Ketchikan-Prince Rupert
- d) Fairbanks-Whitehorse
- e) Juneau-Whitehorse
- f) Erie-Toronto

* Mandatory stop at Tampa until November 1, 1967.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1934, 3456, and 4213.

SCHEDULE II—CANADA

1. Victoria—Seattle
2. Vancouver—San Francisco
3. Halifax—Boston/New York
4. Montreal/Toronto—Chicago
5. Toronto—Cleveland
6. Toronto—Los Angeles
- *7. Toronto—Tampa/Miami
- *8. Montreal—Tampa/Miami
9. Montreal—New York
10. Toronto—New York
11. Canada—Honolulu—Australasia and beyond
12. a) Prince Rupert—Ketchikan
b) Whitehorse—Fairbanks
c) Whitehorse—Juneau

* Mandatory stop at Tampa until November 1, 1967.

United States and Japan Amend Civil Air Transport Agreement

Following is an announcement released by the White House at Austin, Tex., on December 27, together with texts of notes exchanged between the United States and Japan at Tokyo that day (December 28, Tokyo time).

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

Japan and the United States on December 27 announced the signing of an amendment to the civil air transport agreement between the two countries. The amendment grants to Japan the right to operate a new route Japan—Honolulu—San Francisco—New York and beyond.

The United States was granted a new right to serve Osaka. In addition, agreement was reached upon a number of principles under which operations will be conducted by the airlines of the two countries.

The amendment was effected by an exchange of notes in Tokyo between Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer and Minister for Foreign Affairs Etsusaburo Shiina.

EXCHANGES OF NOTES

Japanese Note

TOKYO, December 28, 1965

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR, I have the honor to refer to the civil aviation consultations which re-

cently took place in Tokyo in accordance with the Civil Air Transport Agreement between Japan and the United States of America which was signed on August 11, 1952, and was amended on January 14, 1959.¹ The two delegations agreed to recommend to their respective Governments the deletion of the Schedule attached to the said Agreement and the insertion of a new Schedule, together with an Annex thereto, both of which are enclosed with this note.

I have further the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Japan accepts the new Schedule with the Annex, and to propose that this note and your reply thereto, indicating the acceptance of the new Schedule with the Annex by the Government of the United States of America, will constitute an agreement between the two Governments further amending the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, which will enter into force on the date of your reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ETSUSABURO SHIINA

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosures:

1. Schedule
2. Annex to Schedule

SCHEDULE

(A) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of Japan shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States of America at the points specified in this paragraph:

(1) From Japan to Honolulu, San Francisco, and:

- (a) New York and beyond New York to Europe (including the United Kingdom) and beyond.*
- (b) beyond to Mexico and Central America.**

(2) From Japan to Honolulu and Los Angeles and beyond to South America.**

(3) From Japan to Okinawa and beyond. * * *

(B) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the routes specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in Japan at the points specified in this paragraph:

(1) From the United States via the North Pacific to Tokyo and Osaka and beyond.

(2) From the United States via the Central Pacific to Tokyo and Osaka and beyond.

(3) From Okinawa to Osaka and Tokyo.***

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2854 and 4158.

(C) Except as otherwise indicated, points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated airline be omitted on any or all flights.

* Any flight operating eastbound from Japan which makes a scheduled landing at New York, and any flight operating westbound to Japan which makes a scheduled departure from New York must make a scheduled stop at San Francisco. [Footnote in original.]

** Passengers, cargo, and mail destined for or originating at points beyond the United States may not make a stopover or be picked up or discharged at United States points on these routes. [Footnote in original.]

*** In granting these routes, the respective Contracting Parties are cognizant of the provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, under which the United States of America exercises the powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over Okinawa. [Footnote in original.]

ANNEX TO SCHEDULE

(A) In the event the Government of the United States intends to designate more than one United States airline to operate air services from New York to Japan under the United States route described in paragraph (B) (1) of the Schedule, the Government of the United States will notify the Government of Japan of this intention sixty days in advance of the designation. Without prejudice to the right of the Government of the United States to designate the airline or airlines concerned at the end of such sixty days, the United States will, on request of the Government of Japan, consult with Japan prior to the expiration of such sixty days in accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement.

(B) If during any time that Article 13(F) of the Agreement is in effect, the Government of Japan is dissatisfied with a rate structure proposed by the airline or airlines of the United States which is based on the lower mileage of North Pacific as contrasted to Central Pacific air services, the United States will, without prejudice to the coming into effect of the rates as provided for in Article 13(F), consult with Japan at its request in accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement.

(C) The purpose of the consultations referred to in (A) and (B) above will be to determine whether the eventualities mentioned therein warrant modification of the Agreement in view of the changes which may be brought about in the competitive position of the designated airline or airlines of Japan which are permitted to operate only on the Central Pacific route.

U.S. Reply

TOKYO, *December 28, 1965*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of December 28, 1965, in which Your Excellency has informed me as follows:

[Full text of the Japanese note.]

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States of America accepts the proposal contained in Your Excellency's note which, with this reply, constitutes an agreement between the two Governments further amending the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, which enters into force on this date.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

U.S. Note

TOKYO, *December 28, 1965*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the civil aviation consultations which recently took place in Tokyo in accordance with the Civil Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and Japan which was signed on August 11, 1952, and was amended on January 14, 1959, and on December 28, 1965, and to confirm that the Government of the United States of America accepts the following understandings relating to the above-mentioned Agreement which were reached between the two delegations during the course of these consultations:

1. Where the word "beyond" appears in an air route described in the Schedule attached to the Agreement without specification of a subsequent geographical direction, air services on such beyond portion of the route may be operated to any point or points, including points in the home territory.

2. A designation at any time of one or more airlines to operate air services on any of the air routes specified in the Schedule attached to the Agreement does not prejudice the right of a Contracting Party to designate at a later date one or more additional airlines to operate air services on the same specified route.

3. Any right granted in the Agreement is not prejudiced by the fact that there was a delay in the exercise of such right following the entry into force of the Agreement and its amendments.

4. The rights granted in the Agreement include the right to operate air services for the carriage of passengers, mail, and cargo separately or in any combination.

I shall be grateful if Your Excellency would be

good enough to confirm that the Government of Japan accepts the above understandings relating to the Civil Air Transport Agreement.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

Japanese Reply

TOKYO, December 28, 1965

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of December 28, 1965, which reads as follows:

[Full text of the American note.]

I have further the honor to confirm that the Government of Japan accepts the above understandings relating to the Civil Air Transport Agreement.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ETSUSABURO SHIINA

Minister for Foreign Affairs

U.S. Signs Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States

Press release 3 dated January 7

The United States has signed the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States. The signing was performed by Ambassador Charles W. Yost at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on December 30, 1965.

This convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference on Transit Trade of Land-Locked Countries on July 8, 1965. The convention is intended to promote the economic and social development of the landlocked countries by insuring greater facilities for international trade. It grants freedom of transit for traffic in transit and means of transport. It also deals with or enables contracting states to resolve such problems as customs duties and special transit dues and use of means of transport and application of tariffs, as well as other measures to promote free and uninterrupted

transit traffic, such as storage of goods in transit, free zones, and other customs facilities.

The convention is to enter into force after ratification or accession of two landlocked states and two transit states having a sea-coast. In addition to the United States, the convention has been signed by Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussia, Cameroon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany, Laos, Luxembourg, Nepal, Paraguay, Rwanda, San Marino, Sudan, Switzerland, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Austria of July 29, 1959 (TIAS 4402), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna June 15 and July 28, 1964. Entered into force: December 13, 1965.

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Portugal of July 21, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3317, 3899, 4519, 5111, 5679), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna February 24, 1965. Entered into force: December 15, 1965.

Finance

Convention on settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹ Signatures: Belgium, December 15, 1965; Congo (Brazzaville), December 27, 1965; France, December 22, 1965.

Judicial Cooperation

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Open for signature at The Hague November 15, 1965. Enters into force on the 60th day after deposit of the third instrument of ratification. Signatures: Finland, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.¹ Ratification deposited: Poland, January 5, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931. *Notification of accession*: Cyprus, December 17, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II. *Acceptance deposited*: Portugal, December 31, 1965.

BILATERAL

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement to support personnel from the Federal Republic stationed in the United States during emergencies. Signed at Bonn October 21 and at Washington December 18, 1965. Entered into force December 18, 1965.

Protocol amending convention for avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income of July 22, 1954 (TIAS 3133). Signed at Bonn September 17, 1965. Entered into force December 27, 1965.

Proclaimed by the President: December 30, 1965.

Greece

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 22, 1962 (TIAS 5238). Effected by exchange of notes at Athens October 22 and 23, 1965. Entered into force October 23, 1965.

Italy

Agreement relating to the loan of two naval vessels to Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome December 23 and 27, 1965. Entered into force December 27, 1965.

Mali

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 14, 1965 (TIAS 5852). Effected by exchange of notes at Bamako December 8 and 15, 1965. Entered into force December 15, 1965.

Philippines

Agreement relating to cooperation in consecrating Corregidor Island as a World War II memorial site, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila December 22, 1965. Entered into force December 22, 1965.

Agreement relating to the relinquishment by the United States of the right to use certain base lands and the granting by the Philippines to the United States of the right to use certain land in other areas, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila December 22, 1965. Entered into force December 22, 1965.

Ryukyu Islands

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV

of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Washington October 26, 1965, and at Naha December 23, 1965. Entered into force December 23, 1965.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Board of the Foreign Service and Board of Examiners

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

THE BOARD OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS FOR THE FOREIGN SERVICE

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 (30 F.R. 9353), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

PART I. SECRETARY OF STATE

SECTION 1. *Delegation of functions.* Except to the extent inconsistent with Sections 22(a) and 32(a) of this Order, all the functions which were transferred to the President by Sections 1(c) and 1(d) of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State, hereinafter referred to as the Secretary.

SEC. 2. *Redelegation.* The Secretary may redelegate the functions delegated to him by the provisions of Section 1 of this Order to officials or bodies of the Department of State.

PART II. BOARD OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

SEC. 21. *Establishment of Board.* (a) There is hereby established in the Department of State the Board of the Foreign Service, hereafter in this Part referred to as the Board.

(b) The Board shall be composed of:

(1) Five officials of the Department of State, each of whom shall be designated as a member of the Board by the Secretary and one of whom shall be so designated from among the officials of the Agency for International Development.

(2) One official of each of the following who in each case shall be designated as a member of the Board by the head of the department or agency concerned:

¹ No. 11264; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 67.

(i) The Department of Commerce
(ii) The Department of Labor
(iii) The United States Information Agency
(iv) Such other executive departments and agencies as shall be designated from time to time by the Secretary, each of which shall have one member on the Board.

(3) The Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission.

(c) The Secretary may invite the head of any executive department or other agency which is not represented on the Board by a member of the Board to designate a representative to participate in meetings of the Board whenever matters of substantial interest to such department or agency are to be considered by the Board.

(d) Each member designated pursuant to subsection (b) (1) or (b) (2), above, and each representative designated pursuant to subsection (c), above, shall be chosen from among the officials of the department or agency concerned who are not below the rank of an Assistant Secretary or who are occupying positions of comparable responsibility, except that the Secretary may designate the Director General of the Foreign Service as one of the members under subsection (b) (1), above.

(e) The Secretary shall from time to time designate a member of the Board as the chairman of the Board.

SEC. 22. *Functions of the Board.* (a) There are hereby delegated to the Board the functions which prior to the taking effect of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 were vested in the Board of the Foreign Service abolished by that plan by Section 211 (b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U.S.C. 826(b)), exclusive of that part thereof which follows the last semicolon in the Section, and by Section 637(a) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 1007(a)).

(b) The Board shall perform such additional functions as the Secretary may from time to time delegate or otherwise assign thereto.

PART III. BOARD OF EXAMINERS FOR THE FOREIGN SERVICE

SEC. 31. *Establishment of Board.* (a) There is hereby established in the Department of State the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, hereinafter referred to as the Board of Examiners.

(b) The membership of the Board of Examiners shall be constituted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary. The Secretary shall from time to time designate a member of the Board of Examiners as the chairman thereof. Not more than one half of the membership of the Board of Examiners may be made up of officers of the Foreign Service.

SEC. 32. *Functions of the Board.* (a) There are hereby delegated to the Board of Examiners the functions which prior to the taking effect of Re-

organization Plan No. 4 of 1965 were vested in the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service abolished by that plan by Sections 212(a), 516(a), and 517 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U.S.C. 827(a); 911(a); 912).

(b) The Board of Examiners shall perform such additional functions as the Secretary may from time to time delegate or otherwise assign thereto.

SEC. 33. *Direction and supervision.* All functions delegated or otherwise assigned by or pursuant to this Part shall be performed subject to the direction and supervision of the Secretary.

PART IV. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 41. *Administrative arrangements.* (a) The Department of State is hereby designated as the agency which shall provide administrative services and facilities for the Board of the Foreign Service and the Board of Examiners.

(b) Upon request of the Secretary, the heads of executive departments and agencies shall, as far as practicable, furnish the Board of the Foreign Service and the Board of Examiners information and reports relating to matters within the cognizance of the respective boards.

SEC. 42. *Saving provisions.* (a) Except to the extent that they may be inconsistent with this Order, all determinations, authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, orders, directives, contracts, agreements and other actions made, issued, or entered into with respect to any functions affected by this Order and not revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable before the effective date of this Order shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified, or terminated by appropriate authority.

(b) For the purposes of any proceeding or other business which immediately before the effective date of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 or of this Order was pending or in process before the Board of the Foreign Service or the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service as established by the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 or by the provisions of Executive Order No. 11240 of August 4, 1965, the bodies established by Parts II and III of this Order shall be deemed to represent continuations of the respective Boards.

(c) Nothing in Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 (30 F.R. 9353) or in this Order or in any Executive order issued before the date of this Order shall be deemed to terminate or impair any of the following:

(1) The availability to the Director of the United States Information Agency of the authority which was made available to him by Executive Order No. 10522 of March 26, 1954.


(2) The availability to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development of the authority which was made available to him by Section 2(b)(3) of State Department Delegation of

Authority No. 104 of November 3, 1961, 26 F.R. 10608.

(3) The availability to the Director of the Peace Corps of the authority which was made available to him by Section 2(b)(3) of State Department Delegation of Authority No. 85-11A of August 29, 1962, 27 F.R. 9074.

(4) The availability to the Secretary of State of the authority which was vested in him by Section 42(3) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2582(3)).

SEC. 43. *Effective date.* The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of January 1, 1966.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 31, 1965.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Aviation—Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Civil Glider Aircraft. Agreement with Poland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 16 and 27, 1965. Entered into force September 27, 1965. TIAS 5868. 5 pp. 5¢.

Trade—Quality Wheat. Agreement with the European Economic Community and Member States, extending the date for beginning negotiations under paragraph B(i) of the agreement of March 7, 1962. Exchange of letters—Signed at Brussels June 8 and July 5, 1965. Entered into force July 5, 1965. TIAS 5869. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Kenya, amending the agreement of December 7, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nairobi September 1, 1965. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5870. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Bolivia. Signed at La Paz, August 17, 1965. Entered into force August 17, 1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5871. 11 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Arrangement with Hong Kong. Exchange of letters—Signed at Hong Kong November 7 and 16, 1964. Entered into force November 16, 1964. TIAS 5872. 10 pp. 10¢.

Statute of International Agency for Research on Cancer. Done at the Eighteenth World Health Assembly at Geneva May 20, 1965. Entered into force September 15, 1965. With resolution. TIAS 5873. 13 pp. 10¢.

Desalting. Agreement with Mexico and the International Atomic Energy Agency—Signed at Washington October 7, 1965. Entered into force October 7, 1965. TIAS 5874. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Vietnam, amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon September 23, 1965. Entered into force September 23, 1965. TIAS 5876. 3 pp. 5¢.

Columbia River Basin—Permanent Engineering Board. Agreement with Canada, implementing article XV(4) of the treaty of January 17, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 4, 1965. Entered into force October 4, 1965. TIAS 5877. 5 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: January 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Challenges and Choices in U.S. Trade Policy

1966 should be a critical year for United States trade policy, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon predicted recently. Mr. Solomon sees three major challenges facing our trade policy: (1) the future pattern of our trade relations with the rich, industrialized nations of the free world—which hinges on the outcome of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations at Geneva; (2) the trade problems of the more than 100 independent nations of the developing world—how to improve and stabilize their trade earnings and how best to organize trade with low-income countries; and (3) U.S. trade relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—whether our policies of the last 17 years continue to serve American interests well or whether changes in the Communist world and the world at large have made some aspects of U.S. policy obsolete.

In this pamphlet, which reprints from the Department of State Bulletin two recent addresses by Mr. Solomon, the Assistant Secretary discusses these challenges and the choices that will have to be made in the years ahead.

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THE
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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1388



January 31, 1966

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The State of the Union

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE CONGRESS (EXCERPTS)¹

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the House and the Senate, my fellow Americans:

I come before you tonight to report on the state of the Union for the third time.

I come here to thank you and to add my tribute, once more, to the Nation's gratitude for this, the 89th Congress. This Congress has already reserved for itself an honored chapter in the history of America.

Our nation tonight is engaged in a brutal and bitter conflict in Viet-Nam. Later on I want to discuss that struggle in some detail with you. It just must be the center of our concerns.

But we will not permit those who fire

¹ Delivered on Jan. 12 (White House press release, as-delivered text); also available as H. Doc. 321, 89th Cong., 2d sess.

upon us in Viet-Nam to win a victory over the desires and the intentions of all the American people. This nation is mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people are strong enough to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Society here at home.

And that is what I have come here to ask of you tonight.

I recommend that you provide the resources to carry forward, with full vigor, the great health and education programs that you enacted into law last year.

I recommend that we prosecute with vigor and determination our war on poverty.

I recommend that you give a new and daring direction to our foreign aid program, designed to make a maximum attack on hunger and disease and ignorance in

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1388 PUBLICATION 8030 JANUARY 31, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

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those countries that are determined to help themselves, and to help those nations that are trying to control population growth.

I recommend that you make it possible to expand trade between the United States and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I recommend to you a program to rebuild completely, on a scale never before attempted, entire central and slum areas of several of our cities in America.

I recommend that you attack the wasteful and degrading poisoning of our rivers and, as the cornerstone of this effort, clean completely entire large river basins.

I recommend that you meet the growing menace of crime in the streets by building up law enforcement and by revitalizing the entire Federal system from prevention to probation.

I recommend that you take additional steps to insure equal justice to all of our people by effectively enforcing nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection, by making it a serious Federal crime to obstruct public and private efforts to secure civil rights, and by outlawing discrimination in the sale and rental of housing.

I recommend that you help me modernize and streamline the Federal Government by creating a new Cabinet-level Department of Transportation and reorganizing several existing agencies. In turn, I will restructure our civil service in the top grades so that men and women can easily be assigned to jobs where they are most needed and ability will be both required as well as rewarded.

I will ask you to make it possible for Members of the House of Representatives to work more effectively in the service of the Nation through a constitutional amendment extending the term of a Congressman to 4 years, concurrent with that of the President.

Because of Viet-Nam we cannot do all that we should or all that we would like to do.

The Conflict in Viet-Nam

Tonight the cup of peril is full in Viet-Nam.

That conflict is not an isolated episode but another great event in the policy that we have followed with strong consistency since World War II.

The touchstone of that policy is the interest of the United States—the welfare and the freedom of the people of the United States. But nations sink when they see that interest only through a narrow glass.

In a world that has grown small and dangerous, pursuit of narrow aims could bring decay and even disaster.

An America that is mighty beyond description, yet living in a hostile or despairing world, would be neither safe nor free to build a civilization to liberate the spirit of man.

In this pursuit we helped rebuild Western Europe. We gave our aid to Greece and Turkey, and we defended the freedom of Berlin.

In this pursuit we have helped new nations toward independence. We have extended the helping hand of the Peace Corps and carried forward the largest program of economic assistance in the world.

In this pursuit we work to build a hemisphere of democracy and of social justice.

And in this pursuit we have defended against Communist aggression—in Korea under President Truman, in the Formosa Straits under President Eisenhower, in Cuba under President Kennedy, and again in Viet-Nam.

Continuing Lines of Policy

Tonight Viet-Nam must hold the center of our attention, but across the world problems and opportunities crowd in on the American nation. I will discuss them fully in the months to come, and I will follow the five continuing lines of policy that America has followed under its last four Presidents.

The first principle is strength.

Tonight I can tell you we are strong enough to keep all of our commitments. We will need expenditures of \$58.3 billion for the next fiscal year to maintain this necessary defense might.

While special Viet-Nam expenditures for the next fiscal year are estimated to increase by \$5.8 billion, I can tell you that all the other expenditures put together in the entire Federal budget will rise this coming year by only six-tenths of a billion dollars. This is true because of the stringent cost-conscious economy program inaugurated in the Defense Department and followed by the other departments of Government.

A second principle of policy is the effort to control, and to reduce, and to ultimately eliminate the modern engines of destruction.

We will vigorously pursue existing proposals—and seek new ones—to control arms and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

A third major principle of our foreign policy is to help build those associations of nations which reflect the opportunities and the necessities of the modern world.

By strengthening the common defense, by stimulating world commerce, by meeting new hopes, these associations serve the cause of a flourishing world.

We will take new steps this year to help strengthen the Alliance for Progress, the unity of Europe, the community of the Atlantic, the regional organizations of developing continents, and that supreme association—the United Nations.

We will work to strengthen economic cooperation, to reduce barriers to trade, and to improve international finance.

A fourth enduring strand of policy has been to help improve the life of man.

From the Marshall Plan to this very moment tonight, that policy has rested on the claims of compassion and the certain knowledge that only a people advancing in expectation will build secure and peaceful lands.

This year I propose major new directions in our program of foreign assistance to help those countries who will help themselves.

We will conduct a worldwide attack on the

problems of hunger and disease and ignorance.

We will place the matchless skill and the resources of our own great America, in farming and in fertilizers, at the service of those countries committed to developing a modern agriculture.

We will aid those who educate the young in other lands, and we will give children in other continents the same head start that we are trying to give our own children. To advance these ends I will propose the International Education Act of 1966.

I will also propose the International Health Act of 1966 to strike at disease by a new effort to bring modern skills and knowledge to the uncared-for, those suffering in the world, and by trying to wipe out smallpox and malaria and controlling yellow fever over most of the world during this next decade; to help countries trying to control population growth, by increasing our research—and we will earmark funds to help their efforts.

In the next year, from our foreign aid sources, we propose to dedicate \$1 billion to these efforts, and we call on all who have the means to join us in this work in the world.

The fifth and most important principle of our foreign policy is support of national independence—the right of each people to govern themselves and to shape their own institutions.

For a peaceful world order will be possible only when each country walks the way that it has chosen to walk for itself.

We follow this principle by encouraging the end of colonial rule.

We follow this principle, abroad as well as at home, by continued hostility to the rule of the many by the few, or the oppression of one race by another.

We follow this principle by building bridges to Eastern Europe. And I will ask the Congress for authority to remove the special tariff restrictions which are a barrier to increasing trade between the East and the West.

The insistent urge toward national inde-

pendence is the strongest force of today's world in which we live. In Africa and Asia and Latin America it is shattering the designs of those who would subdue others to their ideas or their will. It is eroding the unity of what was once a Stalinist empire. In recent months a number of nations have cast out those who would subject them to the ambitions of mainland China.

History is on the side of freedom and is on the side of societies shaped from the genius of each people. History does not favor a single system or belief—unless force is used to make it so.

That is why it has been necessary for us to defend this basic principle of our policy, to defend it in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba—and tonight in Viet-Nam.

For tonight, as so many nights before, young Americans struggle and young Americans die in a distant land.

Tonight, as so many nights before, the American nation is asked to sacrifice the blood of its children and the fruits of its labor for the love of its freedom.

How many times, in my lifetime and in yours, have the American people gathered, as they do now, to hear their President tell them of conflict and tell them of danger. Each time they have answered. They have answered with all the effort that the security and the freedom of this nation required.

And they do again tonight in Viet-Nam.

The Decision To Stand Firm

Not too many years ago Viet-Nam was a peaceful, if troubled, land. In the North was an independent Communist government. In the South a people struggled to build a nation, with the friendly help of the United States.

There were some in South Viet-Nam who wished to force Communist rule on their own people. But their progress was slight. Their hope of success was dim. Then, little more than 6 years ago, North Viet-Nam decided on conquest. And from that day to this, soldiers and supplies have moved from

North to South in a swelling stream that swallowed the remnants of revolution in aggression.

As the assault mounted, our choice gradually became clear. We could leave, abandon South Viet-Nam to its attackers and to certain conquest, or we could stay and fight beside the people of South Viet-Nam.

We stayed.

And we will stay until aggression has stopped.

We will stay because a just nation cannot leave to the cruelties of its enemies a people who have staked their lives and independence on America's solemn pledge—a pledge which has grown through the commitments of three American Presidents.

We will stay because in Asia—and around the world—are countries whose independence rests, in large measure, on confidence in America's word and in America's protection. To yield to force in Viet-Nam would weaken that confidence, would undermine the independence of many lands, and would whet the appetite of aggression. We would have to fight in one land, and then we would have to fight in another—or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists.

And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest.

Last year the nature of the war in Viet-Nam changed again. Swiftly increasing numbers of armed men from the North crossed the borders to join forces that were already in the South. Attack and terror increased, spurred and encouraged by the belief that the United States lacked the will to continue and that their victory was near.

Despite our desire to limit conflict, it was necessary to act: to hold back the mounting aggression, to give courage to the people of the South, and to make our firmness clear to the North. Thus we began limited air action against military targets in North Viet-Nam. We increased our fighting force to its present strength tonight of 190,000 men.

These moves have not ended the aggression, but they have prevented its success.

The aims of the enemy have been put out of reach by the skill and the bravery of Americans and their allies—and by the enduring courage of the South Vietnamese, who, I can tell you, have lost eight men last year for every one of ours.

The enemy is no longer close to victory. Time is no longer on his side. There is no cause to doubt the American commitment.

The Search for Peace

Our decision to stand firm has been matched by our desire for peace.

In 1965 alone we had 300 private talks for peace in Viet-Nam with friends and adversaries throughout the world.

Since Christmas your Government has labored again, with imagination and endurance, to remove any barrier to peaceful settlement. For 20 days now we and our Vietnamese allies have dropped no bombs in North Viet-Nam.

Able and experienced spokesmen have visited, in behalf of America, more than 40 countries. We have talked to more than a hundred governments—all 113 that we have relations with, and some that we don't. We have talked to the United Nations, and we have called upon all of its members to make any contribution that they can toward helping obtain peace.

In public statements and in private communications—to adversaries and to friends, in Rome and Warsaw, in Paris and Tokyo, in Africa and throughout this hemisphere—America has made her position abundantly clear.

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Viet-Nam. We fight for the principle of self-determination—that the people of South Viet-Nam should be able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections without violence, without terror, and without fear. The people of all Viet-Nam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification.

This is all we want for South Viet-Nam. It is all the people of South Viet-Nam want. And if there is a single nation on this earth

that desires less than this for its own people, then let its voice be heard.

We have also made it clear—from Hanoi to New York—that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will respond if others reduce their use of force, and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Viet-Nam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.

We have said all this, and we have asked—and hoped—and we have waited for a response.

So far we have received no response to prove either success or failure.

We have carried our quest for peace to many nations and peoples because we share this planet with others whose future, in large measure, is tied to our own action and whose counsel is necessary to our own hopes.

We have found understanding and support. And we know they wait with us tonight for some response that could lead to peace.

The Days Ahead

I wish tonight that I could give you a blueprint for the course of this conflict over the coming months, but we just cannot know what the future may require. We may have to face long, hard combat or a long, hard conference—or even both at once.

Until peace comes, or if it does not come, our course is clear.

We will act as we must to help protect the independence of the valiant people of South Viet-Nam.

We will strive to limit the conflict, for we wish neither increased destruction nor do we want to invite increased danger. But we will give our fighting men what they must have: every gun, every dollar, and every decision—whatever the cost or whatever the challenge.

And we will continue to help the people

of South Viet-Nam care for those that are ravaged by battle, create progress in the villages, and carry forward the healing hopes of peace as best they can amidst the uncertain terrors of war.

And let me be absolutely clear: The days may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle.

There may be some who do not want peace, whose ambitions stretch so far that war in Viet-Nam is but a welcome and convenient episode in an immense design to subdue history to their will. But for others it must now be clear the choice is not between peace and victory. It lies between peace and the ravages of a conflict from which they can only lose.

The people of Viet-Nam, North and South, seek the same things: the shared needs of man, the needs for food and shelter and education—the chance to build and work and till the soil, free from the arbitrary horrors of battle—the desire to walk in the dignity of those who master their own destiny. For many painful years, in war and revolution and infrequent peace, they have struggled to fulfill those needs.

It is a crime against mankind that so much courage, and so much will, and so many dreams, must be flung on the fires of war and death.

To all of those caught up in this conflict, we therefore say again tonight: Let us choose peace, and with it the wondrous works of peace, and, beyond that, the time when hope reaches toward consummation and life is the servant of life.

In this work we plan to discharge our duty to the people whom we serve.

This is the state of the Union.

But over it all—wealth, and promise, and expectation—lies our troubling awareness of American men at war tonight.

How many men who listen to me tonight have served their nation in other wars? How very many are not here to listen?

The war in Viet-Nam is not like these other wars. Yet, finally, war is always the same. It is young men dying in the fullness

of their promise. It is trying to kill a man that you do not even know well enough to hate.

Therefore, to know war is to know that there is still madness in this world.

Many of you share the burden of this knowledge tonight with me. But there is a difference. For, finally, I must be the one to order our guns to fire, against all the most inward pulls of my desire. For we have children to teach, and we have sick to be cured, and we have men to be freed. There are poor to be lifted up, and there are cities to be built, and there is a world to be helped.

Yet we do what we must.

I am hopeful, and I will try as best I can, with everything I have got, to end this battle and to return our sons to their desires.

Yet as long as others will challenge America's security and test the dearness of our beliefs with fire and steel, then we must stand or see the promise of two centuries tremble. I believe tonight that you do not want me to try that risk. And from that belief your President summons his strength for the trials that lie ahead in the days to come.

The work must be our work now. Scarred by the weaknesses of man, with whatever guidance God may offer us, we must nevertheless, and alone with our mortality, strive to ennoble the life of man on earth.

Thank you, and goodnight.

Secretary Rusk and Vietnamese Premier Restate Basic Positions

Press release 12 dated January 17

Following is the text of a joint communique issued at Saigon on January 16 by Secretary Rusk and Nguyen Cao Ky, Prime Minister of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Prime Minister Ky and Secretary Rusk have concluded extremely useful discussions concerning the Vietnamese situation. Secretary Rusk reiterated the firm determina-

tion of the United States to continue its full support for the Government of Viet-Nam in its struggle against external aggression, as most recently restated by President Johnson in his state of the Union message,¹ and the Prime Minister reaffirmed the unflinching resolve of the people and Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to pursue that struggle so that aggression would be brought to an end. Prime Minister Ky also emphasized his Government's deep concern with measures to improve the welfare of the South Vietnamese people, and Secretary Rusk made clear that the United States would do all in its power to assist in these efforts.

The Prime Minister stated the position of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on the subject of the restoration of peace to Viet-Nam as it has been defined and reaffirmed many times. This position remains unchanged.

In sum, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam once again reaffirms that peace in Viet-Nam must:

A. Accord with the pledges and desire of the Vietnamese people: an end to aggression; independence and liberty; in order to permit eventually unification of Viet-Nam;

B. Be accompanied by guarantees in the absence of which there could be resumption of aggression which would endanger both Southeast Asia and the peace of the world.

Secretary Rusk expressed his full appreciation of the position of the Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam as stated above. He reviewed with Prime Minister Ky the position of the United States Government expressed most recently in President Johnson's state of the Union message. The Prime Minister and Secretary Rusk agreed that the basic positions of the two Governments were consistent in all fundamental respects.

The Prime Minister and Secretary Rusk reviewed the extensive efforts made in capi-

tals throughout the world to initiate steps toward peaceful settlement of the conflict in Viet-Nam. It was noted that there was at present no indication that North Viet-Nam was prepared to take positive steps to peace. The Prime Minister and Secretary Rusk agreed that the Vietnamese Government and its allies must continue to take all necessary military measures, while remaining alert to all proposals and initiatives that might lead to peace.

Death of Prime Minister Shastri of India

Statement by President Johnson¹

Our nation mourns the death of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India. As the leader of the world's largest democracy, he had already gained a special place in American hearts. His tragic loss, after fruitful discussions at Tashkent, is a grievous blow to the hope of mankind for peace and progress.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, in only 19 months in office, proved a fitting successor to Pandit Nehru by holding aloft the highest ideals of Indian democracy. His modesty in high office did not conceal his strength and wisdom as the recognized leader of his people. The world is a smaller place without him, and our hearts go out to his family and to the people of India.

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 6 dated January 10

I have heard with profound shock and the deepest grief of the sudden death of Indian Prime Minister Shastri. His time as Prime Minister was relatively brief but full of achievement and promise. It was only this morning that we all learned of his great statemanship in reaching agreement in

¹ For text, see p. 150.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Jan. 10 by Bill D. Moyers, Press Secretary to the President.

Tashkent; and we were looking forward to greeting him here in Washington in only 3 weeks.

I now join with millions all over the world in mourning the passing of this great Indian leader.

U.S. Moves To Support Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia

ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECEMBER 30¹

The Agency for International Development on December 29 concluded an agreement with Pan American World Airways to begin an airlift of gasoline and oil into Zambia as the U.S. contribution to the British efforts to minimize the impact upon Zambia of the cessation of petroleum supplies normally received from and through Southern Rhodesia.

Pan American is supplying a late-model jet cargo aircraft which is expected to leave New York for Léopoldville on January 1. At Léopoldville arrangements have been made for delivery of petroleum products to the airport (Ndjili Airport), from where the cargo will be flown to Elisabethville.

At Elisabethville, under arrangements made with the British and the Zambian Governments, the local oil companies will forward the cargoes by truck and railroad the short distance (60–100 miles) to major towns in the Zambian Copperbelt, where very strict gasoline and oil rationing has had to be imposed. The U.S. aircraft will operate between Léopoldville and Elisabethville, since airports in those cities are capable of handling large jet aircraft. The Zambian airports are not. The Congolese Government has promised complete cooperation in this airlift.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Dec. 30 by Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News. For a joint U.S.–Zambian communique dated Dec. 27, see BULLETIN of Jan. 17, 1966, p. 85.

AID is currently engaged in arrangements to augment the U.S. airlift by procuring further aircraft sufficient to lift approximately 6,000 tons of gasoline, oil, and lubricants during the months of January and February. A further announcement will be made when these plans have been completed.

The U.S. airlift is a part of an overall effort to move 14,000 tons of petroleum products into Zambia during January and a higher amount during February. By March 1 it is expected that alternative overland supply routes through neighboring countries will have been sufficiently developed to terminate the airlift.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF JANUARY 10

Press release 5 dated January 10

The Department of State announced on January 10 two further measures designed to complement the British program of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

The Agency for International Development has arranged to augment the American contribution to the airlift now supplying Zambia with petroleum products. Trans World Airlines will supply an additional jet cargo plane, a Boeing 707-321C, which will operate between Léopoldville and Elisabethville in conjunction with a similar Pan American Airways plane now in operation. It is expected that the TWA plane will be in operation on or about January 14. Together the two planes will be capable of delivering cargo to Elisabethville at the rate of about 3,000 tons a month. From Elisabethville, the lifted petroleum products are delivered by rail and road to Zambia's Copperbelt cities.

In further support of the United Kingdom and of the Security Council resolution of November 20,² the Departments of State and Commerce have been holding talks with United States importers of various South-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916.

ern Rhodesian commodities with a view to replacing such imports with goods from other sources. These talks are continuing, and United States consumers of Rhodesian asbestos and lithium have expressed their willingness to cooperate in finding alternative sources. Lithium and asbestos are two of the most significant United States imports from Southern Rhodesia.

United States Asks for Recall of Burundi Ambassador

Department Statement

Press release 7 dated January 11

The United States today [January 11] requested that the Burundi Government "promptly recall" Ambassador Léon Ndenzako from Washington in a note¹ which "protests strongly" the action of Burundi yesterday in requiring the departure from Burundi of the American Ambassador and two members of his staff.

Ambassador Ndenzako, who has been serving in Washington since December 1963, was summoned to the Department of State at 11 o'clock this morning and handed the note.

A letter¹ from Burundi Foreign Minister Marc Manirakiza addressed to the Secretary of State containing the request for a recall of Ambassador Donald A. Dumont, Counselor of Embassy Thompson R. Buchanan, and USIA Cultural Attaché Nicholas R. Milroy was sent in the open mail—rather than normal diplomatic channels—from Bujumbura December 29 and was received in the Department's Bureau of African Affairs on January 10.

The United States in its note said that it "must reject" the reasons contained in the Foreign Minister's letter. The letter, it added, does not claim that the United States officials concerned had engaged in improper actions. It refers to suspicions, which are

wholly without foundation, that the officials maintained contacts with conspirators in Burundi. Indeed, in the letter, by use of the phrase "wrongly or rightly" to characterize the holding of suspicions by the Government of the Kingdom of Burundi, the Foreign Minister indicates that the GKB has acted without reference to the merits of the question on which it purports to pass.

The United States is aware that Ambassador Dumont and officers of the Embassy in Bujumbura in the normal course of their duties have necessarily maintained contacts with ministers in the Burundi Government and with members of Parliament. Subsequently, some of these individuals were detained and executed for acts against the Government following the attempted coup d'état last October.

Ambassador Dumont, Mr. Buchanan, and Mr. Milroy, although not departing on a regularly scheduled flight until 1:45 p.m., were required to be at the Bujumbura airport at 9 o'clock this morning. The Ambassador and Mr. Buchanan are now en route to Washington.

In its note the United States expressed its amazement at the arbitrary 24-hour time limit laid down and noted that it gives rise to the impression that these officials have been declared *persona non grata*.

"The discourteous treatment by the Government of the Kingdom of Burundi in refusing to allow the United States officials to remain in Bujumbura for an additional 24 hours in order to take the regularly scheduled Sabena flight tends to reinforce this impression," the note said.

The United States note also took account of this peremptory and unreasonable action respecting the United States officials, following upon violation of the Embassy's premises on December 2 and 3, the arrest and detention of a domestic employee of the Ambassador, and harassment of American citizen missionaries in Burundi. There are about 160 Americans in Burundi, mostly missionaries. Henry C. Barringer is serving as Chargé ad interim.

¹ Not printed.

President Ends Increased Duty on Clinical Thermometers

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated January 7

The President on January 7 issued a proclamation terminating the increased rate of duty on clinical thermometers which has been in effect since 1958.

As a result of this action, the rate of duty of 85 percent ad valorem, which was proclaimed pursuant to the so-called escape clause of trade agreements legislation, will be replaced by the trade agreement rate of 42.5 percent ad valorem.

This action was taken following the receipt of a report by the Tariff Commission on the probable effects of terminating or modifying the escape-clause action and is based on the recommendation of interested Federal departments and agencies, including the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

The new rate of duty becomes effective immediately.

PROCLAMATION 3696¹

TERMINATION OF INCREASED DUTY ON IMPORTS OF CLINICAL THERMOMETERS

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the President, on April 21, 1951, entered into, and by Proclamation No. 2929 of June 2, 1951 (65 Stat. c12), proclaimed the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including a concession applicable to certain types of clinical thermometers provided for in item 218(a) in Part I to Schedule XX of the Torquay Protocol (3 U.S.T. (pt. 1) 1144);

2. WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A58; 8 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1786), the President by Proclamation No. 3235 of April 21, 1958 (72 Stat. (pt. 2) c35), proclaimed that, effective after the close of business on May 21, 1958, and until the President otherwise proclaimed, the concession with

respect to the types of clinical thermometers identified in the first recital of this proclamation should be withdrawn, thereby increasing the rate of duty with respect to such articles;

3. WHEREAS, after compliance with the requirements of Section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 73), the President by Proclamation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963 (77 Stat. 1017), proclaimed, effective on and after August 31, 1963, the Tariff Schedules of the United States, which reflected, with modifications, and, in effect, superseded (1) the provisions of Proclamation No. 2929 insofar as that proclamation proclaimed the concession with respect to the types of clinical thermometers identified in the first recital of this proclamation (see item 711.35 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States), and (2) the provisions of Proclamation No. 3235 (see item 930.00 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States);

4. WHEREAS, following my request under Section 351(d) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1981(d)(2)), the United States Tariff Commission conducted an investigation, including a hearing, pursuant to Section 351(d)(5) of that Act (19 U.S.C. 1981(d)(5)), and on May 27, 1965, submitted to me a report (30 F.R. 7306) advising me of its judgment as to the probable economic effect on the domestic industry concerned of the reduction or termination of the increased rate of duty effected by Proclamation No. 3235 (now reflected, with modifications, in item 930.00 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States);

5. WHEREAS, in relation to the possible reduction or termination of such increased rate of duty, I have received and taken into account the advice from the Tariff Commission, advice of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor in accordance with Section 351 (c) (1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1981(c) (1) (A)), recommendations of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations in accordance with Sections 3(b), 3(j) and 5(c) of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963 (48 CFR 1.3(b), 1.3(j), and 1.5(c)), and advice of other interested agencies of the Government; and

6. WHEREAS, in accordance with Section 351(c) (1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I have determined that the termination, as herein proclaimed, of the increased rate of duty effected by Proclamation No. 3235 (now reflected, with modifications, in item 930.00 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States) is in the national interest:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including Section 351(c) (1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the General

¹ 31 Fed. Reg. 421.

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, do proclaim that:


(1) Proclamation No. 3235 is terminated.

(2) Item 930.00 (reflecting, with modifications, Proclamation No. 3235 which effected the increased rate of duty) is deleted from the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

(3) The concession with respect to the types of clinical thermometers identified in the first recital of this proclamation shall be applied to such of those articles as are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date of this proclamation, in accordance with the provisions of item 711.35 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this seventh day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetieth.



President Modifies Import Duty on Stainless-Steel Flatware

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated January 7

The President on January 7 issued a proclamation modifying the tariff quota on imports of stainless-steel flatware, which has been in effect since 1959.

Under this tariff quota as originally proclaimed, trade agreement rates of duty applied to imports coming within a quota of 69 million single units entered in any 12-month period beginning November 1. All imports above that quota were subject to rates of duty substantially above the trade agreement rates.

As a result of the President's action, the quota subject to trade agreement rates of duty is increased from 69 million to 84 million single units. In addition the over-quota rates of duty are reduced as follows:

	WITHIN- QUOTA IMPORTS	OVER-QUOTA IMPORTS	
	<i>Trade agreement rates</i>	<i>Old rates</i>	<i>New rates</i>
Spoons	17% ad val.	60% ad val.	40% ad val.
Knives and forks (chrome steel)	1¢ each + 12.5% ad val.	3¢ each + 67.5% ad val.	3¢ each + 15% ad val.
Knives and forks (nickel steel)	1¢ each + 17.5% ad val.	3¢ each + 67.5% ad val.	3¢ each + 20% ad val.

This action was taken following the receipt of a report by the Tariff Commission on the probable effects of eliminating or modifying the quota and is based on the recommendation of interested Federal departments and agencies, including the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

The new tariff quota becomes effective immediately and applies to imports entering during the quota year beginning November 1, 1965.

PROCLAMATION 3697 ¹

REDUCTION OF INCREASED DUTIES ON IMPORTS OF STAINLESS-STEEL FLATWARE

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the President, on April 21, 1951, entered into, and by Proclamation No. 2929 of June 2, 1951 (65 Stat. c12), proclaimed the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including supplementary concessions with respect to certain types of stainless-steel knives and forks provided for in item 355 in Part I of Schedule XX to the Torquay Protocol (3 U.S.T. (pt. 1) 1160); and, on May 23, 1956, entered into, and by Proclamation No. 3140 of June 13, 1956 (70 Stat. c33), proclaimed the Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including a supplementary concession with respect to certain types of stainless-steel spoons provided for in item 339 in Part I of Schedule XX to the Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions (7 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1362);

2. WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the Gen-

¹ 31 Fed Reg. 423.

eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A58; 8 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1786), the President by Proclamation 3323 of October 20, 1959 (74 Stat. c15), modified, effective on and after November 1, 1959, and until the President otherwise proclaimed, the supplementary concessions with respect to the types of stainless-steel knives, forks, and spoons identified in the first recital of this proclamation by proclaiming increased rates of duty limited to entries after the entry of an aggregate quantity of 69 million single units of such articles in any 12-month period beginning November 1, resulting in an annual tariff quota at the concession rates of duty;

3. WHEREAS, after compliance with the requirements of Section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 73), the President by Proclamation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963 (77 Stat. 1017), proclaimed, effective on and after August 31, 1963, the Tariff Schedules of the United States, which reflected, with modifications, and, in effect, superseded (1) the provisions of Proclamations Nos. 2929 and 3140 insofar as those proclamations proclaimed the supplementary concessions with respect to the types of stainless-steel knives, forks, and spoons identified in the first recital of this proclamation (see Subpart E of Part 3 of Schedule 6 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, including items 650.09, 650.11, 650.39, 650.41, and 650.55), and (2) the provisions of Proclamation No. 3323 (see the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States, including items 927.50 through 927.54);

4. WHEREAS, following my request under Section 351(d) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1981(d) (2)), the United States Tariff Commission conducted an investigation, including a hearing, pursuant to Section 351(d) (5) of that Act (19 U.S.C. 1981(d) (5)), and on April 14, 1965, submitted to me a report (30 F.R. 5655) advising me of its judgment as to the probable economic effect on the domestic industry concerned of the reduction or termination of the increased rates of duty described in the second recital of this proclamation and provided for in Proclamation No. 3323 (now reflected, with modifications, in the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States, including items 927.50 through 927.54);

5. WHEREAS, in relation to the possible reduction

or termination of such increased rates of duty, I have received and taken into account the advice from the Tariff Commission, advice of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor in accordance with Section 351(c) (1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1981(c) (1) (A)), recommendations of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations in accordance with Sections 3 (b), 3(j), and 5(c) of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963 (48 CFR 1.3(b), 1.3(j), and 1.5(c)), and advice of other interested agencies of the Government; and

6. WHEREAS, in accordance with Section 351(c) (1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I have determined that the reduction, as herein proclaimed, of the increased rates of duty described in the second recital of this proclamation and provided for in Proclamation No. 3323 (now reflected, with modifications, in the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States, including items 927.50 through 927.54) is in the national interest:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including Section 351(c) (1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, do proclaim that:

(1) Proclamation No. 3323 is terminated.

(2) Subpart A of Part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States is amended as follows:

(A) The second article description preceding item 927.50 is amended to read as follows:

"For an aggregate quantity from countries subject to the rates set forth in rate of duty column numbered 1 not to exceed (1) 84 million single units entered in the 12-month period beginning November 1, 1965, and (2) 84 million single units entered in the period beginning November 1, 1966, and ending at the close of October 11, 1967, unless the President proclaims otherwise pursuant to section 351(c) (1) or (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1981(c) (1) or (2)):"


(B) Items 927.53 and 927.54 are deleted, and the following new items 927.60, 927.61, and 927.62 are substituted in lieu thereof:

927.60	Knives and forks: With handles not containing nickel and not containing over 10 percent by weight of manganese (item 650.09 and 650.39)	3¢ each + 15% ad val	3¢ each + 15% ad val. but not less than 2¢ each + 45% ad val.
927.61	With handles containing nickel or containing over 10 percent by weight of manganese (items 650.11 and 650.41)	3¢ each + 20% ad val	3¢ each + 20 ad val. but not less than 2¢ each + 45% ad val.
927.62	Spoons (item 650.55)	40% ad val	No change."

(3) The actions proclaimed in paragraphs (1) and (2) above are effective with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after November 1, 1965.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this seventh day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninetieth.



U.S., U.K., and Canada Sponsor Survey of British Honduras

Press release 8 dated January 14

Great Britain, Canada, and the United States will jointly sponsor an economic survey of British Honduras. The survey will analyze the economy and its growth potential and suggest guidelines for development over the next 5 years. The members of the team will be drawn from the three participating countries. The survey is scheduled to begin in the spring of 1966.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

Export Expansion. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 558, a bill to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to carry out certain programs to develop and expand foreign markets for United States products, and to provide more effectively for assistance in the financing of certain foreign sales which are affected with the national interest. March 17-19, 1965. 275 pp.

Refugee Problems in South Vietnam and Laos. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. July 13-September 30, 1965. 408 pp.

Utilization of Excess U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies in Certain Countries. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 20-October 19, 1965. 233 pp.

The Anti-Vietnam Agitation and the Teach-In Movement. The Problem of Communist Infiltration and Exploitation. A staff study prepared for the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. Doc. 72. October 22, 1965. 256 pp.

89th Congress, 2d Session

The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow. Report of Senators Mansfield, Muskie, Inouye, Aiken, and Boggs to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. January 6, 1966. 32 pp. [Committee print.]

The Atlantic Alliance: Treaty and Related Agreements. Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. January 10, 1966. 57 pp. [Committee print.]

International Cooperation in Outer Space

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

If I could name one ideally appropriate theme for United Nations consideration, that theme would be peaceful cooperation in outer space. Our organization offers a unique opportunity to examine not the technical details of space activities but the manner in which these activities are carried out. Are they pursued in cooperation with other nations? Are they conducted in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and the resolutions of the General Assembly? Are they managed openly and generously so as to make their benefits available to states in varying stages of economic and scientific development? What benefits do they actually bring to mankind, and what is their promise for the future? I do not intend to review my country's scientific and technical achievements but rather to address myself to these essential questions.

It is fitting today to emphasize programs of direct interest to the developing countries and the member states who do not have large space programs, for it is not only a few major powers who will benefit from the newest frontier. The potential values of space—and we know enough now to feel certain of such values—should be common to the world. Development of this potential has already produced some remarkable technical breakthroughs, breakthroughs that promise to make important modern services quickly and cheaply available to regions and

states that would not otherwise have been able to afford them.

The first example that inevitably springs to mind is the weather satellite program, now a practical reality. Every nation has a basic need for modern, efficient weather forecasts. The inadequacies of such services have been especially acute for the developing nations in tropical regions. We thus urge developing countries in particular to avail themselves directly of the new technique now opening.

The first TIROS operational satellite will be launched in 1966, following 11 successful experimental TIROS and Nimbus satellites orbited since 1960. The current meteorological satellites are already providing weather information on a global basis. From these data the United States prepares warnings of the existence of storms, particularly in tropical latitudes and in the Southern Hemisphere, and distributes them through normal and special weather communications channels.

In addition, Automatic Picture Transmission systems will permit any nation to acquire local cloud-cover photographs directly from a satellite passing overhead. Automatic Picture Transmission systems use simple ground receiving equipment, which can be purchased at a very reasonable cost or developed locally from available specifications. I hardly need stress the savings in lives, money, crops, and fishing fleets that this technique can afford.

We are pleased that the World Meteorological Organization is taking steps to assure effective use of these satellite data under the World Weather Watch program. We sincerely hope that all member states will cooperate fully with the WMO in this undertaking.

Also in terms of immediate practical bene-

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 18 (U.S. delegation press release 4766).

fits, satellite communications, like weather satellites, rank at the head of outer space programs. In April the international commercial communications satellite system, which includes participants from all areas of the world, became an operational reality as the Early Bird synchronous satellite went into position. In June this satellite commenced handling commercial communications traffic, including television transmissions, between North America and Europe. More satellites will soon be launched to provide telecommunications service on a worldwide basis. This is a giant step toward fulfillment of the provision in Resolution 1721² that, "communication by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis."

The recent accession of Nigeria to the commercial communications satellite agreement brings the total number of participants to 47: 6 from the Western Hemisphere, 8 from Africa, 5 from the Far East, 11 from the Middle East and South Asia, and 17 from Europe.

Opportunities for Research and Training

Of less immediate application, but of great significance for man's intellectual and material advance, are the research programs assigned to explore the realm between the earth and the moon—and beyond. Much of our work in this field is carried out in cooperation with other countries, and we value the scientific and technical skill our partners bring to these ventures.

A particularly good opportunity for cooperation is the program under which foreign scientists are invited to propose individual experiments for inclusion on the larger NASA satellites. Those proposals, which are selected on their merit, are then worked out in detail and the actual experiments prepared for flight by the sponsoring agencies abroad. Sixteen have already been selected for flight, and many more are under con-

sideration. The Apollo manned spacecraft and the first Voyager missions to Mars have been opened to foreign participation of this kind. A number of experiments for both have already been proposed.

Some 17 countries have joined in projects using small sounding rockets. These programs are not simply bilateral in character. Ionospheric rocket studies include Pakistani, Indian, and Australian scientists. Agreements with Argentina and Brazil have led this year to the establishment of an inter-American experimental meteorological sounding-rocket network which we hope will eventually engage Western Hemisphere meteorologists from the Antarctic Peninsula to the shores of Hudson Bay.

This has been a particularly fruitful year for cooperative satellite projects. The Italian San Marco satellite, launched in December 1964 by an Italian crew from the NASA facilities at Wallops Island, Virginia, supplied new information on local atmospheric densities in the equatorial upper atmosphere. The Canadian Alouette II, launched by NASA on November 28, continues the work of the remarkably successful Alouette I. It is the first of four additional Canadian satellites by which Canadian and American scientists, with the active assistance of colleagues in the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Japan, and Nigeria will monitor the ionosphere through the next peak of the solar cycle. December 6 brought the successful NASA launching of FR-1, a French satellite which is making pioneer measurements of very-low-frequency radio emissions. Just a few days previously, France itself had successfully launched its first earth satellite—an achievement of which the people of France may be justly proud.

The United States does not regard its accomplishments in space exploration as narrow national achievements. The eight countries that cooperate in our manned flight networks have played a vital part in the Gemini flights. The three countries that cooperate in our deep space tracking and data acquisition network can feel that they too have made the acquaintance of our

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

neighbor Mars. Scientists in 38 countries have received complete sets of Ranger photographs of the moon suitable for professional measurement and analysis, and a similar dissemination of the Mariner photographs of Mars is underway. Thus, gifted minds throughout the world are encouraged to contribute to the most important part of space research—determining the meaning of the data that spacecraft send back to earth.

To provide a larger base for future international cooperation, the United States offers many opportunities for education and training. These have been published in the Secretary-General's recent report, "Information on Facilities for Education and Training in Basic Subjects Related to the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space."³ Significant advantage has been taken of these opportunities. During the current year, 85 resident research associates from 24 countries are working at NASA centers. Seventy-eight international fellows from 17 countries are studying at American universities. Ninety-one technical trainees from 7 countries are in the United States for training in various of NASA's cooperative projects.

A Great Human Adventure

Mr. Chairman, it is proper that in this forum we should give special attention to the practical benefits for men everywhere that can result from space programs. But there is another kind of benefit—perhaps a little harder to measure—which we should never forget. This is the adventure of the spirit deriving from space exploration. In our lifetime only a very small fraction of the world's population will be able to escape the pull of our planet's gravity, but every man ought to feel a part of the adventure of those who do. This is not just a figure of speech. No great civilization has lacked strong motivations and a strong consciousness of common adventure. No one can now accept bloody competitions between peoples as satisfactory adventures. We need

something much better, much different, much more universal, as our inspiration. Can anyone suggest a brighter beacon than the light of celestial bodies? If we follow this light, some contemporaries may brand us poets; if we ignore it, historians will someday brand us myopes.

But if space exploration is to remain the great human adventure, it must be carried out in an open and generous manner. Information must be shared in good will, allowing a sense of participation that has nothing to do with national boundaries.

The live radio and television reporting of our manned flight projects allows, I hope, this sense of identification. But this is only the most obvious aspect of an open space program.

Just this month, 67 members of the Washington diplomatic corps accepted our invitation to visit Cape Kennedy to witness the Gemini 7 launching. Never had so many official representatives of foreign governments been there at one time, but the visit was no new departure. Some of you recall that all but one or two members of the United Nations Outer Space Committee visited the Cape in 1962. Since 1958 more than 15,000 individuals from 108 countries have visited NASA installations. If any of my distinguished colleagues would like to visit Cape Kennedy or other NASA centers in the future, I invite them to get in touch with me.

Role of the U.N.

Most of my remarks have concerned bilateral and multilateral cooperative space programs, without touching specifically on the role of the United Nations. More progress here is needed. Nevertheless, there have been useful accomplishments in the last few years, sometimes in the face of difficult conditions, through a process as undramatic as hard, day-to-day work. I refer to such undertakings as the publications on national and international cooperative activities, programs of international organizations, and educational opportunities

³ U.N. doc. A/AC.105/28.

in the field of space. The United States is one of many countries that has devoted careful attention to cooperation in this process. I hope that all member nations will consider it an effort deserving of earnest collaboration.

It is clear, Mr. Chairman, that one of the most important successes of the United Nations has been the adoption of resolutions designed to develop a regime of law in space. Resolution 1721 of December 20, 1961, set forth the essential legal principles in an enlightened fashion that had no precedent in any previous age of exploration. One of these principles was that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space. The other was that outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation.

Building on this foundation, Resolution 1962—the Declaration of Legal Principles—which the Assembly approved on December 13, 1963,⁴ set forth a number of additional points that will surely have historic importance centuries from now. Ambassador Stevenson stated that these legal principles, which were unanimously adopted, “reflect international law as it is accepted by the members of the United Nations.” He assured the General Assembly that the United States intended to respect these principles and expressed the hope that other countries would do likewise. I reaffirm this United States position here today.

As the advancement of the space age gave us clearer insight into the nature of legal problems, the next step was to begin putting some of these accepted principles into treaty form.

Two draft international agreements are now in preparation by the legal subcommittee of the U.N. Space Committee. One concerns assistance to and return of astronauts

and space vehicles; the other seeks to define liability for damage caused by space launchings. These topics are of immediate importance. Agreement on both should be well within our reach. But progress has fallen short of expectations.

There is no simple formula that will get negotiations moving, for the basic problem that has arisen does not seem connected to the substance of the draft agreements. Surely, however, progress is possible if all members of the Space Committee approach the problem with determination not to let external political problems interfere with negotiations. For my part, I can commit my delegation to good will, flexibility, and hard work; and I think the record shows that this commitment will be met. President Johnson reaffirmed on August 25⁵ that: “We are working and we will continue to work through the United Nations . . . to extend the rule of law into outer space.”

In addition to the two draft agreements already under discussion, a third topic should be brought under study by the U.N. Committee. On September 23 I suggested in the General Assembly that the United Nations begin work on a comprehensive treaty on the exploration of celestial bodies.⁶ Within a few years the need for a treaty governing activities on the moon and other celestial bodies will be real. My Government plans to present a definite proposal as to the contents of such a treaty.

Provisions of Draft Resolutions

The resolution before us⁷ advances the objectives of the United Nations. It is sponsored by 13 members of the Space Committee, and I hope that all members of the General Assembly will support it.

It urges the Space Committee, in developing law for outer space, to continue work on the two draft agreements now before it.

It renews the Space Committee's mandate

⁴ At a news conference.

⁵ For text of Ambassador Goldberg's statement, see BULLETIN of Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.363/Rev.1.

⁴ For a statement made on Dec. 2, 1963, by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1005.

and encourages an increased exchange of information on such matters as national space activities and on facilities for education and training. Such items are of obvious interest to the entire United Nations membership.

The resolution asks member states to devote special attention to cooperation with the Space Committee.

It takes note of the Space Committee's decision to convene, on January 18, the working group which was established to examine the desirability, organization, and objectives of an international meeting on the peaceful uses of outer space. The United States is interested in a constructive study of this matter. When the working group meets, our delegation will be prepared to consider carefully the wishes of other members and to make its own suggestions.

The resolution accords well-deserved United Nations sponsorship to the equatorial sounding-rocket facility at Thumba, India, and makes it eligible for assistance from the U.N. and its associated agencies.

It notes with satisfaction the growing measure of cooperation among many member states.

Mr. Chairman, what has been accomplished so far is only a beginning. The United States believes that international cooperation must expand and then expand further if mankind is to pursue its common destiny in space and derive the maximum earthly benefits from that endeavor. Thus, during this International Cooperation Year, I specifically invite the nations represented here to examine our national space program, and to look there for projects, interesting to them as well as to us, which can be carried out cooperatively on a realistic and manageable basis. Let me stress that I mean this invitation to be taken literally. I shall be delighted if it is accepted. Let all of us look to the future. A new order and scale of joint effort will serve the interests of all mankind.⁸

⁸ The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.363/Rev. 1, as amended) was adopted in Committee I on Dec. 20 and in plenary session on Dec. 21 (A/RES/2130 (xx)).

U.S. Replies to Cambodian Charges on Frontier Situation

Following is the text of a letter from U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.

U.S./U.N. press release 4783/Corr. 1, dated January 10

JANUARY 8, 1966

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: The Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations recently requested the circulation of three statements¹ from his government dated December 25, 26 and 28 concerning the situation along the frontier between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

I should like to recall to the members of the Security Council that on May 21, 1964, during the Council's consideration of the Cambodian Government's complaint, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson summarized my Government's policy toward Cambodia in these words:²

If the people of Cambodia wish to live in peace and security and independence—and free from external alinement if they so choose—then we want for them precisely what they want for themselves. We have no quarrel whatsoever with the desire of Cambodia to go its own way in peace and security.

Ambassador Stevenson added that Cambodia cannot be secure so long as the North Vietnamese Government continues to direct massive violence within the frontiers of Cambodia's neighbor, South Viet-Nam. The United States, he said, was prepared to discuss any practical and constructive steps to meet the problem of maintaining peace and order along the frontier between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

My Government's policy toward Cambodia and its people remains today as set forth by Mr. Stevenson in 1964. My Government remains ready to consider any constructive proposals to enable Cambodia to pursue its chosen path in peace.

In this connection, the United States Government has noted with interest the pro-

¹ Not printed here.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 907.

posal made by the Cambodian Chief of State that the International Control Commission assume an increased supervisory role in Cambodia. My Government sincerely hopes that this initiative on the part of Prince Norodom Sihanouk will be given close and careful attention by all countries concerned with peace and security in Southeast Asia

and will lead to the development of effective measures to prevent any possible abuse of Cambodian territory.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated to all members as a Security Council document.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States

Statement by William P. Rogers

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

You will recall that this is the second statement the United States has made thus far on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations. The first was directed to the achievements of the Mexico City meeting of the Special Committee.² Today I should like to talk about the resolution which the committee will very shortly be adopting, which will have a significant bearing on the substance of the enterprise in which the United Nations is engaged under guidance of Committee VI.

Secondly, I would like to talk about the three further principles of friendly relations not considered at Mexico City.

The United States is, of course, a co-sponsor of one of the four draft resolutions now before the committee. I have read with care and great interest the other three. All four, Mr. Chairman, are thoughtful and largely constructive. And they bring home the fact that even though there are significant differences of viewpoint, these differences do not seem to be irreconcilable. We would hope that a resolution may be drafted which would meet with general agreement.

Whatever the differences among the four drafts, I think a study of them will show that there is general agreement on the following points: The General Assembly will carry on with a Special Committee. The Committee will be asked to meet to carry forward the work thus far done on these seven basic principles of international law laid down in the charter. And the Committee will present the product of its labors to the next session of the Assembly for such further action as the Assembly may think fit. I do not wish to discuss the four drafts in any great detail, since I understand that all of them will probably be the subject of further informal negotiations.

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Dec. 8 (U.S. delegation press release 4754); for a series of U.S. statements made in Committee VI in 1963, see BULLETIN of Dec. 23, 1963, p. 973; Jan. 13, 1964, p. 57; Jan. 27, 1964, p. 133; and Feb. 17, 1964, p. 264.

² For a statement by Mr. Rogers on Nov. 17, see U.S. delegation press release 4706. The 1964 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States met at Mexico City, Aug. 27-Oct. 2, 1964; for a report on the meeting, see U.N. doc. A/5746.

Question of the "Consensus" Approach

One question which has quite properly commanded a good deal of attention from all sides is that of the approach which the Special Committee, and ultimately the Sixth Committee and the Assembly itself, should take to the formulating of documents on the principles. This has been referred to as the question of whether the "principle of consensus"—or, if you prefer, whether the principle of seeking to achieve a "general agreement"—should be retained.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that there may be a wider area of agreement on this question than may be apparent. For example, I think it is generally recognized that the significance of the end product of our work on the "friendly relations" item will vary radically, depending on whether it is supported unanimously or virtually unanimously, or whether it is dissented from by substantial portions of the membership.

This is true for reasons applicable to Assembly resolutions generally. But it is true particularly for reasons applicable to a resolution which is designed to be an authoritative statement of what these principles of the charter and of international law require. While there are important exceptions, the General Assembly for most purposes is not a legislature and does not make law binding and enforceable against all member states. If such were the case, a member state would lose its sovereignty and become part of a single world state. Thus it is that the juridical value of resolutions of the sort which might eventuate from the "friendly relations" item is, as evidence of the practice of states accepted as law, clearly and carefully articulated by their appointed representatives in the United Nations. It is for this reason that the question of the consensus approach is important, is basic, and, in our view, not really methodological. No one, of course, has in mind formally barring the Special Committee or the General Assembly from voting.

The question of consensus, or general agreement, then, is not one of procedure. Rather, it lies at the heart of the question

of the value of the end product which we want to result from the 4 or more years of work which the United Nations will have spent on the principles of friendly relations. Accordingly, we believe it is vital for the Assembly to express to the Special Committee the importance of a determined and continued effort to achieve consensus, to indicate that the Assembly believes the Special Committee should continue to work essentially by way of consensus and not confrontation. This is the intent and effect of the last operative paragraph of the resolution of which we are cosponsors. If we do not achieve consensus, if we do not achieve general agreement, on the interpretation of the principles, we shall in fact produce texts which have no standing in law.

A closely related question is that of the form of the end product of the Assembly's work on friendly relations: more particularly, whether the Assembly should now in some way commit itself to the eventual adoption of a declaration on the principles—which we understand would be a resolution of the General Assembly, couched in a certain declarative form and language.

The view of the United States on this question is that which certain other delegations have already expressed: We have no objection in principle to a declaration, provided that when the time comes to adopt it, something has been produced which the General Assembly *ought* to declare. It seems to us that the question of a declaration really need not, and should not, be addressed until we have come to the point of producing formulations which, if made the subject of a declaration, would enhance the understanding and the efficacy of the charter's principles and, equally important, do nothing to impair them. And then, so far as the United States is concerned, the question can be answered very easily.

By way of example, I should say at this point that the United States has concluded, after some earnest consideration, that on two of the principles formulations have now been produced which, although by no means perfect, might well be considered for inclu-

sion in some sort of declaration. We have heard suggestions that some of the members of the Special Committee might now be having second thoughts on these formulations, on both of which the United States had announced earlier in the session it was now prepared to agree.

This raises the question as to whether the entire work of the Mexico City meeting is not put into jeopardy. All of us recognize, of course, that until the moment our work is finally completed, what has been previously done can always be undone, either by future sessions of the Special Committee or by the Assembly itself. We think it would be most regrettable, however, if the progress achieved there were to be lost. Such an eventuality would seem clearly to be a step away from, rather than toward, the goal of a complete set of formulations worthy of a declaration, which a number of delegations are seeking.

Consequently we believe it would be desirable, in the interests of orderly progress, to confer a certain recognition and special status upon the texts already formulated on sovereign equality and nonuse of force, as is done in the draft resolution introduced by three Commonwealth powers which we are cosponsoring.³ Otherwise the work of the Special Committee, which all speakers have praised, might go for naught and a new committee might decide to start all over again as if nothing had been accomplished at all.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, a word about the size and composition of the Special Committee, which a number of delegations have recommended changing in the direction of a much larger committee. We think the same committee should be continued. There is, of course, always some delicacy involved when a member of an existing group rises to argue for retaining a given membership, particularly when, as in the present case, there are many members of the United Nations whose interest and capacity for valu-

able contribution are high. But I think there are sound, practical reasons for this position. The Special Committee as a whole was, and will be, essentially a body for detailed study, analysis, and drafting. This being the case, one can argue with considerable validity, I believe, that it already exceeds the optimum size. In fact, to a degree this was recognized by the members of the Committee, and a drafting committee was created. Moreover, its present members have accumulated a valuable body of experience which should be utilized to the maximum. Furthermore, and most importantly, the end product, of course, will be reported back to Committee VI, and all member states will have a full and complete opportunity to express their views and opinions before the matter is voted on by Committee VI. Then again, each member state will have an opportunity to express its view and opinion before the matter is voted on by the General Assembly.

The "Duty To Cooperate"

Now, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few preliminary and tentative remarks on the three further principles of friendly relations, beginning with "The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter."

Mr. Chairman, we think each of the principles of friendly relations is importantly related to what is really the essential task of the United Nations. That task has to do with creating the conditions on this planet under which a viable and peaceful international order can develop. The problem is one of inducing peoples to be willing to rely on a system which binds all equally, which benefits all, and which all are working together to create.

A part of this job is to reach general agreement on a set of principles which will be generally observed, circumscribing the exercise of violence and coercion among states—for example, the principles of non-use of force, nonintervention, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Another, and equally important, part of the task is stated with refreshing directness in article 55 of the

³ U.N. doc. A/C.6/L.575/Add. 1; this draft resolution was not put to a vote.

charter:

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

This is a big order. It is made on the theory that peoples can't very well live up to their international civic obligations with stomachs empty, with minds that lack insight or knowledge, or with hearts filled with prejudice. In such a world the phrase "international law" is an academic luxury for the privileged few.

The duty of the United Nations is to "promote" the elimination of these conditions, in the terms of article 55. The duty of member states, stated in article 56, is to cooperate to the same ends. Precisely: to "take . . . action" with one another, "in cooperation with the Organization." It is, of course, primarily these two articles which are designed to answer to the purpose of the United Nations stated in article 1 (3), to

. . . achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. . . .

This, then, is the role of the notion of "cooperation" in the charter's scheme of things. The charter explicitly recognizes the dangerous relation between economic, educational, and other forms of deprivation and the viability of peace. It imposes a legal duty to cooperate toward the elimination of the danger. Actually, the charter is somewhat more demanding than this as to actions among states: They must "take joint . . . action." It is not enough that a state "cooperate" by avoiding impeding the ef-

forts of others toward the broad ends stated in article 55.

This is a point worth noting carefully, Mr. Chairman. Under the charter, it is not enough that states merely coexist, even if they do so peacefully. We all welcomed, of course, the advent of a doctrine of peaceful coexistence in the last 10 years and the corresponding decline of the doctrine of conquest by violent Communist revolution. We all look forward hopefully to the day when this enlightenment will have spread to all Communist states, east and west. But the charter has already gone one significant step farther. Under the charter it is not enough that states merely vegetate side by side. They are under the strongest duty to take affirmative joint action to promote the ends described in article 55.

Now, when is a state in default in its duty to cooperate with others toward these ends? There is a certain temptation on all of us to answer this question merely by listing those instances where someone has ignored our advice, resisted our demands, or in general declined to see things just as we see them. This criterion has at least the virtue of simplicity. A somewhat less egocentric approach might look to the judgments of United Nations organs. Here, however, an important distinction is to be found between the duties of states in regard to economic and social peacebuilding and their duties as regards eschewing violence and coercion among themselves. As to the latter, the Security Council passes upon specific cases and turns the general duties stated in the charter into specific ones for a particular time and place. This is not normally the case as to the "duty to cooperate." The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council may only recommend in these areas.

For this reason the principle of good-faith fulfillment of charter obligations, of which I shall speak in a moment, is particularly important in relation to the duty to cooperate.

Let me note, too, that while the charter neither imposes, nor creates the procedures.

for imposing, more specific "duties to cooperate" than that laid down by articles 55 and 56, it does give some very clear indications as to certain specific actions which might be taken *prima facie* as a partial fulfillment of that general duty. One of the most significant is participation in the specialized agencies envisaged in articles 57-59.

Equal Rights and Self-Determination

Let me turn now to the second principle—what the charter calls "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." The experience of the United Nations with this principle is great—as extensive as with any of the seven principles, and more so than with most. It is no secret why. Almost overnight, the political configuration of large parts of the globe has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, from colonial dependence to national independence. And in this process the United Nations has been at one and the same time a keenly interested observer, a moral mentor, and an active participant.

The United Nations' role has been of historic dimensions, and it has been played with considerable clarity of purpose. Here, however, in this committee, the United Nations is not seeking to practice the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples but seeking to explicate it. In this enterprise we may rediscover what probably we have all experienced at some time in our lives, that it is often easier to know how to *do* a thing than to know how to *explain* it.

It would be a mistake to assume that because the emergence of dependent peoples into independence has become a commonplace, there are no perplexities remaining in the application of the principle of self-determination, or in understanding its scope and limits and its significance for the future of mankind. If we are inclined to make this mistake, it is because for the most part the question of self-determination since the birth of the United Nations has been the question of decolonization, which in turn has usually been a question of emer-

gence into separate and independent statehood.

So far as concerns the question of whether there is a violation of "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," colonial cases are easy to see, understand, and explain. For overt colonization, as a form of political organization, is by hypothesis a clear denial of the principle of political self-determination, inasmuch as the people in which political authority ultimately rests does not include the people colonized. A colonial power may, of course, by a separate arrangement, recognize a right of self-determination for the future. And just as colonization is a clear instance of the denial of self-determination, the attainment of independent statehood is the remedy least likely to give rise to doubts about whether the requirements of self-determination have genuinely been met—although there are others which in fact may meet these requirements equally well, such as free association or integration with an independent state.

But it would be an error to equate self-determination solely with the classic decolonization of the last 20 years. Problems of self-determination will remain when those "last vestiges of colonialism" of which the Assembly has spoken are in fact eliminated. And these will be problems which cannot easily be fit into the familiar mold of decolonization.

This, Mr. Chairman, is no news to the members of this committee. We all know that at this moment the United Nations is seized of a number of vexing problems—some old, some new—which are probing and testing the scope and content of the notion of self-determination embodied in the charter but which cannot be called "colonial" problems. A good many of the perplexities which these problems present arise from an important peculiarity of the principle of equal rights and self-determination, as opposed to the remaining principles of friendly relations. Our emerging global community is a community of corporate entities which we refer to as states. The principle

of nonuse of force, the principle of non-intervention or peaceful settlement of disputes, and the remaining principles—all have to do with transactions among these corporate entities, or between them and the United Nations. It is *states* which are enjoined from using or threatening force against one another, or to cooperate with one another. The duty to fulfill charter obligations in good faith falls upon states and is owed to other states members of the United Nations or to the organization itself.

The principle of self-determination is of a somewhat different sort. It is, to be sure, intended as a guide for the conduct of states within the United Nations. But it is not states to which the principle of self-determination applies, but *peoples*.

Juridically, as I have said, the world is not made up of peoples but of corporate political entities, which themselves enter into those various relationships out of which a world legal order as envisaged in the charter is built. The "principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" is the charter's test of the legitimacy of the forms of political organization in which human beings find themselves. The fundamental idea that is written into the charter is that only that government is legitimate which derives from the consent of the people governed.

But which group of people in any particular case should consent? In questions of self-determination, consulting the wishes of the smaller and more ethnologically selective segment of a population may yield different results from consultation with a larger, more diverse segment. What persons should consent, and how is this question to be decided? There are, of course, purely ethnological considerations as to what constitutes a single "people." Aside from these, can there be more than one "people" in a population which already comprises a single independent state? In other words, what is the relation between the charter and secession? Again, what weight is to be given to considerations of economic and political viability, particularly when set off against

considerations of ethnic and cultural similarities or differences? Furthermore, are there genuinely objective criteria governing these questions, or are they to be reserved in each instance for *ad hoc* political judgments, or in some cases even military decisions? If there are to be no objective criteria, would there be anything left of the "right" of self-determination of peoples, beyond simply having enough sympathetic votes in the United Nations or enough armed men at one's command? It must never be forgotten that the charter denies self-determination neither to the unpopular nor to the weak.

This is only one set of perplexing questions generated by the experience of the United Nations with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, Mr. Chairman. All are serious. None are merely academic. None have been fully and adequately answered thus far. And some are literally questions of life and death at this moment in more than one place on the globe. If the United Nations is to search out the significance of the charter principle of self-determination, it goes without saying that these questions must be confronted soberly, carefully, and in a genuine spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. They must be examined with an eye to the piece-by-piece construction of a viable world order which is the United Nations' task.

"Good Faith" Fulfillment of Obligations

The third principle which I will allude to briefly is the "good faith" fulfillment of obligations assumed in accordance with the charter, which is, of course, stated in article 2, paragraph 2, of the charter.

One fruitful inquiry in conversation with this principle has to do with the various categories of obligations which are "assumed . . . in accordance with the . . . Charter." There are, first of all, the obligations directly imposed by the charter. Here, as I have already suggested, the importance of the principle of "good faith" fulfillment is greatest in relation to those charter obligations which cannot be turned into further,

more specific legal duties under particular circumstances by the action of U.N. organs—other than, conceivably, by the International Court of Justice. But in the case of all provisions of the charter imposing duties directly upon states, the effect of article 2, paragraph 2, is to require first that the charter be *read* in good faith—a necessary prerequisite to complying in good faith with its requirements. This means simply that it must be read without disregard for what it plainly requires, even for high purposes.

It is true that the charter is a constitution and that its rules, both of procedure and of substance, are more often than not quite general. They are, nevertheless, legal rules, and it is therefore implicit in the charter that at some point we may have to forgo doing what we very much want to do, what it might be very useful to do, simply because the rules provide otherwise. We may have to do what we would strongly prefer *not* to do, simply because the rules, until changed, so require. This is the price we pay for legal order.

And here an important distinction must be drawn. What I have said applies not only to members of the United Nations individually but to the United Nations itself. What we are concerned with is therefore not only a duty of states to fulfill obligations imposed upon states directly by the charter. It is also a duty which falls upon members in their capacity as participants in the decisionmaking organs of the United Nations: the duty to do their utmost to see that the organization itself respects the terms of its constitution. It is sometimes difficult for the organization to restrain itself from buying immediate benefits at the expense of the integrity of its charter. But if we are not able to do so, Mr. Chairman, we will be breaking faith with those who have preceded us, leaving the organization weak and impoverished in a way which cannot be rectified by cash contributions.

There are, of course, other sorts of duties falling within the scope of article 2(2) than those imposed directly by the charter—namely, duties generated by the operation

of U.N. organs as provided in the charter. Decisions of the Security Council in matters of international peace and security; resolutions of the General Assembly in certain limited cases such as the apportionment of expenses under article 17; the decisions of both organs in establishing their rules of procedure as required by articles 21 and 30 and in a variety of matters having to do with the internal operations of the organization; and judgments of the International Court of Justice—all these, under the charter, may create and impose specific new legal duties directly upon states.

These then, Mr. Chairman, are some general and exploratory remarks, which my delegation hopes may contribute to the developing picture of these last three principles which is being sketched out in the committee. The United States looks forward with great interest to the further careful and more detailed examination of these principles in the Special Committee.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say a word about the two items on our agenda which are closely related to the question of the principles of friendly relations and cooperation.

It is difficult to know what to say, in a brief remark, about the substance of the Netherlands item on methods of factfinding, because it deals with matters of such pervasive and fundamental importance in the settlement of disputes and indeed in all the decisionmaking processes of the United Nations system. To ask a lawyer to comment on the importance of processes of factfinding is something like asking a fish his opinion of water, and we are indeed grateful to the Netherlands delegation for providing the focus and insight which their item has produced thus far. We are, of course, not engaged in a discussion of the item in substance, and, in any event, the general views of my delegation have been set forth on previous occasions. Let me merely say here that we wholeheartedly support the resolution introduced here yesterday⁴ by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands.

My delegation also greatly appreciates the initiative of the delegation of Madagascar. The item introduced early in our discussion by the distinguished Ambassador of Madagascar, on "Observance by Member States of the principles relating to the sovereignty of States, their territorial integrity, non-interference in their domestic affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the condemnation of subversive activities," has lent that discussion a new dimension and perspective of considerable value. We do not yet know exactly what will be the action which the committee will wish to take at this stage on this item. But my delegation expresses the hope that, whatever that action may be, it will enable us to continue to reap the benefit of the contribution which this item can make to our discussion of the principles of friendly relations.

May I close by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity of making this statement and by expressing my appreciation to my colleagues, the distinguished representatives of the Sixth Committee, for their kind attention. Thank you.⁵

⁴ U.N. doc. A/C.6/L.580.

⁵ In plenary session on Dec. 20 the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the "friendly relations" item. The first (A/RES/2103 (xx)) was in two parts: Part A expressed appreciation to the 1964 Special Committee for the work it had performed at Mexico City; decided to constitute a Special Committee composed of members of the 1964 Special Committee, to which Algeria, Chile, Kenya, and Syria would be added; and asked the Committee to continue its work on the seven principles of international law and to report to the General Assembly at its 21st session. Part B requested the Committee to consider the documents (A/5757 and Add. 1) submitted to the General Assembly and the discussions at the 20th session on the item entitled "Observance by Member States of the principles relating to the sovereignty of States, their territorial integrity, non-interference in their domestic affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the condemnation of subversive activities." The second resolution (A/RES/2104(xx)), on the question of factfinding, requested the Secretary-General to supplement his "study on the relevant aspects of the problem" and invited member states to submit to the Secretary-General "before July 1966, any views or further views they may have on this subject."

U.S. Presents Views on Population Growth and Economic Development

*Statement by James Roosevelt
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

Although much worthwhile research remains to be done, and although much demographic information remains to be gathered concerning the precise interrelationships in given circumstances between population changes and economic development, the general facts of the exploding world population are well known. The time interval required for the world's population to double itself has telescoped at an alarming rate. We have doubled in number since 1900, when the world's population was approximately 1.5 billion, and today we have a world population of 3 billion. According to projections of the Secretariat, we may have 6 billion people by the end of the century. I might add, parenthetically, that the report of the Committee on Population of the United States National Citizens Commission on International Cooperation has just reported to the President of the United States that if present world trends continue, the century-end figure will be more than 7 billion.

Moreover, it is not only a question of absolute numbers but also one of the *rate* of growth. The world's annual rate of growth in 1945 was 1 percent. Today it is about 2 percent, and some experts have told us that the rate is expected to go even higher. These projections of the world's population present problems of enormous magnitude and potentially disastrous consequences, and we must, as President Johnson said this year at San Francisco, "face forthrightly the multiplying problems of our multiplying populations and seek the answers to this most profound challenge to the future of all the world."²

Most of the attention regarding the effects of population growth has been focused on

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Dec. 15 (U.S. delegation press release 4751).

² BULLETIN of July 19, 1965, p. 98.

the circumstances in developing countries, where the overall average annual increase is slightly more than 2.5 percent and where for some countries the growth rate has reached 3 percent. In the developing regions as a whole, food production has barely kept pace with the population increase. At Belgrade,³ the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization pointed out that per capita world food production had failed to rise appreciably for almost 7 years. Other experts pointed out that during the 1960's food production in the developing regions of the world had increased less rapidly than population, and thus per capita food output was actually declining. If the trend continues, the outlook is grim indeed and the threat of starvation in some countries is a very real one.

But avoiding starvation is not the only, nor even the principal, reason for concern about population increases. The problem is one of diverting resources which could otherwise be used for capital formation. The difficulty is one of finding sufficient savings, after expending resources just to meet current consumption needs of an expanding population, to invest in order to insure a reasonable rate of progress toward modernization and a higher standard of living based on sustaining economic growth.

As we all know, the goal of a 5 percent annual growth rate in the developing countries has not been reached in all developing countries. Even if this goal, in terms of gross national product, is reached, the prospect is that population growth would greatly dilute its impact on individual levels of welfare.

It is in the developing countries that the situation is most critical, and it is there that population growth threatens to frustrate the aspiration for economic and social development. The problem is not, however, limited to those countries. In the United States, with a population growth rate of

about 1.5 percent a year, prospects are that our population will grow from its present 190 million to 300 million by the end of the century. A recent report by the National Academy of Sciences has revealed a variety of problems which even this relatively modest rate is causing—especially among the poor and the uneducated. The problems involve maternal health, infant mortality and morbidity, family life, housing, opportunities for education, employment, and a better standard of living. The growing population adds to strains on our society in the form of air and water pollution, transportation difficulties, overcrowding in urban areas, the depletion of national resources, and the destruction of recreation areas and open space.

My country's efforts to create a Great Society are complicated not only for these reasons but because of the relatively faster increase in that portion of the population which is at the lower end of the economic scale. Parents in the less fortunate economic group have nearly twice as many children as those in the most fortunate bracket. The relatively high birth rate in poor families is not only an important contributing cause in their poverty—it actually tends to perpetuate the circumstances and condemns them to life in conditions of relative economic and cultural deprivation.

I have touched on the problems caused by population growth in my country only to indicate that the problem of population growth and its economic effects is not confined to the developing countries. And if the magnitude of problems faced by my country, with its relatively low annual birth rate and high per capita income, is immense, what must be the problems of a country with an annual population growth of 3 percent and a per capita income of \$100?

I do not believe, however, that we can judge the success of our response in meeting the challenge of population growth only with demographic facts and measurements of the standards of living of peoples. There is more to life than existence and mere freedom from hunger. The goals of national

³ The 2d U.N. World Population Conference was held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Aug. 30–Sept. 10, 1965.

and international society should not only be higher standards of living for all peoples, regardless of the number of people in the world, but, more importantly, should be the satisfaction of the political, cultural, and spiritual needs which are fundamental to all men. It is against these goals that we must measure our efforts, and it is within the context of these goals that we should view the increasing world population and devise appropriate population policies. Against the general background of what I have said, I would like to sketch out the policy views of my Government on this subject of population growth and economic development.

First, we are concerned about the economic and social consequences of our own population trends and are devoting considerable attention, publicly and privately, to the present and probable future demographic facts of domestic life.

Second, we seek more information about population trends and circumstances in the developing countries, not only as a guide to the formation of our own policies but in order to help others to know more. We consider this particularly important in those nations where present population levels and rates of growth may constitute major obstacles to the realization of desired economic and social development aspirations.

Third, we oppose any effort to dictate to any country the means employed or the policies devised to deal with its population problems.

Fourth, while we do not advocate specific policies with reference to population growth in other countries, we are prepared to actively help such countries, at their request, in their efforts to deal with the problems involved. The Agency for International Development has extended its assistance beyond statistical, demographic, and public health fields, to the direct support of family planning programs. I think it would be appropriate to mention that the Agency for International Development missions will, in accordance with a policy message directed to them last March,⁴ now respond positively to

requests for technical, financial, and commodity assistance in support of family planning programs. In that message emphasis was put on the following points:

—Each AID mission assigned one officer to become familiar with the population dynamics and program developments in the country to which he is posted. It is this officer's responsibility to keep both the United States mission in that country and the Agency for International Development headquarters in Washington appropriately advised.

—The Agency for International Development does not advocate any particular method of family regulation. Freedom of choice in this matter should be available in any program for which technical assistance is requested.

—Requests for assistance in this field, as in other fields, will be considered only if they are made or approved by the appropriate authorities of the requesting government.

—The Agency for International Development is prepared to entertain requests for technical, commodity, and local currency assistance in support of family planning programs.

—The Agency for International Development will not consider requests for contraceptive devices or equipment for the manufacture of contraceptives, since experience has made it clear that the cost of these items is not a stumbling block in countries which are developing effective programs.

As a result of this facet of United States policy, the Agency for International Development is at the moment considering the first request for such assistance. The Government of Turkey has requested a \$3.5 million low-interest loan to buy 14,000 vehicles and educational equipment. This is to be used to further its family planning program in rural areas. I am confident the request is now receiving most sympathetic consideration.

⁴ Not printed here.

Fifth, as a matter of general United States policy, we believe that there remains a need for increased knowledge on population matters. We are quite encouraged with indications at the Belgrade conference of the substantially increased body of demographic information available to the international community and the growing number of experts in this field. We hope these indications augur well for further and increasingly precise data.

Sixth, we feel that the United Nations and its affiliated organizations have a role to play in the population field. My Government has consistently supported expansion of the United Nations role in assisting countries at their request in action programs dealing with population problems. We believe that member governments should be able to obtain from the United Nations and its agencies such assistance as they need and request.

Mr. Chairman, this subject was given thorough consideration at the 39th session of the Economic and Social Council, and it was on the basis of those deliberations that the Council passed Resolution 1084. Even more detailed examination was made at the recent conference at Belgrade. Under the crowded schedule of this committee, we would have considered it perhaps more appropriate to have a resolution merely noting the Economic and Social Council's resolution and the Secretary-General's report on the Belgrade conference. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, my delegation supports this draft resolution and its most able introducer, the distinguished representative of India, because, as you may judge from what I have said, there are no important differences between my Government's policies with regard to population growth and economic development and the draft resolution. We will therefore vote in favor of it.⁵

⁵ A proposal to postpone consideration of the agenda item on "Population growth and economic development" until the 21st session of the General Assembly was adopted in Committee II on Dec. 15 and in plenary session on Dec. 20.

U.S. Supports Proposal for High Commissioner for Human Rights

Statement by Frances E. Willis

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly

Of the fundamental areas of activity for our organization, mentioned earlier by my distinguished colleague from the United Kingdom, my Government agrees that it is the area of human rights which has been relatively neglected. We believe that we should take practical steps now to remedy this neglect. The United Nations needs an increased executive capacity in the field of human rights. We support the proposal of Costa Rica to create the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a move to establish this increased executive capacity. It is time to follow up on some of the ringing statements that have been made on the subject.

I would not wish to take the committee's time with a detailed exposition of my Government's view as to what the proposed High Commissioner might be able to do. However, in brief outline form let me indicate that we believe he could assist significantly in the dispassionate consideration by United Nations bodies of human rights around the world by providing an objective report annually on the state of human rights throughout the world. A High Commissioner for Human Rights might also be able to provide appropriate services and assistance to governments at their request. Such assistance and services might include advice on the establishment of new agencies or procedures that would operate in conformity with accepted human rights standards. Also at the request of governments, the High Commissioner for Human Rights might be able to assist by making available his good offices in cases of international or national disputes over alleged human rights violations.

¹ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on Dec. 13 (U.S. delegation press release 4749).

Let me also say that we believe that the High Commissioner would not impinge upon the present procedures for dealing with human rights complaints. If the terms of reference are properly drawn and a person of the desired qualifications fills the post, there would be no reason to believe that a High Commissioner for Human Rights would impinge on the domestic jurisdiction of member states.

At this late stage in this 20th session there is no time for our committee to discuss this proposal in detail. It appears to my delegation that the practical and sensible thing to do is to refer the proposal to the Commission on Human Rights. My delegation therefore heartily endorses the resolution sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nigeria contained in document A/C.3/L.1328. My delegation hopes that this resolution will command wide, if not unanimous, support of our committee.²

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TREATY INFORMATION

Cotton Textile Arrangement With Japan Extended

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 9 dated January 14

Notes were exchanged at Washington on January 14 between the Governments of the United States and Japan which extend for an interim period the United States-Japanese bilateral arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles, signed in Tokyo on August 27, 1963,¹ and amended in Washington on May 19, 1965.² This will remain in force until December 31, 1967, or until superseded by a new United States-Japanese bilateral cotton textile arrangement, whichever is the earlier.

Effective January 1, 1966, all limits and ceilings will be increased 5 percent over the 1965 levels. For the period January 1, 1966-March 31, 1966, no other change is made in the existing arrangement. If a new arrangement has not entered into force by March 31, 1966, some modifications will be made in the existing bilateral arrangement and will be applied retroactively as from January 1. These are:

(a) A provision allowing additional flexibility in transfer among groups.

(b) A provision allowing the ceiling for any category given a specific ceiling to be exceeded by 5 percent, provided that the aggregate agreement ceiling and the appropriate group ceiling are not thereby ex-

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5408 and 5804; for background and text of arrangement, see BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1963, p. 440.

² For texts of notes, see *ibid.*, June 14, 1965, p. 980.

ceeded. The existing arrangement does not allow "swing" into certain categories.

(c) The dropping of specific subceilings for combed ginghams and for other fabrics made from combed warp and filling. A clause providing for consultations should exports of these products disrupt or threaten to disrupt the United States domestic market is included in the text of the amended agreement. Export levels during the course of any such consultations are as provided for in paragraph 5b of the arrangement.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Press release 10 dated January 15

The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires to Secretary Rusk

JANUARY 14, 1966

No. E-2

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Geneva and in Washington between representatives of our two Governments regarding trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States and to the Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, effected by the Exchange of Notes on August 27, 1963, as modified by the Exchange of Notes on May 19, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1963 Arrangement").

I have the honor to confirm, on behalf of the Government of Japan, the understandings reached between our two Governments that the 1963 Arrangement shall be extended with the following modifications during the interim period beginning January 1, 1966, until December 31, 1967, or the date of entry into force of a new arrangement which will supersede the 1963 Arrangement, whichever date is the earlier.

1. The following shall be applicable retroactively as from January 1, 1966:

a. The phrase "for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963" in the preamble and numbered paragraph 1 b of the 1963 Arrangement shall be deleted and replaced by the phrase "for the period beginning January 1, 1963, until December 31, 1967, or the date of entry into force of a new arrangement which will supersede this Arrangement, whichever date is the earlier".

b. In numbered paragraph 3 of the 1963 Arrangement the second and third sentences shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"The annual aggregate limits for 1965 and each subsequent year shall be increased by 5 percent over the limit for the preceding year. These annual increases shall be applied to each limit for the groups and to each limit or ceiling within the groups. The quantity of 16,155 pounds by which the limit for zipper tapes, n.e.s., could be exceeded during 1965 shall not be included in calculating the limits and ceilings applicable after 1965."

c. Numbered paragraph 10 a of the 1963 Arrangement shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"This Arrangement shall continue in force through December 31, 1967, or until the date of the entry into force of a new arrangement which will supersede this Arrangement, whichever date is the earlier, provided that either Government may terminate this Arrangement prior thereto effective at the beginning of a calendar year by giving sixty days' written notice to the other Government."

2. If the said new arrangement has not entered into force by March 31, 1966, the following shall be applicable retroactively as from January 1, 1966:

a. In numbered paragraph 2 of the 1963 Arrangement the sentence commencing with "Within the annual aggregate limit," shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"Within the annual aggregate limit, the limits for Groups I, II and IV may be exceeded by not more than 10 percent, and the limit for Group III may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent."

b. Numbered paragraph 1 b and e in Annex A of the 1963 Arrangement shall be deleted and the following new paragraph 1 b shall be inserted:

"In the event that (1) exports from Japan of "ginghams, combed" should exceed substantially 75 percent of the limit for "ginghams" or exports from Japan of fabrics made from combed warp and filling should exceed substantially the volume equivalent to the limitation that applied to such exports in 1965, respectively, as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of the Arrangement, and (2) as a result of this excess, such exports should cause or threaten to cause disruption of the United States domestic market, the Government of the United States may request, in the manner set forth in paragraph 5 of the Arrangement, consultations with the Japanese Government to determine an appropriate course of action. During the course of such consultations, the Japanese Government will maintain exports in the products in question at the same levels as those mentioned in paragraph 5 b of the Arrangement."

c. Numbered paragraph 5 in Annex A of the 1963 Arrangement shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

"Within the annual aggregate limit and the limitation for each group provided for in paragraph 2 of the Arrangement, the limits and ceilings set for specific products may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent."

I have further the honor to request Your Excellency to be good enough to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

SUSUMU NAKAGAWA
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

*Assistant Secretary Solomon to the Japanese
Chargé d'Affaires*

JANUARY 14, 1966

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date which reads as follows:

[Full text of Japanese note.]

I confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

ANTHONY M. SOLOMON
Assistant Secretary

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Agreement amending article III of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (TIAS 1502). Adopted at Washington August 25, 1965. Entered into force December 17, 1965.

Notifications of acceptance: Afghanistan, Australia, Bolivia, Burundi, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

BILATERAL

Indonesia

Amendment to the agreement of June 8, 1960 (TIAS 4557), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington January 12, 1966. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the establishment of a United States Treasury facility at the United States Naval Base at Subic Bay. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila November 3 and 15, 1965. Entered into force November 15, 1965.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended (TIAS 5821, 5867, 5876, 5891). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon December 20, 1965. Entered into force December 20, 1965.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agreement of October 5, 1964 (TIAS 5667), concerning exports of cotton textiles from Yugoslavia to the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Lend-Lease Activities 1964. A summary of lend-lease activities in 1964 and the last of the printed periodical reports on this subject. Pub. 8006. Economic Cooperation Series 62. 6 pp. 5¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol for the Accession of Spain to the Agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva July 1, 1963. Entered into force August 29, 1963. TIAS 5749. 203 pp. 70¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colombia. Signed at Bogotá October 8, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá October 8, 1964, and February 11, 1965. Entered into force October 8, 1964. TIAS 5797. 14 pp. 10¢.

Education—Educational Commission and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Uruguay. Exchange of notes—Signed at Montevideo March 22 and May 17, 1965. Entered into force May 17, 1965. TIAS 5825. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi September 29, 1965. Entered into force September 29, 1965. TIAS 5875. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo amending the agreement of April 28, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Léopoldville September 21 and 28, 1965. Entered into force September 28, 1965. TIAS 5878. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States—Philippines Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna June 15 and September 18, 1964. Entered into force September 24, 1965. TIAS 5879. 10 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States—South Africa Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna February 26, 1965. Entered into force October 8, 1965. TIAS 5880. 10 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States—China Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with the Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna September 21, 1964. Entered into force October 29, 1965. TIAS 5882. 10 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn October 7, 1965. Entered into force October 7, 1965. TIAS 5883. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States—Viet-Nam Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna September 18 and November 25, 1964. Entered into force October 21, 1965. TIAS 5884. 10 pp. 10¢.

Aviation—Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Civil Glider Aircraft. Agreement with Finland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 3, 1965. Entered into force November 3, 1965. TIAS 5885. 5 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Philippines amending the agreement of February 24, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 5, 1965. Entered into force October 5, 1965. TIAS 5886. 3 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps. Agreement with Barbados. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bridgetown July 15 and August 9, 1965. Entered into force August 9, 1965. TIAS 5887. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea amending the agreement of May 22, 1963, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Conakry September 18, 1965. Entered into force September 18, 1965. TIAS 5890. 3 pp. 5¢.

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Challenges and Choices in U.S. Trade Policy

1966 should be a critical year for United States trade policy, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon predicted recently. Mr. Solomon sees three major challenges facing our trade policy: (1) the future pattern of our trade relations with the rich, industrialized nations of the free world—which hinges on the outcome of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations at Geneva; (2) the trade problems of the more than 100 independent nations of the developing world—how to improve and stabilize their trade earnings and how best to organize trade with low-income countries; and (3) U.S. trade relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—whether our policies of the last 17 years continue to serve American interests well or whether changes in the Communist world and the world at large have made some aspects of U.S. policy obsolete.

In this pamphlet, which reprints from the Department of State Bulletin two recent addresses by Mr. Solomon, the Assistant Secretary discusses these challenges and the choices that will have to be made in the years ahead.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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STATE
BULLETIN

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February 7, 1966

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The Advancement of Peace

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

I come back to Independence to be with one of the world's most persistent searchers for peace in the world. It is quite fitting that this day is set aside for the announcement of the Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace in the world.

I first want to congratulate the men here today whose generous public spirit is making this Center possible.

I take my text from the words which President Truman spoke just 17 years ago in his inaugural address of January 20, 1949. "... we must embark," he said, "on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."²

¹ Made at Independence, Mo., on Jan. 20 (White House press release (Independence, Mo.) dated Jan. 20, as-delivered text) at a ceremony for the announcement of the establishment of the Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University at Jerusalem.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.

This was, as we know now, Point 4. It was a bold and vital idea then, and it is just as bold and just as much alive as we meet here this afternoon.

The initial Point 4 program of technical assistance was enacted in 1949 and has continued from that day to this. Congress after Congress has continued to appropriate to that program—with growing confidence—sums which now, I believe, add up to more than \$3 billion. American experts have traveled the globe to every continent, bringing their skills to the worldwide war against ignorance and against hunger and against disease.

And to measure the success of this effort we have only to ask: What would the world be like today if President Truman had not launched this program?

In this year 1966 I am proposing, on behalf of our nation, a major new effort in this same field that he began so long ago, and I am proud to add to the Point 4 of President Truman the fourth principle of this

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ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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year's state of the Union speech: "to help improve the life of man."³

A New Effort To Improve the Life of Man

How will we help improve the life of man?

First, we propose a radical increase in our response to the needs of international education. There can be no decent life for any man or any people without education.

The International Education Act of 1966 will help build partnerships between American and foreign schools.

It will recruit teachers for overseas work.

It will make possible long-term commitments by American universities toward solving the problems of international education.

It will launch a series of projects to attack illiteracy and to find new ways to teach basic skills. It will begin to provide for an exchange Peace Corps to bring able young people from other countries to live and work here with us.

Second, we are going to enlarge our work for world health. And the twin of the International Education Act will be the International Health Act of 1966. And with that act we will strike at disease by establishing an international medical mission in our Public Health Service.

We plan to triple our effort to train medical manpower in the developing countries.

We plan to double the size of our nutrition program for mothers and for children. We plan to increase by 80 million those who will receive adequate diets.

We plan to set targets and to develop programs so in the next decade we can completely wipe out smallpox in the entire world; we can eliminate malaria in this hemisphere and large parts of Africa and Asia; we can end yellow fever in this hemisphere; we can find new controls for cholera, rabies, and other epidemic diseases.

Third, we will launch a major new attack on worldwide hunger. We will present this year a new food aid program, designed around the principle of intense cooperation

with those in all hungry countries who are ready to help themselves. We will direct our assistance program toward a cooperative effort to increase agricultural production. We will ask the countries which we help to make the necessary land reforms, to modernize marketing and distribution, to invest greater energy and resources in their own food production.

And in return, we will triple our assistance to investments in the powerful weapons of modern agriculture. From fertilizer to machinery we will direct the efforts of our agricultural scientists to the special problems of the developing countries—to the development of new foods and concentrates. We will call for an international effort, including institutions like the World Bank, to expand the world supply of fertilizer.

Fourth, we will increase our efforts in the great field of human population. The hungry world cannot be fed until and unless the growth in its resources and the growth in its population come into balance. Each man and woman—and each nation—must make decisions of conscience and policy in the face of this great problem. But the position of the United States of America is clear. We will give our help and our support to nations which make their own decision to insure an effective balance between the numbers of their people and the food they have to eat. And we will push forward the frontiers of research in this important field.

Fifth, the underlying principle of all our work with other nations will always be the principle of cooperation. We will work with those who are willing to work with us for their own progress, in the spirit of peace and in the spirit of understanding.

And while we work for peaceful progress, we will maintain our strength against aggression. Nothing is more false than the timid complaint that we cannot defend ourselves against the aggressor and at the same time make progress in the works of peace. A celebration which unites the United States is a fit time to reaffirm that energy in the defense of freedom—and energy and progress in the building of a free society—

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

should be the common objectives of any free people, large or small.

The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam

Now this is the central necessity today of the brave people with whom we are associated in South Viet-Nam. Just this week the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam has pledged his country to this necessity. He has spoken for progress in rural education, in housing, in land reform, and, above all, of the need for progress in social revolution and in the building of democracy—by constitutional process and by free elections. All this he has said in the shadow of continuing aggression from the North. In all this he will have the full support of the United States of America.

And so, President Truman, as we dedicate today in your honor the Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace, we recall the vision that you gave us to follow when you gave your farewell address, and I quote: ⁴

I have a deep and abiding faith in the destiny of free men. With patience and courage, we shall some day move on into a new era, a wonderful golden age, an age when we can use the peaceful tools that science has forged for us to do away with poverty and human misery everywhere on earth.

That is still our goal, President Truman. And now we are today redoubling our efforts to achieve it.

Today I informed President Truman of our worldwide efforts to move the violence of Southeast Asia to the table of peaceful discussions. I received a report this morning before I left Washington from Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Harriman on their recent travels. I shall be meeting with the Secretary and the Ambassador again later this afternoon. Both the Secretary and the Ambassador told me that in all the capitals they visited—and Ambassador Harriman went to almost a dozen—government leaders recognized the United States' genuine desire for peace in the world.

And of this one thing I am sure: The door of peace must be kept wide open for all

who wish to avoid the scourge of war. But the door of aggression must be closed and bolted if man himself is to survive.

It is tragic that in the 1960's there are still those who would engulf their neighbors by force, still those who require that vast resources be used to guard the peace rather than to bring all the people in the world the wonders that are really within their grasp.

The central purpose of the American people is a peace which permits all men to remain free. But we must do more. We must work, and we must build upon the solid foundation, as the Chief Justice said, of law among nations. And this is America's determination, and this is America's commitment.

Now let me leave this one last thought with you. I think every schoolboy knows that peace is not unilateral—it takes more than one to sign an agreement. And it seems clear to all that what is holding up peace in the world today is not the United States of America. What is holding back the peace is the mistaken view on the part of the aggressors that we are going to give up our principles, that we may yield to pressure, or abandon our allies, or finally get tired and get out. On the day that others decide to substitute reason for terror, when they will use the pen instead of the hand grenade, when they will replace rational logic for inflammatory invective, then on that very day the journey toward peace can really begin.

If the aggressors are ready for peace, if they are ready for a return to a decent respect for their neighbors, ready to understand where their hopeful future really lies, let them come to the meeting place and we will meet them there.

Here in the presence of the great man who was the 33d President of the United States, who labored so long and so valiantly to bring serenity to a troubled world, the 36th President of the United States speaks with a voice of 190 million Americans: We want a peace with honor and with justice that will endure!

Now, President Truman, there is one more

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 127.

bit of business that I would like to take care of so long as I have come out here to Independence. I was here not long ago in connection with a little project that you inaugurated two decades ago, but when the fellows last night in the Social Security office learned I was coming out here again to see you and Mrs. Truman today, they asked me to bring along your new Medicare card. And it is now my great pleasure to present here, in the presence of these distinguished friends of yours, and many of the young men of yesteryear who fought these battles with you, to bring card No. 1 for you, and card No. 2 for Mrs. Truman.

They told me, President Truman, that if you wished to get the voluntary medical

insurance, you will have to sign this application form, and they asked me to sign as your witness. So you are getting the special treatment, since cards won't go out to the other folks until the end of this month. But we wanted you to know, and we wanted the entire world to know, that we haven't forgotten who is the real daddy of Medicare. And because of the fight that you started many years ago, 19 million Americans will be eligible to receive new hope and new security when the program begins on July 1, and 19 million Americans have another reason, another cause, to bless Harry S. Truman.

Again, I want to thank all of you who made this great day possible.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 21

Press release 15 dated January 21

Secretary Rusk: Ambassador [W. Averell] Harriman and I have now reported to the President on our recent journeys abroad. Yesterday, at Independence, Missouri, President Johnson summarized where we are with respect to the possibilities of peace in Viet-Nam.¹

You are familiar with the intensive effort which has been made since Christmas to probe the prospects for peace. We have been in touch again with the governments of the world and with many of them through special emissaries. There has been an overwhelmingly favorable response to these efforts—except from those who could in fact sit down and make peace.

The diplomatic efforts of the past 4 weeks have not caught the other side by surprise. In April President Johnson at Baltimore called for unconditional discussions.² In May

there was a cessation of bombing which ended after a harsh rejection by the other side of any serious move toward peace. Over the months the President and I have discussed the elements of a reasonable peace, which were summarized at year's end by the so-called 14 points.³

For months on end, both publicly and privately, it was indicated to the other side that the bombing could be stopped as a step toward peace, and every possible effort was made to ascertain what the response might be. But nothing was forthcoming from Hanoi on that subject. Nevertheless, a number of governments, including Communist governments, insisted that diplomacy could play a more effective role and the prospect for peace would be improved if in fact the bombing were suspended. The Christmas cease-fire was therefore extended, as far as the bombing was concerned, until now the suspension is in its 29th day.

The question posed to the other side—Are

¹ See p. 186.

² For text of President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on Apr. 7, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 116.

you interested in peace?—is the same question which has been posed for months, and indeed years, by all available means. We have been waiting for some word from Hanoi that goes beyond bitter invective or charges that talk of peace is a “trick” or a “deceit” or a “swindle.” We have been listening for sounds other than the sounds of bombs and grenades and mortars in South Viet-Nam. I regret that I cannot report to you any positive and encouraging response to the hopes of the overwhelming majority of mankind. These past 29 days, against the background of all that has gone before, have provided every opportunity for the authorities in Hanoi to make some serious response.

The steady purpose of the United States—in Southeast Asia and elsewhere—is to do our full part in building a decent world order, at peace under law, in which small as well as large nations can live in safety and free from molestation. We must continue on this course with patience and persistence. But as President Johnson put it yesterday:

The door of peace must be kept wide open for all who wish to avoid the scourge of war. But the door of aggression must be closed and bolted if man himself is to survive.

So we shall do what we can to bring peace to Southeast Asia and shall do what we must to prevent the success of a cruel aggression.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say in your statement that Hanoi in the past 29 days has been given every opportunity to make some favorable response. Does this mean that the administration in its decisionmaking process is now at the point where it must decide in just what form to take the other hard steps which the President warned December 9⁴ would be taken if the Communists failed to respond favorably to all of the long efforts? In other words, are you ready to resume the bombing?

A. Well, I think you would not want me—or perhaps I should say, you would not expect me to go into questions about the future military policy or military action. I think the President yesterday made the position very

clear, and he has made clear on many occasions that our commitment to the safety and the freedom of South Viet-Nam is deep and that we shall do what is necessary to achieve the elementary objectives which we and the South Vietnamese share.

Hanoi's Aggression, the Central Issue

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-General of the United Nations indicated yesterday that a concrete proposal which would bring the National Liberation Front into a postwar liberation government might spur the peace negotiations. What is your reaction to that, sir?

A. Well, I think that our view is that the government of South Viet-Nam is a matter which should be determined by the people of South Viet-Nam themselves. We ourselves have supported and continue to support the idea of free elections in which the South Vietnamese people can make these decisions rather than have these decisions made for them by imposition from the outside.

What is needed here is a proposal from Hanoi looking toward peace. The simple issue is the apparent determination of Hanoi to impose a political solution upon South Viet-Nam by force. If they abandon that determination, if they themselves adopt another policy, then many of those could fall into line and peace could be readily established.

But that is the heart of the matter. That is the central issue. And almost all of the other aspects are incidental to that central point: Is Hanoi going to hold its hand and refrain from trying to impose a political solution on South Viet-Nam by force? If the answer to that question is yes, they will, then peace can be brought about very quickly. If their answer to that is no, then we and the South Vietnamese will have to do what is required.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, the group headed by Senate Majority Leader [Mike] Mansfield warned about the danger of the war expanding into Southeast Asia and elsewhere in Asia. What could you say about that, sir?

A. I think there is always a danger when

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1014.

an aggressor sets out to impose his will by force on someone else and those of us who have commitments are resolved to meet our commitments. I cannot say that there is no danger. But I would say that those dangers exist for the other side as well and that rational men should try to bring this matter to the conference table and not try to—not allow this matter to move by stages to the kind of conflict which no one could reasonably desire.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you twice mentioned the fact that this is the 29th day of no bombing, and you seem to have left the impression that the string might be running out on this particular line of policy. I wonder, sir, if that was your intention?

A. I think I have already commented on that. I am not going to today get into the question of the future and future moves or what may be required. What we need is something serious from Hanoi pointing toward peace, and that we have not had.

The National Liberation Front

Q. Sir, could you tell us what is the distinction in the minds of the U.S. Government officials concerned with the problem of not permitting the National Liberation Front to be a political entity at negotiations and yet saying that we would not be opposed to having their views presented?

A. The so-called National Liberation Front which was formed in Hanoi in 1960 is only a fraction of the South Vietnamese people. There are many other South Vietnamese. The overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese people are made up of the Buddhists and the Catholics and other sects and the *montagnards*, the million who fled from Hanoi in 1954, 1955, to escape a Communist regime. We feel that the South Vietnamese people as a whole should have the responsibility for making the decisions about their future.

Now, the President, in July,⁵ has indicated that if Hanoi is interested in peace,

there should be no insuperable problem in having the views of a so-called Liberation Front reflected. But that does not mean that they are the representatives of the South Vietnamese people, the overwhelming majority of whom—and there are 14 million of them—the overwhelming majority of whom want something other than what the Liberation Front has been offering.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some military authorities and others already believe the pause has gone too long, that it is giving a military advantage to the other side. What can you tell us about the amount of repairs that the North Vietnamese have made to transportation and about the infiltration of men and supplies and perhaps the arrival of additional weapons?

A. They were, of course, in the North, working on repairs before the pause, working diligently to restore certain of their facilities that have been destroyed by bombing. We have had reconnaissance in North Viet-Nam over this period. We know that many of the installations which were knocked out remain knocked out, but we also know that they have been working on repairing certain of the others.

Now, this is a matter which was taken fully into account in the decisions made with respect to the course of the last month.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we requested of any other nation military assistance, and, if so, what response have we had?

A. Well, we have invited assistance from a good many nations in whatever form they themselves feel that they can provide. I am not able to report on specific decisions taken by specific governments today, but we do know that a number of governments are considering additional assistance to South Viet-Nam and we are hopeful that that will become apparent in the weeks ahead.

Q. Mr. Secretary, many persons looking back upon this record of negotiations since the April speech that you mentioned say that they see an evolution in the United States position toward a more conciliatory posture to provoke negotiations. Do you agree with

⁵ At a news conference on July 28, 1965.

that, and, if so, could you tell us what you think have been the major changes or evolutions on our side?

A. I think in April the President made very clear and public a point of view which he had had before and, indeed, which has marked the efforts of the United States Government for many years.

The most—the first important step after the decisions taken by Hanoi to move into Laos and South Viet-Nam, the first important step to try to find a peaceful solution in Southeast Asia was the conversation between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961,⁶ and there they seemed to reach an agreement about Laos as an important first step. That led to the Geneva conference and the agreement on Laos, an agreement which could have provided a great benefit to the people of Laos as well as a pillar of peace in Southeast Asia, except that Hanoi never brought themselves into compliance with it for a single day, for a single day. They have left large numbers of their troops behind. They continue to use Laos as an infiltration route into South Viet-Nam.

Nonetheless, from that time onward the United States Government has been in touch with many governments every year throughout the year to explore the possibilities of peace in Southeast Asia. During the last calendar year, my staff advises me that I myself had more than 120 discussions personally with high officials of other governments to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia.

In April President Johnson made it very clear that, as far as we are concerned, the door to discussion is open, that if there is anyone there at the table, we will be there to talk to them about peace. And I think that it has been made dramatically clear in the past month that, if there are obstacles to peace in Southeast Asia, they are not in Washington. Those obstacles are in Hanoi. Those obstacles lie with those who are de-

termined to continue aggression in Southeast Asia.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of receiving no indication from Hanoi of being interested in peace. Can we assume that, therefore, any reports we may have received from the Russians were negative after the visit of the Soviet delegation to Hanoi or that we have received no reports from the Russians?

A. I would not wish to embroider on what I said in terms of channels or communications. I am simply saying that we have not received the kind of response for which we were hoping during this period.

Free-World Shipping to North Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. Yes.

Q. —don't you think there is something incongruous in the fact that the British are supplying by ship munitions and other materials to the Viet Cong, while Australians, who are part of the British Commonwealth, are fighting the Viet Cong?

A. I am not aware of any munitions supplied by the British by ship to the Viet Cong. As a matter of fact, free-world shipping to North Viet-Nam has been very drastically reduced in the past several months.

We know that strategic materials are not moving into North Viet-Nam by ship. Indeed, many of those free-world ships go in empty in order to bring out fresh fruits and vegetables and other products for other countries. These free-world ships, for the most part, are under charter to Communist countries and are not fully under the control of the countries whose flags they fly.

Q. But the charges are being made in Congress to the effect that the British are providing such supplies. In addition, it carries quotations—

A. I will have my chance this next week to discuss that with the Members of the Congress, but we have no information at all that indicates that free-world ships are carrying strategic supplies to North Viet-Nam.

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1961, p. 991.

Status of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could discuss with us, on the basis of your talks with Mr. Kosygin [Soviet Premier Aleksai Kosygin], the status of Soviet-American relations at this time?

A. Well, I would not wish to relate them to the Vice President's talk with Mr. Kosygin, at which I was present. That was in the nature of a courtesy call, and we reviewed, as the phrase goes, matters of common interest to the two countries.

I think that it is clear that the Viet-Nam problem has cast some shadow over relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. As far as we are concerned, we would be prepared to try to find ways and means to find points of agreement and get on with the business of normal relations, despite this particular problem.

We would hope that the Soviet Union, as a cochairman of the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1962, would take its responsibilities as a cochairman seriously and do everything that it can to bring these problems of South-east Asia to a peaceful conclusion.

There are some complications, of course, within the Communist world which may make it difficult for them at particular times to move in particular ways, but we would hope that they would recognize the importance of the agreements of '54 and '62 and do what they can to bring about peace in South-east Asia on the basis of those two agreements.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. There's a hand in the back here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been some reports that the North Koreans are infiltrating into South Korea, perhaps in response to the South Korean commitment in Viet-Nam. I wonder, sir, if you could tell us how extensive this is, what sort of infiltration it is, and what is being done to stop it?

A. I haven't seen anything on that at all. Over the years there are occasional infiltrators along the line in Korea. But I am not

aware of anything new or especially significant in that field.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there specifically no reply by the Hanoi government on the memorandum which was delivered to them by an American diplomat 3 weeks ago or so?

A. I think my opening statement covers that point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to assess for us the recent—the significance of the recent military takeover in Africa, especially in Nigeria, a country which we thought would be the standard bearer of Western-style democracy in Africa?

A. There have been events in three or four African countries which seem not to be connected with each other where special circumstances in each country have produced changes in government. We ourselves would hope that these new countries of Africa could find their way onto a path of substantial and constitutional and stable governments which would make it possible for them to move toward economic and social development of their peoples.

I would not wish to comment specifically on individual countries at this point because we are studying these situations and consulting other governments about them and will be getting into such questions as recognition and things of that sort in due course.

Secretary Sees General Trend Toward Peace

Q. Mr. Secretary, you're marking your fifth year in office this week. Could you tell us what your most satisfying personal accomplishments have been during this period, what you're looking forward to, and whether you are finding it difficult or easy to keep up the pace after 5 years?

A. I think the pace has been such I haven't really had much time to philosophize about the total experience. These have been years that have been crowded with events, some very satisfying and some difficult and dangerous and complicated.

I do believe that the world is moving, despite the present difficulties and the present clouds on the horizon, the world is moving steadily toward peace. That seems rather a bold statement under present circumstances, but I do believe there is a greater comprehension of the meaning of war, of a nuclear exchange, of the use of massed armies in conflict.

We have not yet resolved the problem of what the Communist world calls "wars of national liberation." We have not yet achieved a situation in which small as well as large countries can live securely in peace, safe from outside threat or attack by subversion or the infiltration of men and arms. That is why this situation in Southeast Asia is so very important.

But I think the general trend has been toward sobriety, toward prudence, and I would hope that that can continue. I think that one of the most important tasks in front of us is to make more headway in the settlement of disputes and in getting on with the great prospect of disarmament. Far too many of the world's resources are consigned to arms and based upon the possibility of armed conflict. We ought to somehow free mankind from this burden.

But I must say that in the longer range I am optimistic about where people are going, where nations are going, because I think that the decent purposes of ordinary men and women all over the world are making themselves felt. But that does not overlook the fact that in the short range we have some very difficult and dangerous problems to solve.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify one point on the Vietnamese situation which has not been mentioned here today, the President in his state of the Union message⁷ suggested one possible course of action might be a reduction of the level of hostilities. The following day⁸ the President did mention that there had been some reduction of the number of

incidents but said that he was not able to say whether this was a result of the peace probe or not. Could you tell us, sir, what the situation is in that regard at this stage?

A. We have watched not only the number but the character of incidents very closely, not only over the past several weeks but over the past years. The Viet Cong have continued to maintain a high level of terror and sabotage incidents. The attacks by organized units, say a battalion or larger, will vary in number rather considerably from period to period.

There has been some variation in those in recent weeks, but on the whole I would think it would be unsafe to try to draw any political conclusions from the pattern. These patterns change, and we see no general trend. There is every indication that the other side is going to intensify its activity after this Tet [Vietnamese Lunar New Year] period.

Formosa Problem Blocks U.S.-Peiping Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, Secretary-General U Thant advanced what sounds like a rather interesting theory yesterday to the effect that the present Chinese Communist leadership could be compared to a person who had suffered a nervous breakdown and therefore should be treated with extra kindness in order to restore it to complete health. What do you think of this as a guide for the United States in its attitude toward Red China?

A. Well, there are two sides to that problem. As far as we are concerned, in all of our talks with the authorities in Peiping—we have had more than a hundred twenty-five of them now—they start out saying that "There is nothing to discuss unless you are prepared to surrender Formosa," and when we say, "We can't surrender 11 million people against their will," then the conversation gets rather stilted.

So I think that those who are concerned about improving relations with Peiping must face that question: What are you going to do about these 11 million people on Formosa?

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

⁸ At a news conference on Jan. 13.

Those who are prepared to surrender them might do business with Peiping. But we may be in a special position there because we have an alliance with the Republic of China and have forces in Formosa. But that is the beginning and the end of any serious discussions with Peiping as far as our own relations with them are concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to clarify one point—

A. Yes.

Q. Aside from what we can all read, were you telling us that you have had no response from Hanoi or no satisfactory response?

A. Well, I think that I would again go back to my statement: "I regret that I cannot report to you any positive and encouraging response to the hopes of the overwhelming majority of mankind."

Q. No encouraging—

A. No positive and encouraging response.

Q. Mr. Secretary, despite that fact, Hanoi and Peiping have been discussing out loud your 14 points in some detail, and quarreling with them, of course. Has the United States made an effort either—through any channel—to clarify some of the questions that have been raised on the other side as to the exact meaning of certain of these points?

A. If they want clarification, they know how to get it. Why are they afraid to come to the table? Why are they afraid to engage in discussions? Why? They have not asked for clarification. They have simply attacked them. They have attacked the idea of peace in Southeast Asia. They have called all this a "swindle." Peiping even charged that the visits of Mr. Kosygin and Vice President Humphrey to Delhi for the funeral of Prime Minister Shastri was "a part of a collusion and a peace swindle." I think that was about the words they used.

Now, they know how to clarify anything on which they are confused. And the channels are all there, the techniques are all available, the possibilities are present. So, if

they are interested in clarification, we are at their disposal.

Q. Well, is the answer to the question "No"?

A. I beg pardon.

Q. Is the answer to the question "No"—that we have made no effort?

A. No; the answer to the question is the one I gave. (Laughter.)

U.S.—South Viet-Nam Communique

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. You have said earlier that the only obstacles to peace negotiations were Hanoi. But we have had reports that there was some opposition to peace negotiations in the South as well. But since you have just come back from there, could you discuss the extent and importance of that opposition?

A. Now, I was in Saigon very recently and had full discussions with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and with other high officials of the Government of South Viet-Nam. We issued a joint communique on January 16⁹—a full copy of which is available to you. I think that—well, that communique points out that our policies are basically the same; that we fully understand the position with which they are faced, the problems that they are facing out there. We are joining with them to meet this aggression, which is their great preoccupation.

They are naturally very much concerned with the cruel battle that is in front of them. But on the other hand, they understand that the rest of the world is interested in the possibilities of peace, and we agree that we would both have to take all the necessary military measures in this situation. But we would remain alert to all proposals and initiatives that might lead to peace. I think this was talked out in great detail.

⁹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1966, p. 155.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you would indulge me in one more question regarding the tone of your opening statement.

A. Yes.

Q. Without disclosing any military actions that might be taken, and with full recognition of the fact that the President will continue to press for peace no matter what, I would like to ask you whether we are at the end of what has been the month-long intensive phase of this peace offensive? Are more peace envoys going abroad as wandering minstrels in the near future? Or is it now a question of assessment and waiting and going through normal diplomatic channels?

A. Well, you intrigue me when you ask for a "tone" and refer to "wandering minstrels." (Laughter.) I can't really sing what I am saying. No, I think what I did today was to bring you up to date on the situation as it exists now. I think, if you put together the statement made by the President yesterday in Independence and my remarks this morning, you would have as full and as frank a statement of where we are today as we can provide, based upon all the information that is available to us. I would not want to talk about tomorrow, or next week, or next month. I just want to bring you up to date on where we are now.

Tashkent Agreement

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Tashkent declaration open the way to the resumption of economic assistance to India and Pakistan by this country?

A. Well, we would not relate it specifically to Tashkent. We are very much encouraged by the results at Tashkent and have congratulated all three parties on what seems to have been a most constructive step taken there.

To the extent that the agreement reinforced the possibility of peace in the subcontinent, of course, that was very gratifying and opens the way for aid to accomplish the purpose for which it was intended, rather

than have resources consumed in violence between these two great friends of ours in the subcontinent. So we were very much encouraged by the Tashkent agreement and hope and expect that the two Governments will proceed now to try to improve their relations so that all of us can work on the problems of the subcontinent under conditions of peace and some confidence in the future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related aid question, I wonder if you could explain to us why you have decided to resume surplus food shipments to Egypt?¹⁰ And whether you received any assurances that this food would not be used to finance indirectly the purchase of new Soviet arms?

A. We resumed our food shipments to Egypt in an agreement that extends for a period of 6 months on the basis of a full discussion by our two Governments of our own interests on each side, and how we see them, and where our common interests might provide a basis for common action between us. I don't think that these food shipments are involved with the question of purchasing arms from any other source by Egypt.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Chinese leadership said this past week that they must prepare their people and their military to the possibility of war with the United States—I think, as they put it, "in the near future." In view of the fact, sir, that you have said we have received nothing resembling an encouraging comment from the Communist side, I wonder, sir, as you look down through 1966, whether you feel the United States must also make realistically this kind of assessment as well?

A. I think that all of those matters are matters that are taken fully into account in determining what course of action this nation should follow in dealing with this ag-

¹⁰ For text of a memorandum from President Johnson to Secretary Rusk dated Dec. 29, see *ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 123.

gression in Southeast Asia. We have not overlooked any of the contingencies, and we are perfectly aware of the fact that China is there, across the border, and that they

have substantial power; but, nevertheless, we are meeting our commitments in South-east Asia.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

The Quest for Peace in Viet-Nam

by Arthur J. Goldberg

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I am deeply gratified to have the opportunity of standing in tonight for the Secretary of State, and I wish to be associated in full with the words and the sentiment of the citation that has just been read.

The Secretary has cabled the following message, which he has asked me to read for him.

I am profoundly grateful for the high honor your organization has conferred on my colleagues in the Department of State and Foreign Service and myself, and regret deeply that I cannot be present to thank you in person. I am especially gratified that your citation recognizes the dedication and high professional competence of our career employees. I am proud to serve with them and know they will share my pride in this award bearing the name of our nation's first diplomat. My warm appreciation and best wishes to the members of the Printing Industries of Metropolitan New York.

DEAN RUSK

The fact that Benjamin Franklin, who inspires your award, was one of the Founding Fathers of our country may tend to date our impression of him. Nothing could be a greater mistake, for he was a very modern man in every sense.

His modernity, I believe, was evident in his

philosophy that there are important communities of the mind and the spirit which are not circumscribed by national boundaries. Indeed, 188 years ago he set forth succinctly the central objective of the foreign policy of the United States when he said: "We propose, if possible, to live in peace with all mankind."

That proposition still guides us today and is evident in our belief that a country's faith in a world of law and order does not stem from the length of its borders or the strength of its arms. Much more, it is a reflection of the greatness of its vision and the power of its conviction, and these have determined our international policy since the time of Benjamin Franklin. They are the determining reason why our nation is embarked upon an historic quest for peace in Viet-Nam.

U.S. Commitment to World Peace

I should like to report to you tonight on that quest.

Let me emphasize at the very outset that our concern for peace is not limited to Viet-Nam. In a day when the moon and the stars are being brought ever closer to our earthly planet—when continents on opposite sides of the world are but a missile shot apart—our concern with the peace must be worldwide and universal. We recognized that inescap-

¹ Address made before the Printing Industries of Metropolitan New York, Inc., at the Printing Week dinner at New York, N.Y., on Jan. 17 (U.S./U.N. press release 4785). Ambassador Goldberg spoke instead of Secretary Rusk and accepted for him the Franklin Award for Distinguished Service.

Franklin Award for Distinguished Service

Citation to Dean Rusk¹

More than 25,000 Americans, many serving in remote corners of the earth, represent the United States in its daily relations with other nations. The sum total of the work of these citizens, their effectiveness in carrying out the foreign policy of the United States, their individual contributions to the shaping of that policy, exert the most profound influence on the lives, fortunes and honor of 190 million Americans, and, indeed, on the future of the entire world.

The selfless dedication, the high level of professional competence of these State Department career employees are exemplified by the man who since 1961 has served with dignity and ability in the tradition of such illustrious Secretaries of State as Jefferson, Madison, Adams and Webster.

Born on a small farm in Georgia, Rhodes scholar at Oxford, professor at Mills College, he was early attracted to the challenging field of political science. A captain in the army reserve, he was called when war came to head the British Empire Section of military intelligence. By war's end he was serving with the rank of colonel as deputy chief of staff of the China-Burma-India theater.

In 1947 he was appointed by Secretary of State George Marshall to a significant post in the State Department. As Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in 1950 he performed a key role in this country's vigorous response, both military and diplomatic, to the sudden Communist aggression in Korea.

In 1960 he was asked by the newly elected President of the United States to leave his position as president of the Rockefeller Foundation and assume the arduous duties, the awesome responsibilities of the highest ranking Cabinet post. When Lyndon B. Johnson took the helm of a shocked and grieving nation in November, 1963, the Secretary of State, never far from the new President's side, provided visible evidence—to nations both friendly and unfriendly—of continuity in our foreign policy.

For five years he has labored tirelessly, quietly and effectively to extend the scope of human control over the complex forces which are shaping the destiny of our nation. He has stamped his own imprint of order, forethought and tenacious purposefulness on the wide ranging policies of state. A man of courage—trusted by the friends of this nation, respected by our antagonists—he daily pursues in practical ways the dream of Benjamin Franklin for a world of freedom, justice, humanity and peace. It is a privilege to present the Franklin Award for Distinguished Service to Dean Rusk.

¹ Read by Bernard W. Slater, chairman of the board, Printing Industries of Metropolitan New York, Inc., at the Printing Week dinner at New York, N.Y., on Jan. 17.

able fact when we signed the Charter of the United Nations.

I have heard those commitments to peace in distant parts of the world as well as our membership in the United Nations depicted by some as a form of starry-eyed idealism that is out of tune with the realities of our time. Most assuredly it is not; it is based on the most practical consideration of all—survival. But even if the charge had some validity, I would still have no apology. We must never forget our ideals, for if we ever do, we lose the very essence of the freedom that so much of humanity aspires to achieve.

So there is no gap between our ideals and our national interest. Very simply, we cannot find enduring peace in isolation apart from the world community.

The first essential in achieving the peaceful world we seek is to put an end to aggression—if possible by preventing it, otherwise by repelling it. That is the overriding obligation of members of the United Nations, and it is the constant obligation of all peoples who wish to live in peace.

The Charter of the United Nations recognizes the interrelationship between peace and the security of nations. It was a rec-

gnition, I would say, that was the inevitable heritage of a world community just emerging from the havoc and destruction of World War II, a war which had its genesis in a Fascist aggression that remained unchecked.

The founders of the United Nations, therefore, well understood the prime need of any future world order, for not only the last war but the war before it taught them how endless is the cannibalistic appetite of the successful aggressor and how rapidly his aggressions gain momentum and scope. Americans are fighting and dying in South Viet-Nam tonight because the United States has learned that awesome lesson of history.

The President, I believe, summed it up when he said in his state of the Union address² that if we yielded to force in Viet-Nam,

We would have to fight in one land, and then we would have to fight in another—or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists. And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest.

But as he also said, we have “made it clear—from Hanoi to New York—that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace.” In short, the fight we are now waging on the battlefields of Viet-Nam is matched by a peace effort that is being waged with no less intensity and resolve. The harsh guns that now sound in Viet-Nam must be made the last echo of a bitter past, and the rational talk of the conference table must open the way to the fulfillment of a peaceful future.

The President's Peace Initiative

It was to advance this goal that I undertook my recent mission for the President, as did the Vice President,³ the Secretary of State, Governor Harriman [Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman], Governor Williams [Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams], McGeorge

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

³ For remarks made by Vice President Humphrey at the White House on Jan. 3, see *ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 114.

President Joins in Tribute to Secretary Rusk

Following is the text of a telegram sent by President Johnson on January 17 to Paul M. O'Brien, assistant to the president, Printing Industries of Metropolitan New York, Inc., which was read at the Printing Week dinner at New York, N.Y., on that day.

It would be difficult to find a man more fitting for the Franklin Award for Distinguished Service than the man you have chosen—Dean Rusk.

Like Benjamin Franklin, Rusk understands the vital importance of applying quiet intelligence and careful thought to perplexing problems. He reduces complex situations to proportions that are comprehensible.

Carrying on in the high tradition established by Franklin, Rusk represents his country with wisdom and honor. He is abroad on an important assignment tonight. I am happy to add my own greetings and congratulations to those of you gathered to pay homage to Dean Rusk.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Bundy, and all the ambassadors who conveyed our peace messages.

As the President himself summed it up, in 1965 alone the Secretary of State and others of our representatives had 300 private talks for peace in Viet-Nam with both friends and adversaries; thus far we have made special visits to more than 40 countries and we have talked to 113 different governments in their capitals. This summary, I should emphasize, does not include my many discussions with the Secretary-General and with virtually all 116 other member states of the United Nations.

I can assure you tonight, therefore, that our effort is a dynamic and continuing process, that we seek—and shall persevere in seeking—a peaceful settlement through every conceivable channel.

In virtually all of Europe, Africa, and Asia our effort has been received for what it is—a serious move to bring reason to bear and end the terrible bloodshed that profits only the casualty lists.

There are a few voices that say America is engaged in a propaganda maneuver. When that voice comes from Peiping, it can be dismissed for what it is worth. When, however, it is a voice that comes from those who share our yearning for a peaceful world, a word of explanation is in order. I can assure you here and now that our intent is open and our effort is sincere.

As it is well known, my visit to Rome was arranged in complete secrecy. The President, furthermore, gave instructions that it was to be kept this way insofar as possible. The same is true of the missions carried out by Governor Harriman and the other Presidential emissaries. But when our presence became known in the various world capitals we visited, we had no choice but to explain in general terms the initiative that was underway, and we did so out of a decent respect for the opinions of mankind—opinions that have a vital bearing on the success or failure of our effort. We have not, however, publicized in any way the substance of the discussions that we have held. This shall remain the case unless we are authorized to do otherwise and unless it also serves the purposes of our peace mission.

It must be obvious to all that in conjunction with the open diplomacy we are conducting, there is also a great deal of equally quiet diplomacy that is now at work.

There is, however, one apparent fact that can be mentioned. Except for the public reaffirmation of old positions, we have not yet received a response from the place that holds the key to the settlement of the problem—Hanoi. As of tonight, we can still not report either success or failure.

U.S. Position Made Crystal Clear

Despite this, there are already some positive results of the President's peace initiative. The American position has been made crystal clear to all parties concerned, and any possible misunderstanding about the United States position has been eliminated.

Our aims are now better understood in world chanceries and by the people of various countries—including the American

people themselves. The heart of our aims and of our position has been detailed not only in the messages to the various governments setting forth the 14 points of American policy,⁴ but in a letter I sent to the Secretary-General⁵ for distribution to all United Nations members, which summarizes the essence of these points:

That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

In addition, let me emphasize again that we would welcome any initiative by the officials or the members of the United Nations—either collectively or individually—that would help resolve the situation and advance the search for an acceptable formula to stop the fighting and begin the talking.

If I were to try to single out conclusive evidence of our intent, I would point to one simple fact: In the past months we have been told by friends, by nonaligned countries, and by unfriendly countries that the key to negotiations was for the United States to suspend its bombing of North Viet-Nam for a reasonable period. The President did so, and North Viet-Nam has not been bombed since before the Christmas truce.

It is now being said that the question of Viet Cong representation is the chief stumbling block. Our answer has been given by the President in these words:⁶

⁴ For an outline of the U.S. position on Viet-Nam, see *ibid.*, p. 115.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 117.

⁶ At a press conference on July 28, 1965.

The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem.

Status of the Present Situation

Sadly, though, the fighting goes on, and this in itself is the great tragedy of our day. At the present juncture the aim of the United States effort is evident. The question that now presents itself, therefore, is this: Is the sincerity of our effort being matched by the other side?

I cannot tell what the ultimate outcome will be. I can only report the status of the present situation. I do want to stress that the President's state of the Union message reflects the mood of the United States—that we will never negotiate out of fear, but neither shall we fear to negotiate.

It was this philosophy that guided President Eisenhower in Korea and President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis. It is this philosophy that guides President Johnson today.

It is the reason that prompts me to summarize once again tonight where we stand both in the continued fighting and in the continued search for a path to the peace table. We repeat it, and we shall repeat it, because we want it to be heard that we will not accept a settlement imposed by force and

that we profoundly believe that this conflict should be settled by an honorable formula honorably negotiated at the conference table. We say this because we believe, too, that man was created for something far better than a lonely death on a battlefield.

There are, of course, some among us who are impatient and who have expressed disappointment that I and the other Presidential emissaries did not bring back an immediate acceptance of our effort to negotiate the peace. They have been quick to label that effort unsuccessful or even a failure.

I do not agree. Whatever the immediate outcome—and, as I have said, it is in doubt—the President's peace initiative has already succeeded in convincing the world that America wants peace. And because our effort is based on sound moral and humanitarian principles, I am convinced that it is bound to reach fruition, if not now, then in time to come.

This is my hope not only for America but for all humanity. It is one we will attain if we will but endure the ordeal of patience that our quest for peace demands.

At this time in our history, it would be well for all of us to recall the ancient counsel that while the world is full of tribulations, "tribulation worketh patience; and patience, experience; and experience, hope."

"There has been a widening realization . . . that education is central to the development of human beings, and therefore to economic and social progress . . . international education has now come to occupy a central role in international affairs. . . ."

Toward Deeper Cultural Relations in the Hemisphere

by Charles Frankel

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

My opening words are occasioned by a simple fact of geography: We have come together for this fourth regular meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council of the Organization of American States in the capital city of my country. This is the first time the Council has met here. While the members of my delegation and I do not have the role of official hosts, we do welcome you most warmly to our city. This is where we live and work.

I know from visits I have made to your countries the special feeling you have for your own capital cities. Many of them are much older than ours is. Many of them, too, emerged as cities—which means that they grew in a more natural organic manner than did Washington. This city was planned to be a capital and, in its way, a monument to our independence and our Federal system. It had no past before that. Yet I have come to like this city—personally, and as a place in which to live and work and have friends, and not simply as a monument.

It was Aristotle—a gentleman who was an immigrant to a big city, but not to our hemisphere—who said that men come together in cities in order to live, but they remain to-

gether in order to live the good life. That is true. It is true in a simple factual sense, and not simply in a philosophical sense. Because people think of cities as places where there is a good life, they have been flocking to cities, in your countries and in mine. And despite the congestion, disorder, and poverty which many of them find, it is also true that many of them prefer cities to the places from which they came. One reason why this is so—at any rate, my own guess as to one reason why this is so—is that they find in cities places where people are willing to talk about the nature of the good life. To talk about the good life, to explore and debate its meaning, is itself part of the good life.

And this applies even to people who would not imagine that they are talking about philosophy. For people talk about the good life implicitly. They talk about the ends and purposes of life when they are deciding how to live and making choices about their jobs, their governments, their schools, and their way of life. Cities are places where things are happening and changing. That is what makes them exciting, and it is what has always made them centers of thought and civilization.

I say all this not to invite this meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council to put the subject of urbanism on the agenda. I say it only to lead to what seems to me the cen-

¹ Address made at the inaugural session of the fourth meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council at Washington on Jan. 18.

tral reason that we have an Inter-American Cultural Council and the central business that we have to do together.

A Hemisphere of Cities

This hemisphere, like the rest of the world, is now in the process of becoming very rapidly a hemisphere of cities—a hemisphere of events, change, and, inevitably, decisions about what we, the inhabitants of this hemisphere, mean to make of ourselves and our societies. This is the background of the impulse and aspiration that are represented in the Alliance for Progress. And it is in the background of the very great changes that we are all engaged in making, and must continue to make, in our educational systems and our cultural lives.

Since the last meeting of this Council at the ministerial level, at Bogotá in 1963, we have taken steps in our own country to improve educational opportunities for our people. I would like to report to you on some of these steps at this point in my remarks because the national effort of each of our countries provides the base from which much of our common effort must proceed.

Twentieth-century societies have many of the same problems whether they are rich or poor. All must deal with the problem of people coming to cities in great numbers. All must deal with the problem of enabling them to cope with the increasing complexities and varied demands of modern life. Education has come to the foreground in our society as the prime instrument through which orderly social change—an orderly response to the needs and challenges of our time—can take place. These needs and challenges are as familiar to you in your countries as they are to us. There has been a widening realization in all our countries that education is central to the development of human beings, and therefore to economic and social progress.

We see our educational aims in this country in terms of five national objectives:

First, to raise the quality of education in our schools everywhere and for everyone;

Second, to bring equality of educational opportunity to every child in the United

States, whatever his color, or creed, or handicap, or family circumstance;

Third, to provide vocational and technical training that is geared to the economy and technology of today and tomorrow, not of yesterday;

Fourth, to make college and university study possible for all young people who can benefit by it. In our economy, we can no longer afford to regard higher education as a luxury; and

Fifth, to bring our educational resources to bear directly on problems in our communities—as an indispensable social instrument in fashioning the kind of society we want to have.

U.S. Legislation Relating to Education

Let me, then, refer briefly to some of the steps we have taken in the United States to move toward these objectives since the last meeting of this Council. In a little more than 2 years, some 20 separate acts of legislation relating to education in this country have been signed into law by President Johnson. Some of the titles of these acts indicate the particular problems with which we are trying to deal:

The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, with its loans and grants for building classrooms, libraries, laboratories.

The Vocational Education Act of 1963.

The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1963.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, providing new opportunities for adult education.

The 1964 amendments to the National Defense Education Act, a strengthened program of undergraduate assistance and of graduate fellowships to encourage more able young people to make teaching a career.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

The Higher Education Act of 1965.

The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, an act which symbolized our growing concern not only with the answers that science can give but

with the great questions asked by the humanities.

It is not possible in brief remarks to describe what these legislative steps are now making possible and what we have placed ourselves in a position to do in future years. But I do wish to indicate some of the changes by means of brief examples:

Total United States expenditures for education have more than doubled in the last decade and have increased by 25 percent since 1963.

As an indication of the increase in Federal support, one college student out of four will receive some kind of Federal aid toward his education expenses during this academic year. Three years ago the figure was 1 in 15.

For every student enrolled in an educational television course in 1963, there are four students enrolled today.

Since the fall of 1963, nearly twice as many teacher institutes have been held as during the previous 5 years.

In 1963 United States colleges and universities were operating 55 language and area centers with a total enrollment of 31,567 students; in 1965 there were 98 centers with an enrollment of more than 43,000 students.

These are only random examples of the varied kinds of activities being expanded and intensified through Federal, State, and local channels of support. These are things we can do and have, as a nation, decided we must do. You are likewise moving through historic times in your countries, as you consider your own educational needs and your response to them.

I have not dwelt at this length on our experience in these recent years to ask your commendation. I have done so primarily because I believe there are important additional steps to be taken that are dependent on what each country does within its borders. These are steps which infuse a larger international dimension into education. One is the extent to which we seek to know more about other countries as a part of our own educational development. The second is the ex-

tent to which we develop cooperative educational relationships with other countries as a part of our own foreign relations. These are relatively new dimensions, which are now demanding our closer attention.

One of the events in education in our country in the last year was President Johnson's speech at the Smithsonian Institution in September before scholars of 80 nations.² "... learning," he said, "is basic to our hopes It is the taproot which gives sustaining life to all of our purposes. And whatever we seek to do to wage the war on poverty, to set new goals for health and happiness, to curb crime, or try to bring beauty to our cities and our countryside—all of these, and more, depend on education."

But he also gave special emphasis to the important idea that learning respects no geographic boundaries. Founded "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men," the Smithsonian had become the first institution in the United States to promote scientific and scholarly exchange with all the nations of the world. In his address the President asked for recommendations for a broad and long-range plan of worldwide educational endeavor.

Only last week in his state of the Union message³ the President said he would propose to the Congress the International Education Act of 1966—to carry out the participation of our country in the international educational proposals he outlined at the Smithsonian.

A Time for New Initiatives

We in this Council can point to many constructive and useful activities in international education in the 18 years since the IACC was established. I know we hold in respect the efforts of those who have brought us to this day. Over the years the Pan American Union and the Cultural Action Committee have been actively furthering the programs the Council has recommended. But what is most significant is that their work

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

has prepared the way for even more useful undertakings. And I believe the time is now right for new initiatives. In planning such initiatives the Council would not engage in functions already being performed in the OAS. There are roles in inter-American cultural relations which the IACC is uniquely qualified to fill.

The ministers' conference at Bogotá in 1963 made a memorable declaration that I believe can help to point the way for us. It said in part:

1. That the full expression of the cultural personality of every people is an irreplaceable and inalienable part of the common heritage of humanity.

2. That, fundamentally, education has as its purpose the full self-realization of men, in an atmosphere of freedom, of justice, and of peace.

These declarations suggest the kinds of concerns to which I believe this Council should give its increasing attention. They are fundamental concerns. They root in the cultural diversity of peoples, in their own individual, creative expressions of this diversity. And they root in the great purpose of education, to help men achieve full self-realization.

We need to be concerned not only that men have special skills and abilities they can put to effective use in tasks of national growth and progress. We need also to be concerned that they have opportunities for spiritual and cultural enrichment. For the cultural life of a country depends on the capacities, imagination, and insights of its people. So, too, does the ability of a country to sustain productive and beneficial cultural relations with other countries. I am, therefore, suggesting the importance of ministering to the spirits of men, as well as to the needs of their minds and bodies to do the world's work. Our efforts in educational and cultural fields should have in view the many-sidedness of man, the many-sidedness of poor men as well as of the well-to-do.

I believe that one of the most fundamental needs to which the Council can address itself

Intercultural Understanding Among the Americas

Message of President Johnson¹

I have a special pleasure in welcoming to Washington the delegates to the Fourth Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council.

Your Council—as the agency through which the Organization of American States directs its efforts in educational, scientific and cultural fields—symbolizes the patient and painstaking pursuit of the conditions of durable peace which we all seek. This search for peace is no less significant by being relatively unseen and unheard in a world in which men talk more loudly of issues that seem to divide them than they do of common interests that can unite them.

I am confident your meeting can have a significance beyond the days of your deliberations. Though you build quietly, you build no less firmly the sure foundations of societies in which free men can truly know and enjoy the possibilities of cultural interchange in this hemisphere.

We in our country stand in need of greater knowledge and understanding of the old and honored cultures to the south of us; and we likewise stand in readiness to help those in the other American Republics who wish to understand us better by learning more about our cultural growth and aspirations. In efforts our governments are making to realize the goals of the Alliance for Progress, the United States seeks to encourage greater emphasis on bringing about better social and educational opportunities for all our growing populations.

I wish for your deliberations the full success they deserve in planning ways to closer intercultural understanding among the Americas.

¹ Read at the opening session of the fourth meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council at Washington on Jan. 18 (White House press release).

is that for a broader and deeper and continuing dialog between our peoples. I do not have in mind conferences and meetings alone, though they can help to organize the flow of ideas back and forth. The enlarging discourse of which I speak would extend over a very broad range of fields of interest of all our peoples. It would not always need to

be on the practical level, dealing with action items. There can be a "hidden agenda" on which men may find, perhaps to their surprise, that hitherto undisclosed values and interests put them on the same wavelengths with other men of other countries. Such a discovery—a discovery that scholars and artists can make—is often a prelude to a more responsive and meaningful discourse between nations on practical themes.

We especially need to find ways of encouraging an expanded and more disciplined discourse among intellectuals. More than most other groups, intellectuals have the power to create, dignify, inflate, criticize, moderate, or puncture abstractions and stereotypes.

As a Council it could be our role to stimulate and encourage a real proliferation of present points of contact and communication—throughout the educational, scientific, and cultural sectors of our peoples. I believe the IACC has a great potential to be realized as a forum for more direct and rigorous dialog, at the highest intellectual level, on the problems of civilized man in this hemisphere, and to foster a widening scope of useful discussion in many fields and by a broad range of participants.

An enlarged undertaking of this kind would be consonant with the role contemplated for the Council in the Charter of the OAS and in the statutes of the IACC. And it would be consistent with other steps that can be taken to give the IACC a more dynamic function. These steps would involve the identifying of major obstacles which have hindered the full flowering of inter-American educational and cultural relations and would promote activities designed to overcome these obstacles.

We can encourage, for example, closer relations between the educational systems of the various countries. Our professors and teachers can share more fully in the knowledge of innovations and new techniques and in the enriching experiences of teaching and learning in other countries. A fundamental element in maintaining national sovereignty is maintaining control of the sovereignty of

one's educational system. Countries ought, therefore, to do their educational planning for themselves. But there is room here for the kind of close and continuing collaboration that can make for shared transnational interests, common perspectives, a common fund of information and ideas, and a practical system of mutual dependence. On our side, the need to know more about Latin American people and their cultures—and our desire to know more—have led many of our schools and universities to strengthen the teaching of languages and cultures of our hemisphere and to begin doing so at an earlier stage in the educational process.

The Council's program should, I believe, include new or intensified efforts toward goals such as the following:

1. Expanded and improved teaching of the relevant foreign languages in national educational systems.
2. Introduction into national curricula of more courses of study in the history and culture of the nations of the hemisphere.
3. Expansion of inter-American interuniversity exchange relationships.
4. Further development of networks of communication between scholars, artists, and other intellectual and professional people through the strengthening of associations of people within various disciplines.
5. Greater contribution by the private sectors of member nations to educational and cultural exchange, or the fostering of such philanthropic activity where it is now minimal.
6. Renewed stimulation of efforts in each country to guard the basic cultural and spiritual values of the hemisphere. This function goes beyond the preservation of historic monuments and seeks to insure that modernization, industrialization, and social and economic development do not erode the cultural and spiritual values that animate the nations of the Americas.

This Council can do much to assist the forward movement these times are relentlessly developing. And the growing momentum itself can help to broaden the base of support for international educational and cul-

tural activities. For the breadth of the effort requires comparable breadth of support—not just by government agencies, by multi-lateral organizations, or by international banks. This support must also come from the people themselves and their own institutions.

I believe that President Johnson's initiative at the Smithsonian Institution will be remembered for the historic doctrine that international education has now come to occupy a central role in international affairs, a role of direct concern to all of us, officials and citizens alike. International education is not simply a cause to be espoused. It is now a fundamental and overwhelming fact of contemporary life.

In this great context this Council convenes today. These times give us new opportunities. And they give us more effective means through which we can help to hasten the coming of conditions for the good life for more of mankind. This, I need hardly remind you, is a goal of which philosophers have long written and for which men of all walks of life have long struggled. But our reach toward the goal is growing, and our commitment to move toward this goal must engage us all.

United States and Canada Sign Air Transport Agreement

The Department of State announced on January 17 (press release 11) that representatives of the Governments of the United States and Canada had that day signed a new air transport agreement at Ottawa.¹

The agreement was signed on behalf of the United States by Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth and on behalf of Canada by

¹ For text of a joint statement released by the White House at Austin, Tex., on Dec. 31, announcing an agreement in principle, see BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 140.

Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and J. W. Pickersgill, Minister of Transport.

U.S. Agency Preparing Claims Relating to Gut Dam

Press release 13 dated January 20

The Department of State has established the United States Agency, Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal United States and Canada, for the purpose of submitting to arbitration claims of American citizens for damages relating to the construction and maintenance by the Government of Canada of Gut Dam in the St. Lawrence River. The Tribunal will be established pursuant to the treaty between the United States and Canada, signed March 25, 1965,¹ once this treaty is brought into force by being ratified by both Governments.

Considerable property damage from flooding and erosion occurred in the Great Lakes region in 1951 and 1952, when water levels were exceptionally high. Property owners on Lake Ontario asserted that the high water levels were at least partially caused by Gut Dam, which had been constructed by the Government of Canada in the St. Lawrence River near Galops Island in 1903 and removed, in conjunction with the development of the St. Lawrence Seaway, in 1953.

The United States Agency is presently receiving and preparing claims for submission to the Tribunal. Ernest L. Kerley has been designated the United States Agent; Carl F. Goodman has been designated the Assistant United States Agent. Any claimant wishing to correspond regarding claims should address the United States Agent, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 643.

AID Report for Fiscal 1965 Transmitted to Congress

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated January 15, for release January 17

The President on January 17 transmitted to the Congress the annual report on the Foreign Assistance Program for fiscal year 1965.¹

The report showed the United States committed a total of \$3.5 billion for mutual defense and development programs during the fiscal year. Two-thirds of the total—\$2,178 million—was for economic assistance programs administered by the Agency for International Development. The balance, administered by the Department of Defense, was for military assistance and totaled \$1,325 million.

The report said Foreign Assistance Act commitments were the lowest since fiscal year 1961.

Nearly 90 percent of the AID economic assistance total went to just 25 countries, although 77 countries received some kind of AID assistance during the year. Four countries—Viet-Nam, Laos, Korea, and Jordan—accounted for 80 percent of AID supporting assistance during the year. Seven countries—Brazil, Chile, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey—accounted for 80 percent of AID development loans.

The report noted that despite increased demands for supporting assistance in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic during the year, more than 75 percent of AID

programs worldwide provided technical and capital help for long-term development and eventual self-support.

The report noted that AID programs had been brought to a close in five additional countries during the year. No new commitments were made during fiscal 1965 for Greece, Iraq, Syria, or Southern Rhodesia, and the AID mission to the Republic of China on Taiwan was closed June 30, 1965, as that nation achieved self-support.

The report said substantially increased amounts of military assistance were allocated during the year to Southeast Asia because of increased Communist pressure on South Viet-Nam and its free-world neighbors.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

The Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance Program of the United States for fiscal year 1965, which I here transmit, shows what Americans have done during the past twelve months to help other people help themselves.

The record of these months offers new testimony to our continuing conviction that our own peace and prosperity here at home depends on continued progress toward a better life for people everywhere.

In pursuit of that goal, we have, during this past year, placed new emphasis on the basic problem of securing more food for the world's population.

We have agreed to extend technical assistance to countries asking for help on population programs. At the same time, our overseas missions have been directed to give priority to projects for achieving better agriculture. Additional resources of our

¹ The 77-page report is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (30 cents).

great universities have been applied to rural development efforts abroad, and we have moved to increase the nutritional value of food shipped overseas for children.

During these past twelve months we have also:

- Begun to make education a more vital part of our assistance to other nations. Today, 70 American universities are engaged in the development of 39 Asian, African and Latin American countries through this program.

- Given our full support to development of a new life for the people of Southeast Asia through a regional development program—a true and hopeful alternative to profitless aggression. We have made progress toward the establishment of an Asian Development Bank, and accelerated plans for development of the critical Mekong River Basin.

The twelve months covered by this report also reflect our progress toward making our aid programs both more realistic, and more efficient. For example:

- Foreign assistance has become a smaller factor in our balance of payments. In fiscal year 1965, more than 80 cents of every AID dollar was spent for the purchase of American goods and services. American products and skills went overseas as aid; most of the dollars which paid for them stayed in this country.

- Foreign aid has become a smaller burden on our resources. The \$3.5 billion committed for military and economic assistance in fiscal year 1965 represented 3.5 percent of the Federal budget and one-half of one percent of the U.S. gross national product.

At the height of the Marshall Plan, in comparison, foreign aid accounted for more than 11 percent of the Federal budget and nearly 2 percent of our gross national product.

Perhaps the most important single change

in our AID programs has been the shift from simply helping other countries stay afloat to helping them become self-supporting, so that our assistance will no longer be needed.

Three-fourths of our AID program in fiscal year 1965 was devoted to development assistance: programs of technical and capital assistance in agriculture, industry, health and education that strengthen the ability of other nations to use their own resources.

Finally, private participation in AID programs is at an all-time high. Through contracts with American universities, business firms, labor unions, cooperatives, and other private groups, AID has sharply increased the involvement of non-governmental resources in international development.

Two of every five AID-financed technicians in the field today are not Federal employees, but experts from private American institutions.

There is much in the less-developed world that causes us deep concern today: enmity between neighbor nations that threatens the hard-won gains of years of development effort; reluctance to move rapidly on needed internal reforms; political unrest that delays constructive programs to help the people; an uncertain race between food supplies and population.

We are right to be concerned for the present. But we are also right to be hopeful for the future. In this report are recorded some of the solid, human achievements on which our future hopes are based.

Whether it provides strength for threatened peoples like those in Southeast Asia, or support for the self-help of millions on the move in Latin America, in Africa, in the Near East and South Asia, our foreign assistance program remains an investment of critical and promising importance to our own national future.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

JANUARY 1966

Security Council Again Extends U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus

*Statement by James M. Nabrit, Jr.*¹

Once again, Mr. President, this Council meets to consider the extension of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. We meet in the wake of the debate on Cyprus in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

In that debate my delegation, in commenting on the magnificent job which UNFICYP has done in carrying out its mandate, cited the efforts of Ambassador [Carlos Alfredo] Bernardes and General [K.S.] Thimayya in the dangerous Famagusta episode as one more example of their skill and dedication. That recent flareup in Famagusta points up the need to keep the U.N. Force in Cyprus.

In emphasizing the imperative necessity for the extension of the U.N. Force in Cyprus, however, my delegation spoke of the grave concern over the financial problems with which the Secretary-General deals in some detail in the report that he has placed before us.² With your permission, Mr. President, I will repeat what Ambassador [Charles W.] Yost said on this subject in the Political Committee of the present Assembly on December 13.

If essential funds are not forthcoming, this operation simply cannot continue. If it should be interrupted or reduced to a point at which it is no longer effective, the United Nations would have suffered a major setback. There would be the gravest risk that the bloody events of late 1963 and early 1964 would be reenacted and the United Nations would have failed in a major peacekeeping responsibility. There-

fore, to those who have already given to this operation, I would join the Secretary-General in asking that they not withhold even greater support at this critical hour. To those countries who have not yet contributed, I particularly appeal for tangible support of the United Nations in its mission of peace and stability. To the parties directly concerned in the Cyprus problem who are the chief beneficiaries of UNFICYP's efforts, I would direct an especially urgent appeal for them to do much more.

I urge this Council here today to go on record in a strong appeal in support of the Secretary-General's request for additional contributions for UNFICYP from all U.N. members.

Mr. President, serious as the financial problem is, I do not think that we would be wise to delay a decision on a further extension of the Force. My delegation, along with several others, has been actively engaged during the past weeks in attempts to supplement the efforts of the Secretary-General to stimulate additional contributions. We will continue those efforts. As we indicated in the Assembly, my Government is prepared to make an additional contribution toward the current financial deficit, provided such contributions are also received from a substantial number of other states. The United States will also continue its financial support of the U.N. operation in Cyprus if the Council, as we believe it should, decides to extend that operation.

Mr. President, in the First Committee of the General Assembly on December 13, my delegation also stated:

The world community is entitled to expect that, when a dispute is brought before the United Nations and the United Nations acts to keep that dispute within bounds and to promote a climate conducive to negotiations, the parties involved will feel an obligation to bring the dispute promptly to a close.

It was almost a year ago that we said in this Council that the time for sterile recrimi-

¹ Made in the Security Council on Dec. 17 (U.S./U.N. press release 4761). Mr. Nabrit is Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

² U.N. doc. S/7001.

nation, for clinging to rigid positions, had passed. The parties owe it to the world community and to those who have actively supported the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations to be about the work of solving the dispute. I repeat that advice here today with the utmost seriousness.

An accommodation does not require compromise of principle. What is required, and what appears to date to have been lacking, is a sense of urgency and a will to conciliation. The Secretary-General's report underscores the absence of such a will. It is the duty of this Council, Mr. President, to carry home to the parties the message that the United Nations expects them to move forward toward a resolution of their differences and to do so with all dispatch.

In this connection my delegation looks with favor on the constructive appeal to the parties made by our distinguished colleague, the representative of the Netherlands, to enter into negotiations looking to an early solution of the dispute and requests the Secretary-General to give every assistance in facilitating such negotiations and to reactivate the mediation effort, which has been in abeyance these past several months. We recognize that the role of the "third man" in a dispute as complex and deeply rooted as that with which we are dealing is an unenviable one, and we pay tribute to the dedication with which the late Ambassador [Sakari] Tuomioja and his distinguished successor Señor Galo Plaza pursued their efforts. A resumption of the mediation effort need not, in our view, exclude direct diplomatic contact among the parties concerned. What is needed, as I emphasized earlier, is a breaking of the ice, the stimulation of a disposition by the parties to look for areas on which agreement may be possible and to progressively narrow the differences until the shape of a settlement will become apparent.

My delegation has an open mind on the question of whether the U.N. Force should be extended for 3 months, as stated in the draft resolution just circulated,³ or for 6 months, as suggested in the Secretary-Gen-

eral's report. We understand and share the misgivings which we know are in the mind of the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, and indeed of other delegations, concerning the indefinite continuation of the U.N. operation in the absence of clear progress toward an agreed solution. We note that the Secretary-General in his report refers to the danger that an overreliance by the parties on the United Nations to prevent resort to armed force and to maintain the *status quo* may reduce the sense of urgency felt by the parties in coming realistically to grips with the underlying political issues and endeavoring to resolve them.

Mr. President, my delegation welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to make a further cut of 740 men in the strength of UNFICYP. We welcome this announcement particularly in view of the acute deficit in UNFICYP financing. We note that, in the judgment of the Force Commander, such a reduction can safely be made without impairing the effectiveness of the Force or changing its mandate. I hope that the Secretary-General will continue to keep the question of UNFICYP strength under review, with the view to further reductions as they may become possible.

To conclude, Mr. President, my delegation supports the extension of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and appeals to all member states to contribute to the maintenance of that Force. We will support also a clear call upon the parties concerned to recognize their responsibility to bring this dispute to a peaceful end. To this end we urge the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties, to reactivate the mediation effort. For all too long Cyprus has been an island of crisis. The issues in contention can be resolved peacefully; they must be resolved peacefully.⁴

³ U.N. doc. S/7024.

⁴ In a resolution (S/RES/219(1965) (S/7024)) unanimously adopted on Dec. 17, the Security Council "extended once again the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force . . . for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1966."

United States Announces Pledge for Palestine Refugees

*Statement by Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

In response to the resolution ² adopted by the General Assembly on the 15th of December, which extended the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees for another 3 years, it gives me pleasure, on behalf of the United States Government, to pledge \$22.9 million to the agency for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966. As in the past, part of this contribution will consist of the foodstuffs which the agency requires.

This contribution of nearly \$23 million is a concrete demonstration of the United States Government's continuing and sincere concern for the welfare of the refugees. The United States has been the main financial supporter of UNRWA over the years, and this latest pledge brings our total contribution to more than \$375 million. While we intend to continue our financial support for this worthy cause, we believe, as we have said in the past, that the United States bears a disproportionately large share of the costs of the agency. We believe that the community of nations as a whole should manifest an equal degree of concern for the plight of the refugees and that this concern should be reflected in financial support.

During the course of the discussion of the UNRWA item in the committee, I repeatedly emphasized my Government's concern that the agency's limited resources should go to the truly needy. In this regard we have expressed our hope for rapid progress on rectification of the relief rolls. We would hope that any reductions in the agency's expenditures which might be necessitated by its financial difficulties would not be at the expense of the refugee education program,

the importance of which my Government has always emphasized.

The contribution of the United States, as in the past, will be available only to the extent that it does not exceed 70 percent of the total governmental contributions. We again urge the governments directly concerned with the refugee problem to assume a greater role in seeking broader support for the agency. We are also convinced there are many countries whose interest in the stability of the Middle East should make them promising sources of more generous help.

May I conclude by expressing the appreciation of the United States Government for the work being done by the Commissioner General and his staff. We fully recognize the difficulties they encounter in fulfilling their tasks, many of which result from the financial problems which the agency is facing. We would hope that generous contributions on the part of many nations, that is, more nations than in the past, will provide significant help in alleviating these difficulties.

United Nations Adopts Convention on Racial Discrimination

Following are statements made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) and in plenary session by U.S. Representatives Arthur J. Goldberg and Frances E. Willis in explanation of the U.S. vote on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

STATEMENT BY MR. GOLDBERG, COMMITTEE III, DECEMBER 14

U.S. delegation press release 4752

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to join the members of the Third Committee at a significant juncture in the history of the United Nations and in the search for world law and order. We may one day solve the

¹ Made on Dec. 20 at the pledging conference on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (U.S./U.N. press release 4769/Corr. 1).

² U.N. doc. A/RES/2052 (XX).

many and complex political problems that now make the peace so vulnerable, but solving them will not lead to a community of nations safe from "the scourge of war" unless we simultaneously root out and eliminate all instances of inequality and man's inhumanity to man.

The adoption by this committee of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,¹ therefore, goes to the core of so much of the turmoil and injustice that still marks the world of the 20th century. As one who has devoted a large part of his life to the fight against discrimination, it is a matter of deep personal significance and satisfaction to me that I may speak to you about matters so close to the hearts of all of us in this room.

I would, at the same time, like to explain the vote of the United States delegation and tell you of our interpretation and reaction to certain of the convention's provisions.

It is particularly appropriate that the convention has been adopted at a time when we mark the 17th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That declaration was a first step by the United Nations to give voice and purpose to its basic premise that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."

But this organization well knew that, in spite of the revolutionary concept of the Universal Declaration, it could not stop with mere recognition of noble aspirations and that it must lend purpose and force to the attainment of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of every person on this earth. This is precisely what the committee has now done in adopting this convention.

It is, moreover, a fateful service to the entire cause of human freedom that this convention synthesizes, as it does for the most part, the views held by the great majority of member states of this United Nations concerning the evil nature of racial discrimination and those meaningful meas-

ures which will be most effective in realizing what we hope and trust will be its total elimination from our world.

In the long run, any work that is to be lasting demands the good faith of all who participate in it. So it will be with the work of the states parties to this convention, and all pious statements and declarations of intent sounded in this chamber, no matter how laudable, will not lessen the practice of discrimination by one hour unless what we say is backed, not with more words in our own lands, but with realistic action in keeping with the spirit of our convention.

Indeed, I would say the time has long passed for mere protestations about how much we loathe discrimination. The test of our loathing will be the speed and effectiveness with which each and every nation turns up the lights in its own house and thereby forever ends the darkness in which discrimination breeds and dwells.

Definition of "Racial Discrimination"

Mr. Chairman, you will forgive me if I take but a few brief moments to examine the highlights of this vital document which seeks to end the anguish that has tried men's souls in all of recorded history.

As the members of this committee have wisely specified, article 1 defines the term "racial discrimination" to include:

... any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

This definition is comprehensive. It will enable participating states to combat racial discrimination in its many and varied forms in all fields of public life. This definition applies throughout the convention to each of the various articles. It distinguishes clearly between activities in public life and those of a purely private nature.

Let me make one further comment on the definition of racial discrimination in this convention. The discussion and the votes in

¹ U.N. doc. A/C.3/L.1327.

the committee have made it inescapably clear that every form of racial discrimination is pernicious and that the convention's definition of racial discrimination quite clearly covers this illness of our human society in every one of its varied manifestations and guises even if not specifically mentioned by name.

The United States has voted for the convention as a whole because we agree with its constructive humanitarian objectives. The convention is a complex document. It contains some elements about which we have felt doubt, and it will therefore require further study, not only by my Government but also, I am sure, by many other governments.

Provisions of Article 4

Without discussing in detail the various elements of the convention, I would refer to one point about which the United States spoke earlier in the debate with regard to article 4. In voting for the convention as a whole, we understand that article 4 imposes no obligation on any parties to the convention inconsistent with their constitutional guarantees of freedom.

The opening paragraph of article 4 provides that in carrying out certain obligations of the convention, the states that are parties to it shall have "due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention. . . ."

As we know, these principles and rights include freedom of speech and of association. Nonetheless, we find that subparagraph (a) of article 4 holds that the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred shall be declared an offense punishable by law.

It is the view of the United States, therefore, that article 4 does not obligate a state to take action that would prohibit its citizens from freely and fully expressing their views on any subject no matter how obnoxious

they may be or whether they are in accord with government policy or not. We believe that a government should only act where speech is associated with, or threatens imminently to lead to, action against which the public has a right to be protected. Our Supreme Court, in *Yates v. United States*, emphasizes "the distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action." In our view, therefore, a state should act under the terms of article 4 only if the dissemination of obnoxious ideas is accompanied by, or threatens imminently to promote, the illegal act of racial discrimination.

Under our system of government, moreover, there must be an imminent danger of illegal action before speech becomes unlawful. Justice Brandeis stated the reason for this succinctly:

If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.

The same considerations apply to our interpretation of the obligations in subparagraph (b) of article 4. In accordance with the right to freedom of speech and freedom of association, it is our view that organizations cannot be declared illegal if they merely attempt to win acceptance of their beliefs by speech alone. However, if such organizations go beyond advocacy of their views and engage, or attempt to engage, in the illegal act of racial discrimination itself, they come within the purview of the convention.

Let me urge the members of the committee to consider the role that freedom of speech and freedom of association has played—and is playing—in the fight to eliminate racial discrimination. In the United States, for example, a large share of the credit for the adoption of civil rights and voting rights bills in the past 2 years must go to private organizations that exercised their right to freedom of speech and association in the expression of their views.

It is true, of course, that their views were entirely in accord with national policy, but there were local attempts to interfere with the activities of those espousing them. On such occasions, the Supreme Court consistently upheld the right of groups and individuals to freedom of speech and freedom of association.

The Court, I should note, has also upheld the right of other organizations and individuals to express views that do not reflect national policy. Such protection, Mr. Chairman, regardless of viewpoint, is the great strength of the American system. The free trade of ideas, whether we like them or not, is the heart of our overall freedom.

Let me read here some words once written on the subject by one of America's great jurists, Oliver Wendell Holmes:

If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises.

But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution.

The freedom of speech guaranteed to every American by our Bill of Rights is among our most precious national rights and possessions. The Bill of Rights marks its 174th anniversary this week, and I can but hope that Americans will be guarding it as jealously 174 years from now as they have up to now, for it is the matrix within which all our other rights flourish.

Mr. Chairman, we need not weaken freedom of speech to defeat racial discrimination. Quite the contrary. To allow the expression of obnoxious ideas is one of the most

effective ways to assure their ultimate rejection. They cannot stand the light of day or the study of an enlightened citizenry, and when they are exposed to searching criticism, they will wither and fade away.

One brief word about article 15. We have previously explained our objections to this article. Here I would only reiterate our objection to the attempt made in this article to extend the provisions of this convention to territories of states not parties to it.

Implementation Articles

It is when we turn to the implementation articles of the convention that we believe the committee has made a truly notable stride forward. These articles clearly establish the convention's pioneering quality. It is the first time the United Nations has taken such wide-ranging action in a human rights endeavor.

The implementation provisions make this convention more than just a restatement of pious hopes and generally laudable principles. They provide an historic procedure whereby a state that is party to this convention can be called to account for failure to carry out its obligations. We believe that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and any conciliation commission that may be established will contribute effectively to the goals of this convention.

The world owes the Third Committee its deep thanks and appreciation for the practical and effective action it has taken to serve the future by attempting to improve the quality of our contemporary way of life.

Mr. Chairman, as I said at the outset, a companion goal of the U.N.'s search for peace must be the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. What we do from this day on to assure the dignity of man the individual will, in the end, be the final measure of our success or our failure in this search.

We must do our work, therefore, not only here in the councils of the U.N. or in the halls of our own governments; we must also do it—in the words of Eleanor Roosevelt—

"in small places close to home, so close and so small they cannot be seen on any map of the world . . . they are the world of the individual person."

It is this world that must be the concern of our common humanity as reflected in this convention, and we must make every day not only a declaration of our belief in human rights but one of action and implementation until racial discrimination is in fact eliminated from our earth.

**STATEMENT BY MISS WILLIS,
PLENARY SESSION, DECEMBER 21**

U.S. delegation press release 4775

It is a source of deep satisfaction to the United States delegation that the Third Committee under the skillful and patient leadership of its able chairman successfully persisted in the arduous task of drafting the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The adoption of this convention will certainly be one of the main achievements of this session. All delegations which worked hard to achieve this result are to be congratulated.

The United States voted for the convention as a whole because we agree with its constructive humanitarian objectives. It is more than a statement of lofty ideals. It provides machinery for implementation which goes well beyond any previous human rights instrument negotiated in the United Nations. It is inevitably a complex document and will require careful study, not only by my Government but also I am sure by many other governments.

It is not appropriate here to recapitulate even the substance of statements made by the United States delegate in the Third Committee on various articles. For the record, however, here in this Assembly I wish to state that the United States understands article 4 of the convention as imposing no obligation on any party to take measures which are not fully consistent with its con-

stitutional guarantees of freedom, including freedom of speech and association. This interpretation is entirely consistent with the opening paragraph of article 4 of the convention itself, which provides that in carrying out certain obligations of the convention, states parties shall have "due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention." Article 5 in turn lists among its rights to be guaranteed without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin the right of freedom of opinion and of expression.

Let me now turn very briefly to the question of the reservations article. My delegation believes that it would have been better for this convention not to contain an article on reservations. The absence of such an article need not have impaired the effectiveness of the convention. The omission of an article on reservations would, however, have made possible the acceptance by a greater number of states, thereby contributing to the eradication of racial discrimination over a wider area. We think it would have been preferable in this convention, if there had to be an article on reservations, for it to provide for a judicial decision on the question of whether a reservation made by a state was or was not compatible with the object and purpose of the convention.

What I have said explains why we abstained from voting on the article contained in document A/L.479.

Notwithstanding our difficulties with some aspects of the text, we welcome the adoption of this convention by the General Assembly. We hope that it will help in bringing to an end the evils of racial discrimination, for racial discrimination has no place in the world which the peoples of the United Nations are seeking to build.²

² The U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 21 adopted A/RES/2106(XX), the draft convention recommended by Committee III (A/C.3/L. 1327), with one amendment (A/L. 479).

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Reports by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Dominican Republic. S/7025, December 17, 1965, and Add. 1, December 18, 1965; S/7032, December 20, 1965, and Add. 1-8, December 22, 1965-January 17, 1966.

Letter dated December 21 from the representative of Pakistan, transmitting a copy of his Government's protest note regarding India's denial of a "fair share of the waters of the eastern rivers" to Pakistan. S/7037. December 21, 1965.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan. S/6710/Add. 13-16, December 24, 1965-January 15, 1966.

Letter from the representative of India denying Pakistan allegations of mistreatment of Pakistan nationals interned by India. S/7028, December 18, 1965.

Letters from the representative of India concerning violations of the cease-fire by Pakistan. S/7027, December 18, 1965; S/7029, December 18, 1965; S/7033, December 21, 1965.

Letters from the representative of Pakistan concerning violations of the cease-fire by India. S/7035, December 21, 1965; S/7036, December 21, 1965; S/7078, January 11, 1966; S/7079, January 11, 1966.

Letter dated December 28, 1965, from the representative of Thailand denying Cambodia's charge that Thai police or military units were involved in a border incident on November 16. S/7047. December 29, 1965.

Letters from various countries concerning actions taken in compliance with the Security Council resolution on Southern Rhodesia: Belgium S/7052; Canada, S/7082; Byelorussian S.S.R., S/7053; Iraq, S/7056; Israel, S/7083; Italy, S/7048; Luxembourg, S/7055; Netherlands, S/7046; Norway, S/7008; Polish People's Republic, S/7087; Sweden, S/7010; U.S.S.R., S/7068; United Kingdom, S/7021; United States, S/7088.

Exchange of letters between the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus and the Secretary-General regarding the U.N. Mediator's resignation. S/7054. December 31, 1965.

Economic and Social Council

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting a report of the Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, together with a summary of other relevant reports. E/4137. December 23, 1965. 88 pp.

Water Desalination. Report by the Secretary-General on developments in 1965. E/4142. January 12, 1966. 18 pp.

Development of Non-Agricultural Resources. Report by the Secretary-General. E/4132 (Summary). January 17, 1966. 5 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Accession deposited: El Salvador, December 9, 1965.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.²

Acceptances received: Greece, December 1, 1965; New Zealand, November 22, 1965; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, December 16, 1965.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Israel (with a reservation), November 11, 1965.

BILATERAL

Ethiopia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a United States naval medical research unit in Ethiopia. Signed at Addis Ababa December 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965.

Greece

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 17, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5695, 5795). Effected by exchange of notes at Athens January 13, 1966. Entered into force January 13, 1966.

Japan

Agreement amending and extending the arrangement of August 27, 1963, as amended (TIAS 5408, 5804), concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 14, 1966. Entered into force January 14, 1966.

Liberia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Monrovia January 6, 1966. Entered into force January 6, 1966.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Luxembourg

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg December 21 and 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 5814), concerning the succession of Somali Republic to the technical cooperation agreement of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3150, 4392), between the United States and Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio December 16, 1965, and January 2 and 5, 1966. Entered into force January 5, 1966.

United Arab Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966.

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966.

Viet-Nam

Agreement relating to television broadcasting in Viet-Nam. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon January 3, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Africa: Pattern of Sovereignty. The sixth in a series of Geographic Bulletins describes the new states of Africa, explaining many of the politico-geographic factors which account for their existence and the evolution of their complex boundary patterns. Pub. 7994. 14 pp. 15¢.

Economic Aid. Agreement with China amending the agreement of July 3, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei August 11, 1965. Entered

into force August 11, 1965. Effective August 26, 1954. With related notes. TIAS 5888. 9 pp. 10¢.

Education—Educational Commission and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with France—Signed at Paris May 7, 1965. Entered into force May 28, 1965. TIAS 5889. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon October 14, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1965. TIAS 5891. 3 pp. 5¢.

Maritime Matters—Applicability of Liability Agreement of February 6, 1963, to Private Operation of N.S. Savannah. Agreement with the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Dated at The Hague September 8, 1965. Entered into force September 8, 1965. TIAS 5892. 3 pp. 5¢.

Parcel Post. Agreement and regulations of execution with the Philippines—Signed at Manila September 21, 1964, and at Washington November 12, 1964. Entered into force November 1, 1965. TIAS 5893. 24 pp. 15¢.

Aerial Mapping Program. Agreement with Brazil interpreting the agreement of June 2, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 22 and 28, 1965. Entered into force September 28, 1965. TIAS 5894. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi November 4, 1965. Entered into force November 4, 1965. TIAS 5895. 3 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Spain interpreting the agreement of January 29, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid October 11, 1965. Entered into force October 11, 1965. TIAS 5896. 5 pp. 5¢.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Mexico extending and amending the agreement of August 15, 1960, as extended and complemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mexico August 4, 1965. Entered into force provisionally August 4, 1965. With exchange of letters. TIAS 5897. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Chile—Signed at Santiago July 27, 1965. Entered into force September 23, 1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5898. 17 pp. 10¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá October 19 and 28, 1965. Entered into force November 28, 1965. TIAS 5899. 4 pp. 5¢.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Luxembourg. Exchange of notes—Dated at Luxembourg July 7 and 29, 1965. Entered into force July 29, 1965. TIAS 5900. 4 pp. 5¢.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kabul October 12, 1965. Entered into force October 12, 1965. Effective September 30, 1965. TIAS 5901. 3 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps. Agreement with St. Lucia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bridgetown, Barbados, October 19, 1965, and at Castries, St. Lucia, November 10, 1965. Entered into force November 10, 1965. TIAS 5902. 3 pp. 5¢.

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No.	Date	Subject
11	1/17	Signing of air transport agreement with Canada (rewrite).
12	1/17	Rusk-Ky communique (printed in BULLETIN of January 31).
13	1/20	Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal United States and Canada.
*14	1/21	U. Alexis Johnson: "Viet-Nam Today."
15	1/21	Rusk: news conference of January 21.

* Not printed.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Affairs

Excerpt From President Johnson's State of the Union Message

This pamphlet contains the foreign policy section of President Johnson's state of the Union message of January 12, 1966. It deals chiefly with the situation in Viet-Nam, U.S. objectives with regard to the Vietnamese people, and the unceasing search for a peaceful solution. The President outlines here, and pledges to continue, the five major lines of foreign policy that the United States has followed under its last four Presidents. The President's message includes recommendations concerning arms control, a more flexible East-West trade policy, foreign assistance, and a worldwide attack on the problems of hunger, disease, and ignorance.

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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1390



February 14, 1966

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President Announces Resumption of Bombing Against Military Targets in North Viet-Nam

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

For 37 days no bombs fell on North Viet-Nam. During that time, we have made a most intensive and determined effort to enlist the help and the support of all the world in order to persuade the government in Hanoi that peace is better than war, that talking is better than fighting, and that the road to peace is open.

Our effort has met with understanding and support throughout most of the world, but not in Hanoi and Peiping. From those two capitals have come only denunciation and rejection.

In these 37 days the efforts of our allies have been rebuffed. The efforts of neutral nations have come to nothing. We have sought, without success, to learn of any response to efforts made by the governments of Eastern Europe. There has been no answer to the enlightened efforts of the Vatican. Our own direct private approaches have all been in vain.

The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that was published 3 days ago. They persist in aggression. They insist on the surrender of South Viet-Nam to communism. It is, therefore, very plain that there is no readiness or willingness to talk, no readiness for peace in that regime today. And what is plain in words is also plain in acts. Throughout these 37 days, even at moments of truce, there has been continued violence

against the people of South Viet-Nam, against their Government, against their soldiers, and against our own American forces.

We do not regret the pause in the bombing. We yield to none in our determination to seek peace. We have given a full and decent respect to the opinions of those who thought that such a pause might give new hope for peace in the world.

Some said that 10 days might do it. Others said 20. Now, we have paused for twice the time suggested by some of those who urged it. And now the world knows more clearly than it has ever known before who it is that insists on aggression and who it is that works for peace.

The Vietnamese, American, and Allied troops that are engaged in South Viet-Nam, with increasing strength and increasing success, want peace, I'm sure, as much as any of us here at home. But while there is no peace, those men are entitled to the full support of American strength and American determination—and we will give them both.

As constitutional Commander in Chief, I have, as I must, given proper weight to the judgment of those—all of those—who have any responsibility for counseling with me or sharing with me the burdensome decisions that I am called upon to make: the distinguished Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, my national security adviser, and America's professional military men, represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These advisers tell me that if continued immunity is given to all that support North

¹ Broadcast to the Nation on television and radio on Jan. 31 (White House press release).

Viet-Nam aggression, the cost in lives—Vietnamese lives and American lives and Allied lives—will only be greatly increased.

In the light of the words and actions of the government in Hanoi for more than 37 days now, it is our clear duty to do what we can to limit these costs.

So on this Monday morning in Viet-Nam, at my direction, after complete and thorough consultation and agreement with the Government of South Viet-Nam, United States aircraft have resumed action in North Viet-Nam. They struck the lines of supply which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and the Government of South Viet-Nam.

Our airstrikes on North Viet-Nam from the beginning have been aimed at military targets and have been controlled with the greatest of care. Those who direct and supply the aggression really have no claim to immunity from military reply.

The end of the pause does not mean the

end of our own pursuit of peace. That pursuit will be as determined and as unremitting as the pressure of our military strength on the field of battle.

In our continuing pursuit of peace I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg at the United Nations to ask for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council. He will present a full report on the situation in Viet-Nam and a resolution which can open the way to the conference table. This report and this resolution will be responsive to the spirit of the renewed appeal of Pope Paul, and that appeal has our full sympathy.

I have asked Secretary Rusk to meet with the representatives of the press later this morning to give to the country and to the entire world a thorough and a comprehensive account of all of the diplomatic efforts conducted in these last 5 weeks in our continuing policy of peace and freedom for South Viet-Nam.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 31

Press release 22 dated January 31

Secretary Rusk: Earlier this morning President Johnson confirmed that U.S. aircraft have resumed action against the lines of communication which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and government of South Viet-Nam.

I wish to summarize for you the unprecedented diplomatic effort of the past 40 days—an effort aimed at peace—and the tragically negative response from Hanoi. To understand the full import of the past 40 days you must recall the months and years of unremitting effort by the United States and others to achieve peace in Southeast Asia.

We had no assurance at Christmas time that a suspension of the bombing of North Viet-Nam would move us closer to peace.

Hanoi had refused to come to the Security Council of the United Nations in August 1964, in response to an invitation initiated in the Council by the Soviet Union. A call by 17 nonaligned nations for “negotiations . . . without . . . preconditions”¹ had been harshly rejected by Hanoi, as was President Johnson’s call for “unconditional discussions” at Baltimore last April.² A Commonwealth committee had been rebuffed. The Secretary-General of the U.N. had not been permitted to visit Hanoi and Peiping. Suggestions by the President of India were denounced. The machinery of the Geneva conferences was paralyzed by Hanoi’s recalcitrance. Contacts with Hanoi and Peiping

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 611.

² *Ibid.*, p. 606.

had failed to disclose a serious interest in peace. A pause in the bombing last May had yielded only a polemical rejection.

Nevertheless, the President decided, on the advice of myself and his other senior advisers and in agreement with the Government of Viet-Nam, to extend the Christmas pause for a further period. He did so because of America's strong preference for peace in Southeast Asia, a desire which takes into full account the decades of suffering and violence inflicted upon the people of Viet-Nam. He did so because a number of governments, including a number of Communist governments, had insisted that a suspension of the bombing would create a situation in which the possibilities of peace could be greatly improved. He did so because there was unnecessary confusion at home and abroad about where the responsibility lies for the absence of peace—or even of discussions or negotiations about the possibility of peace.

Shortly after Christmas, therefore, we were in touch with all the governments of the world, more than 115 of them, as well as with His Holiness the Pope, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Six special Presidential envoys visited 34 capitals, and personal communications from the President went to the chiefs of government of many more.

Hanoi was informed at an early stage of the suspension of the bombing. They were told that no decision had been made regarding a resumption of bombing and that, if Hanoi would reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension. There was no ultimatum, in word or in fact, but rather an invitation to move toward peace. All governments were reminded of the far-reaching suggestions which the U.S.

had made about the possibilities of peace, suggestions which were summarized in the so-called 14 points.³ It was made clear that, as far as we were concerned, there could be a conference, less formal discussions, or private and tentative contacts through the most discreet channels.

We know that many governments, including Communist governments, were active during this period and that our own direct and indirect contacts were strongly reinforced from many capitals. We were in touch with most governments several times during this period.

It is with genuine regret that I must report that the response has been negative, harsh, unyielding. Channels which had been opened by us, one after the other, yielded no move toward peace. Throughout the period since Christmas, Hanoi and Peiping denounced our efforts toward peace with a continuing barrage of such epithets as "fraud," "trick," "deceit," "swindle," "hoax," "farce." The negative attitudes of Hanoi and the Liberation Front have been clarified in the last few days in an unmistakable fashion. Ho Chi Minh in letters addressed to a number of heads of state stated: "If the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the NFLSV as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Viet-Nam and engage in negotiations with it." In a statement released just yesterday, the Front itself said, "All negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Viet-Nam their troops and all kinds of war materials."

But they made clear their negative view by deeds as well as words throughout the period of suspension of bombing. Infiltrations of men and material from the North into South Viet-Nam continued at a high level. Acts of violence in South Viet-Nam itself continued with relatively minor fluctuations at virtually the same record high

³ See p. 225.

levels set in the last quarter of 1965. By these acts they made it entirely clear that their purpose remained what it has been from the beginning—namely, to take over South Viet-Nam by force.

It has been necessary, therefore, for us to meet our responsibilities to our commitments to South Viet-Nam and the South Vietnamese people. I joined with other senior advisers to the President to recommend to him that he resume the necessary military action to support the South Vietnamese and allied forces and to meet the aggression from the North.

This does not mean that, as far as we are concerned, the search for peace will stop. Far from it. The President told you this morning that the matter is being presented to the Security Council of the United Nations. I will add that the other processes of diplomacy will continue in full operation, publicly and privately, directly and indirectly, in order that any possibility of peace can be explored and tested.

It is possible that one of the obstacles to peace has been a failure on the part of Hanoi to understand that the United States will in fact meet its commitment. It is not easy for a democracy such as ours to prevent such a basic miscalculation on the part of a totalitarian regime. If they are relying upon a military victory in the South, they must abandon that hope. If they are relying on international opinion to divert the United States from its commitment, they must recognize that the world community does not support their aggression. If they are relying upon domestic differences among us to save their cause, they must understand that that will not occur. The way to shorten this war is to make it very clear to Hanoi that the course upon which they are embarked is futile and that, if they are prepared to sit down and talk like reasonable men, answers can be found which will relieve both themselves and their brothers in the South of the violence, of which there has been more than enough.

Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia

Press release 4 dated January 7

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U.S. believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia:¹

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet Nam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Viet Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Viet Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

¹ See also BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 114.

Taking the Viet-Nam Question to the U.N.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past Hanoi and the other Communists involved have shown no interest, rather disdain, for any U.N. role in settling this. Also there has been some concern that bringing it to the U.N.—some concern expressed by some officials, privately at least, that bringing it to the U.N. would inflame the issue and harden attitudes. What, in the light of that, do you expect to accomplish by going to the U.N. with the matter?

A. I think you gentlemen know that the principal concern about taking this matter to the United Nations for a full debate has been that debate should not get in the way of private explorations of the possibility of peace.

Now, we have had during the past 37 days the most intensive exploration of those possibilities through private as well as publicly known channels. Those have not yielded any result. We think, therefore, that the time has come to meet the requirements of article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and indeed of paragraph 1 of article IV of the Southeast Asia Treaty itself, to report this present situation to the Security Council, and to give the Security Council of the United Nations a chance to exercise its large responsibility for finding a peaceful solution to these conflicts in the various parts of the world.

In other words, the principal problem was, can quiet diplomacy proceed more effectively than can be achieved through public debate? Now, that quiet diplomacy has been tested fully in the past several weeks. It will not be abandoned. But, nevertheless, there is not the same obstacle to a full discussion in the Security Council as was apparent, say, 4 or 5 weeks ago.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a story from Tokyo indicates that the Prime Minister of Japan [Eisaku Sato] was advised in advance of the U.S. decision. To what extent were other nations, other allies, and the Communist powers themselves advised in advance?

A. During the past week or 10 days we have not only inquired of many other governments whether they had received any information pointing toward the possibility of a peaceful settlement, but we also advised them that in the absence of such an indication time was running out and that it would be necessary for us to take the necessary military decisions.

We have consulted with a considerable number of governments. I would prefer not to specify the particular capitals. But I think most of the governments of the world were aware that this period could not be protracted in the absence of some indication from the other side that there was an interest in peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of a number of Communist governments in addition to others—

A. Yes.

Q. —that were speaking up in favor of a longer pause or more time. Can you be more specific about the Communist governments?

A. Well, since diplomacy is not resigning at this point, I would prefer not to specify particular governments. But I did point out that, among the governments who told us that a pause might substantially improve the possibilities of peace, there were a number of Communist governments. Obviously those were in Eastern Europe. I could not say the same thing about, say, Peiping and Hanoi.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get straight on just what we are asking the United Nations to do, are we now formally placing the full Viet-Nam problem before the U.N.?

A. Secretary—Ambassador Goldberg will, in the course of the morning, send a letter to the Security Council asking for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in full. He will make a—he will report to the Security Council on the situation, and, as the President indicated, we will table a resolution pointing toward a peaceful settlement of this problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. The details of that will come out of New York. The letter to the Security Council will proceed this morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you contemplate any change in the tactics or nature of the bombing?

A. Well, I wouldn't want to speculate about the future as far as military operations are concerned. I think, from that point of view, we are approximately where we are—where we were—in December before the suspension occurred. The President this morning indicated that this is a matter which will be handled with care and that the effort will be made against military targets. But I would not want to elaborate about future policy on a matter involving military operations.

Informing the American People

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that your statement this morning answers congressional charges that you're keeping the facts from the American people?

A. Will you specify? I mean, give me a "for instance."

Q. I think it was Senator [Wayne] Morse who was on the air during the weekend with the specific charge—on "keeping the facts from the American people" is a direct quote.

A. I don't know of any situation in which the American people have been more fully informed, and I know of no problem in my experience in Washington since 1941 on which there has been more detailed discussion and consideration between the executive branch and the Congress than has been the case in this matter of South Viet-Nam.

I myself went to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I think 12 times during the past session, and in almost all of those the question of South Viet-Nam was discussed in great detail. So there is no significant element here that has been withheld.

What we have done in the interest of a responsible conduct of the public business and in the interest of keeping open the chan-

nels of communication with other governments and with the other side has been not to specify the details of time and place about contacts with particular capitals. That has not been done on our own initiative.

Once in a while some disclosure will occur, and we confirm or correct that disclosure. But it's important from the point of view of diplomacy that we have the freedom of action to establish contacts and to have channels open without having those channels destroyed by premature or unwise disclosure. But that is the only point that I know of in which we have not given all of the detailed facts to the general public.

Infiltration During Bombing Suspension

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your prepared statement that during the bombing suspension the infiltration and supplies from the North continued at a high level. There has been some background information provided during the month that it was proceeding at a higher level than it had when the bombing was going on. Do you have anything to support that?

A. Yes, we have a little résumé on that. If you will just give me a moment (looked through papers)—

In the first week of the pause, that is, in the period between Christmas and New Year's, the total incidents by the V.C. [Viet Cong] and the North Vietnamese elements in the South reached an alltime high, and, since that time, the weekly averages have been above the weekly averages for the final quarter of 1965.

In other words, we have not seen a reduction of activity in the South from which one could draw any conclusion that the other side is interested in peace or were moving toward peace on a *de facto* basis, even though they might not be willing to discuss it. So that there has been maintained a very high level of incident rate, particularly in the terrorist attacks. And that has been true throughout this period of the pause.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the decision to resume

the bombing, was greater weight given on the military side to that kind of buildup, or on the diplomatic side to the failure of response from them?

A. Well, all factors were taken into account. We do have a national responsibility, which is both political and military, to insure that our forces in the field are adequately supported and our commitments to South Viet-Nam and the South Vietnamese forces are met. We also have the problem of the possibility that Hanoi might be making a major miscalculation about the determination of the United States and its allies in this situation.

But I would say that the decisions taken by the President have been taken, both in terms of starting the pause and in terminating the pause, on the basis of full consideration of all the military and political factors which were involved.

Q. Mr. President (sic), back to Congress for a moment. Were any of the leaders of Congress actually advised that the bombing would be resumed yesterday?

A. Well, there was a full consultation of the leadership just a very few days ago, and this was discussed fully with them at that time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there a possibility that we might ask the Security Council to provide United Nations troops in Southeast Asia?

A. Well, the first requirement is to move this matter to a negotiation or to the conference table and to peace.

I think it rather unlikely that the United Nations would provide troops or forces until there has been some sort of understanding about peace and a cease-fire. In other words, I think it is unlikely that the Security Council would provide forces for the purpose of fighting in the present struggle.

Now, there could come a time, if the other side is willing, when the United Nations might play an extremely useful role in ob-

serving, safeguarding, watching, patrolling, insuring that agreements are, in fact, carried out. But I would think there are one or two steps that would have to be taken before that question would arise.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with all these other diplomatic contacts, has there been any effort to contact the Viet Cong themselves as distinct from Hanoi?

A. Well, the Liberation Front knows our views, and we know their views. I have said on many occasions that there is no problem of contact. The Viet Cong can be in regular contact with Saigon. There are others who are in contact with the Liberation Front. There is no failure of understanding through lack of contact, as far as the Front is concerned, or the respective points of view.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as I recall, one of the reasons the United States has been reluctant to take it to the Security Council was the feeling that the Soviet Union would be under compulsions to not act in a constructive way. Has there been any sign from the Soviet Union that they would not veto any resolution that would be put to them?

A. No; we have no indication as to the Soviet attitude as to this discussion in the Security Council. I think that we can expect that there will be a lively debate in the Security Council, and we shall see what is possible from the point of view of resolutions.

Contact With North Vietnamese Troops

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the fact that there has been no large-scale direct contact with North Vietnamese troops since, oh, the latter part of November?

A. Well, there are some ambiguities about that. There seems to have been some contact some time in December, and there are indications that at the present time there is very active contact with North Vietnamese forces there. We have not seen anything on the ground from which one could draw politi-

cal conclusions indicating that Hanoi was prepared to pull away, or hold its hand, or move toward peace in this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President mentioned the appeal of Pope Paul, who suggested arbitration by neutral nations. Do we look on this as one avenue the Security Council might have in this?

A. That is a possibility. The Security Council will undoubtedly consider that. We will ourselves call that to the attention of

the Security Council. It may be that this is one of the things which might come out of Security Council consideration.

I am not at all sure that His Holiness was talking in the most technical sense when he used the term "arbitration." But a role for neutral countries to explore the possibilities of peace would be entirely agreeable and welcome by the United States.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

A. Thank you.

Ambassador Goldberg Submits Viet-Nam Question to U.N. Security Council

Following are two letters of January 31 from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Roger Seydoux, President of the Security Council during January, together with texts of two statements made by Ambassador Goldberg in the Council on February 1.

REQUEST FOR MEETING

U.S./U.N. press release 4798

JANUARY 31, 1966

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

As you know, the United States Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva Accords of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations.

In President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General,¹ in my

letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council,² and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General,³ we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of United Nations members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance by its Government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24 and continued that suspension

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 16, 1965, p. 275.

² For text, see *ibid.*, p. 278.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 117.

for some thirty-seven days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness The Pope and to the Chiefs of State or Heads of Government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in fourteen points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General.

I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows:

That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

Subsequently, the President in his State of the Union Address on January 12⁴ reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these United States views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government.

Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead, there have been from Hanoi, and of course

from Peking as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain Heads of State which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations; on the contrary, he insisted on a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable.

Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts then in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness The Pope only two days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the United Nations confided to neutral nations might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question."

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

SUBMISSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION

U.S./U.N. press release 4799

Letter of Transmittal

JANUARY 31, 1966

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As a supplement to my letter to you of this date, requesting that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Viet Nam, I submit herewith a draft resolution which I request be circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

Text of Resolution *

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Viet Nam,

Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Noting that the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented,

Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honorable settlement of the conflict in Viet Nam,

Recognizing the right of all peoples, including those in Viet Nam, to self-determination,

1. *Calls for* immediate discussions without preconditions at _____ on _____ date, among the appropriate interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia,

2. *Recommends* that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervision,

3. *Offers* to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators,

4. *Calls on* all concerned to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution,

* U.N. doc. S/7106.

5. *Requests* the Secretary General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution.

FIRST STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 1

U.S./U.N. press release 4800

Mr. President [Akira Matsui, President of the Council for February]: In keeping with the wise words of counsel that you have just uttered, I would like to associate myself with your views in expressing appreciation for the outgoing members of the Council, for their great contribution to the work of the Council, which I, in particular as a newcomer to the Council, benefited from in great measure. And I should, likewise, now like to extend my cordial welcome to the distinguished representatives of the newly elected and augmented members of the Council. I know we will all benefit from their contribution to the Council's deliberations.

And, in particular, Mr. President, I would like to welcome you. Your great experience here as permanent representative of your country and your great experience in international affairs will, I am sure, facilitate our work and lead us toward the cause to which we are all devoted, the cause of peace and security which the charter imposes as a primary responsibility to the Security Council.

Mr. President, I have asked now because I think it plain that I have a duty to explain in some detail to the members of this Council the reasons the United States has proposed that the Security Council formally be seized with the problem of bringing about negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese situation. I wish to address myself at this point where the agenda is under consideration to the reasons which impelled us to take this step. I will, of course, with the leave of the Council speak at a greater length after the adoption of the agenda if this is the will of the Council on the background and the genesis of the war in Viet-Nam and my Government's view in respect to this grave and tragic problem.

Other members of the Council will undoubtedly wish to do likewise; and we hope members will agree that the Council's debate would greatly benefit by having the representatives of both the Republic of Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam present their views to the Council.

There is no more urgent task confronting the statesmen of the world and the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole than that of finding, first, a way to terminate the fighting in Viet-Nam and, second, a settlement which will bring enduring peace to the Vietnamese people. It is the undeniable urgency of this task, the failure of every other effort made to date to bring about negotiations over Viet-Nam, the primacy of the Security Council's responsibility—under the charter—for maintaining international peace and security, and our respect for the accumulated experience and wisdom represented on this Council which have impelled my Government to ask for this urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Our resort to the Security Council, despite what anybody may say or speculate about it, is, briefly and simply, further evidence of our resolve to settle this conflict peacefully, a resolve which stems from a deep and abiding belief that a negotiated settlement, rather than a military solution, is manifestly in the best interests of the Vietnamese people as a whole and all parties to the conflict, as well as to the entire international community. Our request that the Council meet and consider this problem signals not the end but a new dimension to the peace offensive we have been engaged in and which we are determined to continue. As President Johnson put it yesterday, our pressure for peace will be "as determined and as unrelenting as the pressure of our military strength on the field of battle."

Our role in Viet-Nam is now and it has been from the beginning based on the indisputable fact that North Viet-Nam has consciously and flagrantly violated the provisions of the Geneva accords—particularly article 19 of the agreement on the cessation

of hostilities, wherein North Viet-Nam was enjoined to insure that its territory would not be "used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

Despite this written pledge, North Viet-Nam, aided by Peiping, has led, equipped, and sustained the fighting in the South—and has sent tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of its army, into battle in Viet-Nam—for the purpose of imposing its will upon the people of South Viet-Nam by force.

The Search for Peace

While we have been and while we remain unflinching in our determination to resist this aggression, we have never lost sight of our hope for the need of a peaceful settlement, and this is our mission in the Council today.

I doubt if there is any parallel in recent history of the pressure for peace which my Government—with the advice and assistance of many welcome hands—has exerted over the past year.

Time and again the United States Government has itself sought and encouraged others to seek the formula which will move this tragic armed conflict to the conference table. We have made repeated appeals for whatever help the United Nations—collectively or individually, through any of its organs, including our distinguished Secretary-General—might be able to provide in bringing about unconditional discussions and negotiations for an acceptable formula to restore peace in Viet-Nam. Mr. President, I wish to pay particular tribute to the unremitting efforts of our distinguished Secretary-General to bring about the peace we all hope and seek to achieve.

We supported and encouraged the United Kingdom when it proposed to the Soviet Union that the two Governments, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference of 1954 and 1962, undertake to explore the possible basis of a Vietnamese settlement with all the Geneva conference countries. We wel-

came the mission which the United Kingdom Government entrusted to a very distinguished citizen of that country, its former Foreign Secretary, the Honorable Patrick Gordon Walker—that of visiting interested countries to explore the possible basis for a Vietnamese settlement.

On April 7, 1965, President Johnson made it unmistakably clear that the United States remained ready for unconditional discussions with all or some of the governments concerned with the Vietnamese conflict.⁶ The following day, we responded affirmatively to the appeal for “negotiations . . . without . . . preconditions” made earlier by 17 nonaligned nations.⁷

When the Government of India proposed the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and the policing of the border between North and South Viet-Nam by an Afro-Asian force, we publicly expressed our interest in this idea and privately sought to pursue the proposal in greater detail, manifesting the most affirmative character to this appeal.

We undertook a brief pause in the aerial attacks directed against military targets in North Viet-Nam in mid-May—and made the purpose of our action known to the North Vietnamese.

But despite this and every effort we or others made, there was not a single sign from Hanoi—or from Peiping—that they shared our desire to move this problem to the conference table, where it ought to be resolved. Notwithstanding, we persevered in our quest for peace.

The Bombing Pause

Although the sincerity of our desire to move from the battlefield to the conference table was questioned by very few, there were many—friends of ours and friends of Hanoi—who urged that another, longer suspension of the bombing of military targets in North Viet-Nam might create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. Our respect

for this opinion, as a manifestation of the opinion of a substantial part of mankind, combined with our own desire to leave no stone unturned in the search for peace, led our Government to suspend that bombing again on December 24—and to continue that suspension for 37 days, over 5 weeks, thus more than honoring the counsel we received.

The suspension, I must emphasize, was undertaken against a background of Hanoi’s unyielding intransigence—both in words and actions—to every peace move made by us or others for more than a year. It was undertaken with no assurance whatever that it would move us closer to peace or to negotiations.

That suspension had two parallel objectives: to ascertain whether, as many claimed but none could prove, bombings were in fact the decisive and final barrier to discussions or negotiations; and also to ascertain whether Hanoi shared our desire to reduce the intensity and the range of the armed conflict in Viet-Nam and to bring about a peaceful settlement.

We explained these objectives by means of an unprecedented diplomatic offensive through consultations with His Holiness the Pope, who has properly, as a great spiritual leader, manifested great concern about the peace of the world, a concern which he eloquently expressed in his unprecedented and welcome appearance here at our last General Assembly. We consulted with the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, who, of course, shared the Pope’s concern, as an organ of this body devoted to the peace. And we consulted with more than 115 governments—virtually all governments in the world—by sending six special Presidential envoys to 34 capitals to confer with chiefs of state or heads of governments—and through personal communications from President Johnson to the chiefs of government of many more.

Equally important, we explained our objectives directly to Hanoi. Indeed, before the suspension of bombings was 1 week old, in other words more than 4 weeks ago, we

⁶ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 611.

directly informed Hanoi of the suspension and advised them that if North Viet-Nam would reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension.

And I want to remind this distinguished body that the suspension of the bombing has continued for more than 30 days after we were in direct touch with North Viet-Nam and after our message relating to the suspension of the bombing was communicated and received by North Viet-Nam.

No Favorable Response From Hanoi

But our restraint and patience regretfully went unrewarded. There was no positive response from Hanoi. There was only a continuing barrage of insults, name-calling and vituperation. I should like to state, Mr. President, that I do not understand how the cause of international peace and security is at all forwarded by insults, name-calling, and vituperation, when what is required is a solemn attention by all nations and all members to the overriding cause and necessity for world peace.

Notwithstanding these insults, the name-calling and vituperation, we recognized, of course, that if the name-calling were accompanied by North Vietnamese restraint on the ground in South Viet-Nam, our effort would have achieved its objectives. And we would have considered such a response to be a positive response to our peace initiative. But such was not the case in the 37-day pause, as Secretary of State Rusk stated only yesterday, for the facts are that:

Infiltrations of men and material from the North into South Viet-Nam continued at a high level. Acts of violence in South Viet-Nam itself continued with relatively minor fluctuations at virtually the same record high levels set in the last quarter of 1965.

Only last Saturday, Hanoi made public a letter which President Ho Chi Minh had sent to certain heads of state or governments. This letter, together with the editorial in the official organ *Nhan Dan* 2 days

later, made it clear beyond reasonable doubt that Hanoi is no more prepared to work for a negotiated settlement or a reciprocal reduction of hostilities at the present time than it was a year ago. Ho Chi Minh interpreted our search for negotiated solution as "an excuse for war." He laid down three preconditions and demanded acceptance of them by the United States before he would even commence negotiations. These preconditions were: first, that the United States "must accept the four-point stand of the DRV Government and prove this by actual deeds"; second, that the United States "must end *unconditionally* and for good all bombing raids and other war acts against the DRV"; and third, a new precondition—I emphasize a new precondition—more objectionable, not more responsive than before the suspension, that the United States "must recognize the National Liberation Front as the *sole*—and I emphasize *sole*—genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam."

In exchange for these demands upon the United States, President Ho Chi Minh offered absolutely nothing, no letup in the war acts on his side, no reduction in infiltration, which had been continuous through the bombing pause, no reduction in terror, which had continued throughout the bombing pause, as it has been going on long before, no reduction in the supply of men and arms, which continued during the bombing pause, no willingness to negotiate or even to talk quietly through the channels of diplomacy with a view to bringing about negotiations. In short, Ho Chi Minh, as has been recognized by all organs of public opinion in all capitals, friendly to us and friendly to Hanoi—in short, Ho Chi Minh flatly rejected both objectives we had sought to achieve by the prolonged suspension of our bombings, a move toward negotiations and a peaceful settlement and the reciprocal reduction of hostilities.

In so doing, Ho Chi Minh and other leaders of North Viet-Nam assume full responsibility for the decision that the bombing suspension

could not be continued beyond 37 days. The United States is not responsible for resuming the bombing. Ho Chi Minh is responsible for resuming the bombing by rejecting a plain offer from the United States to sustain it, to continue the suspension if there were a reciprocal response from North Viet-Nam. We had sincerely hoped for a different response from Hanoi.

At this time I wish to express appreciation to all those governments who worked to encourage a different response. At the same time we have no choice but to accept the plain response which Hanoi has given in words and in deeds.

The Obligation of the Council

We are here today because our resolve for peace—to end the senseless death and destruction in Viet-Nam—is so strong that we cannot and we will not accept that answer as final and immutable. We will continue to seek the forum—we hope that this is the forum, and we hope this formula can emerge here—which will permit the beginning of negotiations. Our views on the elements of such a formula were summarized in my letter to the Secretary-General of January 4 of this year—a summary I wish to repeat here and now with the full approval of my Government and with the explicit authorization of President Johnson, so there can be no doubt of its validity:

That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

And in these last two expressions, our Government merely reiterates what the Charter of the United Nations plainly provides, that the destiny of people should be decided by principles of self-determination, not by force, not by violence, not by having the will of others imposed upon those who should be free to express their own will through democratic processes. And we have indicated many times that we would welcome the participation of the United Nations in making sure that freedom of choice is really, really and truly, exercised in making decisions of this magnitude.

We will pursue through every possible channel—and we can think of no better channel at the present moment than the Security Council—the opportunity to present these views—and receive the views of others and talk them into consideration—at a conference table. As President Johnson said in his state of the Union message on January 12:

We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group.

In short, Mr. President, the reasons for our decision to bring the Viet-Nam situation before the Council are simple and manifest and should be plain to all. The war in Viet-Nam continues unabated. We regret this. Numerous and intense peace efforts outside normal United Nations channels have proved unavailing; the Security Council, the principal organ of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, has not yet had the formal opportunity to see if it can use its accumulated wisdom, experience, and influence to find a new formula which will succeed where others have failed—a new element or catalyst which will answer the question raised by Pope Paul last Saturday, namely: "Who knows if finally an arbitration of the United Nations . . . might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question?" And we support the wish expressed by the Pope last Saturday.

Mr. President, we did not come here before because we were told by many members of the Council that it would interfere with the peace initiatives which were underway and would not contribute to a peaceful solution. And we honored that advice, as we should, because we believe in consulting with our colleagues, and we respected that advice while the peace initiative that we had taken was underway. But President Ho Chi Minh a few days ago closed the door to that particular act. And we have come here today to explore a new avenue, seeking the counsel, the advice, the considered judgment of this great body, which was set up 20 years ago in San Francisco as part of the charter to help the world find the way to peace, the objective we all share.

I recognize, as I said in the letter delivered to you, Mr. President, only yesterday:

We are . . . aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less.

SECOND STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 1

U.S./U.N. press release 4801

At this morning's meeting I attempted to explain in some detail the reasons which have impelled my Government to bring the question of Viet-Nam to the Security Council. I shall not repeat that explanation, but I shall endeavor to deal briefly with doubts which have been raised by other members as to the usefulness of Security Council consideration of this problem at this time.

I have listened very carefully to the discussion which has taken place both this

morning and this afternoon. I agree with the wise observation made by our colleague, the distinguished representative of New Zealand, that the discussions today, which of necessity have extended somewhat beyond the agenda item, have already demonstrated their value. Our discussion in the Security Council, although vigorous, as to be anticipated, and although reflective of varying points of view about the main problem at hand as well as procedure, has been temperate—to the surprise probably of some—reasonable, and informative.

I particularly am appreciative of the interventions of the new members of the Security Council. They have been of high quality. And I have listened to them and to the older members very carefully. I have tried to do so in the spirit so well expressed by our esteemed colleague and my friend, Chief [S. O.] Adebo, the distinguished representative of Nigeria. I know he will not mind if I say there is the necessity to consider, to lay all arguments as one common to all members of the Council, whether aligned or nonaligned. As I said this morning, the Security Council has a corporate responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

Now I shall turn to some of the questions raised by the members in the course of our discussion.

I should like to deal with what was first pointed out by my friend, our earlier president, the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Seydoux. His wisdom I have learned to appreciate very much and his friendship I deeply value. The question he raised—a very important one—has been raised by others—the distinguished representative of Mali, the distinguished representative of Uganda—and has been referred to by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, and I think was mentioned also by our esteemed colleague, Ambassador [Nikolai T.] Fedorenko of the Soviet Union. And their point is this: It has been pointed out by them that the Geneva conference, in which all parties to the con-

lict are represented, has been the international body which has in the past dealt with the problem of Viet-Nam and still remains the appropriate body to do so.

The United States has no quarrel with this contention. The first of the 14 points which represent a summary of our policy on Viet-Nam states that, and I quote, "The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia."

We have repeatedly said that we would welcome the reconvening of the Geneva conference for this purpose. Indeed, the Government of the United Kingdom, one of the cochairmen of this conference, has specifically addressed a request to the Government of the Soviet Union, the other cochairman, that they issue a joint call for the reconvening of the conference. But how was this proposal received? The Soviet Union refused to join in any steps to reconvene the conference. Let the cochairmen issue the call today and we will be in Geneva tomorrow at a conference, and then, indeed, there would be no necessity for the Security Council to deal with this matter.

It has been correctly pointed out that the purpose of our resolution is to assist in what thus far it has not been possible to realize—the reconvening of the Geneva conference. And that has not been possible to realize because of any opposition on the part of the United States. Quite the contrary.

Under those circumstances, therefore, the choice before us, members of the Council, is not whether to deal with this problem in the Security Council or to deal with it in Geneva but whether to deal with it at all. The door to Geneva is, at least for the time being, closed. And the question we have to decide is a plain and simple one: Do we wish also to close the door to the United Nations? What will the people of the world say if we do?

It has been pointed out by distinguished members here that several of the parties to the conflict in Viet-Nam are not members of the United Nations and, therefore, are not in a position to present their case here. But

others have pointed out—and I need only invite the Council's attention to article 32 of the charter, which says in part that,

... any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.

And it is to be remembered also that there is a charter obligation which reaches beyond the members of the United Nations. Article 2, paragraph 6, says,

The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

This organization, of course, has had experience with this matter before. This is not a new subject for our consideration. We have considered matters in the past and will presumably do so in the future when members or nonmembers of the United Nations have refused to participate. The Government of South Africa has consistently refused to participate in proceedings of this Council dealing with the problem of *apartheid*. The Council has, rightly we believe, never permitted itself by this refusal to be prevented from dealing with a problem which it believed clearly fell within the scope of its responsibilities.

It has been said: Why hasn't the United States brought the Vietnamese problem to the Council before? I should like to remind the members of the Council that in 1964 we brought an aspect of the Vietnamese problem to the Security Council—the Gulf of Tonkin incident.⁸ It was not the fault of the United States that that was not fully explored. But I should also like to remind the members of the Council that in Security Council documents we have repeatedly appealed to the United Nations and all of its organs for assistance in the settlement of this dispute.

One of my distinguished colleagues has suggested that the Council should not at-

⁸ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272.

tempt to deal with the problem unless it is assured that it can do so successfully. To do so unsuccessfully, he claims, would be a blow to its prestige.

Let me point out that the Council has not been inhibited in the past from dealing with threats to the peace of the world because it could not be assured of doing so successfully. Indeed, we can hardly expect to have any such assurance in advance. If we had had it in advance, probably the matter would not have to come to the Council.

My distinguished colleagues will remember only a few months ago a full-scale war brought on between two great members of the United Nations, India and Pakistan. Neither saw fit to bring this conflict before the Security Council. Nevertheless, the Council most rightly decided that it must seek to bring an early end to this threat to the peace of the world, despite how the parties to the conflict might feel. While success was far from assured when we began our deliberations, the Council did deal most vigorously and most unitedly with this war, and within a matter of weeks it did overcome very serious obstacles to bring about a cease-fire which still obtains.

In other cases candor compels a statement that the Council has not been successful, and intractable problems still remain on its agenda, which is apparent from the monthly distribution of problems of which the Security Council remains seized. Were the Council, however, to refuse to attempt to carry out the obligations laid on it by the charter, what credit and what prestige could it hope to have in the world?

And I must say that I completely fail to understand how those states which repeatedly insist that the Security Council and the Security Council alone has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security can now deny its competence.

Permit me to say most solemnly to my fellow members of the Council at this critical juncture of its history that what is at stake here is not the United States position. We have brought the matter to the Council.

What is at stake here is how will the world judge the Council if it refuses even to discuss and consider that problem which public opinion almost everywhere considers to be the most serious threat to the peace now confronting mankind? What reliance and confidence will the people of the world henceforth place on the Security Council and the United Nations itself if we will adjourn without having made the attempt to deal with this matter?

Finally, Mr. President, I would remind my colleagues once again of what I said a few minutes earlier. What the United States seeks from this Council—and that is apparent from the draft resolution which we have placed before the Council—is not that we expect the Council itself to solve the whole problem of Viet-Nam, either with or without the other parties to the conflict. What we ask is only that the Council lend its tremendous weight and prestige by calling for immediate discussion, without preconditions, among the appropriately interested governments to arrange for a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.

What we are asking the Council to do is no different from what the nonaligned countries did in their appeal on this subject. What we ask is only that this Council offer its assistance in bringing about peace in Southeast Asia, perhaps with the provision of arbitrators or mediators, as His Holiness the Pope has suggested, or perhaps through some other appropriate means. This much certainly we can do. And let us not underestimate the effect of our doing this much.

The fact that we are attempting to fulfill our responsibilities to the peace of the world by taking action along these lines would not in any way inhibit or prevent any government or governments from seeking to promote negotiation or conciliation through other channels.

A recent example of how that could be done has been provided by the welcome intervention of the Soviet Union at Tashkent which supplemented the efforts of this Council in helping to bring about better understanding

between India and Pakistan, an action which I am sure every member of this Council would commend.

We would welcome all and any efforts to the end of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam, as we have been attempting to do. In the absence of such efforts at this time showing any prospect of success and confronted by the refusal of the government of North Viet-Nam to take part in unconditional negotiations under the auspices which

we have tried, we continue to believe that the body primarily charged with the maintenance of the peace of the world has every right—and, more important, every duty—to explore earnestly and without fear of failure what it can do in this critical turning point in world affairs.⁹

⁹ On Feb. 2 the Security Council by a vote of 9 to 2 (Bulgaria, U.S.S.R.), with 4 abstentions (France, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda), agreed to place the question of Viet-Nam on its agenda.

The Issue in Viet-Nam

*by Under Secretary Ball*¹

Sooner or later the time will come when each of you will experience my sense of shock when your generous invitation led me to count up the years since I first became an alumnus of Northwestern University. I took my degree from the undergraduate school in 1930. More than a third of a century has passed since that time.

That period of more than one-third of a century has been a fortunate time in which to live, an exciting time of change and ferment—particularly for an American. For during that third of a century our country ceased to be a voice offstage and moved to the center of world affairs.

When I received my first degree from Northwestern University, many Americans pretended that the rest of the world did not exist. We were still bemused by isolationism as we had been ever since we rejected the League of Nations in the early twenties. We were self-centered and self-deluding—so much so that when we faced the spectacle of

the Western World in flames from Hitler's lunatic ambitions, many Americans quite solemnly contended that this was none of our affair.

But history has forced us to grow up. We have faced the harsh realities of danger and responsibility—and acquitted ourselves with honor and courage, as befits a great power.

For we are indubitably a great power today—a very different country from what we were in 1930—a wiser, more mature, and more responsible country. Our economy is four times as large—our role in world affairs many times as great.

Most of the Western European nations—which in the thirties controlled vast areas of the globe—are today largely preoccupied with their own affairs. Today we garrison the distant outposts of the world—not in support of colonial interests but in fulfillment of world responsibilities. Six hundred thousand of our countrymen are in uniform overseas. We are providing some form of economic assistance to more than 95 countries. And an America once determined to

¹ Address made before the Northwestern University Alumni Association at Evanston, Ill., on Jan. 30 (press release 21 dated Jan. 29).

keep out of entangling alliances now has more than 40 allies on 5 continents.

Today also we are fighting a shooting war in a country that until recently for most Americans was only an exotic place-name on the map of a distant continent.

Our engagement in Viet-Nam is but one aspect of the world role we are playing. But because we are spending both lives and resources in that faraway land and because the issue being decided profoundly affects our fortunes and our future, I should like to talk with you today about how we got there and why we must stay.

The beginning of wisdom with regard to Viet-Nam is to recognize that what Americans are fighting in the jungles and rice paddies of that unhappy land is not a local conflict—an isolated war that has meaning merely for one part of the world. We can properly understand the struggle in Viet-Nam only if we recognize it for what it is—part of a vast and continuing struggle in which we have been engaged for more than two decades.

Like most of the conflicts that have plagued the world in recent years, the conflict in Viet-Nam is a product of the great shifts and changes triggered by the Second World War. Out of the war, two continent-wide powers emerged—the United States and the Soviet Union. The colonial systems through which the nations of Western Europe had governed more than a third of the people of the world were, one by one, dismantled. The Soviet Union under Stalin embarked on a reckless course of seeking to extend Communist power. An Iron Curtain was erected to enclose large areas of the globe. At the same time, man was learning to harness the power of the exploding sun and technology made mockery of time and distance.

The result of these vast changes, compressed within the breathless span of two decades, was to bring about a drastic rearrangement of the power structure of the world.

This rearrangement of power has resulted in a very uneasy equilibrium of forces. For

even while the new national boundaries were still being marked on the map, the Soviet Union under Stalin exploited the confusion to push out the perimeter of its power and influence in an effort to extend the outer limits of Communist domination by force or the threat of force.

Halting the Communist Drive

This process threatened the freedom of the world. It had to be checked and checked quickly. By launching the Marshall Plan to restore economic vitality to the nations of Western Europe and by forming NATO—a powerful Western alliance reinforced by United States resources and military power—America and the free nations of Europe built a dam to hold back the further encroachment of Communist ambitions.

This decisive action succeeded brilliantly. NATO, created in 1949, stopped the spread of communism over Western Europe and the northern Mediterranean.

But the world was given no time to relax. The victory of the Chinese Communists in that same year posed a new threat of Communist expansion against an Asia in ferment. Just as the Western World had mobilized its resistance against Communist force in Europe, we had to create an effective counterforce in the Far East if Communist domination were not to spread like a lava flow over the whole area.

The first test came quickly in Korea. There the United Nations forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea, supported by materiel from the Soviet Union. It stopped a vast Chinese army that followed. It brought to a halt the Communist drive to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the whole Korean Peninsula.

The Korean war was fought from a central conviction—that the best hope for freedom and security in the world depended on maintaining the integrity of the postwar arrangements. Stability could be achieved only by making sure that the Communist world did not expand by destroying those arrangements by force and threat—and thus

upsetting the precarious power balance between the two sides of the Iron Curtain.

It was this conviction that led to our firm stand in Korea. It was this conviction that led America, in the years immediately after Korea, to build a barrier around the whole periphery of the Communist world by encouraging the creation of a series of alliances and commitments from the eastern edge of the NATO area to the Pacific.

The SEATO treaty that was signed in 1954 was part of that barrier, that structure of alliances. It was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 82-1.

Under that treaty and its protocol, the United States and other treaty partners gave their joint and several pledges to guarantee existing boundaries, including the line of demarcation between North and South Viet-Nam established when the French relinquished their control over Indochina. Since then three Presidents have reinforced that guarantee by further commitments given directly to the Republic of Viet-Nam. And on August 10, 1964, the Senate by a vote of 88-2 and the House by a vote of 416-0 adopted a joint resolution declaring their support for these commitments.²

Today we are living up to those commitments by helping South Viet-Nam defend itself from the onslaught of Communist force, just as we helped Iran in 1946, Greece and Turkey in 1947, Formosa and Korea in 1950, and Berlin since 1948.

The bloody encounters in the highlands around Pleiku and the rice paddies of the Mekong Delta are thus in a real sense battles and skirmishes in a continuing war to prevent one Communist power after another from violating internationally recognized boundary lines fixing the outer limits of Communist dominion.

When we think of Viet-Nam, we think of Korea. In Viet-Nam, as in Korea, the Communists in one part of a divided country lying on the periphery of China have sought by force to gain dominion over the whole. But in terms of tactics on the ground,

Greece is a closer analogy. For there, 20 years ago, as in South Viet-Nam today, the Communists sought to achieve their purpose by what is known in their lexicon as a "war of national liberation."

They chose this method of aggression both in Greece and Viet-Nam because tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion, give a great advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority—particularly where, as in those two countries, the physical terrain makes concealment easy and impedes the use of heavy weapons.

But the Communists also have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation an element of confusion, a sense of ambiguity that can, they hope, so disturb and divide free men as to prevent them from making common cause against it.

This ambiguity is the central point of debate in the discussions that have surrounded the South Viet-Nam problem. Is the war in South Viet-Nam an external aggression from the North, or is it an indigenous revolt?

This is a question that Americans quite properly ask, and one to which they deserve a satisfactory answer. It is a question which we who have official responsibilities have necessarily probed in great depth. For if the Viet-Nam war were merely what the Communists say it is—an indigenous rebellion—then the United States would have no business taking sides in the conflict and helping one side to defeat the other by force of arms.

Evidence on Character of War

The evidence on the character of the Viet-Nam war is voluminous. Its meaning seems clear enough: The North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi systematically created the Viet Cong forces; it provides their equipment; it mounted the guerrilla war—and it controls that war from Hanoi on a day-to-day basis.

The evidence shows clearly enough that, at the time of French withdrawal, when Viet-Nam was divided in the settlement of 1954, the Communist regime in Hanoi never intended that South Viet-Nam should de-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

velop in freedom. Many Communists fighting with the Viet Minh army were directed to stay in the South, to cache away their arms, and to do everything possible to undermine the South Vietnamese Government. Others—80,000 in all—were ordered to the North for training in the North Vietnamese army.

The evidence is clear enough also that the Communist rulers of the North resorted to guerrilla warfare in South Viet-Nam only when the success of the South Viet-Nam Government persuaded them that they could not achieve their designs by subversion alone.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam—held its Third Party Congress in Hanoi. That Congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Viet-Nam. Within 2 or 3 months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning early that year the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate across the demarcation line the disciplined Communists whom the party had ordered north at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954 those men had been trained in the arts of proselytizing, sabotage, and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of Southerners who had gone north. Since then the greater number of men infiltrated into the South have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly larger numbers. Today there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the South.

I mention these facts, which are familiar enough to most of you, because they are fundamental to our policy with regard to Viet-Nam. These facts, it seems to us, make

it clear beyond question that the war in South Viet-Nam has few of the attributes of an indigenous revolt. It is a cynical and systematic aggression by the North Vietnamese regime against the people of South Viet-Nam. It is one further chapter in the long and brutal chronicle of Communist efforts to extend the periphery of Communist power by force and terror.

The National Liberation Front

This point is at the heart of our determination to stay the course in the bloody contest now under way in South Viet-Nam. It also necessarily shapes our position with regard to negotiations.

The President, Secretary Rusk, and all spokesmen for the administration have stated again and again that the United States is prepared to join in unconditional discussions of the Vietnamese problem in an effort to bring about a satisfactory political solution. But so far the regime in Hanoi has refused to come to the bargaining table except on the basis of quite unacceptable conditions. One among several such conditions—but one that has been widely debated in the United States—is that we must recognize the National Liberation Front as the representative—indeed, as the sole representative—of the South Vietnamese people.

Yet to recognize the National Liberation Front in such a capacity would do violence to the truth and betray the very people whose liberty we are fighting to secure. The National Liberation Front is not a political entity expressing the will of the people of South Viet-Nam—or any substantial element of the South Vietnamese population. It is a facade fabricated by the Hanoi regime to confuse the issue and elaborate the myth of an indigenous revolt.

History is not obscure on this matter. As I noted earlier, the creation of the Front was announced by the North Viet-Nam Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after the North Viet-Nam military leader, General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, announced that: “The North is the revolu-

tionary base for the whole country." But the Hanoi regime, while applauding its creation, has taken little pains to give the Front even the appearance of authenticity.

The individuals proclaimed as the leaders of the Front are not personalities widely known to the South Vietnamese people—or, indeed, to many members of the Viet Cong. They are not revolutionary heroes or national figures. They have little meaning to the ordinary Viet Cong soldier who fights and dies in the jungles and rice paddies.

Instead, the names he carries into battle are those of "Uncle Ho"—Ho Chi Minh, the President of the North Vietnamese regime—and General Giap, its military hero. When Viet Cong prisoners are asked during interrogation whether they are members of the National Liberation Front, they customarily reply that they owe allegiance to the Lao Dong—the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam—which is the equivalent of the Hanoi Communist regime.

The Front, then, is unmistakably what its name implies—a Communist front organization created to mask the activities of Hanoi and to further the illusion of an indigenous revolt.

The name of the organization was carefully chosen. It bears the same name as the National Liberation Front of Algeria. But there the resemblance ends, for the Algerian Front did, in fact, represent a substantial part of the Algerian population. It played a major role in an insurgency that was clearly an indigenous movement and not an aggression imposed from outside.

The Algerian Front, moreover, commanded the respect and, indeed, the obedience of the people. When it called a strike, the city of Algiers virtually closed down. By contrast, the Front in Viet-Nam has shown its fictional character by revealing its own impotence. On two occasions it has called for a general strike. These calls have been totally ignored by the people of South Viet-Nam.

The Algerian Front was a vital force in the Algerian community. It secured the overt allegiance of the old, established Moslem

groups and leaders. As the revolt progressed, Moslems serving in the Algerian Assembly and even in the French Parliament announced their support for the Front.

But the Front in Viet-Nam has utterly failed in its efforts to attract the adherence of any established group within the society, whether Buddhist, Christian, or any of the sects that form substantial elements in Vietnamese life. Quite clearly, the people of South Viet-Nam, if they are aware of the Front at all, know it for what it is: the political cover for a North Vietnamese effort to take over the South—in practical effect, the southern arm of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.

To be sure, the Viet Cong military forces include a number of indigenous Southerners under Northern control. Neither the United States nor the South Vietnamese Government has ever questioned that fact. But the composition of the Viet Cong military forces is not the issue when one discusses the role of the Front. The issue is whether the Front has any color of claim as a political entity to represent these indigenous elements.

The evidence makes clear that it does not. It is purely and simply a factitious organization created by Hanoi to reinforce a fiction. To recognize it as the representative of the South Vietnamese population would be to give legitimacy to that fiction.

The true party in interest on the enemy side—the entity that has launched the attack on the South Vietnamese Government for its own purposes, the entity that has created, controlled, and supplied the fighting forces of the Viet Cong from the beginning—is the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi. And it is the failure of that regime to come to the bargaining table that has so far frustrated every effort to move the problem of South Viet-Nam from a military to a political solution.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not taken, nor do we take, an obdurate or unreasoning attitude with regard to the Front. The President said in his state of the Union message,³ "We will meet at any

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group”—and that, of course, includes the Front along with other groups.

As the President has also said,⁴ this false issue of the Front would never prove “an insurmountable problem” if Hanoi were prepared for serious negotiations. But we cannot, to advance the political objectives of the Communist regime in Hanoi, give legitimacy to a spurious organization as though it spoke for the people of South Viet-Nam.

The Continuing Struggle

A European friend once critically observed that Americans have “a sense of mission but no sense of history.” That accusation is, I think, without warrant.

We do have a sense of history, and it is that which enables us to view the war in South Viet-Nam for what it is. We Americans know that it is not, as I have said earlier, a local conflict; it is part of a continuing struggle to prevent the Communists from upsetting the fragile balance of power through force or the threat of force.

To succeed in that struggle we must resist every Communist effort to destroy by aggression the boundaries and demarcation lines established by the postwar arrangements. We cannot pick and choose among those boundaries. We cannot defend Berlin and yield Korea. We cannot recognize one commitment and repudiate another without tearing and weakening the entire structure on which the world's security depends.

Some thoughtful critics of our Vietnamese policy both in Europe and America challenge this. They maintain that the West should not undertake to defend the integrity of all lines of demarcation even though they may be underwritten in formal treaties. They contend that many of these lines are unnatural since they do not conform to the geopolitical realities as they see them. They contend in particular that, since the passing of colonialism, the Western Powers have no

business mixing in the affairs of the Asian mainland. They imply that, regardless of our commitments, we should not try to prevent Red China from establishing its hegemony over the East Asian landmass south of the Soviet Union.

Proponents of this view advance two principal arguments to support their thesis. They contend that the very weight of Chinese power, its vast population, and its consequent ability to mobilize immense mass armies entitles it to recognition as the controlling force of Southeast Asia.

As a second reason for acknowledging the Chinese hegemony, they contend that for centuries China has maintained a dominant cultural and political influence throughout the area. They claim, therefore, that Southeast Asia lies within the Chinese sphere of influence and that we should let the Chinese redraw the lines of demarcation to suit themselves without regard to the wishes of the Southeast Asian people.

This argument, it seems to me, does not provide an acceptable basis for United States policy.

The assertion that China through hundreds of years of history has held sway over Southeast Asia is simply not accurate. Successive Chinese Empires sought by force to establish such sway, but they never succeeded in doing so, except in certain sectors for limited periods. For the people of Southeast Asia have, over the centuries, shown an obstinate insistence on shaping their own destiny which the Chinese have not been able to overcome.

To adopt the sphere-of-influence approach now advocated would, therefore, not mean allowing history to repeat itself. It would mean according to China a status it had never been able to achieve by its own efforts throughout the ages. It would mean sentencing the people of Southeast Asia against their will to indefinite servitude behind the Bamboo Curtain. And it would mean turning our back on the principles that have formed the basis of Western policy in the whole postwar era.

Nor can one seriously insist that geo-

⁴ At a news conference on July 28, 1965.

graphical propinquity establishes the Chinese right to dominate. At a time when man can circle the earth in 90 minutes, there is little to support such a literal commitment to 19th-century geopolitics. It is a dubious policy that would permit the accidents of geography to deprive peoples of their right to determine their own future free from external force. The logic of that policy has dark implications. It would rationalize the greed of great powers. It would imperil the prospects for developing and maintaining an equilibrium of power in the world.

The principles of the United Nations Charter are doctrinally more in tune with the aspirations of 20th-century man.

This does not mean, however, that the political shape of the world should be regarded as frozen in an intractable pattern, that the boundaries established by the post-war arrangements are necessarily sacrosanct and immutable. Indeed, some of the lines of demarcation drawn after the Second World War were explicitly provisional and were to be finally determined in political settlements yet to come. This was true in Germany, in Korea, and in South Viet-Nam as well.

But those settlements have not yet been achieved, and we cannot permit their resolution to be preempted by force. This is the issue in Viet-Nam. This is what we are fighting for. This is why we are there.

We have no ambition to stay there any longer than is necessary. We have made repeatedly clear that the United States seeks no territory in Southeast Asia. We wish no military bases. We do not desire to destroy the regime in Hanoi or to remake it in a Western pattern. The United States will not retain American forces in South Viet-Nam once peace is assured.

The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral, depending on the will of the people. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam as soon as violence has been eliminated and the South Vietnamese people can vote without intimidation. We look forward to free elections—and we will accept the result as a democratic people are ac-

customed to do. Yet we have little doubt about the outcome, for we are confident that the South Vietnamese, who have fought hard for their freedom, will not be the first people to give up that freedom to communism in a free exercise of self-determination.

Whether the peoples of the two parts of Viet-Nam will wish to unite is again for them to decide as soon as they are in a position to do so freely. Like other options, that of reunification must be preserved.

Preserving Freedom of Choice

In the long run our hopes for the people of South Viet-Nam reflect our hopes for people everywhere. What we seek is a world living in peace and freedom—a world in which the cold war, with its tensions and conflicts, can recede into history. We are seeking to build a world in which men and nations will recognize and act upon a strongly shared interest in peace and in international cooperation for the common good.

We should not despair of these objectives even though at the moment they may seem rather unreal and idealistic. For we would make a mistake to regard the cold war as a permanent phenomenon. After all, it was less than two decades ago that Winston Churchill first announced in Fulton, Missouri, that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent." And two decades are only a moment in the long sweep of history.

During the intervening years major changes have taken place on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A schism has developed within the Communist world. The Soviet Union has become the second greatest industrial power. The Soviet people have begun to acquire a stake in stability, and after the missile crisis of 1962 the Soviet Union has come face to face with the realities of power and destruction in the nuclear age and has recognized the awesome fact that in the 20th century a war between great powers is a war without victory for anyone.

The changes taking place within the Soviet Union and among the nations of Eastern Europe are at once a reality and a promise. Over time—and in a world of rapid and pervasive change the measurement of time is difficult indeed—we may look forward to a comparable development within Communist China—a maturing process that will deflect the policies of Peiping from bellicose actions to a peaceful relation with the rest of the world.

After all, it is not the American purpose simply to preserve the *status quo*. That was not our history, and that is not our destiny. What we want to preserve is the freedom of choice for the peoples of the world. We will take our chances on that.

U.S. Team To Help Pakistan Improve Medical Training

The White House announced on January 25 that two medical experts of the Office of Science and Technology would arrive at Karachi, Pakistan, that evening for exploratory discussions on medical training. The visit is a followup on President Johnson's offer on December 14, 1965,¹ to President Ayub of Pakistan to send to Pakistan a high-level team of medical teachers and scientists, headed by the President's Science Adviser, Dr. Donald F. Hornig, to assist in instituting a very broad improvement in medical training and in public health in rural areas. The two medical experts are Dr. Peter S. Bing and Dr. Harold Margulies. They will engage in preliminary discussions with appropriate authorities in Pakistan, preparing the way for the visit of Dr. Hornig and his group, which will follow in the near future.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 3, 1966, p. 2.

U.S. Officials and Businessmen Discuss Overseas Relationships

Press release 16 dated January 26

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann and other senior officers of the Department of State met on January 26 with the chief executive officers of 32 companies of the Business Council for International Understanding (BCIU) to discuss ways of strengthening relationships between the United States Foreign Service and the United States business community abroad.

Fred C. Foy, chairman of the Koppers Company, Inc., of Pittsburgh, led the business group in his capacity as chairman of BCIU. Government officials attending the meeting included the Secretary of Commerce, John T. Connor, and the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, William S. Gaud.

A closer relationship between Foreign Service personnel and U.S. businessmen stationed overseas has been developing for some time, and this meeting was arranged to solidify the progress made to date and lay plans for strengthening future cooperation.

Efforts to improve communications between the two groups include a consultation program arranged with BCIU under which ambassadors and other senior officers of the Foreign Service have met individually with executive groups in some 300 companies with international interests. During 1965 alone, consultation programs were scheduled for 94 officers. Partly as a result of these consultations and meetings held with other business associations, the Foreign Service has been able to obtain a fuller understanding of the needs and aspirations of American business, and United States companies have learned of the kinds of assistance they are able to obtain from the United States Foreign Service.

The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1967 (Excerpts)¹

PART 1. THE BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT

To the Congress of the United States:

With this message I transmit to you today the budget of the United States of America for the fiscal year 1967.

A budget is not simply a schedule of financial accounts.

It is a program for action.

The program of the Federal Government which this budget recommends is grounded on these fundamental premises:

- In international affairs we are determined to seek peace with every means at our command

—but we are fully prepared to meet the costs of opposing aggression.

- In domestic affairs we are determined to press confidently forward toward the Great Society

—but we shall do so in an orderly and responsible way, and at a pace which reflects the claims of our commitments in Southeast Asia upon the Nation's resources.

The budget for 1967 bears the strong imprint of the troubled world we live in.

It provides the funds we now foresee as necessary to meet our commitments in Southeast Asia. If our efforts to secure an honorable peace bear fruit, these funds need not be spent. Yet it would be folly to present a budget which inadequately provided for the military and economic costs of sustaining our forces in Vietnam. And those costs are substantial.

In this setting I have sought to frame a balanced program.

- We are a rich nation and can afford to make progress at home while meeting obligations abroad—in fact, we can afford no other course if we are to remain strong. For this reason, I have not halted progress in the new and vital Great Society programs in order to finance the costs of our efforts in Southeast Asia.

- But even a prosperous nation cannot meet all its goals all at once. For this reason, the rate of advance in the new programs has been held below what might have been proposed in less troubled times, many older and lower priority activities have been reduced or eliminated, and economies have been sought in every operation of the Government.

- At the same time, I want to insure that the necessary increase in budget expenditures is so financed as to promote economic stability. For this reason, I am proposing several tax measures designed to increase Federal revenues.

With this balanced program we can:

¹ H.Doc. 336, 89th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted on Jan. 24. Reprinted here are the introductory paragraphs and conclusion from part 1 and the sections on international affairs and finance from parts 1 and 4 of the 449-page volume entitled *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1967*, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (\$1.50).

• Meet our international responsibilities with firmness.

• Maintain continued prosperity and economic stability at home.

• Raise the productivity, earnings, and living standards of our poorer citizens.

• Improve the quality of life for all citizens.

• Preserve and protect our national resources for the generations to come.

And we can achieve these ends without unduly straining our economic resources or impairing our steady economic expansion.

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Federal Programs and Expenditures

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International affairs and finance.—As we meet the direct military threat to freedom and security, we must also continue our pursuit of a world at peace, in which:

• Freedom can thrive.

• Hunger and disease are no longer a common condition of life.

• Education is available to everyone.

• All people and nations prosper together.

The long-run security and the innate compassion of the American people both call for policies which bring such a world closer.

The Congress and the public rightly demand that our assistance programs be effective in achieving their objectives. In the past several months I have carefully reviewed these programs. As a result of that review I am proposing the following steps:

First, I shall send to the Congress a special message proposing major initiatives in international health and education. Healthy and educated people are the most important resource a nation can possess. Therefore, the 1967 budget provides for expanded activities in education and health as next steps toward a better world.

Second, I am proposing to expand and reorient our food and agricultural assistance to the hungry peoples of the developing

countries. We will emphasize assistance to the recipient countries in raising their own agricultural production so that they may eventually lessen their dependence on food aid from the United States. In this effort, increased economic aid for agricultural development will be closely coordinated with a new Food for Peace program.

Increased expenditures of the Agency for International Development for activities in health, education, and agriculture are provided within an economic assistance budget which, apart from special Vietnam costs, is no higher than in 1966.

Third, we will step up our efforts to encourage recipient nations to take vigorous measures of self-help. Our economic assistance will be provided to countries which are taking determined steps to help themselves.

Fourth, we will further concentrate our economic assistance efforts. In 1967 almost two-thirds of expenditures by the Agency for International Development outside of South Vietnam will be in nine key developing countries.

Fifth, to increase the effectiveness of our assistance, I am proposing that the program be authorized for a 5-year period.

My recommendations will be set forth in greater detail in other messages.

We will carry forward our long-term commitment to the Alliance for Progress. To this end, funds are included in this budget for continued expansion of the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations. Our own Alliance activities are also being increased.

As part of a cooperative effort to promote economic development in Asia, I will propose legislation to authorize the United States to become a charter member of the Asian Development Bank.² The budget also includes funds to pay our share of the current replenishment of the resources of the International Development Association. As soon as future needs and an appropriate sharing

² See p. 255.

formula are determined, I will seek legislation to authorize additional contributions to this highly successful affiliate of the World Bank.

This budget will also enable us to expand the Peace Corps, of which we can be justly proud; to continue our overseas information activities; and to maintain our firm support of the United Nations.

Conclusion

This Nation has committed itself to help defend South Vietnam against aggression. We are determined to fulfill that commitment.

This Nation has also committed itself to a major effort to provide better economic, social, and cultural opportunities for all Americans. We are also determined to fulfill this commitment.

Both of these commitments involve great costs. They are costs we can and will meet.

The objectives we are seeking are interdependent.

We cannot fight for peace and freedom in Vietnam, while sacrificing individual dignity and opportunity at home. For it would be a hollow victory if our pursuit of world peace were carried out at the expense of domestic progress.

Yet we must also recognize that a truly Great Society looks beyond its own borders. The freedom, health, and prosperity of all mankind are its proper concern.

The struggle in Vietnam must be supported. The advance toward a Great Society at home must continue unabated.

This budget provides the means for both these goals.

I urge the support of Congress and all Americans for its principles and its programs.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

JANUARY 24, 1966.

PART 4. THE FEDERAL PROGRAM BY FUNCTION

International Affairs and Finance

The Federal Government engages in a variety of activities in pursuit of our objectives of world peace, stability, and prosperity. These include:

(1) Negotiation with other nations on issues ranging from the reduction of armaments to the liberalization of trade,

(2) Active participation in the United Nations and associated international organizations,

(3) Conduct of worldwide programs of information and exchange of persons, and

(4) Provision of economic assistance to help developing nations achieve economic and social progress.

Total expenditures for the international affairs and finance activities of the Government are expected to be \$4.4 billion in 1967, \$337 million more than in 1966. Excluding special Vietnam costs, total payments rise by \$237 million from 1966 to 1967.

The 1967 economic assistance program is characterized by the following major developments: *first*, increased emphasis on assistance in the areas of health and education; *second*, a comprehensive approach to help feed the hungry peoples of the developing world, stressing greater agricultural production in the recipient countries; *third*, an acceleration of our efforts to encourage the less developed countries to take vigorous self-help measures; *fourth*, a further concentration of our economic assistance in key developing countries, and *fifth*, a five-year authorization for economic assistance. Details of these proposals will be set forth in special messages.

Conduct of foreign affairs.—The Department of State has primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. To

represent U.S. interests, the Department operates some 268 diplomatic and consular posts in 113 countries and expects to establish diplomatic relations with 4 newly independent nations in 1967.

The budget provides for processing 1.5 million passport applications in 1967, 10% more than in 1966. In addition, approximately 1.3 million nonimmigrant visas are expected—a 7% increase over 1966. The budget also includes funds for better worldwide communications, increased security at overseas posts, administration of the recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, and more adequate space for the Foreign Service Institute. Pending legislation should be enacted to provide a unified Foreign Service for the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency.

The United States will continue to share in the cost of supporting the United Nations and other international organizations of which this Nation is a member. Participation in these bodies is essential to increased cooperation among the countries of the world on matters of peace, security, economic and social progress, and scientific advancement. At the same time, we intend to play an increasingly active role in reviewing the program and budgetary proposals of the various international organizations.

Agency for International Development.

—The Agency for International Development administers economic aid programs to assist less developed countries in achieving economic and social progress, maintaining political stability, and resisting aggression or subversion. The United States supplements local resources and supports self-help efforts, in coordination with the programs of international organizations and other donor nations.

The 1967 budget includes funds for new and expanded programs to be proposed in the fields of international health, education, and agricultural assistance. These programs will assist other nations in areas critical to economic development, improve mutual understanding, and strengthen American ca-

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FINANCE

(Fiscal years. In millions)

Program or agency	Payments to the public			Recommended new obligational authority for 1967
	1965 actual	1966 estimate	1967 estimate	
<i>Administrative Budget Funds:</i>				
Conduct of foreign affairs:				
Department of State.....	\$300	\$312	\$313	\$324
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.....	7	9	9	10
Tariff Commission.....	3	3	4	4
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.....	35	2	2	2
Economic and financial programs:				
Agency for International Development:				
Development loans...	754	669	654	665
Technical cooperation...	227	204	200	231
Alliance for Progress...	367	420	430	543
Supporting assistance...	387	509	642	747
Contingencies and other.....	306	298	273	282
Subtotal, Agency for International Development.....	2,041	2,100	2,200	2,469
Subtotal, Agency for International Development, excluding special Vietnam costs.....	(2,041)	(1,996)	(1,996)	(2,144)
International financial institutions:				
Present programs.....	320	-----	70	354
Proposed legislation.....	-----	10	10	20
Peace Corps.....	79	84	88	110
Export-Import Bank.....	-357	-532	-309	-----
Other.....	11	13	15	6
Food for Peace.....	1,641	1,701	1,539	1,617
Foreign information and exchange activities:				
United States Information Agency.....	165	171	179	185
Department of State.....	58	58	58	56
Subtotal, administrative budget.....	4,304	3,932	4,177	5,157
Subtotal, administrative budget, excluding special Vietnam costs.....	(4,304)	(3,828)	(3,973)	(4,832)
<i>Trust Funds</i>	-160	190	126	136
Intragovernmental transactions and adjustment for net cash issuances or withdrawals by international financial institutions (deduct).....	-439	30	-125	-----
Total.....	4,583	4,092	4,429	-----
Total, excluding special Vietnam costs.....	(4,583)	(3,988)	(4,225)	-----

¹ Compares with new obligational authority for 1965 and 1966, as follows: Administrative budget funds: 1965, \$6,703 million; 1966, \$6,497 million. Trust funds: 1965, \$21 million; 1966, \$156 million.

pabilities in these fields. Our agricultural assistance will be reoriented and expanded as part of a comprehensive effort to help meet the growing food needs of the developing nations. Agency for International Development assistance and the Food for Peace Program will be more closely related to each other in support of the efforts of the developing countries to raise their agricultural production.

Total expenditures by AID are estimated at \$2.2 billion in 1967, an increase of \$100 million over 1966. This rise is entirely the result of the heightened conflict in South Vietnam. Exclusive of special Vietnam costs, AID expenditures will remain level at \$2.0 billion in both 1966 and 1967. These amounts will cover only the highest priority requirements and reflect a continuing effort to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of our assistance programs. Within a constant level of expenditures, assistance in the fields of education, health, and agricultural production will be increased. To promote development through better planning, legislation is being recommended to authorize AID activities for a period of 5 years.

Continued progress is being made in tying economic assistance programs to the purchase of goods and services in the United States. More than 80% of AID expenditures in 1967 will be for purchases of U.S. goods and services compared to about 42% in 1960. This minimizes the effect of our assistance program on the U.S. balance of international payments. In addition, the foreign aid program assists the long-term growth of U.S. exports by stimulating new trade patterns and opportunities.

Development loans and technical cooperation.—Most expenditures for development assistance are in the form of long-term loans, repayable in dollars. Expenditures for these loans will total an estimated \$654 million in 1967, \$15 million less than in 1966. This total excludes loans under the Alliance for Progress, discussed separately.

The development loan program is concentrated in a limited group of countries. It

finances the dollar costs of capital projects and critical imports upon which economic growth depends. In these countries, U.S. assistance is part of an overall program of economic development carried out in accordance with a well-defined set of plans and domestic policies.

To complement development loans, the United States provides funds—largely through grants—to cover part of the costs of furnishing U.S. advisers. The experience and technical skills of these advisers assist in dealing with complex problems in the fields of education, health, agriculture, public administration, internal security, and other areas essential to economic and social development. Expenditures for technical cooperation are expected to be \$200 million in 1967, about the same as in 1966.

Alliance for Progress.—This program is a cooperative, long-term effort of the United States and the Latin American nations to promote economic and social reform and development. U.S. participation consists largely of development loans and technical assistance, related to self-help performance by the recipients.

Expenditures for the Alliance for Progress will total \$430 million in 1967, an increase of \$10 million over 1966. The activities financed by AID are coordinated with the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Supporting assistance.—In several countries where there are immediate threats to political and economic stability, the United States provides grants and loans. While these programs contribute to development, they are particularly designed to counter dangers to free world security. Expenditures for supporting assistance are estimated at \$642 million in 1967, compared to \$509 million in 1966. This increase largely reflects higher expenditures in South Vietnam.

Other AID programs.—The Agency for International Development will continue to guarantee private investment abroad, thus encouraging increased participation by the

American business community in the developing countries. The total value of guarantees outstanding is expected to rise in 1967 to \$4.6 billion, about \$1.6 billion more than in 1966.

The efforts of international agencies such as the United Nations Development Program complement our own bilateral activities by enlisting the coordinated support of other nations. The budget proposes expenditures of \$110 million to support the important role of these organizations, an increase of \$10 million over 1966.

Other economic and financial programs.

—New obligational authority of \$250 million is requested for 1967 to complete a 3-year, \$750 million increase in the U.S. contribution to the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB) Fund for Special Operations. This contribution will bring to \$1.2 billion our total subscription to this Bank for strengthening the Alliance for Progress during these 3 years. New obligational authority of \$104 million is also requested for 1967 to finance the second installment of the 3-year, \$312 million increase in the U.S. subscription to the International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank. The \$104 million U.S. contribution will be accompanied by contributions of \$146 million from other developed countries. Legislation will be sought to authorize additional contributions to the IDA when future needs and an appropriate sharing formula have been determined. Both the IDA and the IDB's Fund for Special Operations were set up to make long-term loans to developing nations, repayable on relatively easy terms.

Legislation will be proposed to authorize the United States to become a charter member of the Asian Development Bank—to be formally established in 1966—and to subscribe \$200 million of the Bank's \$1 billion capital stock. The budget includes new obligational authority of \$120 million for 1966 and \$20 million for 1967 for this purpose. Of the 1966 request, \$100 million will be

held in the U.S. Treasury as backing for borrowing by the Bank in private capital markets. No expenditures against these funds are now contemplated. The remaining \$20 million in 1966 and the \$20 million in 1967 will provide the first and second of five equal annual installments toward the U.S. share of the Bank's paid-in capital. Expenditures are estimated at \$10 million in each year.

The Export-Import Bank will continue its efforts to expand U.S. exports. Its insurance and guarantee programs—undertaken in cooperation with insurance companies and commercial banks—by the end of 1967 will protect more than \$1.7 billion of U.S. exports against both political and commercial risks. Its direct loans to foreign borrowers to pay for U.S. exports are expected to increase from \$403 million in 1965 to \$658 million in 1966 and \$906 million in 1967. Sales to private buyers of \$1 billion in loans and certificates of participation in the Bank's portfolio of loans will contribute to an estimated net excess of Bank receipts over expenditures of \$309 million in fiscal year 1967.

The Peace Corps is expected to continue to expand the number of volunteers overseas or in training in response to requests from foreign nations for their services. Peace Corps volunteers will be active in about 46 countries in 1967. This budget provides for 16,000 volunteers and trainees by the end of 1967, compared to an estimated 14,500 in 1966. Expenditures are estimated to increase to \$88 million in 1967.

Food for Peace.—The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480) is the foundation of the existing Food for Peace program, through which U.S. agricultural abundance is used to feed hungry people and promote economic development abroad. However, food production in the developing countries has not been keeping pace with the requirements of expanding populations. Legislation will be proposed to authorize a new Food for Peace

program. The new program will be closely coordinated with economic assistance directed at increased agricultural production in the less developed countries themselves.

About two-thirds of the existing Food for Peace program consists of sales of agricultural commodities to foreign nations for their own currencies. The local currencies are then available in the recipient countries to pay U.S. obligations, to finance loans to U.S. private enterprise, and to support local development projects. Most of these currencies are inconvertible, and considerable balances are lying idle in a number of countries. In order to use these currencies more effectively, special foreign currency authorizations are proposed for applying these balances to specific worthwhile projects serving U.S. program objectives.

The proposed new program contemplates, for future years, an increased emphasis on sales under long-term, dollar-repayable credits. Grant programs will also be continued.

The total volume of commodities shipped under the Food for Peace program in 1967 is expected to increase above 1966 levels. Expenditures, however, are estimated to decline by \$162 million from 1966, reflecting lower export prices resulting from the cotton and wheat legislation enacted last year.

Shipment of commodities abroad through private welfare agencies, authorized by section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, is sometimes considered a part of the Food for Peace effort. Expenditures for this program, which are classified under agriculture and agricultural resources, are estimated at \$200 million in 1967.

Foreign information and exchange activities.—The Department of State and the United States Information Agency conduct activities aimed at improving mutual understanding with other peoples. Expenditures for the information and related programs of the United States Information Agency are expected to increase by \$8 million in 1967, reflecting expanded activities in support of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

President Answers Congressional Letter on Viet-Nam Situation

Following is the text of a letter from President Johnson to Representative Brock Adams, which was made public by the White House on January 22.

JANUARY 22, 1966

DEAR MR. CONGRESSMAN: I am responding to you as the first in alphabetical order of those Members of the House who have written to me under date of January 21 on the search for peace in Vietnam. I hope you will share this answer with your co-signers.

I am grateful for your strong support of our effort to move the war in Vietnam to the conference table. This support is a real encouragement, coupled as it is with the equally strong support of our determination to meet our commitments in Vietnam.

I share your interest in effective action through the United Nations, and I want you to know that there is no part of this whole problem to which we give closer attention. I have reviewed this matter many times with Ambassador Goldberg, and we have repeatedly considered the suggestion you offer. You can be assured that he and I are firmly determined to make every possible use of the United Nations in moving toward peace, and toward an effective ceasefire as part of that purpose.

Unfortunately, you are correct in your statement that the response from the other side has not been encouraging. The evidence available to this government indicates only continuing hostility and aggressiveness in Hanoi and an insistence on the abandonment of South Vietnam to Communist take-over. We are making no hasty assumptions of any sort, but it is quite another matter to close our eyes to the heavy weight of evidence which has accumulated during the last month.

I can give you categorical assurance that there will be no abandonment of our peace efforts. Even though it is increasingly clear that we have had only a hostile response to the present pause in bombing North Viet-

nam, you can be sure that our unflagging pursuit of peace will continue. As I said this week in a letter to Speaker McCormack,¹ "Whether the present effort is successful or not, our purpose of peace will be constant; we will continue to press on every door."

And at the same time, I am confident that as elected representatives of the American people, you will share my determination that our fighting forces in Vietnam shall be sustained and supported "by every dollar and every gun and every decision" that they must have—"whatever the cost and whatever the challenge."² For a month we have held our hand in an important area of military action. But the infiltration of the aggressor's forces has continued, and so have his attacks on our allies and on our own men. I am sure you will agree that we have a heavy obligation not to add lightly to the dangers our troops must face. We must give them the support they need in fulfillment of the commitment so accurately stated in your letter—"the determination of our Government to resist the terror and aggression which deny the people of South Vietnam the right freely to determine their own future."

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President Urges Action on Funds for Southeast Asia Operations

Following is the text of a letter from President Johnson to the Speaker of the House of Representatives made public by the White House on January 19.³

White House press release dated January 19

JANUARY 19, 1966

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith for the consideration of the Congress proposed supplemental appropriations for

¹ See below.

² For text of President Johnson's state of the Union address, see BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

³ Also available in H. Doc. 362, 89th Cong., 2d sess.

the fiscal year 1966. These appropriations, amounting to \$12,760,719,000, are for the Department of Defense and for military and economic assistance primarily in support of our operations in Southeast Asia. They are required to support our growing national activities in helping the people and Government of Vietnam as they face continuing aggression. I also transmit the necessary authorizing legislation.

I urge that Congress act promptly to provide these needed funds.

We are currently engaged in a major effort to open a road to a peaceful settlement. Whether the present effort is successful or not, our purpose of peace will be constant; we will continue to press on every door.

But until there is a response—and until the aggression ends—we must do all that is necessary to support our allies and our own fighting forces in Vietnam. That is the purpose of the present request.

The bulk of this request—\$12.3 billion—is for a military appropriation. These funds will provide for the operations of our men in Vietnam and the weapons, ammunition, ports and airfields which should be available to support them if the aggression continues.

We need about \$4 billion of this amount for military expenditures such as ammunition and about \$8 billion for items with a "long lead time." Items with long lead time (the time it takes the contractor to make the item once he receives the order) range from about a year for helicopters, to fourteen to eighteen months for jet aircraft like the A-4E "Sky Hawk" and the A-6A "Intruder," and up to three to five years for ships.

We hope the aggression will end; we must be prepared if it does not. This military appropriation request also includes about \$200 million which will be applied to military assistance for the forces of South Vietnam and other allies fighting there. This method of appropriation will permit our commanders in Vietnam to simplify and expedite supply operations for all fighting forces there.

An additional sum of \$415 million is re-

requested for the Agency for International Development, again primarily for Vietnam. These economic appropriations are for import financing, for rural construction, for port expansion, for refugee relief and for development. They have an equal basic importance with our military effort itself. On the military side we do what aggression requires. On the economic and social side we work also for the true future of South Vietnam.

In the last two years, in repeated acts of authorization and appropriation, the Congress has provided continuing support for our national decision "to prevent further aggression" in Southeast Asia. The quoted words come from the Joint Resolution of the Congress—Public Law 88-408—approved on August 10, 1964.⁴ It is in the letter and the spirit of the Resolution that I request this supplementary appropriation. While that Resolution remains in force, and until its obligations are discharged, we must persevere. I believe that Resolution is right, and I believe the course we follow is necessary. I intend that those who must face danger and death as we follow that course shall be supported. I am confident that the Congress will agree.

This is an opportunity for us to demonstrate once again—to friend and foe alike—that there is no difference between one party and another or between the Congress and the Executive Branch when it comes to effective and sustained support of our fighting men and their allies. Whatever differences there are on other issues, we are as one in support of our men in Vietnam. As I said just one week ago,⁵ "Until peace comes, or if it does not come . . . we will give our fighting men what they must have: every gun, every dollar, and every decision—whatever the cost or whatever the challenge." And we will continue to help the people of

South Vietnam and our allies in resisting aggression and in protecting the independence of that beleaguered country.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President Urges Participation in Asian Development Bank

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to the Congress transmitted on January 18 (White House press release).¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I recommend that the Congress promptly approve United States participation in the Asian Development Bank.

This new institution expresses the will of Asia to develop her manifold human and natural resources, and thereby to lift the burden of poverty that has been the lot of her people since ancient times.

Conceived and sponsored by Asians, the Bank is open to all countries in that region, regardless of ideology, who are members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. Of its \$1 billion authorized capital, 65% is to be subscribed by nations in the Asian area.

United States representatives—led by Mr. Eugene Black and a distinguished Congressional delegation—signed the Charter of the Asian Development Bank at Manila last December 4.² But only the Congress itself can authorize the final acceptance of U.S. membership.

That is the action I request today.

I

I take this step because of my urgent belief that the works of peace in Asia—the

⁴ For text see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268; for remarks made by President Johnson on Aug. 10, 1964, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 302.

⁵ For text of President Johnson's state of the Union address, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

¹ Also available in H. Doc. 361, 89th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the text of the agreement establishing the Bank and a special report by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1015.

building of roads, dams, harbors, power plants, and all the other public and private facilities essential to a modern economy—are vital to peace in the entire world.

An Asia torn by conflict, depressed by hunger, disease and illiteracy, deprived of the means and the institutions that alone can offer hope to her people, must ever be a source of turmoil and anxiety for nations beyond her borders, as well as those within. Because this is so—and because we have recognized our moral obligation to our brothers on this earth—the United States has committed itself over a decade and a half to major assistance programs in Asia, making food, development loans, and technical assistance available to those who required our aid.

We have sought no American empire. Our purpose has never been to exploit, but to encourage; not to master, but to magnify the works of those who truly served the Asian people.

Now the Asians themselves have formed an institution by whose hand new works of peace may be accomplished. They have committed precious resources to that institution. They are determined to join in a cooperative endeavor, uniting the talents and resources of diverse cultures in pursuit of a common vision of progress.

They have asked us to join with them—to subscribe 20% of the institution's total capital—and thus to help make that vision a reality.

I recommend that we respond quickly and affirmatively.

II

This proposal is neither utopian nor vague. It is the product of careful deliberation by the foremost experts in international finance. It rests solidly on the lessons learned in building the World Bank, and other organs of international finance, into the powerful forces for good they are today. It will take its place among regional financial institutions alongside the Inter-American Development Bank and the newly-formed African Development Bank.

Loan terms will be similar to those offered by the World Bank. Project justifications will be as rigorous as prudent management requires. Special efforts will be made to develop and finance projects involving more than one country, so that the Bank may be an agent of unity as well as development.

The Bank will reinforce existing aid programs in Asia, and thereby multiply their effectiveness. It will link its resources—financial and human—to such institutions as the Mekong Coordinating Committee, already joining the countries of the Mekong River Basin in major water resource projects.

Its Charter permits it to administer special development funds, contributed by either member or non-member countries. Thus it will serve as a channel for funds beyond its own resources.

These advantages are developed further in the Special Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Asian Development Bank which accompanies this message.

III

The largest share of the Bank's subscriptions will be provided by Asians themselves.

The United States has been asked to pledge \$200 million, equally divided between paid-in and callable shares. The paid-in shares are payable in five equal annual installments of \$20 million each, half of which will be in cash, half in the form of a letter of credit.

The callable shares will constitute a guarantee for borrowings by the Bank in private capital markets. They would be drawn on only in the unlikely event that the Bank were unable to meet its commitments.

Our pledge is equalled by that of Japan. India has pledged \$93 million; Australia another \$85 million. More than \$100 million has already been pledged by European countries and Canada, and further pledges may be made.

Joint action with these major subscribers provides another instrument of cooperation between the donors of aid. That is a long-sought goal of the United States, for it

offers the most efficient use of all the free world's aid resources.

Finally, our commitment to the Asian Bank should have little negative effect on our balance of payments. Procurement financed through the Bank's regular capital will normally be limited to member countries. Purchases of U.S. goods and services will approximately offset the dollar outflow occasioned by our \$10 million annual cash subscription.

IV

The Asian Development Bank is a necessity—not a luxury.

It was needed yesterday. It is needed even more today. Tomorrow, when the demands of Asia's millions on her struggling economies are more pressing still, it can mean the difference between opportunity and chaos.

It is practical and imaginative. It is the product of Asian initiative, and it offers the nucleus around which Asians can make a cooperative response to the most critical economic problems—national and regional.

Because it is all these things, it is also an avenue of good will and sound policy for the United States. For our destination is a world where the instinct for oppression has been vanquished in the heart of man. Given the means to work, to build, to teach, to heal, to nourish his family, man may yet achieve such a world—if not in our time, then in the generations that will succeed us on this planet. I believe the Asian Development Bank is an essential tool in providing the means of life for hundreds of millions of human beings who live between the Caspian Sea and the South Pacific.

It will become a reality when fifteen signatories, ten of them Asian, have ratified the Charter. It appears now that this will be achieved by early Spring. Our own constructive influence in the organization and management of the Bank will be increased if we can become active at its very beginning.

Last April in Baltimore I spoke of our dream of a world "where all are fed and charged with hope."³ I promised that "we

will help to make it so." Our partnership in the Asian Bank is a step in keeping that pledge. It brings us nearer that day when our resources—and the world's—can be devoted to the constructive works of peace, not the destructive forces of war.

I urge the Congress to adopt the Asian Development Bank Act. Asia's future—and the world's—requires it.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 18, 1966.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Greece of August 4, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3310, 4837, 5250, 5251), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna June 15, 1964.

Entered into force: January 13, 1966.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Canada, December 23, 1965.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Open for signature at Washington January 17 through 28, 1966.¹

Signatures: India, January 28, 1966; Mexico, January 17, 1966; Spain, United Arab Republic, January 28, 1966; United States, January 24, 1966.

Notification of undertaking to seek ratification: India, January 28, 1966.

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

¹ Not in force.

in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution;

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict.

Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.²

Accession deposited: Turkey, December 15, 1965.

Finance

Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila December 4, 1965. Open for signature at Bangkok until January 31, 1966.¹

Signatures: Afghanistan, Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, China, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Western Samoa, December 4, 1965.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic. Done at London April 9, 1965. Open for signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.¹

*Signatures:*² Belgium, September 9, 1965; Japan, September 30, 1965; Netherlands, October 6, 1965; Norway, October 9, 1965; Senegal, April 9, 1965; Spain, October 9, 1965; Switzerland, September 1, 1965.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881).

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, November 4, 1965; Norway, December 1, 1965; United States, December 29, 1965.

Adherences deposited: Singapore (with reservations), December 7, 1965.

Entered into force: January 1, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ All signed subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the international sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Open for signature at London November 1 through December 23, 1965.

Entered into force: January 1, 1966.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.

Notifications of approval: Australia, November 26, 1965; Federal Republic of Germany, including Land Berlin, December 2, 1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II. TIAS 5844.

Acceptance deposited: Finland, January 24, 1966.

BILATERAL

Korea

Amendment and extension of the agreement of February 3, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3490, 4030), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 30, 1965.

Entered into force: January 28, 1966.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended (TIAS 5821, 5867, 5876, 5891). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon January 17, 1966. Entered into force January 17, 1966.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of April 28 and October 29, 1964 (TIAS 5568, 5685). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade December 29 and 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965.

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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No.	Date	Subject
16	1/26	Businessmen meet with Under Secretary Mann.
†17	1/27	U.S. exercises option to build Libby Dam.
*18	1/27	Rusk: death of Bruce Downes.
†19	1/28	Compliance with U. K. order on export of Rhodesian chromite.
†20	1/28	Williams: International Relations Council, South Bend, Ind.
21	1/29	Ball: Northwestern University Alumni Association.

* Not printed here.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Affairs

Excerpt From President Johnson's State of the Union Message

This pamphlet contains the foreign policy section of President Johnson's state of the Union message of January 12, 1966. It deals chiefly with the situation in Viet-Nam, U.S. objectives with regard to the Vietnamese people, and the unceasing search for a peaceful solution. The President outlines here, and pledges to continue, the five major lines of foreign policy that the United States has followed under its last four Presidents. The President's message includes recommendations concerning arms control, a more flexible East-West trade policy, foreign assistance, and worldwide attack on the problems of hunger, disease, and ignorance.

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February 21, 1966

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U.S. Proposes Seven-Point Program for Disarmament at Geneva

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative William C. Foster on January 26 on his arrival at Geneva for a resumed session of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, together with the text of a message from President Johnson which Mr. Foster read at the opening session of the conference on January 27.

STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER

The reconvening of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on January 27 is timely and important. During 1965 the nations represented at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the United Nations General Assembly, and the ENDC clearly enunciated their concern in the urgent need for agreement on arms control and disarmament measures.

The several resolutions passed by the 20th session of the U.N. General Assembly requesting the ENDC to consider proposals to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons¹ were an expression of faith in the competency of the ENDC to deal with these matters. They also were a clear expression of their concern that arms control and disarmament agreements, especially concerning nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, must be successfully concluded.

The heightened international tensions of today only make more imperative the neces-

sity to achieve progress in controlling the arms race. Successes in this international endeavor can have beneficial impacts in other areas of international affairs.

President Johnson, in his state of the Union message,² made clear the United States' continuing policy to contribute to the development of a flourishing world, to seek international peace and security, and to pursue our goals for the freedom and dignity of man. President Johnson also stated:

A second principle of policy is the effort to control, and to reduce, and to ultimately eliminate modern engines of destruction.

We will vigorously pursue existing proposals—and seek new ones—to control arms and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

The President has forcefully instructed me to do everything humanly possible to advance this principle of policy. I intend to do so.

The United States, along with most other nations of the world, considers agreements on measures of nonproliferation as most urgent in the field of arms control and disarmament. Therefore, as a matter of priority we shall strive for safeguarded agreements on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and related matters, as overwhelmingly endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly.

This principle of policy is consistent with other foreign policies of the United States. Indeed, it is an important complement to some of them.

It is my hope that the Soviet Union and

¹ For statements made by Mr. Foster in Committee I and the text of a resolution, see BULLETIN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873.

² For the foreign policy portion of the President's message, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

other nations represented at the ENDC will share our concern and conviction so that we may make the year 1966 a memorable one for the peaceful aspirations of mankind.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated January 27

The avoidance of war and particularly nuclear war is the central, common concern of all mankind.

My country is dedicated to this end. The effort to control and reduce—and ultimately eliminate—modern engines of nuclear destruction is fundamental to our policy. We have, with all mankind, a common interest in acting now to prevent nuclear spread, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear stocks.

For this reason, we must press on with our work in Geneva. It is true that our meeting is shadowed by continuing aggression against the people and Government of South Viet-Nam. There are differences among the members of the conference on Viet-Nam, but these differences make our common interest in preventing nuclear spread and curbing the nuclear arms race all the more important to pursue. Even while our own nation is engaged in necessary resistance to aggression in Southeast Asia, it must continue to pursue every avenue for stable peace, both in Viet-Nam and throughout the world. That great general effort has no more important set of goals than those of disarmament, which are the business of this conference.

I have instructed the United States delegation to urge upon your meeting the following seven-point program:

1. First, let us seek a nonproliferation treaty which, in the words of the United Nations General Assembly, is "void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form."³ We are prepared to sign such a

treaty, making it applicable to nuclear and nonnuclear countries alike. We are prepared to work with other countries to assure that no nonnuclear country acquires its own nuclear weapons, gains national control over nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third countries or groups of countries, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance.

2. Second, through a nonproliferation treaty and through efforts outside such a treaty, we must continue to secure application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities. To this end, I urge agreement that all transfers of nuclear materials or equipment for peaceful purposes to countries which do not have nuclear weapons be under IAEA or equivalent international safeguards. At the same time, the major nuclear powers should accept in increasing measure the same international safeguards they recommend for other states.

Recently, many responsible Members of both Houses of the Congress of the United States introduced resolutions dealing with measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. These resolutions are an indication of the importance that the people of the United States attribute to such measures, and to the role that international safeguards should play in them. I fully share these views.

3. Third, so that those who forswear nuclear weapons may forever refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race, let us strive to strengthen United Nations and other international security arrangements. Meanwhile, the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail.

4. Fourth, my country persists in its belief that the perils of proliferation would be

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1965, p. 884.

materially reduced by an extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground nuclear tests. For such an extension, the United States will require only that number and kind of inspections which modern science shows to be necessary to assure that the treaty is being faithfully observed. We call upon those nations truly interested in such a ban to provide to this Committee any improvements in means for the detection and identification of seismic events which their research efforts may have developed.

5. Fifth, let us seek agreement not to increase, and indeed to reduce, nuclear materials in weapons stockpiles. The United States continues to urge a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. We continue to urge that such a halt be accompanied by the transfer of large quantities of fissionable material to peaceful purposes, under international safeguards. We continue to urge the demonstrated destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. to produce this fissionable material. We have also stated our willingness, if others cannot now agree to halting all production of fissionable material for use in weapons, to accept step-by-step reductions of such production by the shutting down of equivalent facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with the same type of effective inspection applicable to all.

6. Sixth, as another step to reduce the dangers and burdens of nuclear arms, let us direct our attention to modern, long-range, high-speed carriers of nuclear destruction. I urge continued exploration of the terms and conditions which could make acceptable to all the proposal I put before you in 1964 for a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic bombers and missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons.⁴ If progress can be made

here, the United States will be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles. To facilitate agreement, let us begin now to seek common understanding of some of the issues involved in both these proposals.

7. Seventh, as we focus on nuclear arms, let us not forget that resources are being devoted to nonnuclear arms races all around the world. These resources might better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick, and teaching the uneducated. The cost of acquiring and maintaining one squadron of supersonic aircraft diverts resources that would build and maintain a university. We suggest therefore that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige. The initiative for arrangements of this kind should, of course, come from the regions concerned. The interested countries should undertake not to acquire from any source, including production of their own as well as importation from others, military equipment which they proscribe. If such arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them.

Each of these steps would contribute toward reducing the danger and destruction of war. Each of them would take us further down the path toward our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Yet each of them is possible of achievement today if only all nations have the will.

The limited test ban treaty lit a candle of hope in the darkness. The gleam of that candle shows the way to a brighter tomorrow if we will but follow. We must move toward it quickly while there is yet time.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224.

The Crisis in Southern Rhodesia

by *G. Mennen Williams*

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

The present Southern Rhodesian crisis is an important last chapter in the historic process of British decolonization. This has been an honorable and commendable history which has won respect and friendship from the former subject populations, not only for Britain but for the West. The American who hopes to gain cheap popularity by denigrating the British—in India or in many parts of Africa—quickly finds that, once Britain has shed the embarrassments of colonialism, former subjects and many of their friends hold the Crown, Britishers, and English traditions in genuine esteem. Thus, Britain, as it comes toward the end of decolonization, has at stake both a proud tradition and practical assets of considerable value to her and to the Western World.

What is involved in Southern Rhodesia is the opposition by a few white supremacists to Britain's efforts to develop orderly and measured transition to majority rule for a country of 220,000 whites and 4 million blacks.

What is further involved is the position of Britain and the West in all of the rest of Africa north of the Zambezi and the continuation of the Commonwealth as a democratic force in the world.

Originally, under the Welensky umbrella of the now-defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Whitehead government of Southern Rhodesia (1953–1963), a

program of interracial partnership made some progress toward racial harmony. In 1962, however, reaction set in with the election of Prime Minister Winston Field. When he failed to move fast enough toward white-dominated independence, however, his party, the right-wing Rhodesian Front, ousted him and put Ian Smith in power in April 1964. On November 11, 1965, Smith led Southern Rhodesia into rebellion against the British and toward the establishment of a white-supremacy regime.²

Since that time we have supported the British Government in its efforts to depose the breakaway regime and return the colony to the path of constitutional progress toward eventual majority rule. We have done so because we believe the British sincerely are seeking the only just and sensible solution to this uniquely difficult problem. The British want to set in motion a peaceful and orderly transition toward self-determination on a basis acceptable to the Southern Rhodesian people as a whole. Our support for this British goal remains firm.

Principles of British Policy

The British policy was enunciated clearly and frequently to Mr. Smith—and to the world—by Prime Minister [Harold] Wilson before the Smith regime broke off negotiations with the British on November 11 and seized power illegally. That policy can be

¹ Address made before the International Relations Council, South Bend, Ind., on Jan. 28 (press release 20).

² For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, pp. 894 and 908.

summed up in five principles which, in effect, establish the conditions under which Britain will be willing to agree to independence for Southern Rhodesia. They are:

1. There must be unimpeded progress toward majority rule—this does not require “one man, one vote” tomorrow, but it does mean just and reasonable progress in that direction;

2. There must be firm provisions against any retrogression by the Southern Rhodesia Government on constitutional guarantees for majority rule;

3. There must be immediate constitutional advance for black Africans;

4. There must be progress in reducing racial discrimination, including repeal of the Land Apportionment Act (the basis for both the inequitable distribution of land as well as the cornerstone of the Southern Rhodesian system of racial segregation); and

5. There must be satisfactory evidence that the majority of the Southern Rhodesian population—not merely a majority of the whites or a majority of the Government-salaried chiefs—accepts the 1961 constitution as a basis for independence.

Last Tuesday, January 25, Prime Minister Wilson in Parliament added a sixth principle: “The need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.”

It is hard to see at this point in the 20th century what policy could be more just, more practical, or more democratic than this.

Let me also mention the constitutional and legal considerations in the British-Southern Rhodesian relationship at this stage. First of all, no nation in the world has recognized the Smith regime, and it remains a British colony. Britain reacted to the rebellion by having the Governor dismiss the entire Smith cabinet and by a parliamentary declaration invalidating any act passed by the Southern Rhodesian parliament after November 10. Thus, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, Southern Rhodesia remains under British sovereignty. The Brit-

ish Parliament, therefore, is the only body which may now legally legislate for Southern Rhodesia. Acting for Southern Rhodesia, the British have enacted a series of Orders-in-Council banning the import of oil into Southern Rhodesia, banning the export of chrome from Southern Rhodesia, dismissing the board of the Southern Rhodesian Reserve Bank, and creating a new board in London under which control of Southern Rhodesian foreign exchange reserves is placed. These Orders-in-Council at this point have the force and effect of the law of the land for all those affected by them.

With the cooperation of almost all nations in the world, these controls have proved to be remarkably effective.

Forty percent of the country's gross national product is dependent upon exports, such as tobacco, chrome, asbestos, lithium, pig iron, and other minerals. In a normal year Southern Rhodesia earns 26 percent (about \$87 million) of its foreign exchange from the United Kingdom and another 26 percent from Zambia.

Measures taken by the British and other major trading partners of Southern Rhodesia have cut the country's foreign exchange earning capacity by about 50 percent already. There is every indication that the screws will be further tightened.

U.S. Supports British Countermeasures

American reaction to the illegal seizure of power by the Smith regime was immediate and positive. In the weeks that have elapsed since November 11 we have given many concrete evidences of our support of the British program of economic, political, and psychological countermeasures. We are encouraged by and pleased to acknowledge the widespread support our actions have received in the U.S. press, in American business circles, and from the general public.

At the present time, the United States is enforcing an arms embargo, announced in the U.N. Security Council last November 12,^{*} against the Southern Rhodesian regime.

^{*} *Ibid.*, p. 912.

Under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, we have put anything in the munitions line under Government license to prohibit the export of arms and ammunition to the rebel regime.

Under the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended, we have prohibited the export from the United States of all petroleum and petroleum products to aid the British oil embargo. As far as foreign oil operations of American companies are concerned, they are voluntarily respecting the British embargo, although export control regulations do not apply. Although we are not a major supplier of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia, we did supply that country with about 15-20 percent of its heavy lubricants, and those can now be cut off. Under this act we also are in a position to stay in step with the British as their sanctions against exports to Southern Rhodesia become tighter and tighter.

Although controls over U.S. exports to Southern Rhodesia are provided for by existing legislation, there are no comparable controls over imports from Southern Rhodesia. The President has, however, employed powers given him under the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965 to suspend Southern Rhodesia's sugar quotas for 1965 and 1966. In fact, the entire Southern Rhodesian sugar quota for 1965 was turned back at sea in early December. But for the most part the United States has had to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of American industry and for their recognition of British Orders-in-Council that apply to their operations in Southern Rhodesia. Such cooperation has been forthcoming in commendable fashion from American importers of Southern Rhodesian commodities.

We have managed to cut our imports from Southern Rhodesia almost in half through the elimination of sugar imports and by obtaining the voluntary agreements of U.S. importers of lithium and asbestos to find other sources of these materials. Last week, the British Government issued an Order-in-Council banning exports of chrome from their Southern Rhodesian col-

Compliance With U.K. Order on Export of Rhodesian Chromite

Department Statement

Press release 19 dated January 28

The Government of the United Kingdom has recently announced an Order-in-Council prohibiting the export and transactions intended to promote the export of chromite from Southern Rhodesia. The United States Government recognizes the legal authority of Her Majesty's Government to take this action and has requested all United States importers of Rhodesian chromite to comply with the Order.

ony. If such exports are cut off, it would be another blow to the Smith regime's remaining foreign exchange earnings. This would go a long way in tightening the economic noose around the Southern Rhodesian regime.

Let me express here our regard for the oil companies who were partners in the consortium that operated the Southern Rhodesian oil refinery at Umtali. Those companies responded cooperatively to the British Order-in-Council banning the import of oil into Southern Rhodesia.

Effects of Measures Against Rebel Regime

Now, having mentioned some of the measures being taken against the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia, let me turn to some of their effects.

First of all, the oil embargo has proved to be almost completely successful, as far as we can ascertain. It will not be long before Southern Rhodesians should have pumped their last tank dry unless they succeed in their efforts to find alternate sources of supply. No crude oil has been pumped through the pipeline from the Indian Ocean at Beira, Mozambique, to Southern Rhodesia since December 31, and, as a consequence, the Umtali refinery has been forced to shut down.

The Smith regime obviously miscalculated British determination to end the rebellion. Smith's planning was very poor in

this regard—and, indeed, in many other regards.

For example, he counted on support from other nations, but such support, as he admitted publicly on a television program last week, has not been forthcoming.

Seizing power when it did, the Smith regime was caught with only 2–3 months of its normal supply of petroleum products inside the country. Smith waited a critical 6 weeks after the rebellion started before initiating gasoline rationing, and he has since twice reduced the very small amounts of gasoline people in the country are being allotted.

The British series of fiscal measures has resulted in the seizure or freezing of all official Southern Rhodesian foreign exchange reserves abroad. This has resulted in a drastic cut in the economy's available foreign exchange.

The Rhodesian pound, which has lost sterling backing, has fallen to nearly half its value in the free market.

By the end of January nearly all major international airlines serving Southern Rhodesia will discontinue their service to Salisbury.

Imports, upon which the high standard of living of white Southern Rhodesians was based, have been reduced to about one-third of the former total and will have to be reduced even further. Taxes have been increased on many commodities.

While the Smith regime allowed the general public to have a good Christmas, within 3 days after Christmas many retail dealers began laying off their staffs and shortages of goods were noticeable in most shops, with no replenishments in sight.

The only tire manufacturer in Southern Rhodesia has laid off 60 percent of its work force, and other large businesses and mining firms are similarly laying off their staffs.

Unemployment in the white community already is believed to be reaching 10 percent, and there is perhaps an even higher percentage of unemployment among the black African work force. The regime is al-

ready talking of a public works program to give work to the unemployed of both races.

There are some indications of white Southern Rhodesians looking around for job opportunities in other countries. The black Africans have been hit proportionately harder by sanctions than whites, but their scale of living already was low and they can get subsistence living in their home villages. On the other hand, white living standards are going down sharply and they face relatively greater hardship.

There will be a whole series of corporate and individual bankruptcies over the next few months unless the Smith regime steps in and meets notes for the following year.

All this is happening at a time of the worst drought in southern Africa in this century. It has become questionable whether Southern Rhodesia will be able to produce enough corn, which is the staple African diet, to feed its people this year. Cattle are reported dying by the thousands per week. The tobacco crop, which normally accounts for nearly 50 percent of Southern Rhodesia's foreign exchange earnings, will be less than two-thirds its normal size this year. It also is hard to see how any of it can be marketed abroad, as the United Kingdom and most other major importers of Southern Rhodesia tobacco have banned its import for the duration of the emergency.

Thousands of people have showed their loyalty to the Crown and to the beleaguered Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, by signing his visitors' book.

As far as we can determine, the judiciary has all remained loyal to the Crown.

The various church groups have courageously stood up and announced their opposition to the rebel regime. A pastoral letter was signed by all six Catholic bishops in Southern Rhodesia. The Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland was the first churchman to take a public position against the regime from the pulpit.

There are indications that some anti-Smith groups within the country are beginning to make efforts to coalesce.

African efforts to organize strikes have

had to be put down by Smith's police, tear gas, and guns. On November 11 there were about 2,000 African nationalists held in detention—most of them without trial—for essentially political reasons. There have been hundreds of additional such arrests since that time.

Another indication of popular reaction is found in the regime's attempt to make all government employees sign a loyalty oath. The regime started its effort with postal workers, the great bulk of whom are black Africans. When resistance was encountered, however, the whole project was dropped.

The stringent censorship the regime is enforcing has prevented people inside the country from learning about the full extent of the economic strictures being brought to bear on them, but the British are making an effort to enlighten Southern Rhodesian opinion by building a BBC relay transmitter in neighboring Bechuanaland. That station is now in operation.

Thus the sum total of all these measures is that only a little more than 2 months has brought a drastic reduction in standards of living among whites in the country—and they have only seen the beginning. The British have promised to invoke an even wider range of sanctions and are expected to announce the next round shortly.

There is no question in our minds about the determination of the British to see this program through. I might point out that at the Lagos conference of January 11–12 the British appear to have convinced all other Commonwealth members who attended that there were sufficient reasons to believe that these sanctions can be successful. This led to a decision to wait until July before the Commonwealth will reexamine the effectiveness of this attempt to bring down the Smith regime. We are sure that the British will use that time to good advantage.

Before and after the illegal rebellion, the British position has been that they would not use force in the Southern Rhodesia rebellion, except to restore law and order. Shortly after the rebellion took place, the British gave an indication that they were

willing to send troops into neighboring Zambia, although agreement could not be reached with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda on a mandate for such troops.

In the meantime, when the possibility that the Smith regime would cut off Zambia's power from the Kariba Dam became a specter on the horizon, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson publicly stated that the United Kingdom could not stand idly by and allow that to happen. Zambia's entire copper-based economy depends on Kariba power. Late last week, too, a British military mission arrived in Zambia for talks with the Zambian Government.

Economic Help for Zambia

The United States and the United Kingdom are united in their determination that Zambia shall not be made to bear the brunt of the Southern Rhodesia crisis. As a result of their common colonial past, the economies of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia are rather intricately intertwined. All of Zambia's oil, for example, has been received from the refinery at Umtali. Thus, the announcement of the British oil embargo caught Zambia with less than 2 weeks' supply of petroleum products, although measures were already under way to meet Zambia's petroleum requirements by alternate overland methods.⁴ These, of course, take time to function fully.

The help given to Zambia by its African neighbors has been vital to the success of the supply operation. Kenya and Tanzania have cooperated magnificently in making available their port, railroad, and airport facilities for the British segment of the airlift. Tanzania has greatly facilitated the overland flow of petroleum by helping to organize truck convoys. The Congo has met every request of the United States and Canadian Governments to make a success of the airlift we have mounted from Léopoldville. Two great American overseas airlines, Pan American Airways and Trans

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157.

World Airlines, deserve a hearty "well done" for their assistance with this airlift. Together, they are carrying a minimum of 180 tons of diesel fuel a day to Zambia. By the first of March the petroleum situation within Zambia should be sufficiently normal again for that aspect of the airlift to be discontinued, but we are prepared to continue the airlift for other vitally needed supplies. President Mobutu made a large gift of oil from his Government's own stocks to help tide Zambia over the most critical period of the oil shortage. The Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and Angola and the South African Government have shown a correct attitude. They have respected the British oil embargo and show every sign of continuing to practice their neutrality in what they see as a domestic British problem.

Let me close with a comment on the claim of the Smith regime that it is a bulwark against communism in Africa. We disagree. We believe the regime's policies and actions are designed to perpetuate minority rule. If those are left unchallenged and unchecked, they would create exactly the kind of situation in which the Communists could greatly extend their influence in Southern Rhodesia and which would encourage the Communists to renew their efforts elsewhere in Africa.

We have had some experience in helping responsible African governments resist Communist encroachments—far more experience, I might add, than the Southern Rhodesian regime. We believe the policies of governments in other African countries—policies looking toward social advancement, responsible majority rule, and political stability—are far more effective weapons against communism than any of the methods the Smith regime might devise.

We know of no Communist threat to Southern Rhodesia at present, but we fear one may well develop if the colony continues on its present course. We do not consider our support of British efforts to return Southern Rhodesia to legal, constitutional government inconsistent with our policy of

resisting the Communist threat to genuine independence in Africa. On the contrary, we look on our opposition to the rebel regime as additional evidence of our determination to resist that threat.

President Congratulates U.S.S.R. on Luna 9 Landing

Following is the text of a telegram from President Johnson to N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, U.S.S.R., which was read to news correspondents at the White House on February 3 by Bill D. Moyers, Press Secretary to the President.

FEBRUARY 3, 1966

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You and the people of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are to be congratulated for the great success of Luna 9. Your accomplishment is one that can benefit all mankind. And all mankind applauds it. Your scientists have made a major contribution to man's knowledge of the moon and of space.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Letters of Credence

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of Brazil, Vasco Tristão Leitão da Cunha, presented his credentials to President Johnson on February 2. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated February 2.

Niger

The newly appointed Ambassador of Niger, Adamou Mayaki, presented his credentials to President Johnson on February 1. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated February 2.

Although UNICEF in its programs of aid to children and youth is probably the most successful of the U.N. specialized agencies, the scope of its mission has been a subject of recurring debate. This article, written especially for the Bulletin by Blanche Bernstein, Officer in Charge of International Educational and Social Affairs in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, describes the evolution of UNICEF's policies and programs and the role the United States has played in helping to shape them.

UNICEF—The United Nations Children's Fund

by Blanche Bernstein

"Today UNICEF is possibly the best known, probably the most successful, and certainly the least controversial operation carried on by the United Nations." This quote from the *New Yorker* profile on Maurice Pate, the late Executive Director of UNICEF, is as accurate today as when it was published in December 1961. In fact, the news last year that UNICEF had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1965 was applauded throughout the world. The citation read, in part:

... UNICEF has realized that children provide the key to the future: the children of today are the history of the future. UNICEF is now forging a link of solidarity between the rich and the poor countries. In an age when so many people are terrified of the destructive effects of the forces that science has placed in our hands, UNICEF offers young people in all countries an alternative which it is worth living and working for—a world with freedom for all people, equality between all races, brotherhood among all men.

UNICEF has been enthusiastically endorsed by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. It receives widespread bipartisan support in the Congress—some Members occasionally suggest a substantial increase in the U.S. contribution. And with the exception of a small but vocal

minority, it is widely supported by the public at large through the "trick or treat" Halloween campaign and the purchase of UNICEF greeting cards and calendars.

Other governments and peoples are equally enthusiastic. Though contributions are voluntary, no less than 121 governments contribute to UNICEF, a larger number than to any other voluntary U.N. program. Its greeting cards are sold in many U.N. member states, and many countries have the equivalent of the U.S. trick-or-treat campaign.

The goal of the United Nations Children's Fund is to encourage by means of international assistance to governments the efforts of those governments to improve the lot of children and youth. In pursuing this goal, UNICEF has granted funds for programs of disease control, maternal and child health, nutrition, including child feeding programs, milk conservation projects and nutrition education and related activities, family and child welfare services, training of personnel needed for services to children, and more recently for education and vocational training.

Its work has been carried on in close cooperation with the specialized agencies—the

World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO)—and with the U.N. Bureau of Social Affairs.

Within the United Nations, UNICEF has a semiautonomous status and operates in the framework of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and in accordance with such principles as the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council may lay down. Governing UNICEF is a 30-nation Executive Board which meets annually to set policy, consider requests from governments for assistance, allocate aid, review program developments, and establish the administrative budget of the agency. The United States has always been represented on the Board.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the Executive Board, appoints an Executive Director who is responsible for the day-to-day operations of UNICEF. One man, Maurice Pate, held the post of Executive Director from UNICEF's inception in 1946 until his death in February 1965. In June 1965 Henry R. Labouisse, former U.S. Ambassador to Greece, was appointed Executive Director.

Most of UNICEF's income comes from voluntary contributions of governments. Out of a total income of approximately \$32.9 million in 1964, \$25.6 million, or 77.8 percent, came from governments, including \$12 million from the United States.

Income from private sources was \$4.1 million, or 12.6 percent of the total, a substantial increase from the 7.4 percent in 1960. The largest single contribution came from the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, which raised \$2.2 million, mainly from its trick-or-treat project; \$1.2 million was realized from Freedom-from-Hunger campaigns in Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, and additional sums came from "Shell-out" in Canada and various other campaigns. Other income of \$3.1 million (9.6 percent of the total) consisted of net profits from the

UNICEF Greeting Card Fund and income from miscellaneous sources.

Recurring Debate Over UNICEF's Mission

UNICEF has not always rested on universal consensus. Indeed its historical evolution has been accompanied by periodic disagreement over the scope of its mission in the United Nations family and in the early days over the question of whether it should be continued as a separate organization within the U.N.

The reason for the recurring ambivalence about UNICEF is that it does not appear to fit logically into the pattern of U.N. bodies designed to promote social progress. Others, such as WHO, UNESCO, ILO, FAO, and the U.N. Bureau of Social Affairs, cover certain functional areas—health, education, vocational training, agriculture and nutrition, and social welfare. UNICEF's concern is an age group, specifically children and youth, and, as necessary, their mothers.

Clearly, however, if one wants to help children and youth one does something about their health, education, nutrition, training, and welfare. In a sense, therefore, UNICEF can be said to duplicate the responsibilities of other U.N. agencies, and it could be argued on strictly logical grounds that there is no need for such an organization. This kind of duplication is, of course, not unique to the U.N. It is found in our own Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which is partly organized on functional lines and partly, as in the Children's Bureau, on an age basis. Similar duplication can be found in any welfare and health council in any city in the United States.

In a world which is not altogether logical, however, the justification is easy and can be made on practical grounds. In the first place UNICEF, in view of its special responsibilities, insures that attention will be paid to the problems of children and youth and that their needs will not be overlooked in the fierce competition for limited resources. In view of the close connection between an improvement in the health and educational

and vocational skill levels of children and the objective of social progress in the developing countries, it is essential that adequate provision be made for the young, who today comprise roughly half the population in these countries.

The second practical reason for the continued existence of UNICEF is the emotional appeal of an organization which works in behalf of children and youth. UNICEF has been very successful in raising funds from both governmental and private sources, funds which might not otherwise be made available for social programs of the developing countries.

Finally, a division of responsibilities between UNICEF on the one hand and the specialized agencies and the U.N. Bureau of Social Affairs on the other has been worked out so that duplication of activities is minimized.

In establishing UNICEF in 1946 the General Assembly provided:

... To the maximum extent feasible, the utilization of the staff and technical assistance of specialized agencies . . . shall be requested, with a view to reducing to a minimum the separate personnel requirements of the Fund.

The above directive was confirmed when UNICEF was made a permanent agency in 1953. In implementing this directive it was agreed that, with respect to specific projects, UNICEF would provide the essential supplies and equipment, financial aid (including stipends for training), and engineering assistance for milk and other food conservation programs. The specialized agencies, each within its own area of competence, review and advise on the technical aspects of the projects, and, where necessary, provide experts to the governments for limited periods to help with the administration of the projects in the field.

On the whole the arrangements between UNICEF and the specialized agencies have worked reasonably well. Disagreements which do arise from time to time about the importance of a particular project requested by some government, the details of how it should be set up, or the sharing of the direct

and overhead costs of the technical personnel provided by the specialized agencies have not prejudiced the development of close and cooperative relations between UNICEF and the specialized agencies.

Questions about the scope of UNICEF programs have also been raised from another angle. A substantial part of its funds have gone into disease-control campaigns, particularly malaria eradication and yaws, and in more recent years to rural water and sanitation control. These campaigns, of course, benefit adults and children alike.

In the monumental study *The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare* by Robert Asher, Walter Kotschnig, and others, published in 1957 by the Brookings Institution, the question was raised whether the terms of reference of UNICEF "should be clarified to make it evident that in much of its work it acts as a supply organization in the execution of highly important functions serving the population as a whole and not just children." The authors felt that if public opinion were properly educated the explicit recognition of the broad scope of UNICEF's program would not weaken the emotional appeal based on its association in the public mind with children.

In recent years, however, the United States has pressed for a sharper UNICEF focus on programs for children and youth. Ambassador Jonathan B. Bingham, former U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), stated the problem at the 1963 spring session of the Council as follows:

There are many who believe that the best way of assuring the welfare of children is to improve the general level of economic and social development. We have no basic quarrel with this view. Indeed, many programs—such as the improvement of child health—require action which reaches all members of the community such as environmental sanitation or increased agricultural production. We believe, however, that UNICEF fulfills a different purpose from other international agencies which are concerned with economic and social development in general. Children have special needs; they are more vulnerable to the effects of such new and developing factors as rapid increases in population, the ever-increasing migration of people from rural to

urban areas and the frequently accompanying breakdown of family traditions and solidarity.

At the June 1963 UNICEF Executive Board meeting, the U.S. Representative, Dean Frederick DelliQuadri, stated that the United States was satisfied with the major policy decisions which governed the scope of UNICEF programs but expressed concern about certain types of projects in nutrition and training. He illustrated the dilemma in the field of nutrition by describing UNICEF projects that would be of special benefit to children. These included, he said:

. . . nutrition education for mothers and children, training in nutrition of personnel who serve mothers and children, provision of food supplies for school or other feeding programs for children, assistance in the production of milk or other protective foods for children and research to develop such foods, and assistance to improve the quality and quantity of noncommercial locally produced foods for home or school consumption. We believe, however, that the general—and acute—problem of increasing the commercial production of foodstuffs is not the concern of UNICEF. Our objection would extend to UNICEF assistance to research projects designed to increase food production for commercial sale and to the training of agronomists or other personnel whose work will be related largely to improvement in general food production.

The United States has also had some questions concerning UNICEF assistance to *rural* sanitation and water supply programs, but it recognized that contaminated water constituted one of the greatest health hazards to children, particularly the very young, and that, until other international or bilateral aid agencies were ready to undertake such programs, UNICEF could not ignore appeals for assistance in a matter so critical for child health.

Although a variety of points of view were expressed at the 1963 meeting by representatives of other governments, some of which were more restrictive than the U.S. view and some of which would have permitted very wide flexibility, there was general agreement that UNICEF should not spread itself too thin and that its programs should be focused through a good standard lens and not a wide-angle lens on the major

problems of children. Beyond this, it is unlikely that there will ever be unanimous agreement on any restatement of the proper scope of UNICEF programs.

The almost universal acclaim of and the recurring ambivalence about UNICEF can be understood only in the framework of its history and its origins.

The Origin of UNICEF

The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) was established by the General Assembly (Resolution 57(I)) in December 1946 to aid children and youth in countries which had been the victims of aggression in World War II. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was coming to an end, but the feeling was strong that the task of emergency feeding programs and the distribution of clothing and blankets should be continued for the young. The Fund was to give emergency relief "for child health purposes generally, giving high priority to the children of countries victims of aggression."

In its first years UNICEF concentrated on distributing food, clothing, and blankets to the children of 14 European countries and China. But by the end of 1949 the Fund had expanded to 13 European countries, 14 countries and territories in the Far East, 6 countries in the Middle East, and 11 Latin American countries. Its program had increased too: construction of and equipping milk conservation plants; training for doctors and nurses; provision of raw materials for shoes and jackets.

It was at this juncture that concerned people began to think in terms of a permanent international body to meet the needs of children. There were differing views, however, on the appropriate organizational arrangements.

In June 1949 the United States began discussions with other major donors to UNICEF looking toward the discontinuance of UNICEF as a separate organization. It was the U.S. view that for the long run U.N. programs devoted to the needs of children should be a part of the regular U.N. struc-

ture. It proposed, therefore, that a modest amount should be added to the regular U.N. budget for this purpose, in addition to the voluntary contributions from governments. Main emphasis of the new program, it suggested, should be on training services, advisory assistance, and demonstration projects.

These elements of the U.S. position, which in effect constituted an effort to reduce drastically the scope and operations of the agency, became the principal issues debated by governments in 1950 at the Social Commission, at ECOSOC, and at the General Assembly. The U.S. position was defeated at the Social Commission, but a compromise was reached at ECOSOC. When the matter reached the General Assembly, strong opposition to the ECOSOC resolution developed among the delegations from Asia and the Middle East, who felt that there was no reason for the termination of the present emergency organization simply because the "emergency" was over in Europe. They argued that their children had been in a "state of emergency" for centuries.

As the debate progressed, most of the donor countries switched positions and supported a new resolution sponsored by Australia which extended UNICEF's life for 3 years, endorsed the recent trend in policy, and specified that greater emphasis should be given to long-term aid directed particularly to children in the less developed countries. On the final vote only the U.S. delegate abstained. (Actually, new instructions to support the resolution were en route. They arrived too late, however, simply because the resolution came up for a vote earlier than anticipated.) The United States representative, in explaining his abstention, stated that although the United States preferred other organizational arrangements, his Government and the American people were sympathetically aware of the plight of children in many parts of the world; further, the United States was second to none, as shown by the record, in its willingness to help those children.

The U.S. record of generosity was main-

tained. In 1951 and 1952 the United States continued as it had in earlier years to contribute almost 72 percent of the funds UNICEF received from governments. Further, throughout the fifties the U.S. Government's contribution was gradually increased in absolute terms even while as a proportion of the total it was reduced to 50 percent. At present, the U.S. annual contribution of \$12 million constitutes 40 percent of UNICEF's income from voluntary government contributions.

The Question of Long-Term Assistance

In 1950 General Assembly Resolution 417 (V) directed UNICEF to meet

... through the provision of supplies, training and advice, emergency and long-range needs of children and their continuing needs particularly in underdeveloped countries, with a view to strengthening, wherever this may be appropriate, the permanent child health and child welfare programmes of the countries receiving assistance.

From 1950 to 1953 UNICEF policy with regard to long-term assistance gradually took shape. The Executive Board decided that the agency would favor action projects over research projects and that, in its review of project proposals, it would consider the capacity of a given country to meet its own needs and/or to secure international assistance from other sources. Furthermore, a government had to be prepared to meet local costs and match UNICEF aid with its own funds before a proposal could be considered. (At present the contribution of governments is equal, on an average, to about 2½ times the UNICEF contribution to assisted projects.)

The Board looked with favor upon those projects which had the "greatest direct impact" on a large number of children, which represented an attack on "serious problems" assuring long-range benefits, and which were "strategic" in dealing with "basic lacks in adequate child care." Finally, UNICEF wanted projects which would give results on the basis of low per capita costs, which were within the capabilities of the country to continue after an initial period

of international aid, and which set "organizational patterns" capable of being duplicated elsewhere in the country.

During this period UNICEF resources were devoted mainly to three basic types of programs:

1. Basic maternal and child welfare services—efforts to establish basic permanent health and welfare services for children, especially networks of health centers, and aid to national programs for training personnel to plan and operate these services.

2. Disease control—campaigns to control or eradicate diseases affecting large numbers of children such as malaria, tuberculosis, yaws, trachoma, and leprosy.

3. Nutrition—mainly supplementary child feeding projects and milk conservation. Some funds were also devoted to the development of other protein-rich foods and to the education of families in better nutrition practices.

In addition, UNICEF continued grants for emergency aid for the relief of children and mothers in times of disaster due to earthquakes, floods, droughts, etc.

In 1953 the General Assembly reviewed the work of the Fund. The result of the review was an unqualified endorsement of UNICEF's work; a unanimous resolution (802(VIII)) continued the Fund without a termination date. In recognition of the new long-range aspect of the UNICEF program, the words "International" and "Emergency" were dropped from the Fund's title. The acronym "UNICEF" had become so familiar throughout the world, however, that the Assembly decided to leave it unaltered.

Evolution of Policies and Programs

Beginning in 1954 evolving UNICEF policy moved ever closer toward the two most significant aspects of the "new look" which the agency would formally adopt in 1961: (1) attention to the needs of children within the framework of a national plan and (2) a flexible policy allowing UNICEF to expand its assistance beyond the boundaries of its traditional fields of operation.

Early in 1954 the Executive Board established the practice of "approval of projects in principle." The Board decided that where a request for a UNICEF allocation was for only one stage of a government project, the Board should have an opportunity to consider the whole project. The 1954 report of the Executive Board advised:

If [the Board] approves the project in principle, future requests for continued aid would be given the priority, which under existing Board policy is accorded to "help complete or perfect work already undertaken."

This was the first time UNICEF had given a direct endorsement to the planning process. Obviously, the applying country would have to assemble some sort of plan—however narrow in scope—if the Board were going to be able to make commitments of continued assistance to a project years in advance of its completion.

In 1957 the Board took a second step in this direction. It formally recognized that the needs of children must be viewed "within the context of their family and community environment." The following year the Board approved the proposition that provision for the welfare of the child should be one facet of a broad national plan for raising family and community levels of living, and the U.S. proposal that UNICEF assist social service programs was accepted.

Finally, during the Executive Board meeting of 1960 several representatives advanced the view that UNICEF should be prepared to help a country set up a broad child welfare program within the general framework of a national development plan, even if this should require some redistribution of UNICEF's financial and administrative resources.

Even as it began to accept the concept of the national plans, UNICEF policy also began to move toward a more flexible position regarding the types of assistance which the agency might render. This trend was especially obvious with respect to the question of UNICEF aid for training national personnel.

Until 1959 the agency had generally

limited this type of assistance to the provision of supplies and equipment required by government training programs bearing upon maternal and child welfare services, disease control, and child nutrition. UNICEF looked upon the expenses incurred for administration and scholarships or stipends for the trainees as local costs which were properly the responsibility of local governments. Only when governments for some reason needed to educate nationals in other countries was UNICEF willing to bear the financial burden.

In 1959, however, the Executive Director of UNICEF recommended to the Board that the agency give increased emphasis to the training of national personnel within the country. One result was that the Board at last agreed to let UNICEF provide local stipends for training programs. Even more significant was the fact that the presentation of the proposal set the stage for a lively Board debate over UNICEF assistance policy. Some representatives, including the U.S. representative, urged caution in adding new categories of aid, fearing that UNICEF's modest resources might be spread too thin over too many types of projects. Others held the opposite viewpoint that UNICEF should endeavor to assist whatever projects governments *themselves* believe of highest priority, providing only that the projects are related in some way to the needs of children.

The same division of opinion appeared again at the 1960 Board meeting in the discussion of UNICEF's "matching" policy. The Board agreed, however, that while the former matching policy would continue to apply to the bulk of UNICEF-assisted projects, it would allow some "flexibility" in particular cases where: (a) a government's contribution provided all necessary local costs, (b) a government had previously provided funds for a project and then needed help to improve the coverage or the quality of the service, or (c) a government's contribution would increase progressively even though in the first instance it was less than the UNICEF allocation.

With the liberal proposals with respect to planning and matching before it in 1960, the Board decided that it would consider the future orientation and scope of UNICEF activities at its June 1961 session and called upon the Executive Director for two studies for consideration at that time: a broad survey of children's needs, and an examination of training in health, nutrition, and social services.

The "New Look," 1961-65

The Executive Board in June 1961 made a number of decisions which together constitute the "new look" in UNICEF program policy. As previously mentioned, the most significant aspects of the "new look" are two:

1. UNICEF may now help governments, upon their request, to draft national plans for meeting the needs of children and youth. The Board expressed the hope that these plans would be an "integrated part of, or related to, overall economic and social development." UNICEF now gives priority to those projects which fall within the framework of a national development plan.

2. UNICEF can aid whatever programs countries themselves feel are of highest priority. This means that UNICEF is no longer limited to programs designed to meet only the physical requirements of children but can also serve other needs—for example, education, vocational training and guidance, and expanded social services.

UNICEF's "new look" embodies two other important shifts in policy:

UNICEF now meets local costs of projects where this is essential for their success and funds are not available from other sources (a situation most likely to occur with respect to training projects and experimental programs).

UNICEF now assumes the expenses of hiring specially qualified national or other consultants to help governments prepare project requests where sufficient assistance is not available from UNICEF field staff and the technical personnel of other agencies in the United Nations family.

The implementation of the new look is reflected in Table I showing the distribution of UNICEF assistance by type of program. In the 5 years from 1960 to 1965, education allocations jumped from less than 1 to 17 percent of UNICEF's program allocations. There has been a sizable increase in allocations for maternal and child health services and a substantial decline in assistance to disease-control programs. Allocations for nutrition have also declined, but this may prove to be only a temporary phenomenon.

TABLE I—ALLOCATIONS BY PROGRAM
(in thousands of U.S. dollars)

	1960		1965	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Basic maternal and child health . . .	4,314	20	6,824	29
Disease control . . .	11,105	50	7,893	34
Nutrition	4,602	21	2,691	12
Family and child welfare services .	385	2	576	2
Education	143	¹	4,041	17
Vocational training . . .	..	..	399	2
Other	43	¹	694	3
Total long-range aid	20,592	93	23,118	99
Emergency aid . . .	1,538	7	345	1
Total program aid	22,130	100	23,463	100

¹ Less than 0.5 percent.

Table II shows UNICEF's dramatically increased involvement in Africa and Asia—particularly Africa—and a concomitant reduction in aid to Europe.

TABLE II—ALLOCATIONS OF LONG-TERM AID BY AREA
(in thousands of U.S. dollars)

	1960		1965	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Africa	2,073	9	4,548	20
Asia	6,663	27	9,070	39
Eastern Mediterranean . .	3,682	15	2,718	12
Europe	1,385	6	505	2
The Americas	7,399	30	5,379	23
Interregional	3,115	13	898	4
	¹ 24,317	100	² 23,118	100

¹ Includes freight.
² Excludes freight.

The United States on numerous occasions since 1961 has expressed its strong support for the expansion of UNICEF programs in education and vocational training and has

urged that special attention be given to the problems of children of families recently migrated to urban areas. Furthermore, at the most recent meeting of the UNICEF Executive Board, in June 1965, the U.S. delegation proposed that the Board at its next meeting, which is scheduled to be held at Addis Ababa in May 1966, consider what role UNICEF should play in family planning as part of its maternal and child health program. The United States also proposed that the secretariat present to the Board a few requests for assistance in family planning programs which may be made to it by member governments giving high priority to such programs. These proposals had strong support from many of the developing countries, as well as from Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the Board accepted them after extended debate.

UNICEF's Accomplishments

UNICEF is currently assisting more than 500 projects in 118 countries. Since 1950 UNICEF has equipped more than 30,000 health centers, ranging from simple village dispensaries to modern pediatric wards. These facilities have provided services to over 70 million mothers and children. About 100 million persons around the world have been examined for yaws, and 41 million have been treated. About 200 million persons have been protected against tuberculosis through the use of BCG vaccine, and 145 million persons have been protected from malaria through insecticide spraying and other measures.

More than 200 milk processing plants in 38 countries have been or are presently being equipped by UNICEF. These include Asia's largest dairy installation, which handles 500,000 quarts of milk a day—the Worli plant in Bombay, India. UNICEF is concentrating on applied nutrition projects in 57 countries to stimulate greater production and the use of nutritious foods. It has provided equipment for more than 4,000 nutrition centers.

Since the inauguration of UNICEF aid to

education and vocational training in 1962, UNICEF has helped equip more than 2,000 primary schools, 34 secondary schools, 231 teacher training centers, and 372 vocational and prevocational training centers, and it has earmarked funds sufficient to equip as many again in the immediate future. About one-third of UNICEF's program expenditures are now devoted to the training of local personnel to staff vital programs for children. To date UNICEF stipends and fellowships have been used to train more than 100,000 persons in the developing countries for child services. UNICEF projects are currently assisting in the training of an additional 96,000 persons.

This is an impressive record of accomplishment. Yet, although UNICEF projects are directed toward meeting basic needs, the individual projects are not to any great extent related to an overall plan which takes account of the wide range of child needs and the limited resources available to meet them, nor are they integrated into overall country development plans.

At the Executive Board meeting in June 1961 the importance of integrating UNICEF programs into overall plans for children was recognized and provision was made in the budget for the sum of \$100,000 to assist countries, at their request, in assessing children's needs and preparing plans to meet them. So far, however, no country has asked for this type of assistance.

At the June 1962 Board meeting the theme of overall planning for children, as well as the importance of relating such plans to country development plans, was repeated by a large number of countries. It was of interest, however, that several of the developing countries took the occasion to point out that it was often very difficult to develop overall plans for children and that they trusted that UNICEF aid would still be available for useful projects even in the absence of overall country plans.

In an effort to promote the idea of planning for children and youth and to promote the interests of children within national de-

Miss Bernstein's article is one of a series being written especially for the Bulletin by officers of the Department and the Foreign Service. Officers who may be interested in submitting original bylined articles are invited to call Jewell Wilson in the Bulletin office, extension 5806.

velopment plans, the Executive Board, on the recommendation of the Executive Director, approved allocations for a roundtable conference on planning for the needs of children in developing countries, held at Bellagio, Italy, in 1964, and for two regional conferences, one in Latin America, the other in the ECAFE region. The first of these regional conferences was held at Santiago, Chile, in December 1965; the other is scheduled for March 1966 at Bangkok. The Board will have to evaluate the results of these meetings at its next session, and the United States will have to formulate its own position on the usefulness of this technique for promoting planning for children.

The Future of UNICEF

At present, despite differences in the past, the U.S. Government warmly supports UNICEF policies and programs and recognizes that UNICEF is making a substantial contribution to the objectives of the U.N. Decade of Development. The United States has announced on several occasions—at UNICEF Board meetings and most recently at the 20th General Assembly—that it would be prepared to consider an increase in its present contribution of \$12 million to UNICEF if other governments would increase their contributions to maintain a ratio of 40 (U.S.) to 60 (other governments). Current limitations on its income have forced UNICEF to limit severely the number of new projects it can assist in order to complete programs already underway. Additional funds would enable it to accelerate its assistance in the newer areas of its activity—education and vocational

training and, if the Board approves, family planning programs.

About 2 years ago Harlan Cleveland,¹ meeting with several people interested in UNICEF, asked them to consider and advise him on what UNICEF should be doing 20

¹ Mr. Cleveland was formerly Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; he is now U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

years hence. It was a good question but a hard one. None of those asked has yet come forward with an answer.

Perhaps the answer lies in recognition of the fact that this is not just the Decade of Development but the "generation of development." If so, UNICEF's role will continue to be to help meet the priority needs of children and youth in the developing countries in each succeeding decade.

Science in a World of Widening Horizons

by Glenn T. Seaborg
*Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission*¹

I am pleased to be here with you this evening and to have the opportunity to present one of the five "UNESCO Lectures" being given at our five Washington area universities. This past year we celebrated the 20th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and of its Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization—UNESCO—created at the same time as its parent organization. The first U.N. delegates realized, and wisely so, that their political and social goals could best be attained in a world which had established better international contacts in education, science, and culture. UNESCO, one of the largest members of the United Nations family, has a roll of 117 nations and two associate members, and a staff made up of nationals from over 90 countries.

While I am not going to speak about the work of UNESCO directly, the topic I am going to cover, "Science in a World of Widening Horizons," makes clear the importance of having a world organization such as

UNESCO and of the need to support and strengthen its work.

I hope to present several different ideas, but summed up they might lead to the following conclusion: that man may well have reached that point in his history, that stage of his development, where he has not only been made master of his fate, but where his technology and his morality have come face to face, where he can scarcely treat fact and value separately, and where he may see principles as diverse as the second law of thermodynamics and the Golden Rule being considered side by side in the making of decisions which determine his future. For I believe—as I am sure many of you do also—that the major forces that have shaped our lives in the last 20 years—since the birth of UNESCO—are not only widening our horizons but forcing us to shape up for a rigorous journey toward those horizons. We are headed for some new undiscovered shores, and after a million years of headway—of struggle and growth, of conquest and accomplishment—during which time we believed we were all sailing separately, I think we have reached the point where we now

¹ Lecture delivered under sponsorship of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and the Joint Graduate Consortium of Washington, D.C., Universities at Georgetown University on Jan. 17.

realize we are essentially all in the same boat together. I think it is science which has made this so. And it is the power derived from science and how we use or misuse it which will determine our future.

Of course, we all realize that science has been with us for longer than the past 20 years. As an organized way of thinking and acting for man, it has been with us in many respects since ancient times. Experimental science, the foundation of today's science, had its beginning a few centuries ago. The forging of the bond between science and technology dates back to the last century, and the adoption of both by industry took place at the beginning of this century. But it has only been within the last few decades that the impact of scientific theory, transformed with increasing rapidity into technology—into tangible products and power—has been felt by society as a whole.

Before I go into some of the results of this impact and the challenges it has placed before us, let me review, in broad terms, some of the recent progress of science and the ways in which it has widened our horizons.

Extending the Range of the Senses

Endowed with an intellect that allows him to reason, and to remember, record, and transmit his ideas, man has been responsible to a large degree for his own creative evolution. In speed and scope it far exceeds his own natural evolution. Physically we are not that much different today than our forebears of the stone age. We exist on a pinpoint of time, temperature, and chemical balance, individually weak and ineffectual, and our only contact with the real world is through our five meager senses. But through the highly organized intelligence we call "science" and the highly organized group we call "society," we have been able to extend our senses and amplify our energy to an incredible degree. We have been able to learn much about ourselves and our environment, and we have developed ways to adapt ourselves to environments not only unsuited to man but to those where no other life has ever existed.

Our sense of vision has always been our primary method of knowing about our world. Yet marvelous as our eyes are, they allow us only a very limited picture of our immediate world. Today, through scientific innovations which have been developed or refined mainly within the last 20 years, we have extended the limits of our sight by orders of such magnitude and in such terms that the very expression "sight" needs redefining. We are now able to witness indirectly events taking place almost anywhere on the surface of the earth at the time they happen. We are able to "see" the existence of stars far beyond those at what we believed was the "outer edge" of space, and to film cosmic events which happened billions of light-years ago; we are able to visualize the structure of an atom and to track the path of its disintegrating particles, though their lifetimes be far less than a billionth of a second. We are able to observe the microcosmic world of life and see the detailed structure of such simple self-reproducing things as viruses, some of which are so small that a trillion of them could comfortably live on the head of a pin. This same extension of sight toward the inner world allows us to study in detail the basic structure of our own living cells and the chemical basis of our heredity.

Our sense of hearing has also been enormously extended by technologies which transform understandable sounds into various forms of energy, carry them to us over vast distances, then transform them back into familiar patterns and the wave lengths our auditory nerves can handle. From such diverse places on earth as Sugar Grove, West Virginia, and Jodrell Bank, England, we cock those gigantic "ears"—our radio-telescopes—toward the farthest galaxies and beyond and pick up sounds from distant worlds, listening for (and hoping for) patterns which might indicate the existence of intelligent, communicative life somewhere in those remote cosmic regions. We can "hear" the sounds of moderate-sized earthquakes anywhere in the world, determine their intensity and often their exact location. We

have extended our hearing (as well as our sight) beneath the sea and in doing so have learned not only how to detect animate and inanimate objects in that almost lightless world but that, dark as its depths may be, the sea is not a silent world, and that the voices of the fish and the other marine life in it make it a veritable screeching, croaking jungle of sound.

Fortunately we have created new senses as well as extended the range of our natural senses. We have no natural sense organs designed to detect magnetic fields, or the greater range of radiation—that not in the limited areas of the spectrum which produce light, sound, or heat—yet we can detect almost all forms of radiation in the smallest amounts, whether in the confines of a laboratory or in orbit around the earth or sun.

But miraculous as these extensions of our natural senses may be, they would all be for naught if man were not endowed with the ability to remember, to record and transmit these impressions and the ideas he develops from them. It is only through memory and communication that the collective intelligence of mankind grows and that he is able to make any use of the impressions gathered by his senses. It is, therefore, most fortunate for us that the same scientific revolution which has magnified our knowledge-gathering ability has given us the electronic tools to handle this great new accumulation of data, to sort it, store it, recall it when we need it, to solve problems with it, and to some extent put the answers to work for us. If it were not for these tools, how would we begin to handle the incredible input of our information explosion, one which in science alone sees the publishing of 100,000 journals a year in more than 60 languages, a figure doubling every 15 years?

New Understanding of Life Processes

If the past 20 years has seen a modification of man through a vast technological extension of his senses and collective intellect, certainly it has also seen an important, though perhaps less spectacular, modification of man himself. The understanding we

have gained of the life processes and of the many biological forces at work in ourselves and our environment has extended our life-span, has allowed us to reduce disease and suffering and to enjoy longer, healthier lives. But this progress, important as it may be and as grateful as we are for it, may soon seem insignificant compared to that which appears to be just ahead of us. The possibilities of new and rather dramatic changes in man loom large, some of them in the not too distant future. They may stem from advances in a number of diverse fields—from newfound knowledge of the body's chemistry, of the electrochemical nature of the brain and nervous system, of our genetic makeup, and from advances by the chemical engineer, the surgeon, the electronics expert, and the biochemist.

Man has been modifying himself for centuries by such simple devices as external braces, artificial limbs, hearing aids, and even dentures. Now we are beginning to think and act in terms of internal modifications, of replacing parts of organs and eventually even entire organs with synthetic, manmade substitutes. The replacement of an artery with a dacron tube is now commonplace. Externally used artificial kidneys, heart-regulating pacemakers, and heart-lung machines perform lifesaving functions today. Serious effort is now being devoted to developing artificial kidneys, pacemakers, and even mechanical hearts which can be carried internally by the patient and in effect become a part of his natural body. Efforts are also being made to repair man's damaged or diseased parts with the healthy parts of other men and even animals, and just in recent years some remarkable new progress has been made in the understanding and technique of the transplanting of human organs.

I do not have time to go into the great strides that have been made by our biochemists in recent years. The extent of their progress might best be expressed by the fact that work in an understanding of the life processes has reached the point where it was seriously suggested this past year by

the president of the American Chemical Society, Dr. Charles C. Price, that a national crash program, similar to that taken by the Government in nuclear fission in the 1940's, would probably lead to man's ability to create life. Even without such a crash program, we may see this accomplished before the end of this century.

Paralleling our growing understanding of the biochemical basis of life has been a growing interest in, and knowledge of, the basic mechanism of the brain and nervous system. At the recent annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science there was much discussion of the work being done now in the chemistry of the brain and central nervous system. If current research in this field—including the use of chemical compounds to influence memory and learning—offers any indication of the possibilities ahead, we may see some revolutionary advances in the treatment of mental illness. We may also see some other startling uses of chemicals in relation to man's mental and physical processes which could have very serious social ramifications and call for the utmost consideration and control in their uses.

Adaptation to New Environments

The electrical nature of the brain's activity and its comparison with the computer has become the basis of the relatively new science of cybernetics. Cybernetics, together with another new discipline known as bionics, give us cause to speculate on how far man can go in combining his naturally endowed self with the mechanical products of his creative evolution. Those involved in these new fields suggest that some day in the future it may be possible to "program" information directly into the human brain, or develop cybernetic control systems through which a man's thoughts alone can remotely control a machine. Work in this area of so intimately combining man and machine has already led to the coining of a new word—"cyborg"—standing for cybernetic organism. And to a great extent "Man,

the Cyborg" is with us today and making valuable contributions to our programs in space, nuclear energy, and oceanography—in those areas where man must operate in a hostile, hazardous environment.

In a literal and figurative sense man's horizons have been widened most by his ability to venture into, adapt to, and work in new environments. No discernible amount of natural evolution has allowed him to do this, but his creative evolution, through science and technology, has allowed him in recent years to take giant strides in this direction.

Our adaptation to new environments has taken many forms. In some cases we work indirectly in a hazardous environment. A good example of this might be that of a laboratory worker in a nuclear facility who, from behind thick radiation shielding, is able to use the master-slave manipulators, or "magic hands" as they are sometimes called, to work with highly radioactive material. These extremely sensitive mechanical extensions of his own hands permit him to work in an environment he cannot otherwise enter.

When we enter an environment we could not normally survive in, we take the necessities of our own environment with us. These might take the form of an aqualung for limited underwater work, or some type of submarine vehicle should we need warmth, light, oxygen, greater mobility, and protection from great pressures. The fact that we have been able to descend almost to the bottom of the deepest trench in the oceans—a depth of over 35,000 feet—seems remarkable, and yet we are just beginning major efforts to explore this environment of "inner space."

There is no need to go into detail on the efforts we are making to explore our horizons of outer space or the progress we are making in this endeavor. In recent years a good part of the world's attention has been focused on our entrance into this new environment. Here again man is bringing his own environment with him on his journey, and he will have to bring a great deal of it

great distances if he is to go far or accomplish much in the incredibly vast areas he hopes to explore and possibly inhabit.

What is perhaps most remarkable about our space program, and perhaps not realized by many, is that the fulfillment of this desire on the part of man to leave his mother planet requires an effort involving almost every one of the scientific disciplines known to man. There is scarcely an area of human knowledge or technology that will not come into play in putting a man on the moon and eventually on the planets.

The Energy Revolution

No review of how science and technology has widened our horizons would be complete without some discussion of the role of energy. For it is man's extraction, conversion, and control of energy which has made all that I have mentioned to this point possible. And it is our relationship to energy—how we use it and what we do with it—which offers us both our greatest promises and our greatest challenges.

Less than 2 months after the birth of the United Nations and UNESCO—and very influential in the early development of these organizations—was the revelation that man could release the enormous energy of nuclear fission. With this discovery came the realization that it would be only a matter of time—a relatively short time—before we would have at our disposal enough energy, and the technologies for using it, either to completely destroy our civilization or to lift it to great new standards.

But the energy of the atom is remarkable not only because of its total power. The range and usefulness of nuclear energy, from the standpoint of both fission and radiation, opens to us whole new energy horizons. With our nuclear science and technologies, we will be able to convert, through the manmade element plutonium and a manmade isotope of uranium, almost all of the energy bound up in the natural elements uranium and thorium into a nearly inexhaustible supply of power. And we will be able to

do this just at a time when the demands of our high-energy civilization are growing so fast that a new energy source to supplement our fossil fuels will soon be needed. Through our nuclear science and technologies we will also be able to produce enough compact power to make possible our forthcoming adventures in space—to take us, and the equipment we will need, to the planets. This will be possible through nuclear-powered rockets and systems for nuclear auxiliary power, all of which are under development and some of which have already been used successfully in various ways.

I mentioned before the range and usefulness of nuclear energy, and perhaps this versatility of the atom is one reason why it is so valuable to man. To give you an example of what I mean, let me contrast some of the work of two of our divisions at the Atomic Energy Commission, both involved in entirely different aspects of the peaceful uses of the atom. At one end of the scale is the Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives and at the other is the Division of Isotopes Development. I place them at opposite ends of this arbitrary energy scale because, while the nuclear explosives group deals mostly in energies measured in kilotons and megatons—equivalents of thousands and millions of tons of TNT—the isotope group is more apt to be using such power terms as watts or microwatts, or such terms as curies or millicuries, and at times even microcuries or picocuries.

The Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives administers the AEC's "Plowshare" program—the term "Plowshare" derived from the Biblical expression concerning the beating of swords into plowshares. This program involves the development of nuclear explosives, and related technologies, for large-scale excavation such as the digging of canals, mountain passes, harbors, and underground storage areas. To give you some idea of the energy involved in such work or, more accurately, the work done with such energy, I might point out that in an early Plowshare cratering experiment—in 1962—a single 100-kiloton thermonuclear device was able

to lift 6.6 million cubic yards or 8.4 million tons of earth in a matter of seconds.

Contrast this with the energy of the radioisotope, perhaps the 10–50 microcuries of iodine-131 in a glass of water, which a person might drink in the course of a routine diagnostic test of his thyroid gland. Such an isotope, finding its way to the thyroid, would be emitting a constant signal which only a highly sensitive electronic scanner could detect. And of course even this represents an energy level far greater than many used in other nuclear work.

The energy revolution of the past few decades has been more than one of a growth of sheer power. It has been one of tremendous refinement in the production and control of power, and of heat, light, and various forms of radiation. It has been one of incredible speed, bringing into almost common use in some fields such previously unused divisions of time as the nanosecond (a billionth of a second). And it has been one inseparable from our revolutions in transportation, communication, and the growth of human knowledge.

Science and International Cooperation

Review of the widening of our horizons over the past 20 years may leave us very impressed with our collective accomplishments. And such a review with some contemplation of what the future holds is in many respects overwhelming; to some, it seems almost frightening. But the facts and figures alone do not tell the most important part of the story. Our scientific progress must not be considered apart from our social progress, nor our technology talked of in terms not relating to human values.

Wherever we are headed on our new wide horizons, we are traveling there as the family of man. As such, what has this journey done for us? And what future does it hold? I would like to devote the remaining few minutes of this talk to some thoughts on these matters.

Certainly, while science has widened our horizons, it has brought us physically closer together. I believe it has done the same in

spirit—in engendering broader human cooperation and understanding. Science comes to us from an international heritage, and it promotes a growing internationality. In spite of the scientific ascendancy of some countries, no nation has a monopoly on scientific talents. One does not have to go far back in history to see an outstanding example of the contributions of scientists of many national backgrounds to a single scientific field. Within the past three decades, the nuclear age was born of the labor of such an international group of scientists as Hahn, Fermi, the Joliot-Curies, Rutherford, Bohr, Einstein, Szilard, Lawrence, Compton, Oppenheimer, De Hevesy, and a host of many other multinational names too numerous to mention at this time.

Today the sharing of scientific brainpower is an important inducement toward international cooperation. In this regard, it is interesting to note that last year representatives of the United States attended about 600 international, intergovernmental conferences, mostly on technical subjects. We belong to 53 international organizations, again mostly scientific and technical. These are organizations which exist because they are needed, because they serve the purposes of many nations and many people. It is a fact of 20th-century life that, while nations may stress national sovereignties and avow national purposes, science has created a functional international society. It exists, and it works, in spite of all who doubt it.

Modern science is such a dynamic force that its success—its very existence—demands growing cooperation from all quarters. The explosion of scientific and technical knowledge, from a multiplicity of specialized fields and diverse sources, calls for tremendous cooperative efforts in the gathering and exchanging of information. Expanding international communications are vital to scientific growth. We are just now beginning to learn how to efficiently handle the overwhelming flow of material being recorded and transmitted throughout the world each day.

Cooperation is again a factor in science in

the use of scientific equipment. The staggering expense of some of today's scientific tools makes the sharing of large facilities and laboratories mandatory. I think that the future will see the development of many cooperative international facilities such as the one operated by CERN, the European Center for Nuclear Research.

Aside from the benefits which science itself gains from cooperation, the social applications and implications of science demand international cooperation. The consequences of decisions in scientific matters and the benefits of scientific progress are inexorably connected to the well-being of all men. They affect life itself—birth, health, and death; they affect living conditions—food, shelter, and environment; they affect human contact—communications and transportation; and they affect the general state of the world—war or peace. In this regard—because of the consequences of science—we have a vital stake in what is being done abroad and an obligation to disseminate the beneficial knowledge we gain here.

In many ways the physical scope of scientific investigation today transcends national boundaries. Global science demands global cooperation. The fields of meteorology and climatology, oceanography and geology, astronomy and space exploration need as their laboratories all the earth's oceans, its lands, its atmosphere, and the boundless space of the universe. These world-straddling sciences have been responsible for a surprising degree of worldwide cooperation, even among countries harboring great political differences. In the field of meteorology, our current program involves the cooperation of more than 100 other countries. In our space program we have the cooperation of more than 50 countries and are beginning to cooperate directly with the Soviet Union in this field. In addition, we have had much success with the Soviets in exchanging information and ideas in the nuclear energy field.

I think that all this has brought us face to face with the fact that we can no longer live in a world where only a small percentage of

the people enjoy the benefits of 20th-century life. Each year brings us closer to the realization that it is a technical, social, political, and moral necessity that we learn to live together in peace and understanding, sharing more and more of the knowledge we gain and the abundance that knowledge brings, until such time when all have the ability to share the workload evenly and all can enjoy the benefits which only some of us enjoy today. We no longer are a world of local or regional civilizations which can flourish or wither away by themselves. Our civilization is now global and absolute, and the actions of each nation, and to some degree of each individual, strongly affect our collective destiny.

Working To Plan the Future

There are many people who fear the current explosion of science and technology, who see in it a dehumanizing effort, who believe that it is running away with us and that we are becoming its slaves instead of remaining its masters. I cannot agree with these thoughts. A comparison of the conditions of people in any age with those of today will show that we are far better off. And I do not mean just in creature comforts, suffering less from disease, hunger, and the whims of our environment. More of us share a larger, richer culture—one international in scope, containing a vast heritage from each other's lands, and from the past—the art, music, and literature of bygone days preserved, reproduced, and recreated for our enrichment. And these are in addition to our own cultural contributions, which are substantial by the standards of any age. We have more leisure to enjoy all this. If there is a certain framework of superficial conformity as a result of our methods of mass production, there is also within that framework a larger degree of freedom and individuality. Today we have more freedom of choice than any of our ancestors ever had. We have more freedom of expression. We have more freedom *from* ignorance, superstition, and ironclad tradition and, as a result, more freedom to change—to control

and direct our future, our creative evolution.

I believe we *can be* masters of our fate. We *need not* be trapped by the onrush of our technology—simply because we recognize it. We realize (and not too late, as some would have us believe) its speed, its effects, and their cumulative impact. And in the light of this we can predict, plan, and work to shape our future.

Most of you are aware of the massive challenges facing mankind today. You read about them in your newspapers and magazines, see and hear about them on television and radio—environmental pollution, hunger, water shortages, the population explosion, the problems associated with urban growth, and, above all, that plague which mankind has not yet eliminated, the threat of war, compounded today by the overwhelming destructiveness of nuclear weapons.

Yet I believe that none of these problems are insoluble if we face them without delay and work hard toward their solution. There is an enormous amount of national and international effort already going into the meeting of every one of these problems. Unfortunately the mass media do not direct as much attention to our work in meeting these challenges as they do in dramatizing the problems and some of our failures in dealing with them.

Explaining some of the ways we are attacking these problems would take another talk—in fact, a whole series of them. But let me drop a few national and international names and give a few random examples of the efforts being made to meet these challenges.

Essential to the meeting of all the challenges ahead of us is education—education on all levels. A technologically developing world and an uneducated one are incompatible. Stating its support for the goal of universal education, UNESCO's Advisory Committee on Science and Technology has said: "Governments of many developing countries must find the quickest formulae to teach children of largely illiterate people how to read and write and, at the same time, to train engineers and scholars drawn from

among the same people. This is a phenomenon of the present century in which supersonic aircraft will be used as a means of transportation, while inside these same countries, traffic is still carried on donkeys."

In support of its strong belief in the importance of education, UNESCO will this year launch its 5-year Experimental World Literacy Program, which will also include the vocational and technical training of millions of now illiterate workers.

With regard to what is being done about the problems of pollution, I call your attention to our own battle, in the United States, against environmental pollution and to the recently released report to the President by the Environmental Pollution Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee. This report, the work of some 40 experts and their staffs, carefully outlines the problems we face and some possible approaches to solving them. It is an important first step in our national campaign in—as the report is titled—"Restoring the Quality of Our Environment."

The problem of hunger, still with us in so many areas of the world, is being attacked on an international scale by the work of many U.N. organizations. Under the leadership of the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization, a Freedom From Hunger Campaign has been launched which involves over 80 countries working with UNESCO, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Organization, and the World Meteorological Organization. This formidable combination of international scientific and educational groups is exploring every natural, technological, economic, and social means of providing basic food staples for all human beings everywhere.

This new year—1966—has been designated International Rice Year by a joint FAO-UNESCO drive "to focus world attention on the role that rice could play in furthering the aims of the Freedom From Hunger Campaign; and to improve international understanding of the rice economy."

Related to the solving of the world's water problems—of which we have become more aware because of our own droughts—far more than a year has been designated. Under the sponsorship of UNESCO, FAO, and the World Meteorological Organization, an International Hydrological *Decade* has been proclaimed, during which a massive program will be undertaken to find ways of averting the water crisis that so many nations face. During the IHD, a sustained and coordinated program of scientific research will be carried on to find out, among many other things, where the sources of fresh water lie, how we can recover them, what the best methods are for desalting water, what can be done to salvage the water that evaporates or runs into the sea—and what all of these operations will cost. With all this knowledge, it is believed we can make substantial progress in solving our water problems for many decades.

Finally, I call your attention to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, mentioned briefly before because of its cooperation in the Freedom From Hunger Campaign. The IAEA is not only making an important contribution to the world's efforts in developing the many peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, but it is also playing a leading role in seeing that the atom remains peaceful, in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This organization, with its 95 member nations, oversees and administers an international "safeguards" system, a system of inspection and control designed to assure that the nuclear materials, facilities, and technology furnished for peaceful uses are not diverted to military applications. Right now—today—the IAEA safeguards inspection system is at work. It is the first program of international inspection in the arms limitation field to be put into operation, and it is operating with the blessing and encouragement of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Such an organization truly deserves our strongest praise and support.

We look to the IAEA, to UNESCO, and to all the organizations of the U.N. to help us

achieve world peace—true peace, not just stalemates of political and military power but lasting peace based on reason and understanding, on world stability, and on the well-being of all men sharing a newly created abundance on this earth.

I believe that it is possible, through science and technology, to achieve these long-unfulfilled dreams of mankind. Our progress of the past few decades has, indeed, widened our horizons. It has given us much new knowledge and many remarkable new tools. It has also given us a glimmer of a better new world which can be reached with these accomplishments as a beginning. Let us not sit back then and revel in what we have done. Let us continue our progress. Let us continue to grow in knowledge, to apply that knowledge, and to work hard with our new tools so that we can continue to move toward those wide horizons and the greater promise they hold for all mankind.

President Lowers Rate of Duty on Safety Pins

White House press release dated January 28

The President on January 28 issued a proclamation¹ terminating the increased rate of duty on safety pins which has been in effect since 1957.

As a result of this action, the rate of duty of 35 percent ad valorem, which was established pursuant to the escape-clause provision of the trade agreements legislation, will be replaced by the trade agreement rate of 22.5 percent ad valorem.

This action was taken following the receipt of a report by the Tariff Commission and on the basis of a unanimous recommendation from the interested Federal departments and agencies, including the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

The new rate of duty becomes effective immediately.

¹ Proclamation 3703; 31 *Fed. Reg.* 1295.

Members of Board of Foreign Scholarships Announced

President Johnson announced on January 27 (White House press release) the appointment of six members to the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the reappointment of four members who currently serve on the Board.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships supervises the educational exchange programs administered by the Department of State under the Fulbright-Hays Act and certain exchange functions administered by the U.S. Office of Education established by the same legislation. The Board has responsibility for the selection annually of more than 5,000 students, teachers, research scholars, and university lecturers, both in this country and abroad.

Two members appointed to fill unexpired terms terminating September 22, 1966, are: W. J. Driver, Administrator of Veterans Affairs; and Brooks Hays, formerly a Member of the 78th-85th Congresses and currently Arthur Vanderbilt Professor of Political Affairs at Rutgers University and a special consultant to President Johnson.

Two members appointed for terms expiring September 22, 1967, are: William G. Craig, headmaster of the John Burroughs School, St. Louis, Mo., a former special assistant to the Director of the Peace Corps; and Teruo Ihara, associate professor of education at the University of Hawaii.

Two members appointed for terms expir-

ing September 22, 1968, are: Frederick B. Pike, professor of Latin American history at the University of Pennsylvania; and James R. Roach, associate professor of government at the University of Texas.

The four members whose reappointments were announced by the President are John M. Stalnaker, president of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation, and Francis Keppe, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for terms expiring September 22, 1967; and George E. Taylor, director of the Far Eastern and Russian Institutes at the University of Washington, and John Hope Franklin, professor of history at the University of Chicago, for terms expiring September 22, 1968.

Dr. Oscar Handlin, Warren Professor of American History at Harvard University, currently serves as chairman of the Board of Foreign Scholarships.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on January 27 confirmed the following recess appointments:

Marshall P. Jones to be Ambassador to Malawi.

Cecil B. Lyon, Ambassador to Ceylon, to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador to the Maldive Islands.

International Economic Policies for 1966

Following are the portions of the *Economic Report of the President*¹ entitled "Vietnam and Our Economy" (page 4), "International Economic Policies for 1966" (page 13), and "Conclusion" (page 19).

VIETNAM AND OUR ECONOMY

We face the challenges of prosperity while some 200,000 of our fellow citizens and billions of dollars of our resources are engaged in a bitter defense of freedom in Vietnam. The true costs of this conflict are death, pain, and grief; interrupted careers and separation from loved ones. They are incalculable. But the *economic* cost of Vietnam imposes no unbearable burden on our resources.

Vietnam does, however, add to the usual problems of maintaining balanced prosperity. It imposes special burdens on some industries, and raises, as well, uncertainties both for the fiscal planning of Government and the private planning of business. These uncertainties underscore the need for flexibility in Government policies and responsibility in private decisions.

Production for Vietnam accounts for less than 1½ percent of our GNP. These expenditures are a part of the total demand that provides a full market for our manpower and our production. But the private demands of consumers and businesses, and

high-priority civilian programs of Government, could and would provide a far more welcome market for that output if there were no war in Vietnam. Our prosperity does not depend on our military effort.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR 1966

These are the objectives of our international economic policies in 1966:

- to correct our remaining balance of payments deficit, so that the dollar will remain strong;
- to work toward reduction of trade barriers, so that all nations may reap the benefits of freer trade;
- to improve the international monetary system, so that it will continue to facilitate sound and orderly growth of the world economy;
- to press forward with the other fortunate nations in the great international task of our age: helping those countries now economically less advanced which are prepared to help themselves make rapid progress toward a better life in freedom.

Balance of Payments

Decisive progress was made in 1965 toward reducing our balance of payments deficit. Though the results for 1965 are gratifying, we cannot afford to relax. We have not yet balanced our external accounts.

For 1966, external balance is our goal. It requires that

- Business continue to cooperate wholeheartedly in following the strengthened guidelines governing capital flows announced in December;

¹ H. Doc. 348, 89th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted on Jan. 27. The *Economic Report of the President*, together with the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers, is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (\$1.25).

- Banks and financial institutions maintain their excellent performance of last year;
- Businesses sell even more abroad this year, in spite of full domestic order books;
- Business and labor keep costs and prices stable in order to maintain the competitiveness of our goods and services in international markets;
- Government work vigorously to minimize the dollar drain abroad of its aid and defense programs as well as all other activities;
- The Congress pass the tax legislation I recommended last year to enhance opportunities for foreigners to invest in the United States;
- We intensify our efforts to encourage our own citizens and foreigners to travel in the United States. I am directing that high priority be given to these efforts.

Trade

The year 1966 is the year when the world can take a giant step forward in liberalizing international trade by successfully concluding the Kennedy Round of negotiations to reduce trade barriers on all classes of products. The resulting growth of world trade and world income will benefit all countries, developing as well as industrial. The United States will bend every effort to get meaningful negotiations back on the track. This great venture in international cooperation must not fail.

We shall continue our efforts to improve the trade prospects of the developing countries by helping to stabilize commodity trade, by supporting regional integration among them where practicable, by providing access to markets, and by giving positive assistance to export promotion.

International Monetary Reform

As we achieve and maintain balance in our external accounts, dollars will no longer add to international monetary reserves as

they have in the past. We learned long ago that we cannot rely on gold alone. The free world must look to new sources of liquidity—rather than to deficits in the U.S. balance of payments—to support growing international trade and payments.

We are, therefore, pressing forward with other nations

- to assure the adequate and orderly growth of world monetary reserves;
- to improve the adjustment of imbalances by both surplus and deficit countries;
- to strengthen the monetary system that has served the world so well.

I hope that the major industrial nations—and then the entire community of free nations—will reach an agreement that will make creation of new reserve assets a deliberate decision of the community of nations to serve the economic welfare of all.

Economic Assistance

We have molded our foreign assistance policies into more efficient tools with which to confront one of history's gravest challenges—the development of the impoverished but awakening and turbulent two-thirds of the world.

The United States stands ready to continue to assist those countries which have demonstrated their commitment to the task of moving their economies forward toward self-sustaining growth under freedom.

In recent years, I have consciously held back further increases in our foreign assistance request while we designed a lean but effective program to give maximum impact to each dollar we spend.

Today, we are ready to move forward with special emphasis on three areas in which the United States is particularly well qualified to help:

- agriculture*, to stimulate food production where it fails to keep pace with spiraling populations;
- health*, to strengthen millions who could contribute more fully to their own economic progress;

—*education and training*, to provide the modern skills needed for development.

CONCLUSION

A few years ago, much was heard of the "European economic miracle." Today, across the Atlantic and around the world one hears once again of the "American economic miracle."

For the American economy, in the past 5 years, has demonstrated anew the confident vitality, the internal dynamism, and the enormous productivity which had long been its hallmark. We had settled for a while on what seemed a plateau of affluence; now, once again, there has been the strong thrust of progress—but a newly steady and balanced progress.

We have again shown the world what free men and a free economy can achieve. The peoples struggling toward economic development see with renewed interest that free markets and free economic choices can be a mighty engine of progress.

Moreover, there is new respect in the world for an America concerned with using its abundance to enhance the quality of human life: for a people

- who undertake a war on poverty along with the defense of freedom;
- who seek to restore their cities to greatness and to conserve the beauties of their landscape;
- who are determined to break down a centuries-old barrier of prejudice and injustice;
- who are resolved to lift the quality of education at every level;
- who are determined to promote and reward excellence in every endeavor;
- who have provided new health services and better social security for their older citizens;
- who offer to share their abundance and technical skills with a needy world.

The new vigor and progress of America can be a source of satisfaction. Yet we can-

not rest on past accomplishments. Continuing problems challenge our determination and our resourcefulness.

Perhaps our most serious economic challenge in 1966 will be to preserve the essential stability of costs and prices which has contributed so significantly to our balanced progress.

I do not know what additional burdens of defense the American economy will be asked to assume in 1966. Whatever they are, they will be met, and they will be small relative to the growth of our abundance. But in an economy approaching full use of its resources, the new requirements of Vietnam make our task of maintaining price stability more difficult.

To insure against the risk of inflationary pressures, I have asked Americans to pay their taxes on a more nearly current basis, and to postpone a scheduled tax cut. If it should turn out that additional insurance is needed, then I am convinced that we should levy higher taxes rather than accept inflation—which is the most unjust and capricious form of taxation.

We know that we do not need to put our growing economy into a straight jacket, or to throw it into reverse. But the extent of the fiscal or monetary restraint that will be needed to avoid inflationary pressures will depend directly on the restraint and moderation exercised by those who have power over wages and prices.

I again ask every leader of labor and every businessman who has price or wage decisions to make in 1966 to remember that his decisions affect not alone the wages of his members or the returns of his stockholders. Shortsighted pursuit of short-run interests fails in the longer run to advance the interests of either labor or management. And it surely does not advance the interests of the Nation.

I am confident that the overwhelming majority of private decisions in 1966 will be sound and responsible—just as I am determined that public decisions will be fully responsible.

If they are, the American economic mir-

acle will remain in 1966 the single most important force in the economic progress of mankind.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

January 27, 1966.

President Reports on Textured Yarn Tariffs

Letter of Transmittal

White House press release dated February 1

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, in accordance with section 2 of Public Law 89-229, a report concerning the feasibility and desirability of separate classification in the Tariff Schedules of the United States for those articles of man-made fibers commonly referred to as textured or texturized yarns.

The report concludes that such separate tariff classification for textured yarns is feasible but not desirable in view of the current situation.

Textured yarn production in the United States has been rising steadily in recent years, from 74 million pounds in 1960 to over 250 million pounds in 1965. During this period, the independent throwster industry, which processes a major portion of textured yarn, has had rising employment. At the same time, imports have been declining. The Tariff Commission has estimated that the annual imports of textured yarns declined from more than two million pounds in 1962 to less than one million pounds in 1965, representing less than one-half of one percent of the domestic market.

However, the representatives of the domestic industry have argued that a serious threat of injury looms in the future. In part because of this concern, the report recommends that more accurate import data for textured yarns be provided in the future, so that Congress, the Executive Branch, and the industry can keep close watch on import

levels and consider additional measures should they be warranted. I am therefore directing that steps be taken to obtain more accurate data on imports of textured yarns.

I am also transmitting for the information of the Congress the report of the Tariff Commission on textured yarns which I requested.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 1, 1966.

Congress Receives IJC Report on Pollution of Lakes

Press release 23 dated February 1

The Secretary of State on February 1 sent to Congress the Interim Report of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada (IJC), on the Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River.¹ The report, prepared pursuant to an investigation requested by the two Governments in October 1964, recommends measures which the IJC considers essential at this stage in dealing with pollution of these waters.

Due to the great interest in the subject and the urgent nature of the problems discussed, the report is being released before the respective governmental authorities have completed their studies and recommendations. When the study is completed, the United States will endeavor to reach quick agreement with the Government of Canada on the action to be taken in the light of the Commission's recommendations.

A final report of the Commission will be made to the two Governments when the full investigation has been completed. Technical personnel of Federal and State agencies are assisting the IJC in its investigation.

In the interim report, the IJC recommended that the Governments of the United States and Canada, as soon as possible and

¹ Copies of the report are available upon request from the International Joint Commission, Room B208, 1711 New York Ave., Washington, D.C., 20440.

in association with State and Provincial governments, take appropriate action to insure:

(a) sufficient purification of all municipal and industrial wastes before discharge into these waters and their tributaries to achieve the maximum possible removal of phosphates;

(b) prohibition of the construction of combined sanitary and storm sewers and initiation of a program of separating existing combined sewers in communities discharging wastes into these waters and their tributaries; and

(c) an effective system of regular sampling of effluents discharged into these waters and their tributaries in accordance with programs approved by the Commission.

The Commission also recommended that the two Governments support fully the Commission's program of investigation and research—as outlined in its interim report and as subsequently developed—by the provision of the personnel and facilities required from time to time for its effective implementation.

The recommendation for phosphate removal was prompted by what is known as eutrophication of the lakes and accompanying heavy growths of algae which decay and use up the dissolved oxygen in the lake waters. Eutrophication is the enrichment of waters by nutrients. In the case of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, the nutrients in the form of phosphates are contained in sewage and some industrial wastes. The nutrients, acting as a fertilizer, stimulate the growth of the algae.

The Commission's report states that Lake Erie possessed a high degree of oxygen saturation in 1929 but that 1959 and 1960 surveys indicated an area of 1,600 square miles in which the oxygen concentration was one part per million or less. A 1964 survey showed a total of 2,600 square miles, 25 percent of the lake area, had an oxygen level of less than two parts per million near the lake bottom. An oxygen level of four parts per million is generally considered necessary to support fish life. Existing rec-

ords do not show any critical dissolved oxygen depletion in the main body of Lake Ontario, the Commission report said.

In the United States portion of Lake Erie, about 53 percent of the municipal wastes from a population of 10 million persons receives secondary sewage treatment. Such treatment, which involves biological and chemical action, can remove up to 65 percent of the phosphates from the wastes. About 41 percent of the municipal wastes receives primary treatment, which is less effective, and 6 percent receives no treatment at all. In the Canadian portion of the lake, about 79 percent of the municipal wastes from a population of 1.2 million persons receives secondary treatment, 12 percent receives primary treatment, and 9 percent no treatment.

On the United States side of Lake Ontario, about 25 percent of the municipal wastes from a population of 1.8 million persons receives secondary treatment, 72 percent primary treatment, and 3 percent no treatment. On the Canadian side, with a population of 2.5 million, 82 percent of the wastes receives secondary treatment, 17 percent primary treatment, and 1 percent no treatment.

The Commission also reported that 63 sources of industrial wastes on the United States side of Lake Erie and 18 on the Canadian side have inadequate waste treatment facilities. No similar data was presented on Lake Ontario.

The Commission also announced it will carry out a three-part program of research and studies examining the pollution problems of Lakes Erie and Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The first phase involves the collection of data on the extent, origin, and location of pollution in these waters. Field studies are now underway. The second phase of the program will involve intensive study of the physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of the lakes and will include an assessment of any pollution abatement measures undertaken. A third phase of the program provides for long-term research on the behavior of the lakes in respect to pollutants and their dispersal.

Financing the United Nations Emergency Force

*Statement by Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

For many years the United States has considered the establishment and the maintenance by the United Nations of the Emergency Force in the Middle East to be one of the outstanding accomplishments of this organization. There can be little doubt that the presence of that Force has been a vital factor in preserving peace and quiet in that area. Despite differences of view concerning the financing of the Force, no delegation has ever sought to challenge the necessity for its establishment or the manner in which it has performed its task. The fact that this is the case constitutes a very high tribute to the Secretary-General, to the members of his staff who have dealt with the Force, and to the commander, officers, and men of the Force itself.

It is true that the Force has been in the Middle East for some 9 years and that, as a result of this fact, some member states appear to have become concerned about the need to continue to carry the financial burden involved. This is not surprising, since the Force was originally established, as its name implies, as an emergency measure. Further, apart from the burden imposed on member governments by the amount of money dedicated each year to financing this

Force, there is the disquieting fact that the continuation of any particular peacekeeping operation for a long period of time limits, to some extent, the capacity of the organization to take necessary measures in other directions in the interest of peace and security. Thus it is quite natural that member states, and the Secretary-General as well, have shown more and more interest in the last several years in the possibility of reducing the size and cost of the UNEF without significantly limiting its effectiveness.

Unfortunately, the cost estimates for 1965 amount to \$18,911,000—a figure which is higher than anticipated. The hope for reduction in cost did not materialize this year. As much as member states might regret this fact, they must nevertheless recognize that the year is at its end and no reduction in the cost estimates is now possible. There is no alternative but to finance the full amount of the 1965 estimates.

When we turn to the 1966 estimates, however, we find that the report² before this committee indicates that the Secretary-General has now found it possible to propose a reduction in the cost of the Force by a reduction in the manpower involved. He foresees other possible reductions which would depend upon the willingness of governments supplying troops to enter into new arrangements with respect to their rotation.

We consider that this reduction in cost is an important step forward and should reassure member states which had begun to worry about what appeared to be a static situation. We hope that the Secretary-General will keep the matter of the further

¹ Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on Dec. 20 (U.S. delegation press release 4770); for a statement made by Congressman Frelinghuysen on Oct. 19 on the 1966 U.N. budget estimates, see BULLETIN of Jan. 10, 1966, p. 69.

² U.N. doc. A/C.5/1049.

possible reductions in the cost of the Force under continuous review and will repeat periodically surveys of the type which have now proved to be so successful.

So far as the actual dollar level of the cost estimates for 1966 is concerned, the Advisory Committee [on Administrative and Budgetary Questions] has suggested a target expenditure of \$15 million, rather than the somewhat higher figure proposed by the Secretary-General. As indicated by the Controller, the Secretary-General plans to make every attempt to reach the level of \$15 million in 1966. We do, however, realize that the new and less costly arrangements proposed by him are not fully subject to his control.

We now come to the difficult question of how to finance UNEF for 1965 and 1966. In view of the fact that in the past there have been substantial differences of view as to financing methods, I wish to congratulate the delegations which have found it possible to prepare and submit to this committee such a broadly sponsored draft resolution^a covering UNEF financing for 1965 and 1966. Their action has greatly facilitated the work of the committee and deserves our sincere appreciation.

With respect to the content of the draft resolution, it contains the most significant and essential element of past UNEF financing resolutions, namely, the recognition that the costs of an operation such as UNEF should be shared by all member states. This reliance on the principle of collective financial responsibility rather than on contributions by only a part of the membership should be welcomed by all member states as evidence of a determination to continue this organization as an effective instrument to help keep the peace.

There is, however, one important element in the draft resolution which makes it impossible for the United States delegation to vote for it and requires an abstention instead

of an affirmative vote. This is the fact that the resolution provides for financing UNEF in a manner which would result in a contribution by the United States in an amount in excess of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent of the total. In this connection, I believe that most delegations are aware that the United States Congress in 1952 enacted legislation which provides:

No representative of the United States Government in any international organization . . . shall make any commitment requiring the appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per centum of the budget of any international organization. . . . (Public Law 495, 82d Congress, 2d session.)

An affirmative vote on the draft resolution before us might imply such a commitment, and accordingly we are precluded from taking this action. I wish to make it clear, however, that if the resolution is adopted, an appropriation will be requested from the Congress. Only the Congress can appropriate funds, and the United States delegation cannot make a commitment on its behalf.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to make a further statement on this matter.⁴

^a The draft resolution (A/C.5/L.862, as amended) was adopted in Committee V on Dec. 20 by a vote of 38 to 14, with 37 abstentions (U.S.) and in plenary on Dec. 21 (A/RES/2115 (XX)) by a vote of 44 to 14, with 45 abstentions (U.S.). The resolution appropriates \$18,911,000 for the operation of UNEF in 1965 and \$15 million for 1966. As an *ad hoc* arrangement for 1965, it decides to credit against this appropriation \$3,911,000 "from those funds already contributed as voluntary contributions to restore the solvency of the United Nations"; to apportion "\$800,000 for 1965 among the economically less developed Member States in proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1965"; and to apportion "\$14,200,000 for 1965 among the economically developed Member States in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1965 plus—in order to meet reserve requirements—an additional amount from each contributor in this group equal to 25 per cent of its apportionment, such additional contributions to be reimbursable on a *pro rata* basis when the General Assembly shall determine that all or part of these additional contributions are no longer needed. . . ."

^a U.N. doc. A/C.5/L. 862.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated January 4 from the U.S. Representative regarding the steps taken by the U.S. Government in pursuit of peace in Viet-Nam. S/7067. January 5, 1966.

General Assembly

Twenty-third Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine for the period from May 1, 1964, to December 23, 1965. A/6225. December 26, 1965.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Information furnished by states launching objects into orbit or beyond.
Letter dated December 21, 1965, from the U.S.S.R. Representative concerning launchings during the period from November 12 to December 10, 1965. A/AC.105/INF.118. December 29, 1965.
Letters dated December 29 from the U.S. Representative concerning launchings during the period from September 12 to November 15, 1965. A/AC.105/INF.119, 120, 121, and 122. January 10, 1966.

TREATY INFORMATION

**U.S. Exercises Its Option
To Build Libby Dam**

Press release 17 dated January 27
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States on January 27 moved forward with plans to build Libby Dam on the Kootenai River in northwestern Montana. In Ottawa, Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth delivered to Secretary of State [Paul] Martin a note exercising our option under article 12 of the Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of

the Columbia River Basin,¹ signed at Washington January 17, 1961, and entered into force September 16, 1964. The terms of the United States note were developed by consultation among authorities of the two Governments. A Canadian reply acknowledges the United States note.

Full operation of the storage of Libby Dam is required to be completed within 7 years of the date established for commencement of construction. The date on which construction will be commenced, within the meaning of the Columbia River Treaty, is specified by a schedule of construction which is enclosed with the U.S. note.

Libby Dam will be located in Montana; the reservoir will extend into the Province of British Columbia. Congress has made an initial appropriation of \$7,500,000 for the beginning of construction of Libby Dam, which is the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army. Total cost of the project will be \$352 million.

In accordance with the U.S. note, the Seattle District Engineer of the Corps of Engineers, under the immediate supervision of the Division Engineer, North Pacific Division, will accomplish the planning and construction of the Libby Dam and Reservoir Project.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

JANUARY 27, 1966

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Treaty between Canada and the United States of America relating to cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin, signed at Washington on January 17, 1961, the respective instruments of ratification of which were exchanged at Ottawa on September 16, 1964.

I have been directed by the Secretary of State to inform you that by this note the United States of America exercises its option to commence construction of a dam on the Kootenai River near Libby, Montana, known as the Libby Dam Project, as provided for in Article XII, Kootenai River Develop-

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5638.

ment, of the Treaty. There is enclosed the schedule of construction of the Libby Dam Project.

The planning and construction of the Libby Dam Project has been assigned to the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army. The work will be accomplished by the Seattle District Engineer of the Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division, Corps of Engineers.

In the interest of facilitating necessary field liaison, may I be advised of the authority in Canada with which the field offices of the Corps of Engineers may consult in connection with detailed matters relating to the planning and construction of the Libby Dam Project.

I await your note in reply including your concurrence or suggested revisions.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

SCHEDULE OF CONSTRUCTION LIBBY DAM PROJECT

Commencement of Construction

Construction will commence by June 30, 1966, except that commencement of construction may be delayed until, but not later than, June 30, 1967, provided that:

a. The delay is not wilful or reasonably avoidable as determined by the United States of America; and

b. The United States of America notifies the Government of Canada by June 30, 1966, of the occurrence of such delay. If the commencement of construction is to be delayed, the delayed commencement date shall be communicated by written notice to the Government of Canada as soon as that date has been determined.

Operation of Storage

Initial closure will be completed within 6 years after June 30, 1966, or the delayed commencement date as the case may be. The dam will have the capacity of storing water up to elevation 2459, with the outlet facilities fully operable within 7 years from June 30, 1966, or the delayed com-

mencement date as the case may be, it being understood that such delayed date will not in any event be postponed beyond June 30, 1967.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

Acceptance deposited: Singapore, October 10, 1965. *Signature:* Singapore, October 28, 1965.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

Acceptance deposited: South Africa, January 7, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II. TIAS 5844.

Acceptance deposited: Dominican Republic, January 20, 1966.

BILATERAL

Iceland

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 30, 1964 (TIAS 5713). Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik January 25, 1966. Entered into force January 25, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1391 PUBLICATION 8037 FEBRUARY 21, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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Releases issued prior to January 31 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 17 of January 27 and 19 and 20 of January 28.

No.	Date	Subject
22	1/31	Rusk: news conference (printed in BULLETIN of February 14).
23	2/1	Interim IJC report on pollution of lakes.

Challenges and Choices in U.S. Trade Policy

1966 should be a critical year for United States trade policy, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon predicted recently. Mr. Solomon sees three major challenges facing our trade policy: (1) the future pattern of our trade relations with the rich, industrialized nations of the free world—which hinges on the outcome of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations at Geneva; (2) the trade problems of the more than 100 independent nations of the developing world—how to improve and stabilize their trade earnings and how best to organize trade with low-income countries; and (3) U.S. trade relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—whether our policies of the last 17 years continue to serve American interests well or whether changes in the Communist world and the world at large have made some aspects of U.S. policy obsolete.

In this pamphlet, which reprints from the Department of State Bulletin two recent addresses by Mr. Solomon, the Assistant Secretary discusses these challenges and the choices that will have to be made in the years ahead.

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U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS MEET AT HONOLULU

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"We went to Honolulu to meet the leaders of the Government of South Viet-Nam. They and their people understand, and we understand, that the war we are helping them fight must be a war that will be won on two fronts. One front is the military. The other front is the struggle against social injustice, against hunger and disease and ignorance, against political apathy and indifference."

—PRESIDENT JOHNSON, Los Angeles, February 8, 1966.

U.S. and South Vietnamese Leaders Meet at Honolulu

BACKGROUND

President Johnson, with several members of his Cabinet and other top advisers, held a 3-day meeting at Honolulu, February 6-8, with the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, and their principal advisers. The leaders of the two Governments exchanged views on the situation in Viet-Nam and at the close of the meeting released a joint communique and a "Declaration of Honolulu" expressing their agreement on policies and purposes.

Included in the U.S. delegation were Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner; Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler; U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam Henry Cabot Lodge; Special Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy; Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson; Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton; Special Consultant to the President Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor; and the U.S. commander in Viet-Nam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland.

When President Johnson returned to the mainland on February 8, he was met at Los

Angeles by Vice President Humphrey, who, on a special mission for the President, was proceeding to Honolulu to meet the Vietnamese leaders and return with them to Saigon. Following his mission to Saigon, the Vice President visited several other Asian capitals.

WELCOMING OF VIETNAMESE LEADERS, HONOLULU, FEBRUARY 6

White House press release (Honolulu, Hawaii) dated February 6, as-delivered text

Remarks by President Johnson

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: I welcome these two brave leaders of the Vietnamese Republic and their colleagues to American soil. We meet here in a time of testing and trial, but we will talk also of hope and harvest.

Our friends in Korea and Australia and New Zealand have sent their own men to join with Vietnamese and Americans in a conflict to decide if aggression and terror are the way of the future or whether free men are to decide their own course.

It is a question of the gravest importance to all other nations, large or small, whose peoples seek to walk in independence and peace, for were the Communist aggressors to win in Viet-Nam, they would know that they can accomplish through so-called "wars of national liberation" what they could not

accomplish through naked aggression in Korea, or insurgency in the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya, or the threat of aggression in Turkey, or in a free election booth anywhere in the world.

During the past year more than 1,300 Americans have lost their lives from Communist action in Viet-Nam. But more than 11,000 of our Vietnamese brothers-in-arms died last year protecting their homeland.

Why do these Vietnamese fight on? Because they are not going to let others enslave them or rule their future. And with their soldiers are the administrators and civil officials and the villagers themselves—to many of whom each darkness of the evening is filled with fear, and to many of whom each noise in the night may be a terrorist bomb or an assassin's grenade.

And yet they fight on. They fight for dreams beyond the din of battle—the dream of security in their village, a teacher for their children, food for their bodies, medicine for their sick, the right to worship in the way they choose. They fight for the essential rights of human existence, and only the callous or the timid can ignore their cause.

There are special pleaders who counsel retreat in Viet-Nam. They belong to a group that has always been blind to experience and has been deaf to hope. We cannot accept their logic that tyranny 10,000 miles away is not tyranny to concern us, or that subjugation by an armed minority in Asia is different from subjugation by an armed minority in Europe. Were we to follow their course, how many nations might fall before the aggressor? Where would our treaties be respected, our word honored, and our commitment believed?

In the forties and fifties we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. If we had not then acted, what kind of Europe might there be today? Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where aggression is on the march and enslavement of free men is its goal.

Our stand must be as firm as ever. If

we allow the Communists to win in Viet-Nam, it will become easier and more appetizing for them to take over other countries in other parts of the world. We will have to fight again someplace else—at what cost no one knows. That is why it is vitally important to every American that we stop the Communists in South Viet-Nam.

To these beautiful islands and the newest of our States have come the leaders of South Viet-Nam and the United States—come here to talk of our resolution to defend the peace and to build a decent society for the people of South Viet-Nam. Because we are here to talk especially of the works of peace, we will leave here determined not only to achieve victory over aggression but to win victory over hunger, disease, and despair.

We are making reality out of the hopes of the common people—hope for a better life. We will talk here of health and education, of agriculture and economics—and we will talk of those other important aspects of a vital future for the people of Viet-Nam. In all of these endeavors we will give all the support possible to the energetic efforts of our Vietnamese allies.

As leaders of our two nations, engaged in this struggle, it is appropriate that we should meet together in order that we may best move forward together. So this afternoon I extend to these two friends and these allies of ours a most warm welcome to our country.

Response by Chairman Thieu

Mr. President, today as we set foot on American territory, on behalf of the people and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, we extend to the people of the United States our friendly greeting.

We also express our gratitude for the warm support and the precious assistance of the American people and Government.

Your words have gone beyond the usual welcoming address, for they have told Viet-Nam and the world of a renewed and much stronger determination on the part of the United States to draw a line and stop

Communist aggression in Viet-Nam, and now.

Your review of the past Communist aggressions the world over leaves no doubt whatsoever as to the logical conclusion that has been drawn. Once again the Americans have confirmed themselves as the champions of liberty, the worthy descendants of the Minutemen. By adopting the Vietnamese cause, you have not only carried on the American tradition of coming to the assistance of a friend in need, but you have also shown enlightenment, vision, and realism in the best American tradition.

We welcome your initiative, Mr. President, in inviting us to this conference. This is a precious occasion for the leaders of our countries to personally meet. This also serves to further strengthen the friendship and the close cooperation already existing between our Governments in the common struggle against Communist aggression so as to maintain world peace and protect the freedom of mankind.

This is also a meeting between friends who already are in agreement for the purpose of showing the Communists our unwavering determination to call a stop to their efforts at enslaving the people of the world, notwithstanding the force they may adopt in going about this task.

Our determination is also to go one step further toward the complete eradication of the Communist wish, for whereas the Communists only *promise* a better society, we will wage every effort to make a reality of this dream for a better society that is in the mind of every Vietnamese.

We Vietnamese have a great admiration for the remarkable fighting spirit of the Americans and are grateful to those who have sacrificed their lives for a just cause and for the sake of our people. We send to the families of those valiant fighters our most sincere admiration for their loved ones and our condolence.

Mr. President, we firmly believe that the efforts of our two nations in the service of the ideals of liberty and peace in the world will lead to final victory.

In closing, we sincerely thank you, Mr. President, for the warm and heartening welcome which you have extended to us, and we take this opportunity to reiterate the solemn pledge of the Vietnamese people to continue to fight this war for as long as is necessary, and to be willing and ready to make sacrifices so as not to betray all those brave Americans and Vietnamese who have given their lives so that we may be free.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, FEBRUARY 8

White House press release (Honolulu, Hawaii) dated February 8

1. The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam have concluded three days of the most intense and friendly discussion, and their fundamental concord of purpose and policy is stated in the Declaration of Honolulu which they are issuing together today. In addition there has been opportunity for extended review of many urgent specific questions, both at the level of the Chiefs of Government and at the level of Cabinet Ministers. The results of this immediate discussion are reported in the remaining paragraphs of this communique.

2. The leaders of the two Governments, with their advisers, reviewed the intense efforts for peace undertaken by the Government of the United States between Christmas and the end of January. Both Governments noted with regret the total absence of a present interest in peace on the part of the Government of North Vietnam. They reviewed the present diplomatic situation in the United Nations and elsewhere, and they agreed upon continued diplomatic efforts for peace.

3. The economic advisers of the two Governments had a thorough discussion of their cooperative programs for maintaining economic stability and controlling the cost of living in a war-torn country. On the basis of their reports, the President and the Chief of State and Prime Minister have agreed that their two Governments will take further concrete steps to combat inflation in Vietnam.

4. The leaders of the two Governments received comprehensive reports on the intensified program of rural construction. The Government of Vietnam set forth a plan for efforts of particular strength and intensity in areas of high priority, and the President gave directions to ensure full and prompt support by all agencies of the United States Government.

5. In the construction program three particular points were agreed on as essential for rapid progress:

(1) Continued emphasis by both Vietnamese and Allied forces on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas—an effort as important as the military battle itself.

(2) Continued emphasis on the design of rural construction work to meet the people's needs for larger output, more efficient production, improved credit, handicrafts and light industry, and rural electrification.

(3) Concentration of resources—both Vietnamese and American—in selected priority areas which are properly related to military plans so that the work of rural construction can be protected against disruption by the enemy.

6. Cabinet members of both Governments had thorough discussions of special needs of the people of South Vietnam in the fields of agriculture, health, and education. In agriculture it was agreed that special effort would be made to move agricultural know-how—particularly new species of highly productive rice and corn and vegetable seed—from the experimental station to the farmer in the fields. Steps for more rapid land reform were carefully reviewed. It was agreed that Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and a team of agricultural experts would proceed at once to Vietnam for the purpose of developing enlarged programs of agricultural cooperation.

7. It was also agreed that programs in health and education would be intensified. The President pledged that he would soon dispatch teams of experts in those fields to Vietnam under the direction of Secretary Gardner. Both Governments agreed to make

increased efforts in the training of health personnel, in providing teams for medical care, and creating a stronger medical logistics system. They also agreed to strengthen their cooperation in building elementary schools, in training teachers, in reinforcing vocational and technical education, and in supplying textbooks.

8. It was agreed that the refugees who have of their own free will come over from the enemy side must be adequately cared for and prepared to resume a useful role in society. The Government of Vietnam described its plans to meet this problem and the President assured them of full American support. It was agreed that a special effort will be made to provide good schools for refugee children.

9. There was a full discussion of the military situation and of military plans and programs. The leaders of the two Governments reached full agreement upon a policy of growing military effectiveness and of still closer cooperation between the military forces of Vietnam and those of the United States. They reaffirmed their determination to act with all possible regard for the rights of innocent civilians, to adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the treatment of prisoners of war, and to act with full respect for the independence and territorial integrity of neighboring countries which wish to live in peace.

10. Finally, it was agreed that the leaders of the two Governments will have further meetings like this one in the future for the continued execution of the policies and purposes of the Declaration of Honolulu.

DECLARATION OF HONOLULU, FEBRUARY 8

White House press release (Honolulu, Hawaii) dated February 8

PART I

The Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America jointly declare:

their determination in defense against aggression,

their dedication to the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam,

and their commitment to the search for just and stable peace.

In pursuit of these objectives the leaders of their governments have agreed upon this declaration, which sets forth:

the purposes of the Government of Vietnam,

the purposes of the Government of the United States,

and the common commitment of both Governments.

PART II

The Purposes of the Government of Vietnam

Here in the mid-Pacific, halfway between Asia and North America, we take the opportunity to state again the aims of our government.

We are a government—indeed a generation—of revolutionary transformation. Our people are caught up in a mortal struggle.

This struggle has four sides.

1. *We must defeat the Viet Cong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil.* We are the victims of an aggression directed and supported from Hanoi. That aggression—that so-called “War of National Liberation”—is part of the communist plan for the conquest of all of Southeast Asia. The defeat of that aggression is vital for the future of our people of South Vietnam.

2. *We are dedicated to the eradication of social injustice among our people.* We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society in which every man can know that he has a future; that he has respect and dignity; that he has the opportunity for himself and for his children to live in an environment where all is not disappointment, despair and dejection; that the opportunities exist for the full expression of his talents and his hopes.

3. *We must establish and maintain a stable, viable economy and build a better material life for our people.* In spite of the war, which creates many unusual and unpredictable economic situations, we are determined to continue with a policy of aus-

terity; to make the best possible use of the assistance granted us from abroad; and to help our people achieve regular economic growth and improved material welfare.

4. *We must build true democracy for our land and for our people.* In this effort we shall continue to imbue the people with a sense of national unity, a stronger commitment to civic responsibility. We shall encourage a widened and more active participation in and contribution to the building of a free, independent, strong and peaceful Vietnam. In particular, we pledge again:

—to formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, including an electoral law;

—to take that constitution to our people for discussion and modification;

—to seek its ratification by secret ballot;

—to create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government.

These things shall be accomplished mainly with the blood, intelligence, and dedication of the Vietnamese people themselves. But in this interdependent world we shall need the help of others:—to win the war of independence; to build while we fight; to reconstruct and develop our nation when terror ceases.

To those future citizens of a free, democratic South Vietnam now fighting with the Viet Cong, we take this occasion to say come and join in this national revolutionary adventure:

—come safely to join us through the Open Arms Program,

—stop killing your brothers, sisters, their elders and their children,

—come and work through constitutional democracy to build together that life of dignity, freedom and peace those in the North would deny the people of Vietnam.

Thus, we are fighting this war. It is a military war, a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the

people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution.

PART III

The Purposes of the Government of the United States

(1) The United States of America is joined with the people and Government of Vietnam to prevent aggression. This is the purpose of the determined effort of the American armed forces now engaged in Vietnam. The United States seeks no bases. It seeks no colonial presence. It seeks to impose no alliance or alignment. It seeks only to prevent aggression, and its pledge to that purpose is firm. It aims simply to help a people and government who are determined to help themselves.

(2) The United States is pledged to the principles of the self-determination of peoples, and of government by the consent of the governed. It therefore gives its full support to the purpose of free elections proclaimed by the Government of South Vietnam and to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural construction. The United States will give its full support to measures of social revolution including land reform based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam.

(3) Just as the United States is pledged to play its full part in the world-wide attack upon hunger, ignorance, and disease, so in Vietnam it will give special support to the work of the people of that country to build even while they fight. We have helped and we will help them—to stabilize the economy—to increase the production of food—to spread the light of education—to stamp out disease.

(4) The purpose of the United States remains a purpose of peace. The United States Government and the Government of Vietnam will continue in the future, as they have in the past, to press the quest for a

peaceful settlement in every forum. The world knows the harsh and negative response these efforts have thus far received. But the world should know, too, that the United States Government and the Government of Vietnam remain determined that no path to peace shall be unexplored. Within the framework of their international commitments, the United States and Vietnam aim to create with others a stable peace in Southeast Asia which will permit the governments and peoples of the region to devote themselves to lifting the condition of man. With the understanding and support of the Government of Vietnam the peace offensive of the United States Government and the Government of South Vietnam will continue until peace is secured.

PART IV

The Common Commitment

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again:

to defense against aggression,
to the work of social revolution,
to the goal of free self-government,
to the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease,
and to the unending quest for peace.

MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT, LOS ANGELES, FEBRUARY 8

White House press release (Los Angeles, Calif.) dated February 8, as-delivered text

Remarks by President Johnson

We went to Honolulu to meet the leaders of the Government of South Viet-Nam. They and their people understand, and we understand, that the war we are helping them fight must be a war that will be won on two fronts.

One front is the military. The other front is the struggle against social injustice, against hunger and disease and ignorance, against political apathy and indifference.

The meeting in Honolulu could take place,

and take place successfully, because, as our friends from Saigon said in their part of the Declaration of Honolulu, "We are a government—indeed a generation—of revolutionary transformation."

As I looked across the table at these brave and determined young men, I thought also of the young Vietnamese soldiers and Province chiefs, and teachers and student leaders, who are really a part of this new generation. They know, and we know, that this revolutionary transformation cannot wait until the guns grow silent and until the terrorism stops.

With that common understanding, we took these last 3 days together to take stock of where we are and where we must go in the days and the weeks and the months that are ahead of all of us.

We talked of many very special and specific things. We talked of rural construction, of agricultural credits, of rural electrification, of new seeds and fertilizers for their crops, of schools and teachers and textbooks for their children, of medical schools and clinics and equipment to give them better health, of how to give training and education to the refugees, of how to deal with inflation in a war-torn country, of how to build the bases for a democratic constitution and for free elections, of how to seek the peace, and of how to effectively conduct the war.

In all of these fields, we set targets and we set concrete targets. Progress is not going to be easy. I think I should tell you in many fields it is not going to be even quick. But the leaders of both of the Governments are determined that we are going to move forward and we are going to make progress.

We shall meet again in the next few months, and we will measure the progress that we have made. On our part, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, with an expert staff, with the Vice President, Hubert Humphrey, will be going to Saigon tomorrow morning to see how we can help with the food and rural developments.

Missions will follow that have been or-

ganized by Secretary Gardner in the field of education, in the field of health, and in other fields, where our people can help with the work of social construction in South Viet-Nam.

The distinguished Vice President, standing with me here tonight, has followed our work over the cable lines, and I have been in frequent contact with him the last 3 days. He is leaving Los Angeles immediately to carry forward the mission that we outlined and we agreed upon and we defined at this very unusual conference in Honolulu.

He will go first to Saigon, to assure that our representatives there get to work rapidly and effectively on the task that we laid out at Honolulu. He will fly to Saigon with the leaders of the Government of South Viet-Nam, and on the way he will learn how they intend to carry forward their part of the plan in these fields.

The Vice President will go from Saigon to other capitals in Asia, to explain what was done at Honolulu and the real meaning of our work there. He will also, on behalf of our Government, ask for understanding and the support of other nations.

With him will be some of those who were at the Honolulu conference, like our revered Ambassador Averell Harriman and my Special Assistant for National Security, McGeorge Bundy.

So I have come back here tonight to the mainland refreshed and confident. The road ahead may be long and may be difficult. It will require the unfailing unity of our people in support of the courageous young Americans who, with their comrades from South Viet-Nam and Australia and Korea and New Zealand, are tonight fighting and suffering for us. They are out there dying in order to save freedom. We shall give them that support, and we shall fight the battle against aggression in Viet-Nam to a successful conclusion.

We shall fight the battle for social construction, and throughout the world we shall fight the battle for peace, and to the American people, who have given us their strength in every hour of trial, I say to you that we

shall fight all of these battles successfully and we shall prevail.

Remarks by Vice President Humphrey

Mr. President, we rejoice at your safe return, and we are heartened by the progress that is so evident from the Honolulu conference.

I deeply appreciate the faith and trust that you have placed in me to go on to Saigon and to help implement some of the decisions and programs and policies agreed upon at that very important conference.

We are, with our friends in Viet-Nam, partners in conflict, but we are also partners in social progress. It is to that endeavor, Mr. President, that I shall try to do my best, as your representative and the representative of this country, to work with the brave people of Viet-Nam in helping them to rebuild their country; and going on, as you have indicated, to other capitals to carry the message of America's commitment to the building of human resources and of social and economic progress for all of mankind.

Mr. President, we surely are happy to have you back on the mainland. I know that the people of the Hawaiian Islands, of the State of Hawaii, were honored and delighted with your visit, but the whole Nation, and, indeed, the free world, is grateful for the leadership that you have given us and given in the cause of peace and of freedom.

Ambassador Goldberg Reviews U.N. Peace Efforts With President

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations¹*

I reported to the President yesterday, February 10, on the action of the United Nations Security Council in inscribing the Viet-Nam problem on its agenda² and on the consultations now being carried on

among members to determine whether and in what manner the Council might assist in moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

The President reviewed the background of the decisions taken at Honolulu³ by the Governments of the United States and of the Republic of Viet-Nam to continue vigorously to resist aggression, to pursue with equal vigor the search for a peaceful settlement, and to carry on a common struggle against social injustice, poverty, disease, and ignorance.

Now that I have returned to New York I will review my discussion with the President with the Secretary-General and the representatives of member states on the Security Council and other representatives. The President asked me in this review to reaffirm that the goal of the United States in Viet-Nam is an honorable and just peace—peace at the earliest possible time.

The President also asked me to reiterate his conviction that negotiations, either without conditions or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, could serve to work out a mutually acceptable political solution, restore peace and tranquillity, and lay the groundwork for rehabilitation and progress throughout both North and South Viet-Nam and the rest of Southeast Asia. The President further believes that there might be a reciprocal reduction of hostilities, with or without negotiations, which might constitute a significant step toward peace.

An honorable and just peace is the U.S. objective in Viet-Nam, and it is for that reason that we have sought the help of friends and adversaries alike, in and out of the U.N., to bring this tragic war to a rapid and peaceful end. We shall pursue that objective unremittingly until it is achieved.

¹ Released at New York, N.Y., on Feb. 11 (U.S./U.N. press release 4806).

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

³ See p. 302.

The United States and Communist China

by William P. Bundy

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

Communist China is without doubt the most serious and perplexing problem that confronts our foreign policy today. Peking's foreign policy objectives, and the tactics it employs to achieve these objectives, sharply focus for us the issues of war and peace in Asia and the freedom and lives of millions of people, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

U.S. Objectives

The key questions we must ask at the outset are: What are our objectives, in Asia and in the world as a whole? What are Communist China's objectives? and What kind of policy is best for the United States in the light of those basic assessments?

And, viewed in this light, the unfortunate fact is that the kind of world that we seek and the kind of world our Asian friends seek is totally antithetic to the kind of Asia and the kind of world that Communist China seeks. What we seek is a situation where small as well as large nations are able to develop as free and independent countries, secure from outside aggression or subversion. We look toward their economic, political, and social development and growth; we hope their development will be in the direction of increasingly democratic institutions, but we recognize that these nations must develop as they themselves see fit, in accordance with their own traditions and customs. Their rate of progress, we

believe, will vary according to individual situations, but progress will inevitably take place and toward goals which are deeply rooted in individual aspirations.

In harsh conflict with these objectives is any situation in which a single nation or combination of nations sets out to control others in the region or to exercise political domination over other nations in the area or any major part of it.

Our objectives are consistent with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and, I believe, with the aspirations of the peoples and the governments of the area and of the nations in contiguous and other areas that share with us a concern for what happens in Asia in this and in the next generation. We believe, too, that our objectives accord with the whole tide of history at the present time. They are not abstract principles. They are the bedrock of our policy throughout the world. Governed by what the nations themselves wish to do and by practical factors, what we seek is to assist the nations that are trying to preserve their independence, trying to develop themselves, and, therefore, necessarily trying to resist forces working in the contrary direction.

Chinese Communist Objectives

There is today in Communist China a government whose leadership is dedicated to the promotion of communism by violent revolution.

The present leaders in Peking also seek to restore China to its past position of grandeur and influence. Many of Peking's

¹ Address made before the Associated Students of Pomona College at Pomona, Calif., on Feb. 12 (press release 26).

leaders today, now grown old, are proud and arrogant, convinced that they have been responsible for a resurgence of Chinese power. The China of old exercised a degree of control over Asia that waxed and waned according to the power of the ruling emperor. Under strong rulers this meant a type of overlordship, sometimes benign but frequently otherwise, over the countries around its borders. And the restoration of that image and controlling influence is certainly a part of Communist China's foreign policy today.

In the 1930's Mao Tse-tung called attention to areas controlled by China under the Manchu Empire but since removed from Chinese control: Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyus, the Pescadores, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Annam, and Outer Mongolia. In more recent years, Chinese Communist leaders have added to that list parts of Soviet Central Asia and eastern Siberia. I think we can take this as valid evidence of Peking's Asian ambitions. As Professor Oliver Edmund Clubb, in his *Twentieth Century China*, says: "The urge to revolutionary empire is fortified by the feeling drilled into all Chinese since the beginning of the Republic that all territory ever included in the vast Manchu Empire rightfully belongs to China."

In addition to these historically rooted aspirations, the present leadership is inspired by a Communist ideology still in a highly militant and aggressive phase. This phase is ideologically akin to that in the Soviet Union in the 1920's or early 1930's. It coincides, however, with a situation in which the opportunities for expansion are, or appear to Peking, more akin to those available to the Soviet Union at a much later phase in its ideological development—in 1945 and the immediate postwar years. This Communist element includes the advocacy of change through revolution and violence throughout the world and particularly in China's neighboring areas—not revolution seeking the fruition of the national goals of the people of these areas, but revolution supplied or stimulated from out-

side and based on a preconceived pattern of historical development.

Their vision of this Communist mission extends to countries far from China—including, as we all clearly have seen, Africa and even Latin America. Peking's plans for carrying out its objectives have been delineated in a series of pronouncements issued by its leaders, one of the latest and most widely publicized having been that issued last September by Marshal Lin Piao, top military leader in Communist China, in which Lin Piao offered Chinese Communist experience in the war against Japan as a lesson to be emulated by the less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their pursuit of "revolution."

As you know, the Lin Piao article draws an elaborate analogy based upon the domestic experience of Mao and his cohorts in taking over China: the organization of the rural areas against the urban ones. It extends that analogy to the thesis that the less developed areas of the world are all in the rural category which will be mobilized in order to destroy "the cities"; that is to say, all the Western, more advanced centers—ourselves, of course, at the head.

I mention this article because it is a clear and comprehensive indication that there has not taken place any moderating, but if anything a solidifying at least at this stage, of this virulent revolutionary policy that is central to our discussion of Communist China. And, of course, we have seen it in action over and over again.

The Chinese Threat in Asia

I shall not speak at length of the problems created by Communist Chinese policy in Africa and Latin America. The recent reaction even of Castro suggests that Latin America is reacting adversely to the heavy-handedness of these policies. In Africa, too, there is every sign that the new nations of the area, themselves carrying out nationalist revolutions of their own design, know full well what is meant when Chou En-lai, for example, referred last June to Africa

being ripe for a second stage of revolution. The new leaders of Africa have shown no desire to be Kerenskys.

But it is in Asia itself that the major thrust of Communist Chinese policy is felt and must be countered by their neighbors. It is sometimes argued that the ambitions of Communist China in the areas contiguous to it do not mean outright control; and it can certainly be argued that they are tactically cautious in pursuing these ambitions. They have not wished to seek a confrontation of military power with us, and in any situation that would be likely to lead to wider conflict they are tactically cautious. But in looking at the extent of their ambitions one cannot, I think, simply take the historical picture of tributary governments that would be tolerated as long as they did roughly what China wished. That indeed was the historic pattern in many periods when powerful governments ruled in the mainland of China. It is also, perhaps, the pattern one might draw abstractly from the desire any major power might feel not to have hostile military power based in areas adjacent to it. Those two logics, historic Chinese logic and "great power" logic, might appear to point to something less than total political domination as the Chinese Communist objective around their borders.

And yet we must recognize, I think, because of the Communist element in the thinking and practice of the leaders of Peking today, that there is another factor that raises strong doubts whether their ambitions are in fact this modest. We have seen, for example, in the contrast between what the Soviets have done in Eastern Europe and the behavior of predecessor Russian regimes, that there is a Communist logic that does insist on total control, that will not tolerate anything other than the imposition of the full Communist totalitarian system. The experience of Soviet control in Eastern Europe suggests that this same kind of Communist logic does and would apply to the behavior of Communist China.

That it would be further strongly sug-

gested by the way that the Communist Chinese regime has treated Tibet. The fact that Tibet was within the historic limits of Chinese suzerainty does not explain why Communist China has virtually obliterated the culture of Tibet in seizing control of it. One cannot rationalize this on grounds of history or of the need of a great power not to have hostile forces adjacent to it. So I suggest that we must give great weight to the probability that the ambitions of Communist China do extend, not necessarily to the degree of obliteration of the local culture that we have seen in Tibet, but at least to a fairly total form of domination and control in areas contiguous to it.

What, then, would be the consequences if Communist China were to achieve the kind of domination it seeks? Here again one is tempted to look for analogy to Eastern Europe, where there is a growing will to pursue national and independent policies and to adopt domestic policies that differ sharply from the original Communist model. Yet it has taken 20 years of virtual subjugation for the nations of Eastern Europe to move this far, and their nationalism, traditions of independence, and capabilities for independent development were in general far more highly developed than those of the smaller nations on China's borders. To accept Mainland Chinese domination in Asia would be to look forward to conditions of external domination and probably totalitarian control, not merely for 20 years but quite possibly for generations.

Moreover, the spread of Chinese domination would inevitably create its own dynamic and in the end threaten even the most securely based and largest nations within the area of that threat, such as India and Japan. One does not need to subscribe to any pat "domino" formula to know from the history of the last generation, and indeed from all history, that the spread of domination feeds on itself, kindling its own fires within the dominant country and progressively weakening the will and capability of others to resist.

Past Mistakes and Their Relevance to Present

This is what we are dealing with. We can all think, as we look back at the history of China, of errors that we as a nation have made and that other nations of the West have made—errors in justice and conduct in our relationships with China. We should search our souls on these and set our objectives and our principles to avoid repeating them ever again. In Asia, at least, the colonial era is for all significant purposes at an end.

But to say that the West itself bears a measure of historical responsibility for the strength of the feelings of Communist China does not deal with the present problem any more than discussion of the inequities of Versailles dealt with the ambitions of Hitlerite Germany. Whatever the historic blame may be, we have to deal with the present fact of a Chinese Communist government whose attitudes are very deeply rooted in China's national history and ambitions to revive its past greatness, and in an extremely virulent Communist ideology.

In the words of a recent article by Professor [John K.] Fairbank:

We are up against a dynamic opponent whose strident anti-Americanism will not soon die away. It comes from China's long background of feeling superior to all outsiders and expecting a supreme position in the world, which we seem to thwart.

Tactics and Strategy

I would like to emphasize that up to this point I have been speaking of the basic objectives of Peking's policy. To describe these objectives as deeply expansionist is by no means to paint the picture of another Hitler, building a vast military machine with the aim of conquest by conventional warfare on a timetable backed at some point, in the Chinese case, by a nuclear capability.

This has not been the historical Chinese way, and there is every reason to believe that it is not their present preference. Chinese are patient and think in long historical terms. Military force is important and they

would like to think that their nuclear capability may at some point be useful in backing the picture of an overwhelmingly strong China whose will must be accepted. But the doctrinal statements of Lin Piao and others speak rather in terms of what they call "people's war," which plainly means the instigation and support of movements that can be represented as local movements, designed to subvert and overthrow existing governments and replace them by regimes responsive to Peking's will.

This is what we are seeing today in Thailand in the form of a so-called "Thai Patriotic Front" established and supported from mainland China. This is the direct form of Communist Chinese tactic that must be met. A variant tactic was reflected in the Communist Chinese role in support of the PKI [Communist Party of Indonesia] in Indonesia.

But equally important to Peking is its encouragement and support of the parallel efforts of the other Communist Asian regimes in North Korea and North Viet-Nam. What is now happening in Viet-Nam is basically the result of Hanoi's own ambitions and efforts. Peking might wish eventually to dominate North Viet-Nam or a unified Viet-Nam under Hanoi's initial control. But if this were resisted by the Vietnamese in the classic historical pattern of relations between the two areas Peking would still gain enormously from the success of Hanoi's effort, which would clear the way for Peking to expand and extend the kind of action it is undertaking on its own in Thailand. It takes no vivid imagination to visualize what Peking would do in Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma if Hanoi were to succeed in Viet-Nam and Peking itself succeed in Thailand.

This, then, is the preferred Communist Chinese tactic and strategy. Ideas are a part of it, although Communist China's image as a successful model of social and political organization is hardly as attractive today as it may have been before the disastrous mistakes of the "great leap forward" and

the uneven progress of the years since. Few Asians today think of the Communist Chinese structure as a model, although individual ideas such as land reform and attacks on "feudal" social structures are a part of Peking's tactical efforts.

But essentially we are dealing here not with the power of ideas but with the power of subversive organization—perhaps the one field in which Communist China has shown real innovation and skill. In mainland Southeast Asia, as today in South Viet-Nam, what we could expect to see as the spearhead of the subversive effort would be terrorism, selective assassination, guerrilla action, and finally, if it were required, conventional military forces largely recruited by the tactics of the earlier phases.

These tactics might be varied if Communist China were to decide again to threaten India directly. There the element of conventional forces would play a greater part but would still be backed and reinforced by major political efforts to disrupt the cohesion and strength of India.

Our Basic Policies

I repeat, we must look at things and deal with them as they are, if we are to hope for change. Our basic policy must include, as major elements, two interrelated efforts: to assist the free nations of the area, as they may desire, to preserve their security; and to help them, again in accordance with their own wishes, to improve their political, economic, and social conditions. The latter is an effort that I am sure we would be making even if there were no security threat.

These two fundamental elements of our policy have much in common with the policies that we and our NATO allies pursued so successfully in the areas threatened by the Soviet Union after the war. And surely there is, to a very high degree, a valid parallel between the situation we continue to face vis-a-vis Communist China and that we faced with the Soviet Union after the war. We have dealt with the Soviet Union fundamentally by assisting in the restoration of the power and strength of Europe so that

Soviet ambitions were successfully checked. Since 1955, although Soviet ambitions remain, we have seen a trend toward moderation in Soviet policy and a turning inward by the Soviets to their domestic problems.

There are, of course, myriad differences between the situation in Asia and that in Europe in terms of sophistication of economic and political bases, the stability of the societies, and the unity of national cultures. But basic to our policy in respect to Communist China, as in the case of our policy toward the Soviet Union, must be our determination to meet with firmness the external pressure of the Communist Chinese. Again, in Professor Fairbank's words:

We have little alternative but to stand up to Peiping's grandiose demands.

So the effort to assist in preserving security is fundamental to our policy. It is reflected in our treaty commitments—bilateral with Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines, multilateral (but individually binding) through the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] and ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Security Treaty] treaties, and extending to South Viet-Nam through a protocol to the SEATO treaty.

Necessarily, our security effort and commitments have a major military element, for the threat of military action is direct in relation to Korea and the Republic of China and lurks in the background of the Communist Chinese threat to Southeast Asia, as it does for India. The day may come when other nations in the area can join in assuming more of this burden, but the simple fact is that today there cannot be an effective deterrent military force, and thus a balance of power, around China's frontiers without major and direct military contributions by the United States.

But even in the security area the effort is far from merely a military one. Local military forces should wherever possible be adequate, so that an external attack would have to take on large proportions immediately identifiable as aggression. But at least as basic to the preservation of the in-

dependence of the nations of Asia is their capacity to insure law and order and to deal with subversion, and this in turn relates to the whole nature of their political structures and to their social and economic progress. So in the end what is done under the heading of "security" merges almost indistinguishably into what is done under the heading of "development."

And so, at one time or another, we have had assistance relationships with all of the non-Communist countries of Asia. Today three of these—Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia—have chosen to follow paths that involve little or no assistance from us. And there are nations such as Japan, and more recently the Republic of China, which have made such economic progress that they no longer need our direct help. Malaysia and Singapore are other special cases, which look for historical and practical reasons to Britain and the Commonwealth.

So the pattern is varied. In a very few instances we supply major assistance to conventional military forces. In others, such as Thailand, the emphasis is as great or greater on nonmilitary measures to better the lot of the people and thus to strengthen the fabric of the nation. And throughout the area, even where we are no longer giving direct economic assistance, we have joined in supporting the increasing efforts of the World Bank and private lenders to pitch in on the economic side, and more recently the profoundly important regional economic developments represented by the formation of the Asian Development Bank and the growing, though still embryonic, effort to provide an effective framework, through the United Nations, for assistance in the Mekong Basin and on a regional basis to Southeast Asia.

All of these efforts are linked together. They represent the kind of activity which, as I have said, we would be supporting in large part in any case irrespective of the threat of Communist China and the other Communist nations. What they should do, over time, is to help build in Asia nations which are standing on their own feet, re-

sponding to the needs of their peoples, and capable of standing up to the kind of tactics and strategy employed by Communist China, backed where necessary and in accordance with our treaty commitments by the assurance that, if external attack in any form should ever take place, the United States and others would come to their help.

This is the essence of what we are trying to do. Containment, yes, but containment carried out by actions that run clear across the board. And containment in the last analysis that depends upon the performance of the Asian nations themselves. As one looks back over the short historical span of the last 15 years, one can surely see throughout the area tremendous progress where security has been maintained. Even though present difficulties are formidable, the nations of Asia have great capacity, and there is much reason for encouragement at the long-term prospect.

U.S.—Chinese Communist Relations

This brings me to the whole question of how we deal specifically with Communist China. Let me briefly review and analyze some of the things we have done or might do.

As far as contacts through diplomatic channels are concerned, we have had 128 meetings at the ambassadorial level with Peking's representatives, first in Geneva and now Warsaw. I think it is fair to say that we have had the longest and most direct dialog of any major Western nation with Communist China.

I am bound to say at the same time, however, that the dialog so far has not been very productive and founders on the fundamental issue of Peking's demand for Taiwan and by its stated conviction that the United States is by historical necessity Peking's prime antagonist on the world scene. But it is fair to say that it is more of a dialog than we could expect to have if we were ever to recognize Communist China, if the experience of Western diplomats in Peking is representative. And it is an opportunity to try directly to make them understand that

we have no hostile designs on mainland China or its leaders but that we fully intend to maintain our commitments to defend our friends and allies against Communist aggression and that the United States seeks peace, freedom, and stability for the countries of Asia.

In addition to these direct contacts, we have of course been prepared to deal with Communist China in multilateral forums where its interests are directly involved. This was true of the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1961-62, and we have made clear our willingness to participate in a Geneva-conference type of format to resolve the present Viet-Nam problem or to have Communist China appear at the United Nations if Hanoi or Peking were ever ready to let the United Nations deal with the Viet-Nam issue.

And there is the possibility that Peking may at some point be prepared to participate usefully in multilateral discussions on disarmament. We have always said that we would envisage such participation if workable arrangements appeared to be in prospect, although I am bound to add that Peking's attitude, particularly since its nuclear tests, has given no ground for supposing that she is prepared to enter disarmament discussions with any constructive position.

Chinese Representation at the U.N.

Some nations at the U.N. hope that Communist China's seating would have a moderating effect on its policies. They advance the thesis that, not being included in the U.N., Peking feels rejected and acts with considerably less restraint than if it were a member with a member's obligations.

We respect those who hold this view, but we cannot agree with it. It seems to us a rationalistic view that ignores the deep-seated historic and ideologic reasons for Peking's current attitudes. Nor does this theory—the "neurosis" theory if you will—explain Peking's behavior toward other Communist nations or its behavior in Afro-Asian groupings to which Communist China

has been fully welcomed. I return again to Professor Fairbank's description of China's "long background of feeling superior to all outsiders and expecting a supreme position in the world." Surely this, alongside ideologic differences, lies at the root of the Sino-Soviet split, of Communist China's disruptive behavior in Afro-Asian groupings, and of the heavyhandedness of Communist China's policy from Indonesia to Burundi.

Moreover, we must consider Peking's price for entering the U.N. On September 29, 1965, Chen Yi, the Chinese Communist Premier, made the following demands:

1. The expulsion of the Republic of China from the U.N.
2. The complete reorganization of the U.N.
3. The withdrawal of the General Assembly resolution condemning Peking as an aggressor in the Korean conflict.
4. The branding of the United States as an aggressor in that conflict.

These are obviously unacceptable conditions.

The Republic of China, for example, is one of the original signatories of the United Nations Charter and has lived up to its obligations as a U.N. member in good faith. More than 13 million people live on the Island of Taiwan. This is a larger population than that of 83 members of the United Nations. The United States for many years has had close and friendly relations with the Republic of China, and since 1954 we have been bound by treaty to join with it in the defense of Taiwan. It would be unthinkable and morally wrong to expel the Government of the Republic of China from the U.N. to meet this demand of Peking's.

One must also consider the attitude of Communist China toward conflict, not only where its own interests are directly concerned but even in cases where they are not. Had Communist China been in the United Nations, could there have been a cease-fire resolution on the India-Pakistan conflict in September and could Secretary-General U Thant have received any mandate to bring

that conflict to a halt? Peking's critical comment on the Tashkent proceedings is a clear answer. We are dealing with a nation that, at least as far as we can now see, will attempt as a matter of principle to put a monkey wrench into every peacemaking effort which may be made in the world.

Finally, there is the psychological factor: whether the admission to the U.N. of a nation that is dedicated to violent revolution and currently supporting North Viet-Nam's aggression against South Viet-Nam and threatening India in seeking to exacerbate and extend the Indo-Pakistan conflict would, in fact, not encourage Peking to think it is on the right track while deeply discouraging other nations which are resisting Peking's pressures and seeking to maintain their own independence.

It continues, therefore, to be U.S. policy to support the position of the Republic of China in the U.N. For our part, we will also continue to oppose the admission of Communist China.

Bilateral Contacts

Now I should like to talk briefly on the subject of unofficial contacts with Peking, stressing above all one point which has not been sufficiently emphasized.

Many people do not realize that it is Communist China which has prevented any movement toward bilateral contacts. The United States over the past several years has tried to promote a variety of contacts, but the Chinese have kept the door tightly barred.

Since 1958, for example, we have validated passports of over 80 representatives of newspapers and other media for travel to Communist China. Only two have been admitted. We have tried unsuccessfully to arrange with the Chinese either a formal or an informal exchange of newsmen, and more recently we have indicated to them our willingness unilaterally and without reciprocity to see Communist Chinese newsmen enter the United States.

In addition, we have a short time ago amended our travel regulations to permit

doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine to travel to Communist China.² We shall see, but so far the response has been negative.

We have discussed with various scientific and other organizations their interests in arranging people-to-people exchanges with the Chinese. We have encouraged the exchange of publications between various universities and institutions in the United States with Peking. There is a free flow of mail to and from Communist China. All of these efforts have been consistent with our worldwide concern for a freedom of information and for the exchange of knowledge and views in humanitarian fields. Yet they have been consistently rejected by Communist China. If there were a possibility that such contacts might over time develop a broader understanding of the rest of the world in Communist China, it is they, not we, who reject this possibility.

Trade With Communist China

Let me now say a few words about trade.

We have not opposed the trade of other nations with Communist China except insofar as there is a strongly built-up pattern of control in the area of strategic commodities. We have expressed our concerns to other nations from time to time, recognizing that their trade policies were their own decision but raising questions of their vulnerability to possible pressures from Peking in their overinvolvement in trading patterns.

As for the possibilities of our trade, every time the subject is seriously mentioned in this country, it is shot down immediately in Peking. In 1961, for example, when food supplies in mainland China were very short, President Kennedy made it quite clear that we would take under consideration a Chinese Communist request to purchase grain. The Chinese Communist response was to denounce the President and to reject any possibility of trade, not only in grain but in other commodities with the United States.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 17, 1966, p. 90.

Conclusion

These are samples of what we are up against. We are Peking's great enemy because our power is a crucial element in the total balance of power and in the resistance by Asian states to Chinese Communist expansionist designs in Asia. That is the really controlling fact, not sentiment, not whatever wrongs may have been done in the past, but that very simple fact and the very fundamental conflict between their aims and objectives and the kinds of aims that we have—above all, our support for the right of the nations of Asia to be free and independent and govern themselves according to their own wishes.

All of us must hope that this picture will change. Mainland China is, of course, a great power in the world historically. How it will develop economically and in other respects remains to be seen. I myself think that they will have considerable problems that will tend over time to absorb them if their external ambitions and desires are checked. There are those who argue that mainland China's great size and population, its historical and cultural links with the areas around its borders, and its economic potential make inevitable the growth of a Chinese "sphere of influence" in Asia. Those who advance this fatalistic theory discount the aspirations of the peoples in the area, their ability, and the effectiveness of U.S. aid, and they ignore the historical trends of our time.

In sum, I repeat that the problem must be considered basically in the same way we did that of the Soviet Union. We must, on the one hand, seek to curtail Peking's ambitions and build up the free nations of Asia and of contiguous areas; on the other hand, while maintaining firm resistance to their expansionist ambitions, we can, over time, open the possibility of increased contacts with Communist China, weighing very carefully any steps we take in these general areas lest we impair the essential first aim of our policy, including our clear commitments.

It is unlikely that the present leaders,

who have become doctrinaire and dogmatic, can be expected to change, but they in due course will be replaced with a new generation of leaders. It is our hope that these men will see with clearer eyes and better vision that China's best interest lies in pursuing a peaceful course.

Registration of Rhodesian Agent Implies No Recognition by U.S.

Department Statement

Press release 27 dated February 12

The Department of State has been informed by the Department of Justice that Henry J. C. Hooper has filed a statement under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as the agent of what he describes in his registration as the "Department of External Services, Ministry of Information, Government of Rhodesia." A copy of this registration statement is on public file at the Department of Justice.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act was passed to assure public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities and other activities on behalf of foreign groups. It specifically requires the registration of agents for insurgents in other countries who are not recognized by the United States Government. Thus, registration as an "agent of a foreign principal" under the act in no way implies U.S. approval of the activities of the registered agent or recognition of the political faction or regime which the agent represents or purports to represent.

The Secretary of State announced on November 11, 1965,¹ upon his departure from the Texas White House, that "the President instructed me to inform the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, that the United States Government in no way recognizes the rebel regime" in Southern Rhodesia. The position of the United States toward the il-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 894.

egal regime in Southern Rhodesia has not changed in any way since November 11. We deplore the illegal seizure of power by the white minority regime, and we continue to recognize the British Government as the sovereign authority in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia.

U.S.-Canada Economic Committee To Meet at Washington

The Department of State announced on February 10 (press release 25) that a meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs would be held at Washington, D.C., on March 4-5.

This will be the 10th meeting of the Joint Committee, which was established by agreement between the two Governments in 1953.¹ Its periodic meetings provide an opportunity for Cabinet officers of both Governments to consult and examine economic and trade matters of common interest and concern to the two countries. The last meeting of the Joint Committee was held at Ottawa on April 29-30, 1964.²

Representing Canada will be: Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance; Robert W. Winters, Minister of Trade and Commerce; John J. Greene, Minister of Agricul-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 739.

² For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1964, p. 774.

ture; Charles M. Drury, Minister of Industry; Jean-Luc Pépin, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys; Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of Canada; Sydney D. Pierce, Chief Negotiator on Trade Negotiations; and Charles S. A. Ritchie, Ambassador to the United States.

The United States will be represented by: Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury; Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce; Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; and W. Walton Butterworth, Ambassador to Canada.

Secretary Sends Battle Act Report to Congress

The Department of State announced on February 11 (press release 24 dated February 10) the release of the 18th report by the Secretary of State to the Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, also known as the Battle Act. Copies of the report (Department of State publication 8019) are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (price 40 cents).

Foreign Aid

*Message From President Johnson to the Congress*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I recommend a foreign aid program to help those nations who are determined to help themselves.

I recommend a program to help give the people of the less developed world the food, the health, the skills, and education—and the strength—to lead their nations to self-sufficient lives of plenty and freedom.

I propose to carry forward the best of what we are now doing in the less developed world, and cut out the worst. I also propose to make the basic changes the times demand.

My recommendations are grounded in the deep conviction that we must use foreign assistance to attack the root causes of poverty. We must concentrate on countries not hostile to us that give solid evidence that they are determined to help themselves.

This is the lesson of the past. It is the hope for the future. It is the guiding principle for a nation ready and willing to cooperate with the industrious, but unwilling to subsidize those who do not assume responsibility for their own fate.

During the past year I have given our foreign assistance program the most sober and searching review. I have questioned the merit of each program. Special groups have concentrated on the particular areas of food, education, and health. A Cabinet com-

mittee has examined the details of our general economic and military assistance.

Thus, the steps I recommend today have been developed in the light of advice from senior officials in the executive branch, congressional leaders, and experienced advisers from outside Government. They also have been developed with full recognition of our balance-of-payments situation. They emerge from a rigorous examination of our past experience. They are informed by compassion and shaped by the history of two decades. They are the proof of our devotion to the works of peace. They reflect our vision of a world free from fear and ripe with opportunity. They will shape the legacy we leave our children.

I

The quest for peace is as old as mankind.

For countless centuries man struggled to secure first his home, then his village, then his city. It is the unique heritage of our century that men must strive for a secure world.

Peace, plenty, freedom—our fathers aspired to these as we do now. But the fateful truth of our age is that all our personal and national hopes hang in a balance affected by events and attitudes half a world away.

We have paid a fearful price to learn the folly of isolation. We have learned that the human misery which infects whole nations with a thirst for violent change does not give way to mere slogans. We have learned

¹ H. Doc. 374, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (White House press release dated Feb. 1).

that the works of peace require courage and foresight. The need knows neither national boundary nor narrow ideology.

We have demonstrated this understanding in many ways over the past two decades. Our military strength has protected many countries threatened by invasion from without or subversion from within. Our economic assistance programs have rebuilt Europe. We have helped untold millions to gain confidence in peaceful progress, where there has been neither peace nor progress for centuries.

We will never know how many crises have been averted, how much violence avoided, or how many minds have been won to the cause of freedom in these years. But I believe we have many such achievements to our credit.

Yet today the citizens of many developing nations walk in the shadow of misery: half the adults have never been to school; over half the people are hungry or malnourished; food production per person is falling; at present rates of growth, population will double before the year 2000.

These are the dominant facts of our age. They challenge our own security. They threaten the future of the world.

Our response must be bold and daring. It must go to the root causes of misery and unrest. It must build a firm foundation for progress, security, and peace.

II

Although we recognize the shortsightedness of isolation, we do not embrace the equally futile prospect of total and endless dependence. The United States can never do more than supplement the efforts of the developing countries themselves. They must supply most of the capital, the know-how—and the will to progress. If they do, we can and will help. If they do not, nothing we can supply will substitute. Nothing can replace resources wasted in political or military adventures.

For the essence of economic development is work—hard, unremitting, often thankless work. Most of it must be done by the people

The Foreign Assistance Program

Remarks by President Johnson

White House press release dated February 1

The Foreign Assistance Program that I have sent to the Congress has a new look and a new purpose. We serve notice here and now from this day on that our foreign assistance will go to those nations and only those nations who are willing and ready to help themselves.

Unless nations and peoples are determined to do all that must be done in their own country and by their own work to lift the quality of their own lives, then we cannot really effectively help them. We want to see other countries achieve for their people a life of freedom and security.

We must pursue that goal with all the talent that we have. Today the majority of the people in this world are living in desperate need. Americans, I think, are not going to just sit complacently and idly by wringing their hands and doing nothing while this suffering goes on. But compassion is not enough.

While our wealth is great, our wealth is not unlimited. Our wealth must be used to root out the causes of dangerous disorder so that the lasting values can survive and prosper, and that is why we are not going to allow American aid to become an international dole.

Our assistance must be concentrated on those particular nations which will put it to the best use. It must be based on merit as well as need, on action as well as aspiration, on responsibility as well as despair. We are eager to cooperate with the industrious and the willing and the responsible, and I believe that this is the kind of program that our Congress advocates and the kind of program that our Congress desires.

whose futures and whose children's futures are directly at stake.

Only these people and their leaders can—

Invest every possible resource in improved farming techniques, in school and hospital construction, and in critical industry;

Make the land reforms, tax changes, and other basic adjustments necessary to transform their societies;

Face the population problem squarely and realistically;

Create the climate which will attract foreign investment, and keep local money at home.

These are just a few of the steps on the road to modernization. They are far from easy. We would do well to remember how difficult many of them were for us. But they are absolutely necessary. Without them, outside help is wasted. Neither we nor they can afford waste, and we will not continue any partnership in which only we recognize that fact.

As I said last October, "Action, not promises, will be the standard of [our] assistance."² It must be clear that the principle of our assistance is cooperation. Those who do not fulfill their commitments to help themselves cannot expect help from us.

III

In this spirit of cooperation, I propose that the United States offer to join in new attacks upon the root causes of world poverty.

The incessant cycle of hunger, ignorance, and disease is the common blight of the developing world. This vicious pattern can be broken. It must be broken if democracy is to survive.

The problem of hunger is a continuing crisis. In many parts of the world we witness both the ravages of famine born of natural disaster and the failure of food production to keep pace with rising needs.

This is a catastrophe for all of us. It must be dealt with by all who can help. In many other countries food output is also falling behind population growth. We cannot meet the world food needs of the future, however willing we are to share our abundance. Nor would it serve the common interest if we could.

The solution is clear: an all-out effort to enable the developing countries to supply their own food needs, through their own production or through improved capacity to

buy in the world market.

I will shortly send to the Congress a special message³ which will recommend new legislation to redirect and strengthen our food aid programs to induce greater agricultural self-help abroad; make food aid a more integrated element of general programs of economic cooperation; and move as quickly as our mutual interest permits toward harder financial terms, thereby adding to our commercial markets and a favorable balance-of-payments result.

In addition, I propose that the Agency for International Development increase its efforts in the field of agriculture by more than one-third, to a total of nearly \$500 million. One-third of this total will finance imports of fertilizer from the United States. The remainder will finance transfer of American farming techniques, the most advanced in the world; improvement of roads, marketing, and irrigation facilities; establishment of extension services, cooperatives, and credit facilities; purchases of American farm equipment and pesticides; and research on soil and seed improvements.

These programs will also have long-range benefits for our own farmers. Higher incomes abroad mean greater exports for our highly efficient food producers.

To combat ignorance, I am proposing a major new effort in international education. I propose a 50-percent increase in AID education activities to a total of more than \$200 million. Shortly I will transmit to the Congress a special message⁴ proposing an International Education Act which will commit the United States to a campaign to spread the benefits of education to every corner of the earth. Nothing is more critical to the future of liberty and the fate of mankind.

To fight disease, I will shortly propose an International Health Act⁵ which will provide for extensive new programs at home and abroad.

² For text of a statement made by President Johnson on Oct. 20, 1965, see BULLETIN of Nov. 8, 1965, p. 760.

³ For text, see p. 336.

⁴ For text, see p. 328.

⁵ *Ibid.*

We now have the capacity to eliminate smallpox from the list of man's natural enemies; to eradicate malaria in the Western Hemisphere and in large areas of Africa and Asia; and to relieve much of the suffering now caused by measles, cholera, rabies, and other epidemic diseases.

I will propose a two-thirds increase in fiscal year 1967 in AID support of health programs, to a total of more than \$150 million. In addition to financing disease eradication, we will step up our program to combat malnutrition. We will expand help to community water supply projects. We will finance the training of more doctors and nurses, needed for new health centers and mobile health units.

I also propose to provide nearly \$150 million in food-for-work programs, and more than \$100 million in contributions to international organizations to further support the war on hunger, ignorance, and disease.

IV

We stand ready to help developing countries deal with the population problem.

The United States cannot and should not force any country to adopt any particular approach to this problem. It is first a matter of individual and national conscience, in which we will not interfere.

But population growth now consumes about two-thirds of economic growth in the less developed world. As death rates are steadily driven down, the individual miracle of birth becomes a collective tragedy of want.

In all cases, our help will be given only upon request, and only to finance advisers, training, transportation, educational equipment, and local currency needs.

Population policy remains a question for each family and each nation to decide. But we must be prepared to help when decisions are made.

V

In many areas, the keys to economic and social development lie largely in the settling of old quarrels and the building of regional solidarity. Regional cooperation is often the

best means of economic progress as well as the best guarantor of political independence.

I propose that we continue and enlarge our support of the institutions and organizations which create and preserve this unity.

Last April I pledged full U.S. support for regional programs to accelerate peaceful development in southeast Asia.⁶ We have already begun to implement this pledge by support to the Nam Ngum Dam in the Mekong Basin and to other projects.

In my legislative proposals, I am requesting new and specific authority to carry forward this support for regional progress. We must make it clear to friend and foe alike that we are as determined to support the peaceful growth of southeast Asia as we are to resist those who would conquer and subjugate it. These efforts in Asia will be further enhanced by the formation of the Asian Development Bank, which was the subject of my message to the Congress of January 18.⁷ I am confident that this Bank will be a major unifying force in the region, and a source of vital development capital invaluable to our mutual interests.

In Africa, we look forward to working closely with the new African Development Bank as its programs materialize.

We also look forward to progress toward an East African economic community and other subregional common markets on that massive continent. As these institutions and arrangements develop, the United States intends to make greater use of them as channels for our assistance. We will move in the direction of more regional administration of our bilateral programs.

We have recently extended our ongoing commitment to the Alliance for Progress, which includes strong support for the successful economic integration of Central America. The movement toward greater cooperation among all Latin American economies will gain momentum in the years ahead. It has our strong support.

The United States will support the pro-

⁶ BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 255.

posal of the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank to establish a new fund for feasibility studies of multinational projects. These projects can be of enormous value to countries which share a river valley or another natural resource. They are sound combinations of good economics and good politics.

VI

I propose that the United States—in ways consistent with its balance-of-payments policy—increase its contributions to multilateral lending institutions, particularly the International Development Association. These increases will be conditional upon appropriate rises in contributions from other members. We are prepared immediately to support negotiations leading to agreements of this nature for submission to the Congress. We urge other advanced nations to join us in supporting this work.

The United States is a charter member and the largest single contributor to such institutions as the World Bank, the International Development Association, and the Inter-American Development Bank. This record reflects our confidence in the multilateral method of development finance and in the soundness of these institutions themselves. They are expert financiers, and healthy influences on the volume and terms of aid from other donors.

I propose that we increase our contributions to the United Nations development program, again subject to proportionate increases in other contributions. This program merges United Nations technical assistance and preinvestment activities. It promises to be among the world's most valuable development instruments.

VII

We will expand our efforts to encourage private initiative and enterprise in developing countries. We have received very useful advice and guidance from the report of the distinguished Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid. Many of the rec-

ommendations of that report are now being put into effect.

We will review frankly and constructively with cooperating countries the obstacles to domestic and foreign private investment. We will continue to support elimination of inefficient controls; formation of cooperatives; training of labor and business leaders; and credit facilities and advisory services for small- and medium-sized farms and businesses.

The U.S. Government can do only a small part of the job of helping and encouraging businessmen abroad. We must rely more and more on the great reservoirs of knowledge and experience in our business and professional communities. These groups have already provided invaluable service and advice. We in Government must find ways to make even greater use of these priceless assets.

I propose to continue our support for the International Executive Service Corps and increase the AID authority to guarantee U.S. private investments in developing countries.

VIII

To signify the depth of our commitment to help those who help themselves, I am requesting 5-year authorizations for our military and economic aid programs.

For development loans and loans under the Alliance for Progress, this is merely a reaffirmation of the principle adopted by the Congress in 1961 and 1962. It will not impair the ability or the duty of the Congress to review these programs. Indeed, it will free the Congress from the burden of an annual renewal of basic legislation, and provide greater opportunity for concentration on policy and program issues.

Annual congressional consideration of both economic and military programs will be maintained through full annual presentations before the substantive committees, if they so desire, as well as through the annual appropriation process.

The military and economic authorization requests are contained in two separate bills. I believe this is a forward step in clarifying

the goals and functions of these programs in the minds of the public and the Congress.

IX

I am requesting a total appropriation of \$2.469 million in fiscal year 1967 to finance programs of economic cooperation. As in the last 2 years, I am requesting the absolute minimum to meet presently foreseeable needs, with the understanding that I will not hesitate to request a supplemental appropriation if a clear need develops.

Aid to Vietnam

The largest single portion of my request—\$550 million in supporting assistance—is to support our effort in Vietnam. Our help to the Government of Vietnam in carrying forward programs of village economic and social improvement is of crucial significance in maintaining public morale in the face of the horror of war. With the help of AID advisers, who often serve at great personal risk, the Vietnamese Government is patiently building the foundations of progress in the rural areas.

Other Supporting Assistance

The remainder of my request—\$197 million—is for aid to countries whose security is directly threatened. This is concentrated in programs for Laos, Korea, and Thailand. Each country is a key link in our defense system. Each lives in the shadow of great and hostile powers. Each is well worth the investment.

Alliance for Progress

I am requesting a total of \$543 million in fiscal year 1967 appropriations for the countries cooperating in the Alliance for Progress. Of this total \$88 million will be used to finance technical cooperation.

At the Rio Conference, the United States announced its intention to support this great hemispheric effort beyond 1971. Our ultimate goal is a hemisphere of free nations, stable and just—prosperous in their economics and democratic in their politics.

We can cite many indications of heartening progress:

In 1965 alone, Chile settled about 4,000 families on their own land, about as many as had acquired land during the preceding 35 years;

Brazil, as a result of courageous economic policy decisions, has reduced its rate of inflation, restored its credit, encouraged private investment and modernized many of its economic institutions;

In only 2 years, the five members of the Central American Common Market have increased intramarket trade by 123 percent.

These are not isolated or exceptional examples. The keynote of the Alliance for Progress has always been self-help. The pattern of our assistance—65 percent of which is concentrated in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia—demonstrates our determination to help those who help themselves.

Most heartening of all, a new generation has risen to leadership in Latin America as the Alliance for Progress has taken hold. These young men and women combine a belief in democratic ideals with a commitment to peaceful change and social justice. We are happy to welcome them as leaders of great nations in the community of freedom.

Development Loans

Nine-tenths of the \$665 million requested for this account is for five countries—India, Pakistan, Turkey, Korea, and Nigeria.

We have long recognized the importance to all the world of progress in the giant nations of south Asia. But in the past year we witnessed a tragic confrontation between India and Pakistan which forced us to withhold all new assistance other than food. We will not allow our aid to subsidize an arms race between these two countries. Nor can we resume aid until we are reasonably certain that hostilities will not recur. The progress of reconciliation—first at the United Nations and then at Tashkent—holds promise that these two great countries have resolved on a course of peace. My request for development loan funds is made in the hope and belief that this promise will be fulfilled.

Turkey has continued her steady progress toward self-sustaining growth, and has re-

mained a staunch NATO ally. She deserves our continued support.

Korea has made similar economic progress and has shown her dedication to the cause of freedom by supplying a full military division for service in Vietnam.

Nigeria has recently suffered a painful upheaval, but we are hopeful that she too will maintain her responsible and progressive course.

The uncertainties of world affairs permit no guarantees that these hopes will be fulfilled. But I do guarantee the Congress and the American people that no funds will be used in these or other countries without a clear case that such expenditures are in the interest of the United States.

Technical Cooperation

This request—\$231 million—will finance American advisers and teachers who are the crucial forces in the attack on hunger, ignorance, disease, and the population problem. The dollar total is relatively small. But no appropriation is more critical. No purpose is more central.

Contributions to International Organizations

I am requesting \$140 million for these contributions in fiscal year 1967. The majority of these funds will support such efforts as the United Nations development program and the U.N. Children's Fund. The remainder represents our share of the cost of maintaining essential United Nations peacekeeping and relief activities in areas of tension and conflict.

Other

The remaining \$142 million of my request is distributed among the contingency fund, AID administrative expenses, and support of American schools and hospitals abroad.

X

In making these requests, I assure the Congress that every effort will be extended to minimize the adverse impact on our balance of payments. I think the record is proof of the sincerity of these commitments.

AID procurement policies have been tight-

ened to the point that, with minor and essential exceptions, all funds appropriated to AID must be spent in the United States for American goods and services. As a result, offshore expenditures of AID funds declined from \$1 billion in 1960 to \$533 million in 1964.

Further steps have been taken. I now expect that the figure will drop to about \$400 million in fiscal year 1967. Receipts are expected to rise to \$186 million in fiscal year 1967, yielding a net outflow of only \$214 million.

XI

I am transmitting the Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966 as separate legislation. This new act will provide a 5-year authorization for the program which strengthens U.S. security by building the strength of others to deter and resist aggression.

The new act will provide—

Effective coordination between our economic and military programs.—I request the Congress to retain in the new act those provisions which place responsibility for continuous supervision and general direction of all military assistance programs in the Secretary of State.

Greater emphasis on self-help.—As with economic aid, we must condition our military aid upon commitments from recipients to make maximum contributions to the common defense.

Greater emphasis on civic action programs.—We shall give new stress to civic action programs through which local troops build schools and roads, and provide literacy training and health services. Through these programs, military personnel are able to play a more constructive role in their society, and to establish better relations with the civilian population.

Emphasis on training.—One of our most effective methods of building free world security is through the training provided foreign military personnel. Today, 8,500 foreign trainees come to this country each year and a similar number are trained at our service schools overseas. They return to their home countries with new professional

skills and a new understanding of the role of the armed forces in a democratic society.

Continued shift from grant aid to military sales.—We will shift our military aid programs from grant to sales whenever possible—and without jeopardizing our security interests or progress of economic development. Military sales now exceed the dollar volume of the normal grant aid program. This not only makes a substantial favorable impact on the balance of payments, but it also demonstrates the willingness of our allies to carry an increasing share of their own defense costs.

* * *

I am requesting new obligational authority of \$917 million for military assistance in fiscal year 1967. This is the bare minimum required if we are to keep our commitments to our allies and friendly armed forces to provide the equipment and training essential to free world defense.

The military assistance request for fiscal year 1967 does not include funds for support of South Vietnamese and other allied forces who are engaged in the crucial struggle for freedom in that country. Financing for this effort will come directly from Department of Defense appropriations.

Almost three-fourths of the total program will go to countries adjacent to the borders of Soviet Russia and Communist China. The armed forces of such countries as Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Republics of China and Korea are effective deterrents to aggression. The balance of the funds will strengthen the capacity to maintain internal security in countries where instability and weakness can pave the way for subversion.

XII

Americans have always built for the future. That is why we established land-

grant colleges and passed the Homestead Act to open our western lands more than 100 years ago. That is why we adopted the progressive programs proposed by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. That is why we are building the Great Society. And that is why we have a foreign assistance program.

We extend assistance to nations because it is in the highest traditions of our heritage and our humanity. But even more because we are concerned with the kind of world our children will live in. It can be a world where nations raise armies, where famine and disease and ignorance are the common lot of men, where the poor nations look on the rich with envy, bitterness, and frustration, where the air is filled with tension and hatred. Or it can be a world where each nation lives in independence, seeking new ways to provide a better life for its citizens: a world where the energies of its restless peoples are directed toward the works of peace; a world where people are free to build a civilization to liberate the spirit of man.

We cannot make such a world in one message, in one appropriation, or in one year. But we can work to do this with this appropriation in this year. And we must continue to build on the work of past years and begin to erase disease and hunger and ignorance from the face of the earth.

But the basic choice is up to the countries themselves. If that choice is for progress, we can and we must help. Our help can spell the difference between success and stagnation. We must stand ready to provide it when it is needed and when we have confidence that it will be well used.

This is the price and the privilege of world leadership.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 1, 1966.*

International Education and Health

Message From President Johnson to the Congress¹

To the Congress of the United States:

Last year the Congress by its action declared: the Nation's No. 1 task is to improve the education and health of our people.

Today I call upon Congress to add a world dimension to this task.

I urge the passage of the International Education and Health Acts of 1966.

We would be shortsighted to confine our vision to this Nation's shorelines. The same rewards we count at home will flow from sharing in a worldwide effort to rid mankind of the slavery of ignorance and the scourge of disease.

We bear a special role in this liberating mission. Our resources will be wasted in defending freedom's frontiers if we neglect the spirit that makes men want to be free.

Half a century ago, the philosopher William James declared that mankind must seek "a moral equivalent of war."

The search continues—more urgent today than ever before in man's history.

Ours is the great opportunity to challenge all nations, friend and foe alike, to join this battle.

We have made hopeful beginnings. Many of the programs described in this message have been tested in practice. I have directed our agencies of government to improve and enlarge the programs already authorized by Congress.

Now I am requesting Congress to give new purpose and new power to our efforts by declaring that—

¹ H. Doc. 375, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (White House press release dated Feb. 2).

Programs to advance education and health are basic building blocks to lasting peace.

They represent a long-term commitment in the national interest.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is charged with a broad authority to help strengthen our country's capacity to carry on this noble adventure.

EDUCATION

Education lies at the heart of every nation's hopes and purposes. It must be at the heart of our international relations.

We have long supported UNESCO and other multilateral and international agencies. We propose to continue these efforts with renewed vigor.

Schooled in the grief of war, we know certain truths are self-evident in every nation on this earth:

Ideas, not armaments, will shape our lasting prospects for peace.

The conduct of our foreign policy will advance no faster than the curriculum of our classrooms.

The knowledge of our citizens is one treasure which grows only when it is shared.

International education cannot be the work of one country. It is the responsibility and promise of all nations. It calls for free exchange and full collaboration. We expect to receive as much as we give, to learn as well as to teach.

Let this Nation play its part. To this end, I propose to strengthen our capacity for in-

ternational educational cooperation; to stimulate exchange with students and teachers of other lands; to assist the progress of education in developing nations; to build new bridges of international understanding.

I. To Strengthen Our Capacity for International Educational Cooperation

Our education base in this country is strong. Our desire to work with other nations is great. But we must review and renew the purpose of our programs for international education. I propose to—

(1) *Direct the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish within his Department a Center for Educational Cooperation.*—This Center will be a focal point for leadership in international education. While it will not supplant other governmental agencies already conducting programs in this field, it will—

Act as a channel for communication between our missions abroad and the U.S. educational community;

Direct programs assigned to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare;

Assist public and private agencies conducting international education programs.

(2) *Appoint a Council on International Education.*—Our commitment to international education must draw on the wisdom, experience, and energy of many people. This Council, to be composed of outstanding leaders of American education, business, labor, the professions, and philanthropy, will advise the Center for Educational Cooperation.

(3) *Create a Corps of Education Officers to serve in the U.S. Foreign Service.*—As education's representatives abroad, they will give sharper direction to our programs. Recruited from the ranks of outstanding educators, they will report directly to the ambassador when serving in foreign missions.

(4) *Stimulate new programs in international studies for elementary and secondary schools.*—No child should grow to manhood in America without realizing the promise

The International Education and Health Acts of 1966

Remarks by President Johnson

White House press release dated February 2

Last year Congress, by its acts, declared this nation's number-one task is to now improve the education and health of our people.

Today I call upon Congress to add a world dimension to this task. The International Education Act of 1966 marks our commitment to help others to rid themselves of the slavery of illiteracy and ignorance. The International Health Act of 1966 pledges us to join in banishing the curse of disease.

I have set bold yet prudent goals for all of us to meet: to create 1,000 school-to-school partnerships with the young of other nations; to bring 5,000 exchange Peace Corps volunteers from abroad to live and work in our country; to conquer or control some of the world's killer diseases—cholera, smallpox, malaria; to enrich diets of 150 million infants and mothers in less developed nations.

Half a century ago the philosopher William James declared that mankind must seek "a moral equivalent of war." That search has become more desperate today than ever before. So we call on all rich nations and all poor nations, friend and foe alike, to join us in this combat. It can be the first work of the world for generations yet to come.

and the peril of the world beyond our borders. Progress in teaching about world affairs must not lag behind progress made in other areas of American education.

I am directing the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to earmark funds from title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 so that our regional education laboratories can enrich the international curriculums of our elementary and secondary schools.

(5) *Support programs of international scope in smaller and developing colleges.*—Many of our Nation's institutions have been unable to share fully in international projects. By a new program of incentive grants administered through HEW these institutions will be encouraged to play a more active role.

(6) *Strengthen centers of special com-*

petence in international research and training.—Over the past two decades, our universities have been a major resource in carrying on development programs around the world. We have made heavy demands upon them. But we have not supported them adequately.

I recommend to the Congress a program of incentive grants administered by HEW for universities and groups of universities—

(a) To promote centers of excellence in dealing with particular problems and particular regions of the world.

(b) To develop administrative staff and faculties adequate to maintain long-term commitments to overseas educational enterprises.

In addition, I propose that AID be given authority to provide support to American research and educational institutions, for increasing their capacity to deal with programs of economic and social development abroad.

II. To Stimulate Exchange With the Students and Teachers of Other Lands

Only when people know about—and care about—each other will nations learn to live together in harmony. I therefore propose that we—

(1) *Encourage the growth of school-to-school partnerships.*—Through such partnerships, already pioneered on a small scale, a U.S. school may assist the brick-and-mortar construction of a sister school in less developed nations. The exchange can grow to include books and equipment, teacher and student visits.

To children, it can bring deep understanding and lasting friendships.

I recommend a goal of 1,000 school-to-school partnerships.

This program will be administered by the Peace Corps, in cooperation with AID, particularly its partners of the Alliance program. The chief cost will be borne by the voluntary contributions of the participating schools.

(2) *Establish an exchange Peace Corps.*—Our Nation has no better ambassadors than the young volunteers who serve in 46 countries in the Peace Corps. I propose that we welcome similar ambassadors to our shores. We need their special skills and understanding, just as they need ours.

These “volunteers to America” will teach their own language and culture in our schools and colleges. They will serve in community programs alongside VISTA volunteers. As our Peace Corps volunteers learn while they serve, those coming to the United States will be helped to gain training to prepare them for further service when they return home.

I propose an initial goal of 5,000 volunteers.

(3) *Establish an American Education Placement Service.*—We have in the United States a reservoir of talent and good will not yet fully tapped:

School and college teachers eager to serve abroad;

Professors and administrators who are retired or on sabbatical leave;

Peace Corps volunteers who desire further foreign service.

To encourage these men and women to assist in the developing nations and elsewhere, I recommend that we establish an American Education Placement Service in HEW. It will act as an international recruitment bureau for American teachers, and will provide supplemental assistance for those going to areas of special hardship. In time, I hope this Service will lead to the development of a World Teacher Exchange—in which all nations may join to bring their classrooms into closer relationship with one another.

III. To Assist the Progress of Education in Developing Nations

To provide direct support for those countries struggling to improve their education standards, I propose that we—

(1) *Enlarge AID programs of education*

assistance.—In my message on foreign assistance,² I directed AID to make a major effort in programs of direct educational benefit. These will emphasize teacher training, vocational and scientific education, construction of educational facilities, specialized training in the United States for foreign students, and help in publishing badly needed textbooks.

(2) *Develop new techniques for teaching basic education and fighting illiteracy.*—Our own research and development in the learning process can be adapted to fit the needs of other countries. Modern technology and new communications techniques have the power to multiply the resources available to a school system.

I am calling on HEW to support basic education research of value to the developing nations.

I am requesting AID to conduct studies and assist pilot projects for applying technology to meet critical education shortages.

(3) *Expand U.S. Summer Teaching Corps.*—The Agency for International Development now administers programs for American teachers and professors who participate in summer workshops in less developed countries. They serve effectively to support teacher training in these countries. They also enrich their own teaching experience.

I propose this year that AID double the number of U.S. participants in the Summer Teaching Corps.

(4) *Assist the teaching of English abroad.*—Many of the newer nations have a vital need to maintain English as the language of international communication and national development. We must help meet this demand even as we extend the teaching of foreign languages in our own schools.

I have directed AID, supported by other agencies, to intensify its efforts for those countries which seek our help.

(5) *Establish binational educational foundations.*—We have at our disposal excess foreign currencies in a number of developing

nations. Where conditions are favorable, I propose that significant amounts of these currencies be used to support binational educational foundations. Governed by leading citizens from the two nations, they would have opportunities much like those afforded major foundations in the United States to invest in basic educational development.

To the extent further currencies are created by our sales of agricultural commodities abroad, I propose that a portion be earmarked for educational uses, particularly to assist technical training in food production.

IV. To Build New Bridges of International Understanding

The job of international education must extend beyond the classroom. Conferences of experts from many nations, the free flow of books and ideas, the exchange of works of science and imagination can enrich every citizen. I propose steps to—

(1) *Stimulate conferences of leaders and experts.*—I have directed every department and agency to support a series of seminars for representatives from every discipline and every culture to seek answers to the common problems of mankind.

We are ready to serve as host to international gatherings. I have therefore called on the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to explore ways to remove unnecessary hindrances in granting visas to guests invited from abroad.

(2) *Increase the flow of books and other educational material.*—I recommend prompt passage of legislation to implement the Florence agreement³ and thus stimulate the movement of books and other educational material between nations. This agreement was signed by representatives of the U.S. Government in 1959 and ratified by the Senate in 1960. This necessary congressional action is long overdue to eliminate duties

³ For the text of a statement made by President Johnson on Nov. 8, 1965, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 907.

² See p. 320.

and remove barriers for the importation of educational materials.

I also recommend that Congress implement the Beirut agreement to permit duty-free entry of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific, or cultural nature.

Finally, we must encourage American private enterprise to participate actively in educational exchange. I urge the Congress to amend the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 to permit improvements in the informational media guarantee program.

(3) *Improve the quality of U.S. schools and colleges abroad.*—We have a potentially rich resource in the American elementary and secondary schools and colleges overseas assisted by the Department of State and AID.

They should be showcases for excellence in education. They should help make overseas service attractive to our own citizens. They should provide close contact with students and teachers of the host country.

I request additional support to assist those institutions which meet these standards.

(4) *Create special programs for future leaders studying in the United States.*—There are some 90,000 foreign students now enrolled in U.S. institutions. Many of them will someday play leading roles in their own countries. We must identify and assist these potential leaders.

I recommend that HEW and AID provide grants to enrich their educational experience through special courses and summer institutes.

HEALTH

The well-being of any nation rests fundamentally upon the health of its people. If they are cursed by disease, their hopes grow dim. If they are plagued by hunger, even the blessings of liberty give little comfort.

We have committed ourselves for many

years to relieving human suffering. Today our effort must keep pace with a growing world and with growing problems. Therefore, I propose a program to—

Create an international career service in health;

Help meet health manpower needs in developing nations;

Combat malnutrition;

Control and eradicate disease;

Cooperate in worldwide efforts to deal with population problems.

I. Create an International Career Service in Health

The first requirement of an international health program is trained manpower. I propose to—

(1) *Increase the supply of trained Americans.*—I recommend a program of Public Health Service grants to our universities and professional schools. Our first-year goal will be to increase by at least 500 the number of graduate students preparing to participate in international health activities.

(2) *Establish a select corps of international health associates.*—The Public Health Service will recruit young professionals in the health disciplines to be available for assignments at home and overseas. Through service with AID, the Peace Corps, and international organizations, they will gain experience as the first step in building careers in international health.

I recommend recruitment of 100 outstanding young Americans to be the freshman class of international health associates.

(3) *Establish a program of fellows in international health.*—I propose that 50 special fellowships be awarded to the best qualified young Americans with previous experience overseas and demonstrated capacity for leadership. With the help of advanced training, they will prepare for ever more rewarding service in this challenging career.

(4) *Create an international corps in the Public Health Service.*—I have directed the

Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to build a career service corps competent to sustain the international health programs in which this country participates.

II. To Help Meet the Health Manpower Needs of Developing Nations

In many countries, the struggle for better health is crippled by severe shortages not only of physicians but of all health workers—nurses, sanitarians, laboratory technicians, public health workers, health educators, hospital administrators, and others.

We must work for the day when each country will be able to train, in its own institutions, the health workers it needs. Meanwhile, we must assist in relieving critical manpower needs. Toward these ends I propose to—

(1) *More than double the present AID program to strengthen medical and health training institutions in the developing nations.*—This program supports construction of teaching and laboratory facilities, modernization of teaching materials and methods, and assignments of American faculty abroad.

(2) *Enable the Peace Corps to recruit and provide more volunteers for service in the health manpower programs of the developing nations.*—This will require an expanded recruitment effort, new programs of training, and an increased emphasis on health.

III. To Combat Malnutrition

Last year, in a special message to Congress, I emphasized the cost of malnutrition to the developing nations. This cost is counted in stunted human and national growth.

Since then, we have done much to combat hunger. Today, our food-for-peace programs reach about 100 million people.

With our help, a number of countries have begun to establish self-sustaining programs to conquer malnutrition. Through international organizations—the Food and

Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, the World Health Organization—we have added further resources to this struggle.

But food production has not kept pace with the increasing demands of expanding population.

Where food is scarce, babies, young children, and mothers are the first affected. By 1967, nearly 270 million of the world's children will suffer from malnutrition. The legions of the hungry will grow unless mankind acts to meet this peril.

This Nation must play a larger role in combating malnutrition, especially among the young. I propose to—

(1) *Establish a Head Start nutritional program* to increase the number of infants, children, and mothers receiving adequate diets under the food-for-peace program.

Our assistance currently reaches about 70 million children, 10 million of whom are under 5 years of age. Our goal must be to help the developing nations start or expand programs that will reach 150 million children within the next 5 years.

To overcome the most serious nutritional diseases, I have directed AID to enlarge its program for enriching milk and other food-for-peace commodities with vitamins and minerals.

(2) *Provide training in nutrition.*—The developing nations need trained manpower—professional, technical, and administrative—to carry out effective nutrition programs. I am requesting that Congress appropriate funds for AID to support training in the United States for nutrition specialists from the developing countries and to support training institutions that have been established in 27 nations.

(3) *Expand research on malnutrition.*—We need to know much more about the effects of nutritional deficiency; the cheapest and best ways to apply technological advances; and how to develop new, rich sources of protein. I am requesting funds for AID to expand basic and applied research in these areas.

IV. To Control and Eradicate Diseases

In the rich nations, a healthy childhood is the birthright of most children. But in the poor nations, children die daily of diarrheal diseases and cholera. Smallpox, malaria, and yellow fever—all preventable diseases—drain the health of the people and the economy of the nation. Animal diseases destroy desperately needed food.

To launch a simultaneous and concerted attack upon these major infectious diseases, I propose that we initiate or enlarge programs to—

(1) *Eradicate malaria—within 10 years—from the Western Hemisphere, Ethiopia, Nepal, Jordan, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, and Iran.*—The United States assists 15 malaria eradication programs now in progress. I am requesting additional funds to expand these programs, and thus bring freedom from this disease to more than 800 million people in the coming decade.

We will strengthen the Pan American Health Organization as coordinator of the hemispheric attack on malaria. We will support the efforts of the World Health Organization.

(2) *Eradicate smallpox throughout the world by 1975.*—Toward this goal, we will continue our support for the World Health Organization and provide special AID support for 19 West African countries which have requested our assistance.

(3) *Reduce the hazard of measles.*—Measles, a relatively mild disease in our country, is virulent in others. It kills many children. It leaves others blind, deaf, or mentally retarded. AID and the Public Health Service have conducted a successful pilot project in measles immunization in Upper Volta. Since then, nearly all the neighboring West African countries have requested similar assistance. AID will expand its vaccination program to help those countries control measles within the next 5 years.

(4) *Develop the means to control cholera and diarrheal diseases in developing nations.*—Because cholera cannot yet be prevented, we must develop more effective means of

control. Through our own research, through cooperative programs with Japan, and through continued assistance to the SEATO Cholera Research Center in East Pakistan, we will move actively to curb the outbreak of this dread disease.

Diarrheal disease, a major cause of infant death in the poor nations, is transmitted largely through contaminated water. Working directly with these nations and with international organizations, AID will expand worldwide programs to insure safe water supplies.

(5) *Control animal diseases.*—Control or eradication of animal diseases could increase the meat supply by more than 25 percent in a number of developing nations. As many as three-fourths of the rural population suffer from debilitating diseases that originate in animals.

I am requesting funds to support the Pan American Health Organization in developing and testing vaccines against rabies and foot-and-mouth disease. In addition, we will support PAHO as it initiates and expands control measures against foot-and-mouth disease in several Latin American countries.

(6) *Expand United States-Japan science cooperation.*—In 1965 we joined Japan in a cooperative science program to combat some of the major diseases of Asia—leprosy, parasitic diseases, tuberculosis, cholera, and malnutrition.⁴ I am requesting funds to expand this important venture administered through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

V. To Cooperate in Worldwide Efforts To Deal With Population Problems

By 1970, there will be 300 million more people on this earth. A reliable estimate shows that at present rates of growth the world population could double by the end of the century. The growing gap—between food to eat and mouths to feed—poses one of mankind's greatest challenges. It threatens the dignity of the individual and the sanctity of the family.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 671.

We must meet these problems in ways that will strengthen free societies—and protect the individual right to freedom of choice.

To mobilize our resources more effectively, I propose programs to—

(1) *Expand research in human reproduction and population dynamics.*—We are supporting research efforts through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, AID, and the World Health Organization. I am requesting funds to increase the pace and scope of this effort. The effort, to be successful, will require a full response by our scientific community.

(2) *Enlarge the training of American and foreign specialists in the population field.*—We are supporting training programs and the development of training programs through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and AID. We will expand these programs at home and abroad.

(3) *Assist family planning programs in nations which request such help.*—Here at home, we are gaining valuable experience through new programs of maternal and infant care as well as expansion of private and public medical care programs. Early last year we made clear our readiness to share our knowledge, skill, and financial resources with the developing nations requesting assistance. We will expand this effort in response to the increasing number of requests from other countries.

THE CHOICE WE MUST MAKE

We call on rich nations and poor nations to join with us—to help each other and to help themselves. This must be the first work of the world for generations to come.

For our part, the programs in international education and health I am recommending this year will total \$524 million:

\$354 million in the foreign assistance program.

\$103 million in the Health, Education, and Welfare Department program.

\$11 million in the Peace Corps program.

\$56 million in the State Department cultural and education program.

As I indicated in my message on foreign assistance yesterday, these programs will be conducted in a manner consistent with our balance-of-payments policy.

Last fall, speaking to a gathering of the world's scholars at the Smithsonian Institution, I said: “. . . We can generate growing light in our universe—or we can allow the darkness to gather.”⁵

In the few months since then, 44 million more children have come into the world. With them come more hunger—and more hope.

Since that time the gross national product of our Nation has passed the \$700 billion mark.

The choice between light and darkness, between health and sickness, between knowledge and ignorance, is not one that we can ignore.

The light we generate can be the brightest hope of history. It can illuminate the way toward a better life for all. But the darkness—if we let it gather—can become the final, terrible midnight of mankind.

The International Education and Health Acts of 1966 present an opportunity to begin a great shared adventure with other nations.

I urge the Congress to act swiftly for passage of both measures.

Our national interest warrants it.

The work of peace demands it.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 2, 1966.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

Food for Freedom

Message From President Johnson to the Congress¹

To the Congress of the United States:

Men first joined together for the necessities of life—food for their families, clothing to protect them, housing to give them shelter.

These are the essentials of peace and progress.

But in the world today, these needs are still largely unfulfilled.

When men and their families are hungry, poorly clad, and ill-housed, the world is restless—and civilization exists at best in troubled peace.

A War on Hunger

Hunger poisons the mind. It saps the body. It destroys hope. It is the natural enemy of every man on earth.

I propose that the United States lead the world in a war against hunger.

There can only be victors in this war. Since every nation will share in that victory, every nation should share in its costs. I urge all who can help to join us.

A Program for Mankind

The program I am submitting to Congress today, together with the proposals set forth in my message on foreign assistance,² look to a world in which no man, woman, or child need suffer want of food or clothing.

The key to victory is self-help.

Aid must be accompanied by a major effort on the part of those who receive it. Unless it is, more harm than good can be the end result.

I propose—

1. *Expanded food shipments to countries where food needs are growing and self-help efforts are underway.*—Even with their maximum efforts abroad, our food aid will be needed for many years to come.

2. *Increased capital and technical assistance.*—Thus, self-help will bear fruit through increased farm production.

3. *Elimination of the “surplus” concept in food aid.*—Current farm programs are eliminating the surpluses in our warehouses. Fortunately the same programs are flexible enough to gear farm production to amounts that can be used constructively.

4. *Continued expansion of markets for American agricultural commodities.*—Increased purchasing power, among the hundreds of millions of consumers in developing countries, will help them become good customers of the American farmer.

5. *Increasing emphasis on nutrition, especially for the young.*—We will continue to encourage private industry, in cooperation with the government, to produce and distribute foods to combat malnutrition.

6. *Provision for adequate reserves of essential food commodities.*—Our reserves must be large enough to serve as a stabilizing influence and to meet any emergency.

¹ H. Doc. 378, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (White House press release dated Feb. 10).

² See p. 320.

America's Past Efforts

This program keeps faith with policies this nation has followed since President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed the Four Freedoms of mankind.

After World War II, we helped to make Europe free from want. We carried out on that continent massive programs of relief, reconstruction, and development.

This great effort—the Marshall plan—was followed by President Truman's point 4, President Eisenhower's Act of Bogotá, and its successor, President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Under these programs we have provided technical and capital assistance to the developing nations.

Our food aid programs have brought over 140 million tons of food to hungry people during the past decade.

Hunger, malnutrition, and famine have been averted.

Schools and hospitals have been built.

Seventy million children now receive American food in school lunch and family and child feeding programs.

Nevertheless the problem of world hunger is more serious today than ever before.

A Balance Is Required

One new element in today's world is the threat of mass hunger and starvation. Populations are exploding under the impact of sharp cuts in the death rate. Successful public health measures have saved millions of lives. But these lives are now threatened by hunger because food production has not kept pace.

A balance between agricultural productivity and population is necessary to prevent the shadow of hunger from becoming a nightmare of famine. In my message on International Health and Education,³ I described our increased efforts to help deal with the population problem.

Improving Local Agriculture

Many of the developing countries urgently need to give a higher priority to improving and modernizing their own production and distribution of food. The over-

The Food for Freedom Act of 1966

Remarks by President Johnson

White House press release dated February 10

The Food for Freedom Act of 1966 charts a new course for world agriculture. It faces up to the inescapable fact that man is losing the race between the size of population and the supply of food. Before the peace of the world can be secure, this problem must be solved. For, as was said long ago, "A hungry people listens not to reason, nor cares for justice, nor is bent by any prayers."

During the past 10 years, America has sent over 140 million tons of food to feed hungry people in other countries. We will continue that effort—but it alone is not enough. Compassion itself does not strike at the root causes of hunger. And the time is coming when even the fabulous abundance of America will not be enough to feed the world's hungry millions.

The answer is for these nations to develop their own capacity to produce the food their people must have. They must learn to depend less on us and more on themselves. And that is the purpose of the program I have sent to Congress. The Food for Freedom program will encourage and assist those who try to help themselves. In the long run, that is the gateway to abundance.

whelming majority of those who till the soil still use the primitive methods of their ancestors. They produce little more than enough to meet their own needs, and remain outside of the market economy.

History has taught us that lack of agricultural development can cripple economic growth.

The developing countries must make basic improvements in their own agriculture.

They must bring the great majority of their people—now living in rural areas—into the market economy.

They must make the farmer a better customer of urban industry and thus accelerate the pace of economic development.

They must begin to provide all of their people with the food they need.

³ See p. 328.

They must increase their exports, and earn the foreign exchange to purchase the foods and other goods which they themselves cannot produce efficiently.

In some developing countries, marked improvement is already taking place. Taiwan and Greece are raising their food output and becoming better cash customers for our food exports every year. Others have made a good beginning in improving agricultural production.

The Need for Self-Help

There is one characteristic common to all those who have increased the productivity of their farms: *a national will and determination to help themselves.*

We know what would happen if increased aid were dispensed without regard to measures of self-help. Economic incentives for higher production would disappear. Local agriculture would decline as dependence upon United States food increased.

Such a course would lead to disaster.

Disaster could be postponed for a decade or even two—but it could not be avoided. It could be postponed if the United States were to produce at full capacity and if we financed the massive shipments needed to fill an ever-growing deficit in the hungry nations.

But ultimately those nations would pay an exorbitant cost. They would pay it not only in money, but in years and lives wasted. If our food aid programs serve only as a crutch, they will encourage the developing nations to neglect improvements they must make in their own production of food.

For the sake of those we would aid, we must not take that course.

We shall not take that course.

But candor requires that I warn you *the time is not far off when all the combined production, on all of the acres, of all of the agriculturally productive nations, will not meet the food needs of the developing nations—unless present trends are changed.*

Dependence on American aid will not bring about such a change.

The program I present today is designed to bring about that change.

Better Nutrition

Beyond simple hunger, there lies the problem of malnutrition.

We know that nutritional deficiencies are a major contributing cause to a death rate among infants and young children that is *30 times higher in developing countries* than in advanced areas.

Protein and vitamin deficiencies during preschool years leave indelible scars.

Millions have died. Millions have been handicapped for life—physically or mentally.

Malnutrition saps a child's ability to learn. It weakens a nation's ability to progress. It can—and must—be attacked vigorously.

We are already increasing the nutritional content of our food aid contributions. We are working with private industry to produce and market nutritionally rich foods. We must encourage and assist the developing countries themselves to expand their production and use of such foods.

The wonders of modern science must also be directed to the fight against malnutrition. I have today directed the President's Science Advisory Committee to work with the very best talent in this nation to search out new ways to—

Develop inexpensive, high-quality synthetic foods as dietary supplements. A promising start has already been made in isolating protein sources from fish, which are in plentiful supply throughout the world.

Improve the quality and the nutritional content of food crops.

Apply all of the resources of technology to increasing food production.

New Directions for Our Abundance

Our farm programs must reflect changing conditions in the United States and the world. Congress has provided—

For American farmers, a continuing prospect of rising incomes.

For American consumers, assurance of an abundance of high-quality food at fair prices.

For American taxpayers, less dollars spent to stockpile commodities in quantities greater than those needed for essential reserves.

Today—because of the world's needs, and because of the changing picture of U.S. agriculture—our food aid programs can no longer be governed by surpluses. The productive capacity of American agriculture can and should produce enough food and fiber to provide for—

1. Domestic needs,
2. Commercial exports,
3. Food aid to those developing countries that are determined to help themselves, and
4. Reserves adequate to meet any emergency, and to stabilize prices.

To meet these needs, I am today directing the Secretary of Agriculture to—

1. *Increase the 1966 acreage allotment for rice by 10 percent.*—Unprecedented demands arising out of drought and war in Asia require us to increase our rice crop this year. I know that our farmers will respond to this need, and that the Congress will understand the emergency that requires this temporary response.

2. *Buy limited amounts of dairy products under the authority of the 1965 act.*—We must have adequate supplies of dairy products for commercial markets, and to meet high priority domestic and foreign program needs. Milk from U.S. farms is the only milk available to millions of poor children abroad. The Secretary will use authority in the 1965 act whenever necessary to meet our needs for dairy products.

3. *Take actions that will increase soybean production in 1966.*—The demand for soybeans has climbed each year since 1960. Despite record crops, we have virtually no reserve stocks. To assure adequate supplies at prices fair to farmers and consumers, the Secretary of Agriculture will use authority under the 1965 act to encourage production of soybeans on acreage formerly planted to

feed grains. Feed grain stocks are more than sufficient.

These actions supplement earlier decisions to increase this year's production of wheat and barley. Although our present reserves of wheat are adequate to meet all likely shipments, the Secretary of Agriculture has suspended programs for voluntary diversion of additional spring wheat plantings.

Our 60 million acres now diverted to conservation uses represent the major emergency reserve that could readily be called forth in the critical race between food and population. We will bring these acres back into production as needed—but not to produce unwanted surplus, and not to supplant the efforts of other countries to develop their own agricultural economies.

These actions illustrate how our domestic farm program will place the American farmer in the front ranks in the worldwide war on hunger.

Food for Freedom

I recommend a new Food for Freedom Act that retains the best provisions of Public Law 480, and that will—

Make self-help an integral part of our food aid program.

Eliminate the "surplus" requirement for food aid.

Emphasize the development of markets for American farm products.

Authorize greater food aid shipments than the current rate.

Emphasize the building of cash markets and the shift toward financing food aid through long-term dollar credits rather than sales for foreign currencies. Except for U.S. requirements, we look to the completion of that shift by the end of 5 years.

Continue to finance the food aid program under the Commodity Credit Corporation.

Increase emphasis on combating malnutrition. The act will authorize the CCC to finance the enrichment of foods.

Continue to work with voluntary agencies in people-to-people assistance programs.

Provide for better coordination of food aid with other economic assistance.

Food and Fiber Reserves

I recommend a program to establish the principle of the ever-normal granary by providing for food and fiber reserves.

This program supplements Food for Freedom.

It establishes a reserve policy that will protect the American people from unstable supplies of food and fiber, and from high prices in times of emergency.

The legislation I recommend to the Congress will enable us to draw strength from two great related assets:

The productive genius of our farmers. The potential that lies in the 60 million acres now withdrawn from production.

In case of need, most of those acres could be brought back into productive farming within 12 to 18 months. But because of the seasonal nature of farming time would be needed to expand production even under the flexible provisions of the Agriculture Act of 1965. Therefore we need a reserve to bridge this gap.

We have been able to operate without a specific commodity reserve policy in recent years, because the surpluses built up in the 1950's exceeded our reserve needs. This condition has almost run its course.

Under present law, the Secretary of Agriculture must dispose of all stocks of agricultural commodities as rapidly as possible, consistent with orderly marketing procedures. As we continue to reduce our surpluses we need to amend the law to authorize the maintenance of reserve stocks.

The act I recommend will do that.

It will authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to establish minimum reserve levels. Under the act, he must take into account normal trade stocks, consumer and farm prices, domestic and export requirements, crop yield variations, and commitments under our domestic and foreign food programs.

The reserve would be used to meet priority needs, under prices and conditions to be determined within the broad guidelines established by existing law.

The act could be implemented in the year ahead without any additional cost to the Government. We are still reducing our surpluses of most agricultural commodities. During the first year of the new program, it is not likely that we will have to purchase any commodity to build up a reserve.

* * *

Under the two acts I recommend today, with the farm legislation now on the statute books—and with the foreign assistance program I have recommended—we will be able to make maximum use of the productivity of our farms.

We can make our technology and skills, powerful instruments for agricultural progress throughout the world—wherever men commit themselves to the task of feeding the hungry.

A Unified Effort

To strengthen these programs our food aid and economic assistance must be closely linked. Together they must relate to efforts in developing countries to improve their own agriculture. The Departments of State and Agriculture and the Agency for International Development will work together, even more closely than they have in the past, in the planning and implementing of coordinated programs.

In the past few years AID has called upon the Department of Agriculture to assume increasing responsibilities through its International Agricultural Development Service. That policy will become even more important as we increase our emphasis on assisting developing nations to help themselves.

Under the Food for Freedom Act, the Secretary of Agriculture will continue to have authority to determine the commodities available. He will act only after consulting with the Secretary of State on the

foreign policy aspects of food aid and with other interested agencies.

We must extend to world problems in food and agriculture the kind of cooperative relationships we have developed with the States, universities, farm organizations, and private industry.

An International Effort

It is not enough that we unify our own efforts. We cannot meet this problem alone.

Hunger is a world problem. It must be dealt with by the world.

We must encourage a truly international effort to combat hunger and modernize agriculture.

We shall work to strengthen the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The efforts of the multilateral lending organizations, and of the United Nations Development Program should be expanded—particularly in food and agriculture.

We are prepared to increase our participation in regional as well as worldwide multilateral efforts, wherever they provide efficient technical assistance and make real contributions to increasing the food-growing capacities of the developing nations. For example, we will undertake a greatly increased effort to assist improvements in rice yields in the rice-eating less developed countries, as part of our cooperation with FAO during this International Rice Year.

For a World at Peace

The program I recommend today will raise a new standard of aid for the hungry, and for world agriculture.

It proclaims our commitment to a better world society—where every person can hope for life's essentials—and be able to find them in peace.

It proclaims the interdependence of mankind in its quest for food and clothing and shelter.

It is built on three universal truths—

That agriculture is an essential pursuit of every nation,

That an abundant harvest is not only a gift of God, but also the product of man's skill and determination and commitment, and

That hunger and want—anywhere—are the eternal enemies of all mankind.

I urge Congress to consider and debate these suggestions thoroughly and wisely in the hope and belief we can from them fashion a program that will keep freemen free, and at the same time share our leadership and agricultural resources with our less blessed brothers throughout the world.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 10, 1966.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

Shipping Restrictions on Grain Sales to Eastern Europe. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. September 17–27, 1965. 256 pp.

89th Congress, 2d Session

Forty-ninth Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1965. H. Doc. 346. December 1, 1965. 22 pp.

Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Message from the President transmitting the agreement. H. Doc. 361. January 18, 1966. 55 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriations for the Department of Defense, 1966. Communication from the President transmitting proposed supplemental appropriations, for the fiscal year 1966, for the Department of Defense, and for military and economic assistance in support of our operations in Southeast Asia. H. Doc. 362. January 19, 1966. 10 pp.

International Organizations Immunities Act. Report to accompany H.R. 8210. S. Rept. 946. January 19, 1966. 6 pp.

Suspension of Duty on Certain Tropical Hardwoods. Report to accompany H.R. 7723. S. Rept. 949. January 20, 1966. 4 pp.

Authorizing the Loan of Naval Vessels to China. Report to accompany H.R. 7813. S. Rept. 950. January 20, 1966. 3 pp.

Postal Systems of U.S. Armed Forces and Certain Countries in Europe. Report of subcommittees of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. H. Rept. 1226. January 26, 1966. 43 pp.

International Petroleum Exposition, Tulsa, Okla., May 1966. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 63. S. Rept. 954. January 26, 1966. 3 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Canada, December 23, 1965.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Opened for signature at Washington January 17 through 28, 1966.¹

Notifications of undertaking to seek ratification: Mexico, February 4, 1966; Spain, February 10, 1966.

Health

Amendment to article 7 of the World Health Organization constitution of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.¹

Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic, December 13, 1965; Ivory Coast, December 6, 1965; Madagascar, November 26, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, December 2, 1965; Zambia, November 22, 1965.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July

10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Australia,² Austria, December 23, 1965.

Women

Convention on political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.³

Accession deposited: Ghana, December 28, 1965.

BILATERAL

Italy

Agreement providing for transfer of remaining treaty claim funds to the educational exchange program and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Exchange of notes at Rome April 6, 1965, and January 12, 1966. Entered into force January 12, 1966.

Malta

Agreement relating to the deployment of United States naval repair ship to Malta. Effected by exchange of notes at Valletta January 15, 1966. Entered into force January 15, 1966.

United Nations

Supplemental agreement regarding the headquarters of the United Nations. Signed at New York February 9, 1966. Entered into force February 9, 1966.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 22, 1965 (TIAS 5910). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade January 21, 1966. Entered into force January 21, 1966.

² Including Papua, Norfolk Island, Cocos (Kee-ling) Islands, Christmas Island, Heard Island, McDonald Island, Australian Antarctic Territory, New Guinea, and Nauru.

³ Not in force for the United States.

¹ Not in force.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1392 PUBLICATION 8040 FEBRUARY 28, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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No.	Date	Subject
24	2/10	Report on Battle Act operations released (rewrite).
25	2/10	Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs (rewrite).
26	2/12	Bundy: "The United States and Communist China."
27	2/12	Registration of Rhodesian agent.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1393



March 7, 1966

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"Why are we in Viet-Nam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. . . . we are in Viet-Nam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live."—SECRETARY RUSK, February 18, 1966.

The U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam: Fundamental Issues

*Statements by Secretary Rusk and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*¹

SECRETARY RUSK, FEBRUARY 18

Press release 30 dated February 18

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: The immediate occasion for these hearings is a request by the President for a supplemental appropriation to the AID administration of \$415 million, of which \$275 million are intended for South Viet-Nam.² Mr. David Bell, the Administrator of AID, and I have both already testified on this particular request. These hearings, as the chairman has pointed out, have also entered into the largest and most far-reaching aspects of our interests and involvements in Southeast Asia. For my part, I welcome this opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss with you these larger issues.

Since World War II, which projected the United States into the role of major world power, we Americans have had to face a series of difficult tasks and trials. On the whole, we have faced them very well. Today we are facing another ordeal in Southeast

Asia, which again is costing us both lives and treasure.

South Viet-Nam is a long way from the United States, and the issues posed may seem remote from our daily experience and our immediate interests. It is essential, therefore, that we clearly understand—and so far as possible agree on—our mission and purpose in that faraway land.

Why are we in Viet-Nam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. Quite the contrary. We have recognized that, just as we are not gendarmes of the universe, neither are we the magistrate of the universe. If other governments, other institutions, or other regional organizations can find solutions to the quarrels which disturb the present scene, we are anxious to have this occur. But we are in Viet-Nam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live.

¹ Broadcast live on nationwide television networks.

² For text of President Johnson's letter of transmittal dated Jan. 19, 1966, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 254.

The situation we face in Southeast Asia is obviously complex but, in my view, the underlying issues are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental. I am confident that Americans, who have a deep and mature understanding of world responsibility, are fully capable of cutting through the underbrush of complexity and finding the simple issues which involve our largest interests and deepest purposes. I regard it, therefore, as a privilege to be able to discuss these problems with the committee this morning—to consult with you—and at the same time to try to clarify for the American people the issues we must squarely face.

I do not approach this task on the assumption that anyone, anywhere, has all the answers or that all wisdom belongs to the executive branch of the Government, or even to the Government itself. The questions at issue affect the well-being of all Americans, and I am confident that all Americans will make up their own minds in the tradition of a free and independent people. Yet those of us who have special responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy have had to think hard and deeply about these problems for a very long time. The President, his Cabinet colleagues, and the Congress, who share the weightiest responsibilities under our constitutional system, have come to certain conclusions that form the basis for the policies we are now pursuing.

The Problem in Perspective

Perhaps it is worth pointing out that those who are officially responsible for the conduct of our public affairs must make decisions—and must make decisions among existing alternatives. None of us in the executive or the legislative branch has fulfilled our responsibilities merely by formulating an opinion—we are required to decide what this nation shall do and shall not do and are required to accept the consequences of our determinations.

What are our world security interests involved in the struggle in Viet-Nam?

They cannot be seen clearly in terms of

Southeast Asia only or merely in terms of the events of the past few months. We must view the problem in perspective. We must recognize that what we are seeking to achieve in South Viet-Nam is part of a process that has continued for a long time—a process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of Communist power.

This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Viet-Nam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat.

I have observed in the course of your hearings that some objection has been raised to the use of the term “Communist aggression.” It seems to me that we should not confuse ourselves or our people by turning our eyes away from what that phrase means. The underlying crisis of this postwar period turns about a major struggle over the very nature of the political structure of the world. Before the guns were silent in World War II, many governments sat down and thought long and hard about the structure of international life, the kind of world which we ought to try to build, and wrote those ideas into the United Nations Charter. That charter establishes an international society of independent states, large and small, entitled to their own national existence, entitled to be free from aggression, cooperating freely across national frontiers in their common interests, and resolving their disputes by peaceful means.

But the Communist world has returned to its demand for what it calls a “world revolution,” a world of coercion in direct contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations. There may be differences within the Communist world about methods, and techniques, and leadership within the Communist world itself, but they share a common attachment to their “world revolution” and to its support through what they call “wars of liberation.”

So what we face in Viet-Nam is what we have faced on many occasions before—the

need to check the extension of Communist power in order to maintain a reasonable stability in a precarious world. That stability was achieved in the years after the war by the valor of free nations in defending the integrity of postwar territorial arrangements. And we have achieved a certain stability for the last decade and a half. It must not be overthrown now.

Like so many of our problems today, the struggle in South Viet-Nam stems from the disruption of two world wars. The Second World War completed a process begun by the first. It ripped apart a structure of power that had existed for 100 years. It set in train new forces and energies that have remade the map of the world. Not only did it weaken the nations actively engaged in the fighting, but it had far-reaching secondary effects. It undermined the foundations of the colonial structures through which a handful of powers controlled one-third of the world's population. And the winds of change and progress that have blown fiercely during the last 20 years have toppled those structures almost completely.

Meanwhile the Communist nations have exploited the turmoil of a time of transition in an effort to extend Communist control into other areas of the world.

Checking Communist Ambitions

The United States first faced the menace of Communist ambition in Europe, when one after another of the nations on the boundaries of the Soviet Union fell under the dominion of Moscow through the presence of the Red army.

To check this tidal wave the United States provided the Marshall Plan to strengthen the nations of Western Europe and then moved to organize with those nations a collective security system through NATO. As a result, the advance of Soviet Communist power was stopped and the Soviet Union gradually adjusted its policies to this situation.

But within a year after the establishment of NATO, the Communists took over China. This posed a new and serious threat, particularly to those weak new nations of the Far

East that had been formed out of colonial empires.

The problems in Asia were, of course, different from those in Europe. But the result was much the same—instability, uncertainty, and vulnerability to both the bully and the aggressor. Western Europe, with its established governmental and traditional social institutions, recovered quickly. But certain of the new nations of Asia—particularly those that had not known self-government for a century or more—continued to face a far more formidable problem, which they still face.

The first test in Asia came in Korea, when the United Nations Forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea supported by material aid from the Soviet Union. It stopped the Chinese Army that followed. It brought to a halt the Communist effort to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the Korean Peninsula.

We fought the Korean war, which like the struggle in Viet-Nam occurred in a remote area thousands of miles away, to sustain a principle vital to the freedom and security of America—the principle that the Communist world should not be permitted to expand by overrunning one after another of the arrangements built during and since the war to mark the outer limits of Communist expansion by force.

Before the Korean war had ended, the United States, under President Truman, moved to settle and consolidate the situation in the Pacific through a peace treaty with Japan, and through bilateral security treaties with Japan and the Philippines, and through the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand.

Hardly had the Korean war been finished when France, which had been fighting a protracted struggle in Indochina, decided to relinquish its political presence in Southeast Asia. After a brief negotiation it came to terms with the Communist forces that had captured the nationalist movement. The result was the division of Indochina into four parts: a Kingdom of Cambodia, a Kingdom

of Laos, and Viet-Nam divided at the 17th parallel between the Communist forces in the North and a non-Communist Vietnamese government in the South.

Recognizing that the Communists had not abandoned their ambitions, the United States Government, under President Eisenhower, took steps to secure the situation by further alliances. Bilateral treaties were concluded with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa. In the Middle East the so-called "northern tier" of countries lying to the south of the Soviet Union entered into the Baghdad Pact, which established what is now known as CENTO—the Central Treaty Organization. The United States did not become a formal member of this alliance, which is composed of Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. But we are closely associated with CENTO and have bilateral military assistance agreements with its regional members, concluded by the Eisenhower administration.

In order to give support to the nations of Southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in the creation of an alliance embodied in a treaty and reinforced by a collective security system known as SEATO—the South-east Asia Treaty Organization. In this alliance the United States joined with Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines to guarantee the security not only of the member nations but also to come to the aid of certain protocol states and territories if they so requested.

South Viet-Nam was included in this protocol. The United States had not been a party to the agreements made in Geneva in 1954, which France had concluded with the Communist Vietnamese forces known as the Viet Minh. But the Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, stated under instructions that the United States would not disturb the agreements and "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the . . . agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."³

Under Secretary Smith's statement was

only a unilateral declaration, but in joining SEATO the United States took a solemn treaty engagement of far-reaching effect. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides that "each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack . . . would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."⁴

It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Viet-Nam.

The language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it imposes is not only joint but several. The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. If the United States determines that an armed attack has occurred against any nation to whom the protection of the treaty applies, then it is obligated to "act to meet the common danger" without regard to the views or actions of any other treaty member.

The far-reaching implications of this commitment were well understood by this committee when it recommended, with only the late Senator [William] Langer dissenting, that the Senate consent to the ratification of the treaty. The committee's report states:

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

Following this committee's recommendation, the Senate gave its advice and consent

³ For text of a U.S. declaration dated July 21, 1954, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1, the late Senator Langer dissenting. All members of this distinguished committee who were then Senators voted for that treaty.

Our multilateral engagement under the SEATO treaty has been reinforced and amplified by a series of bilateral commitments and assurances directly to the Government of South Viet-Nam. On October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to President Diem offering "to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."⁵ In 1957 President Eisenhower and President Diem issued a joint statement⁶ which called attention to "the large build-up of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Viet-Nam" and stated:

Noting that the Republic of Viet-Nam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that "the United States is determined that the Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render."⁷

On December 14, 1961, President Kennedy wrote to President Diem, recalling the United States declaration made at the end of the Geneva conference in 1954. The President once again stated that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence."⁸ This commitment has been reaffirmed many times since.

These, then, are the commitments we have taken to protect South Viet-Nam as a part of protecting our own "peace and security." We have sent American forces to fight in the jungles of that beleaguered country because South Viet-Nam has, under

the language of the SEATO treaty, been the victim of "aggression by means of armed attack."

There can be no serious question as to the existence and nature of this aggression. The war is clearly an "armed attack," cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Viet-Nam.

The North Vietnamese regime has sought deliberately to confuse the issue by seeking to make its aggression appear as an indigenous revolt. But we should not be deceived by this subterfuge. It is a familiar Communist practice. Impeded in their efforts to extend their power by the use of classical forms of force such as the invasion of Korea, the Communists have, over many years, developed an elaborate doctrine for so-called "wars of national liberation" to cloak their aggressions in ambiguity.

A "war of national liberation," in the Communist lexicon, depends on the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It has a particular utility for them since it gives an advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration relatively easy.

At the same time the Communists have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation a sense of ambiguity that they can exploit to their own advantage.

Nature of the Conflict in South Viet-Nam

Yet, in spite of Communist efforts to confuse the issue, the nature of the conflict in South Viet-Nam is very clear.

Let me review the facts.

With the benefit of hindsight no one can doubt that, in agreeing to the 1954 accords, the regime in Hanoi fully expected that within a relatively short period the South Vietnamese would fall under their control. The South seemed overburdened with troubles. Its formidable economic problems were complicated by the need to absorb almost 1 million North Vietnamese, who—having seen the true face of communism—fled

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

⁶ *Ibid.*, May 27, 1957, p. 851.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 372.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.

South after the 1954 accords. The North, moreover, had concealed resources in the South. At the time of the accords in 1954, many Communists fighting with the Viet Minh had been directed by the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to stay in the South, to hide their arms, and to devote their efforts to undermining the South Vietnamese Government. These efforts of subversion were in the initial years quite unsuccessful.

Much to the dismay of the Hanoi regime, South Viet-Nam made substantial progress in spite of the extraordinary problems it faced, while North Viet-Nam lagged far behind. As a consequence the Communist leaders in North Viet-Nam were forced to conclude that more active measures were necessary if the subversion of South Viet-Nam were to succeed.

During the 5 years following the Geneva conference the Hanoi regime developed a secret political-military organization in South Viet-Nam based on the cadres who had been ordered to stay in the South. Many of the activities of this organization were directed toward the assassination of selected South Vietnamese civilians. More than 1,000 civilians were murdered or kidnaped from 1957 to 1959. In 1960 alone, terrorists assassinated 1,400 local government officials and kidnaped 700 others, while armed guerrillas killed 2,200 military and security personnel.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam—held its Third Party Congress in Hanoi. That Congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Viet-Nam. Three months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning in 1960 the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam the disciplined adherents whom the party had ordered North at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, these men had been trained in the arts of sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the

villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

All of this was documented by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. That body, established to supervise the performance of the Viet-Nam cease-fire, is composed of Indian, Polish, and Canadian members. The Legal Committee, with Poland objecting, reported in 1962:

There is evidence to show that arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the zone in the South with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the South.

There is evidence that the PAVN [i.e., the North Vietnamese Army] has allowed the zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the South. In 1962, 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated. And by the end of 1964, North Viet-Nam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of Southerners who had gone North. Since then, the greater number of men infiltrated into the South have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly larger numbers. Today there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the South.

I have reviewed these facts—which are familiar enough to most of you—because, it seems to me, they demonstrate beyond question that the war in Viet-Nam is as much an act of outside aggression as though the Hanoi regime had sent an army across the 17th parallel rather than infiltrating armed forces by stealth. This point is important since it goes to the heart of our own in-

vovement. Much of the confusion about the struggle in South Viet-Nam has arisen over a failure to understand the nature of the conflict.

For if the war in South Viet-Nam were—as the Communists try to make it appear—merely an indigenous revolt, then the United States would not have its own combat troops in South Viet-Nam. But the evidence is overwhelming that it is, in fact, something quite different—a systematic aggression by Hanoi against the people of South Viet-Nam. It is one further effort by a Communist regime in one-half of a divided country to take over the people of the other half at the point of a gun and against their will.

Up to this point I have tried to describe the nature of our commitments in South Viet-Nam and why we have made them. I have sought to put those commitments within the framework of our larger effort to prevent the Communists from upsetting the arrangements which have been the basis for our security. These policies have sometimes been attacked as static and sterile. It has been argued that they do not take account of the vast changes which have occurred in the world and are still in train.

These contentions seem to me to miss the point. The line of policy we are following involves far more than a defense of the *status quo*. It seeks rather to insure that degree of security which is necessary if change and progress are to take place through consent and not through coercion. Certainly, as has been frequently pointed out, the world of the mid-20th century is not standing still. Movement is occurring on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Communism today is no longer monolithic; it no longer wears one face but many, and the deep schism between the two great power centers of the Communist world—Moscow and Peking—is clearly one of the major political facts of our time.

There has been substantial change and movement within the Soviet Union as well—and perhaps even more among the countries of Eastern Europe. These changes have not been inhibited because of our efforts to maintain our postwar arrangements by or-

ganizing the Western alliance. They have taken place because of internal developments as well as because the Communist regime in Moscow has recognized that the Western alliance cannot permit it to extend its dominion by force.

Over time the same processes hopefully will work in the Far East. Peking—and the Communist states living under its shadow—must learn that they cannot redraw the boundaries of the world by force.

What we are pursuing, therefore, is not a static concept. For, unlike the Communists, we really believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it. That was the meaning of President Johnson's initiatives at the Honolulu conference^a—to encourage the efforts of the South Vietnamese Government to transform the country in a way that will correct ancient injustices and bring about a better life for all the people.

A Limited and Well-Defined Objective

In meeting our commitments in South Viet-Nam we are using substantial military forces. At the same time, we are making it quite clear to North Viet-Nam and to the world that our forces are being employed for a limited and well-defined objective.

What we seek in South Viet-Nam is to bring about a restoration of the conditions contemplated by the accords of 1954. We seek, in other words, to restore the integrity of the settlement made between the French Government and the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh—a settlement which was joined in by the United Kingdom, Communist China, the Soviet Union, Laos, and Cambodia. This settlement forms a part of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.

Unfortunately, the limited nature of our purpose is foreign to the philosophy of the Communist world. It may be hard, therefore, for them to realize that the United States seeks no territorial aggrandizement

^a *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

in South Viet-Nam or anywhere in Southeast Asia. We do not wish to maintain our troops in that area any longer than is necessary to secure the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. We want no permanent military bases, no trade advantages. We are not asking that the Government of South Viet-Nam ally itself with us or be in any way beholden to us. We wish only that the people of South Viet-Nam should have the right and the opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat.

For months now we have done everything possible to make clear to the regime in Hanoi that a political solution is the proper course. If that regime were prepared to call off the aggression in the South, peace would come in almost a matter of hours. When that occurred, the people of North Viet-Nam could safely go about their business. For we do not seek to destroy the Hanoi regime or to force the people of North Viet-Nam to accept any other form of government. And—under conditions of peace—we would be quite prepared for the North Vietnamese people to share with the other peoples of Southeast Asia in the economic and technical help that we and other nations are extending to that area.

This is the simple message that we have tried to convey to Hanoi through many channels. We have sought in every way to impress upon the Communist world the ease with which peace could be attained if only Hanoi were willing.

We have used every resource of diplomacy. I know of no occasion in history where so much effort has been devoted—not only on the part of the United States but of many other nations—in an effort to bring about a political solution to a costly and dangerous war. I know you are generally familiar with the record.

But to this point the sounds from the other side have been harsh and negative. The regime in Hanoi has been unwilling to accept any of the possibilities open to it for discussion. All we have heard is the constant insistence that they will not negotiate unless we accept in advance their four

points. Yet the effect of those four points, as propounded by Hanoi, would be to give away the very purposes for which we are fighting and to deliver the people of South Viet-Nam against their will to the domination of a Communist regime.

To understand the situation realistically, we should not underestimate the harshness of the Communist side or overestimate the ease of a political solution.

From time to time we have heard it suggested that we should seek a Geneva conference, or enlist the good offices of the conference cochairmen, or take the problem to the United Nations, or invite the mediation efforts of neutral nations. Well, we have done all of these things, and in most cases we have done them repeatedly—with no result.

We heard it suggested also, by governments and individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that no peace was possible so long as American planes were flying bombing missions over North Viet-Nam but that negotiations might be possible if the bombing were discontinued. We did that also—not once but twice. The last pause, as this committee will recall, lasted more than 37 days. And again with no response.

The "14 Points"

Certainly we shall do everything consistent with our national objectives to seek a solution through diplomacy. There is no doubt as to the elements for an honorable peace as we see it. We have made them clear again and again. Most recently we have summarized them in the form of "14 points."¹⁰

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;¹¹
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.

¹¹ For text of the 17-nation appeal, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 611.

order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet Nam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Viet Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Viet Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

These 14 points are on the public record. Our Government has made quite clear what kind of peace we are prepared to accept—a peace that will guarantee the security of South Viet-Nam, a peace that will stop armed aggression in violation of international agreements and international law.

This is the position that we have made known to the other side both directly and through intermediaries. How does this compare with the position of the Hanoi regime?

Hanoi's Four Points

Both Hanoi and Peking have repeatedly rejected our proposal for unconditional discussions. They have insisted instead that before any discussions can take place our side must agree in advance to the four points of Hanoi's program. The words that they have used have differed from formulation to formulation. Sometimes they have said their points are the "sole basis" for negotiations, sometimes the "most correct

basis." But the effect is the same. What they are insisting upon is that we accept in advance their substantive position and then discuss only the ways in which it shall be given effect. The technique of demanding such substantive agreement in advance is a familiar Communist negotiating tactic. It does not mean that the basic points are open for discussion or that they can be loosely interpreted. It means just what it says.

We have subjected these four points to the most careful scrutiny. What do they reveal?

The first point calls for "recognition of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity." This point also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, dismantling of our military bases, and abolition of our military alliance with the Government of South Viet-Nam, "in strict conformity with the Geneva Agreements."

The United States has made clear that we, too, are prepared to support a restoration of the provisions of the Geneva agreements and that we are prepared to withdraw our troops and dismantle military bases once there is compliance with the accords by all parties. We have said also that we would not expect or require a military alliance with a free South Viet-Nam.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements, and these, too, we could agree to under the conditions I have indicated.

The fourth point provides that the issue of peaceful reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese people without foreign intervention. This also we could accept if it be clearly understood that conditions must first be created both in the North and South that will make it possible for truly free elections to be held.

It is in the third point that the core of the Communist position is disclosed. That point provides that "The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front."

Character of the National Liberation Front

To understand the significance of this point, it is necessary not only to examine what is meant by the "program of the National Liberation Front" but to explore somewhat further the character of the Front itself and the purposes it serves in the tactics of the North Vietnamese regime.

Let us turn first to the Front itself. Both Hanoi and Peking have made clear again and again—and they have been joined in this by other Communist powers—that negotiations will be possible only when the United States recognizes the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people."

What are the implications of this proposal, and why are the Communists urging it so insistently?

The evidence is overwhelming that the National Liberation Front is exactly what its name implies—a Communist front organization intended to give support to the deliberate fiction that the war in Viet-Nam is an indigenous revolt. The Front is, as the facts make clear, an invention of the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam, to serve as a political cloak for its activities in the South.

As I have noted earlier, the Front was created by the North Vietnamese Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after North Viet-Nam's military leader, General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, announced: "The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country." The individuals proclaimed as leaders of the Front are not personalities widely known to the Vietnamese people, either in the North or in the South. To suggest that they represent the aspirations of the Vietnamese people is absurd. The significant fact is that at no time has any single individual of political significance in South Viet-Nam adhered to the Front or to its policies. While some Vietnamese leaders and groups may differ among themselves on how the country is to be led, none of them differs on the fact that the Front does not speak for them.

In 1961 Hanoi sought to strengthen the fiction of the Front's indigenous origins by

creating a seemingly independent Communist Party as the principal element of the Front. It therefore established the People's Revolutionary Party. A secret Lao Dong circular dated December 7, 1961, advised party members that "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually our Party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam unified from North to South under the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which is President Ho. . . . during these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Viet-Nam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose."

The People's Revolutionary Party has not concealed its role in the Front. It has frankly stated that it is the dominant element. On February 15, 1961, the Viet Cong Committee for the South went even farther, stating that in time the Communist Party would "act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam." In other words, the Communists have told their followers that, at the proper moment, they would emerge from cover and cast off the disguise of the National Liberation Front.

And so the Communists have a clear purpose in insisting that we recognize the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. For them this is not a procedural question but a major question of substance. They insist on our recognition of the Front as the sole spokesman for the people of South Viet-Nam since our acceptance of the Front in that capacity would in effect mean our acceptance of the Communist position as to the indigenous nature of the conflict and thus our acceptance of a settlement on Hanoi's terms—which would mean delivering South Viet-Nam into the control of the Communist North.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not asserted nor do we assert an unreasonable attitude with regard to the Front. The President said in his state of the Union message,¹² "We will meet at any conference

¹² *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group”—and that, of course, includes the Front along with other groups.

To the extent then that the Front has any validity as a representative of a group, the views of that group can be heard and the issue of the Liberation Front should, as the President has said, not prove “an insurmountable problem.”

It remains a problem only because Hanoi insists on using it to establish its own substantive position—that the Front represents the hopes and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people—and hence should control them.

The significance of this issue is clearly seen when one examines the so-called “Program of the National Liberation Front” as it was announced from Hanoi on January 29, 1961, and revised and amplified in a second publication on February 11 that same year. The first point of this program discloses the full Communist intention. It calls for the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government in Saigon and the establishment of a coalition government from which the government in Saigon would be totally excluded.

In other words, the Hanoi regime is demanding the following preconditions to which the United States must agree before the Communists will even condescend to negotiate:

First, that the South Vietnamese Government be overthrown;

Second, that the Liberation Front, the creature and agent of Hanoi, be accepted as the sole bargaining representative for the South Vietnamese people;

Third, that South Viet-Nam be put under the control of a coalition government formed by the Communists and from which the South Vietnamese Government would be excluded.

May I conclude, therefore, Mr. Chairman, with certain simple points which are at the heart of the problem and at the heart of United States policy in South Viet-Nam.

1. The elementary fact is that there is an aggression in the form of an armed attack

by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam.

2. The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam to repel this aggression.

3. Our commitments to South Viet-Nam were not taken in isolation but are a part of a systematic effort in the postwar period to assure a stable peace.

4. The issue in Southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we must make clear that the United States keeps its word wherever it is pledged.

5. No nation is more interested in peace in Southeast Asia or elsewhere than is the United States. If the armed attack against South Viet-Nam is brought to an end, peace can come very quickly. Every channel or forum for contact, discussion, or negotiation will remain active in order that no possibility for peace will be overlooked.

GENERAL TAYLOR, FEBRUARY 17¹³

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen: I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee for your willingness to hear my views on the situation in South Viet-Nam. I am afraid that they will not be new to many of you since you have often heard me express them in the days when I was an official of the Government. I agree thoroughly with the motivating purpose of these hearings, namely, to analyze the reasons why we are involved in South Viet-Nam, the importance of this involvement, and the effectiveness with which we are dealing with the resultant problems. If my personal views can assist in clarifying these points, I am most happy to present them.

For the purpose of providing a basis for our subsequent discussion, with your permission I would like to make a continuous statement which will undertake to answer three basic questions. First, what are we doing in South Viet-Nam? Secondly, how are

¹³ General Taylor is a former Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam and is now a Special Consultant to President Johnson.

we doing it? Finally, can we improve upon what we are doing?

What Are We Doing in Viet-Nam?

A simple statement of what we are doing in South Viet-Nam is to say that we are engaged in a clash of purpose and interest with the militant wing of the Communist movement represented by Hanoi, the Viet Cong, and Peking. Opposing these Communist forces, in the front rank stand the Government and people of South Viet-Nam, supported primarily by the United States but assisted in varying degree by some 30 other nations.

The purpose of the Hanoi camp is perfectly clear and has been since 1954. It is to absorb the 15 million people of South Viet-Nam into a single Communist state under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his associates in Hanoi. In the course of accomplishing this basic purpose, the Communist leaders expect to undermine the position of the United States in Asia and to demonstrate the efficacy of the so-called "war of liberation" as a cheap, safe, and disavowable technique for the future expansion of militant communism.

Our purpose is equally clear and easily defined. In his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, President Johnson did so in the following terms: ¹⁴

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

This has been our basic objective since 1954. It has been pursued by three successive administrations and remains our basic objective today.

Like the Communists, we have secondary objectives derived from the basic one. We intend to show that the "war of liberation," far from being cheap, safe, and disavowable, is costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure. We must destroy the myth of its invincibility in order to protect the independence of

many weak nations which are vulnerable targets for subversive aggression—to use the proper term for the "war of liberation." We cannot leave while force and violence threaten them.

The question has been raised as to whether this clash of interests is really important to us. An easy and incomplete answer would be that it must be important to us since it is considered so important by the other side. Their leadership has made it quite clear that they regard South Viet-Nam as the testing ground for the "war of liberation" and that, after its anticipated success there, it will be used widely about the world. Kosygin told Mr. Reston in his interview of last December:

We believe that national liberation wars are just wars and they will continue as long as there is national oppression by imperialist powers.

Before him, Khrushchev, in January 1961, had the following to say:

Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest example of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank of peoples waging liberation struggles.

General Giap, the Commander in Chief of the North Vietnamese forces, has made the following comment:

South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.

The Minister of Defense of Communist China, Marshal Lin Piao, in a long statement of policy in September 1965, described in detail how Mao Tse-tung expects to utilize the "war of liberation" to expand communism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

These testimonials show that, apart from the goal of imposing communism on 15 million South Vietnamese, the success of the "war of liberation" is in itself an important objective of the Communist leadership. On our side, we can understand the grave con-

¹⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

sequences of such a success for us. President Eisenhower in 1959 stressed the military importance of defending Southeast Asia in the following terms. He said: ¹⁵

Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries of Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. . . . The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

This view has often been referred to as the "domino theory." I personally do not believe in such a theory if it means belief in a law of nature which requires the collapse of each neighboring state in an inevitable sequence, following a Communist victory in South Viet-Nam. However, I am deeply impressed with the probable effects worldwide, not necessarily in areas contiguous to South Viet-Nam, if the "war of liberation" scores a significant victory there. President Kennedy commented on this danger with moving eloquence: "The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe—Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence. It is a battle for the conquest of the minds and souls as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides."

Gentlemen, I think a simple answer to the question, what are we doing in South Viet-Nam, is to say that for more than a decade we have been taking sides in a cause in which we have a vital stake.

My second question was, how are we doing in the pursuit of our objectives in South Viet-Nam? Both sides in the struggle have over the years developed the current strategies which are now in confrontation. Dur-

ing 1964 and 1965, the Hanoi leadership attempted to exploit the political turbulence which followed the fall of President Diem in November 1963. Greatly encouraged by the disorder which marked the political scene in Saigon, the Communist leadership made a massive effort to press on to victory. To meet the growing needs in military manpower, they began the infiltration of personnel of the North Vietnamese army, first as individual replacements, later as formed tactical units. Utilizing this new strength, they intended to make the monsoon offensive of 1965 a major drive for significant military victories. Concurrently they increased the sabotage directed at the land communication system in South Viet-Nam for the purpose of hampering the distribution of commodities and thus adding to the economic stresses in the South. Terrorism was stepped up and directed with added frequency at United States personnel and installations. They apparently hoped to be able to seize and hold politically important localities such as district and provincial capitals, to demoralize the Vietnamese people and Government, and to demonstrate to the United States that we were backing a cause which must inevitably fail.

A Four-Point Strategy

Faced with this growing threat, the Vietnamese Government and our American officials were obliged to develop a counter-strategy to blunt and defeat the intensified efforts of our adversaries. It evolved out of the experience of the preceding months and years and assumed its full form with the critical decisions in 1965 to introduce United States ground forces and to initiate the bombing campaign against military targets in the North.

Both of these courses of action had been under consideration at least since November 1961, when I presented my report to President Kennedy following a visit to Saigon to appraise the growing criticality of the situation there. We did not take either action at that time, but my report contained the following comment with regard to the pos-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1959, p. 579.

sible necessity of using airpower against the source of the Viet Cong support in North Viet-Nam:

While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken now, I would not suggest that it is the final word. guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war declared on South Viet-Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of the aggression after the fact that external aggression is clearly established?

By February 1965, it became clear that we could no longer tolerate this clandestine support from the immune sanctuary in North Viet-Nam which served as the external base for the Viet Cong insurgency.

Increasing Effectiveness of Ground Combat

In brief, the strategy which we have been and are pursuing consists of four components. The first includes the many activities directed at increasing the effectiveness of our ground combat against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in South Viet-Nam. For this purpose, we have made the utmost efforts to increase the indigenous forces of South Viet-Nam, always mindful that this is a Vietnamese war in which we should do only those things which the Vietnamese cannot do for themselves or cannot do in time to avert defeat. From July 1954 to July 1955 the armed forces and police of South Viet-Nam were increased by some 140,000 trained men, a very creditable effort on the part of this small country, where military leadership and administrative experience are inevitably in short supply. As of today, the overall military strength in South Viet-Nam is approaching 700,000, the largest military force in being among all of our allies worldwide.

Encouraging though the results have been in increasing the Vietnamese strength, during the year cited our intelligence authorities believed that the Viet Cong increased their total strength by some 60,000. In

other words, we were advancing at a rate only a little better than 2 to 1 in our favor. Since history has shown that the government forces successfully opposing a guerrilla insurgency in the past have required a much greater preponderance of strength—10 to 1 or 12 to 1, for example—it was quite clear that the Vietnamese could not raise forces fast enough to keep pace with the growing threat of the Viet Cong in time. It was this sobering conclusion that led to the decision to introduce American ground forces with their unique mobility and massive firepower to compensate for the deficiency in Vietnamese strength. With such forces available, it was felt that the ratios of required strength cited above would lose much of their validity.

I am thoroughly aware of the concern of this committee over the growing requirement for American troops in South Viet-Nam. Is this an endless requirement in an open-ended war? I do not believe that anyone can give a completely satisfactory reply to this question, but I can suggest the consideration of certain limiting factors which have a bearing on the matter.

First, on our side, we are not setting as an objective for our ground forces the occupation of all South Viet-Nam or the hunting down of the last armed guerrilla. We are in Viet-Nam to safeguard the people who are the real target of the enemy. Terrain has little meaning except insofar as it supports people. Thus the extent of control and protection of population is the true measure of progress rather than control of territory. By the former indicator we are not doing too badly. Senator [Mike] Mansfield estimates in his recent report¹⁶ that the government controls about 60 percent of the population, the Viet Cong about 22 percent, leaving 18 percent contested. When I left Saigon last July, those figures were 53 percent, 25 percent, 22 percent.

¹⁶ *The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow*. Report of Senators Mansfield, Muskie, Inouye, Aiken, and Boggs to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Jan. 6, 1966. 89th Cong., 2d sess.

The point I wish to make is that, when one expresses our military objective in terms of securing a high proportion of the population, the troop requirement loses some of its impression of open-endedness. Under this concept, the prime target of our United States forces becomes the main-line enemy units which constitute the greatest threat to population—not the entire guerrilla force wherever found.

Another limiting factor is the logistic difficulty of the Viet Cong in supporting increased numbers of troops in combat. The combination of air attacks on their lines of supply and of increasing ground attacks on their units, which must then consume supplies at an increased rate, places some kind of ceiling on the forces they can maintain in South Viet-Nam. I wish I knew exactly where that ceiling is, but our basic data on Viet Cong logistics are too uncertain to permit precision. But the point is that there are factors which tend to keep our troop requirement finite and limit the capability of Hanoi to support large numbers of additional forces in the South.

Use of Airpower Against North Viet-Nam

The second component of our strategy relates to the use of airpower against military targets in North Viet-Nam. It is well to remind ourselves of the reasons which impelled us to this decision. There were three which we recognized perfectly at the time of the decision and which remain valid today. The first was to give the people of South Viet-Nam the assurance for the first time of imposing a direct penalty on the source of the aggression. For 11 years they had suffered the depredations of the Viet Cong without exacting any price from the country which provided the direction and support. The morale of the people and that of the armed forces in Viet-Nam received an unestimable lift from the decision to use the air forces of both our countries against military targets in the homeland of the enemy—a lift which has certainly contrib-

uted to sustaining their will to continue the fight.

The second reason for the decision was to use airpower, insofar as it could be effective, to limit and render more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. It was perfectly clear from the start, as it is clear today, that airpower would not be able to stop infiltration. We were quite sure, however, that it could impose a ceiling on the forces which could be sustained in combat in South Viet-Nam. I do not believe that anyone who has reflected on the effect of the destruction of bridges, ports, rail yards, and similar facilities, and on the effect of the limitation of daylight movement on the roads throughout a large part of North Viet-Nam can avoid the conclusion that the air campaign has had an important effect in slowing down infiltration and in raising its price. A testimonial to its effectiveness was the feverish activity in North Viet-Nam during the bombing pause to repair bomb damage and to move transport in daylight.

The third reason for the decision to use our airpower was to provide a sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Viet Cong insurgency. In spite of their defiant statements of determination to endure these attacks forever, I for one know from experience that no one derives any enjoyment from receiving incoming shells and bombs day after day, and I have no doubt that the warning message is getting through to the leadership of Hanoi. In a very real sense, the objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership. We hope that, in due course, the combination of the Viet Cong failure to win victory on the ground in South Viet-Nam and the effect of continued air attacks will present to the Hanoi leadership a situation so disadvantageous that they will decide that it is in their interest to halt their aggression, redefine their aims, and join with us in discuss-

ing ways and means of improving the lot of all Viet-Nam.

Nonmilitary Activities

The third component of our current strategy includes all of those nonmilitary activities which are so important but which receive too little public attention. It is not that our leaders have been unaware of the importance of better government, better living conditions, and the promise of a better future for the people of this country. Unfortunately lack of security and governmental instability were for a long time factors limiting the effectiveness of the many programs for development and reconstruction. But now, with the growing military effectiveness of our forces on the ground and the slowly developing maturity of the civil leadership in Saigon and in the provinces, I hope that conditions will permit much greater progress than in the past in bringing the benefits of a comparatively normal life to this war-weary people. As you know, the recent Honolulu conference devoted most of its time to a consideration of these nonmilitary activities. If we are to leave a viable country after the end of the Viet Cong insurgency, it is essential that we make progress even under the conditions of war in stabilizing the government, the society, and the economy.

Efforts To Initiate a Peaceful Settlement

The fourth component of our strategy is that which relates to our political and diplomatic efforts to initiate the discussion of a peaceful settlement of this conflict. The so-called "peace offensive" is so well known as to require no discussion at this time, as is also the discouraging lack of response from the other side. I am obliged to feel that the Hanoi leadership is not yet convinced that it must mend its ways. Perhaps they still hope for some kind of military victory in the South. Certainly they are not convinced that in some way the United States cannot be detached from the support of South

Viet-Nam. They hope against hope that through international or domestic pressures our Government can be forced off course. They have not forgotten that the Viet Minh won more in Paris than in Dien Bien Phu and believe that the Viet Cong may be as fortunate in Washington. They doubt the will of the American public to continue the conflict indefinitely. In a contest of patience, they expect to win even though North Viet-Nam, like the South, has been constantly at war for over 20 years. Until it becomes perfectly clear to them that we are going to stay on course regardless of anything they do, I am afraid we are not likely to see them at a conference table. Or if they come unconvinced of the inevitability of the failure of their present course, we can expect them to stall, delay, and maneuver just as they did at Panmunjom in Korea for over 2 years.

A Summary of U.S. Strategy

In summary, then, our four-point strategy consists of a complex but coherent package of measures designed to improve the effectiveness of our forces on the ground in South Viet-Nam, to exploit our air superiority by attacking military targets in North Viet-Nam, to stabilize the political, social, and economic systems in South Viet-Nam, and to seek an honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict. It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces employed, and as to targets attacked. All parts of it are interrelated; all parts are indispensable; we must be successful on all fronts. The key, I believe, is inexorable pressure at all points, directed at the will, the ability, and the means of the Communist aggressors.

It is a fair question to ask whether this is the best strategy to attain our basic objective. I am the first to concede that we can and must do better in all four categories of our efforts, but, unhappily, progress toward peaceful negotiations is a bilateral affair which can progress only with some

cooperation from Hanoi. As you know, thus far that cooperation has been withheld.

Having conceded the need and possibility for improvement within the components of our current strategy, I must add in honesty that I know of no new strategic proposal which would serve as a better alternative to the one which I have described—that is, provided we do not sacrifice our basic objective. There are, of course, the two old alternatives which we have always rejected and I hope will continue to reject—to withdraw and give up our basic objective or to widen the war by massive air attacks on the North Vietnamese and even on Chinese targets. These two courses of action appear so to contravene our national and international interests that I shall not take the time of the committee to discuss them here.

The So-Called “Holding Strategy”

The only new proposal of which I am aware is the so-called “holding strategy” which, in its least extreme form, calls for a cessation of United States reinforcements and a limitation of military operations to those necessary for the security of our forces and for the maintenance of our military presence. On several occasions I have expressed myself in opposition to such a course of action. To button up our troops in defensive positions and thus to sacrifice their unique attributes of mobility and firepower would constitute the abandonment of our allies on the battlefield and would assign a most inglorious mission to our troops, who, for the present, have high morale and complete confidence in their ability to cope with the Viet Cong in the field. The effect of such behavior on our Vietnamese allies could be disastrous. At a minimum, it would destroy all confidence in Viet-Nam in ultimate success and would encourage the timid and the wavering to turn to the Viet Cong for protection and to the Liberation Front for political accommodation.

Another serious result of such passivity

would be the impossibility of obtaining honorable terms at any peace table. The Communists are tough enough to deal with when one has the upper hand. They would never give us acceptable terms if the military situation reflected weakness on our part and a readiness to withdraw. Our only alternative would be to accept dishonorable terms or to continue to sit out the war indefinitely on a supine defensive. I can hardly see the American public or this Congress long supporting such a course of action. Thus I am obliged to conclude that the so-called “holding strategy” is really not an alternative way of reaching our objective of an independent South Viet-Nam free from attack. We could never reach it on such a course. Rather than being a true alternative, it amounts to the modification and erosion of our basic objective and hence appears to me to be unacceptable.

In conclusion, I feel that our present strategy is the best that has been suggested and that it is important that we adhere to it, always striving to improve our performance within the confines of its general concept. Certainly it is not without risks—but little of value in this world is accomplished without risk. It seems to me that the risks entailed are warranted by the importance of our stake in Southeast Asia.

Congress recognized this importance in the wording of the joint resolution of August, 1964:¹⁷ “The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.” I subscribe to those words and believe we should live by them and by the words of President Johnson when he said in regard to our commitment in South Viet-Nam:¹⁸ “We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.”

¹⁷ BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

Building a Better Society, the Main Test in Viet-Nam

Following is the foreign policy portion of an address made by President Johnson before the American Association of School Administrators at Atlantic City, N.J., on February 16 (White House press release; advance text).

You know that the job of building a better school and a better nation is hard, often thankless work. Someone must take on the perilous task of leadership. Someone in shirtsleeves must turn ideas into action, dollars into programs. Someone must fight the lonely battles in each community—make the accommodations, win the supporters, get the results.

Many of you have endured this hard journey from hope to reality—when the applause died, the crowd thinned out, and you were alone with the dull administrative details still to be done.

But this is how a Great Society must be built: brick by brick and in the toil and noise of each day.

We have so little reason to be discouraged. Others face tasks so much more difficult than ours. Only last week¹ I sat across the table from the very young leader of South Viet-Nam and heard him say of his country:

We were deluding ourselves with the idea that our weaknesses could not be remedied while we were fighting a war. . . . We will not completely drive out the aggressor until we make a start at eliminating these political and social defects.

The work of his Government will not be easy. But these are not timid men. They have learned that government must meet the outreach of its people's hopes.

There at Honolulu, I pledged support to

¹ For background and texts of a joint communique and the "Declaration of Honolulu," issued at Honolulu on Feb. 8 following a meeting of U.S. and Vietnamese officials, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

their plans for education in their country. This year alone, we will help them build 2,800 classrooms, nearly three times the average for the last 10 years.

We will help them train 13,400 teachers, eight times the yearly average of the last decade.

We will help them distribute nearly 6 million textbooks.

And we will help them educate almost a fourth as many doctors as the total number they now have.

This little country maintains 700,000 men in its armed forces, over 2½ times as many for its size as we have. Yet these leaders voiced no weariness before the task of getting on with reforms in education and health and agriculture. If they keep their commitment, they will be the real revolutionaries of Asia. For the real revolution is to build schools and, through them, to build a nation.

What they are committed to do, with our help, must be done under the most brutal conditions imaginable. Their civilian population lives in constant danger of terror and death at the hands of the Viet Cong. Last year over 12,000 civilians were kidnaped or killed by Communist terrorists. There were more than 36,000 incidents of terror—an increase of 10,000 over 1964. Two days ago the Viet Cong killed 39 civilians and wounded 7 others as they rode on buses.

Terrorism—deliberately planned and coldly carried out—continues to be the chief instrument of Viet Cong aggression in South Viet-Nam. It is not just a byproduct of their military action; it is the way they hope to win the war.

Who—and what—are their targets? School-teachers and school administrators, health officials, village leaders, schools, hospitals, research stations, medical clinics—all of those people and places essential to the growth of a healthy, free society.

This is the terrible, scarred face of the war, too seldom seen and too little understood. Often it is not even reported by our journals most concerned about the war in

Viet-Nam. These incidents usually happen in rural areas remote from the camera's eye. Observers are not invited when the Viet Cong murder the mother of an officer in the army of Viet-Nam as reprisal against her son—or torture and dismember the master of a local school.

But people who hate war ought not ignore this strategy of terror.

What is its purpose? It is through fear and death to force the people of South Viet-Nam into submission. It is as simple, and as grim, as that. And it must not succeed.

If these tactics prevail in Viet-Nam, they will prevail elsewhere.

If the takeover of Viet-Nam can be achieved by a highly organized Communist force employing violence against a civilian population, it can be achieved in another country, at another time, with an even greater cost to freedom.

If this "war of liberation" triumphs, who will be "liberated" next?

There is a job of liberation in South Viet-Nam. It is liberation from terror, liberation from disease, liberation from hunger, and liberation from ignorance. Unless this job is done, a military victory in South Viet-Nam would be no victory at all—only a brief delay until the aggressor returns to feed on the continuing misery of the people.

We have the military strength to convince the Communists they cannot achieve the conquest of South Viet-Nam by force.

But the building of a better society is the main test of our strength—our basic purpose. Until the people of the villages and farms of that unhappy country know that they personally count, that they are cared about, that their future is their own—only then will we know that real victory is possible.

I came away from Honolulu filled with new hope and energy. I came away convinced that we cannot raise a double standard to the world. We cannot hold freedom less dear in Asia than in Europe or be less willing to sacrifice for men whose skin is a different color.

If this young nation, ridden with danger,

can show such determination, we, with all our wealth and promise, must be no less determined.

Our time is filled with peril. So it has been every time freedom has been tested.

Our tasks are enormous. But so are our resources.

Our burdens are heavy and will grow heavier. But the Bible counsels that we "be not weary in well-doing." The house of freedom may never be completed, but it will never fall—so long as you and I and those who share our commitment keep this vision of what we seek to build.

Astronauts Schirra and Borman Make Far Eastern Tour

White House press release dated February 15

The White House announced on February 15 that President Johnson is sending astronauts Walter Schirra and Frank Borman on an eight-country good-will tour of the Far East beginning February 21. The two astronauts were command pilots of the Gemini 7/6 rendezvous mission in December. They will visit Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand during their 3-week trip.

The purpose of the trip is to demonstrate the scientific, technological, and educational values of the U.S. space program and to visit countries in the Far Eastern area which have cooperated with the United States in space programs. Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand have joint programs with this country.

The President sent Gemini 4 astronauts James McDivitt and Ed White to the Paris Air Show in June and Gemini 5 astronauts Gordon Cooper and Charles Conrad on a tour of Africa last September. John Glenn, the first American to go into orbit, toured Europe in October and is now on his way to Burma under the auspices of the United States Information Agency.

While in the Far East, Schirra and Borman

will appear before scientific and educational groups and will visit leading governmental officials. In Australia they will visit two tracking facilities—Canberra and Carnarvon—that supported their flight.

Astronauts Frank Borman and James A. Lovell, Jr., are the current record holders in long-duration space flight. Their Gemini 7 spacecraft was launched on December 4 and

was recovered 2 weeks later. Schirra is the third American astronaut to go twice into space. The other two are Virgil Grissom and Gordon Cooper. Schirra and Thomas P. Stafford were launched into orbit on December 15 and rendezvoused with Gemini 7 for the first successful space rendezvous mission, bringing their spacecraft to within 1 foot of Gemini 6.

The Chain of Common Interest Uniting the United States and Mexico

Remarks by Secretary Rusk¹

Distinguished delegates, Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen: It is a great pleasure for me to come here to take part in the opening session of this sixth annual meeting of legislators of Mexico and the United States.

When President Kennedy visited Mexico 4 years ago, he recalled that Franklin Roosevelt had predicted that the day would ultimately come when the Presidents of our two countries would freely meet and freely discuss their common responsibilities and common opportunities.

In November 1964, when he met with the then President-elect, [Gustavo] Diaz Ordaz, President Johnson said,²

It is part of the feeling of kinship between the great Republic of Mexico and the United States that the two Presidents should meet and should talk and should counsel and should be friends.

This meeting today is evidence that we have come even farther than President Roosevelt prophesied. Since 1960, members of our

two great legislative bodies have met jointly each year to discuss problems of common interest to the United States and Mexico. These annual meetings are another link in the chain of common interest that unites our two nations.

We believe that our relations with Mexico have never been better. In early 1964 our two countries were successful in settling the century-old Chamizal dispute. Last year the lower Colorado River salinity problem was resolved.

We have made considerable progress in alleviating the problems that remain. I know that you will be devoting much of your time during your meeting here to these problems, and I am convinced that you can contribute a great deal toward their resolution.

I note that one of the items on your agenda refers to trade and commodity matters. As you are aware, a joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee met for the first time in Washington last October.³ It is to meet again this year in Mexico City. The creation

¹ Made at the opening session of the Sixth Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 10.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 7, 1964, p. 805.

³ For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, Nov. 8, 1965, p. 738.

of this joint committee represents the first effort by our two Governments to initiate and maintain a permanent institution for the regular exchange of views on ways to promote mutually beneficial trade. We believe that regular talks of this kind offer great promise for increasing trade and understanding between our two countries.

Increased Understanding and Exchange

The excellent relations that exist between Mexico and the United States today result not only from the efforts of our two Governments but from an increasing understanding on the part of private individuals and organizations on both sides of our 2,000-mile-long border. More than 3 million of our citizens are descendants of yours. More than a million U.S. citizens visited Mexico last year, and several hundred thousand Mexicans visited the United States. More than 1,700 American students are enrolled in Mexican schools, and almost that many Mexicans attend U.S. colleges and universities.

Commercial information and entertainment produce an enormous interchange of ideas. Our athletes regularly compete against each other in a variety of sports. We are all too aware of the prowess of men like Antonio Palafox and Rafael Osuna, to mention two of your outstanding tennis stars. Intellectual exchange between our two countries, in the artistic and scholarly fields, is extensive. Anthony Quinn, born in Chihuahua, is one of Hollywood's finest actors. Mario Moreno, as Cantinflas, has enriched the world with laughter.

Mexican painting, sculpture, and music command high prestige in the United States. Mexican muralists have achieved great renown. Mexican folk singing and dancing enjoy increasing popularity in this country. Carlos Chávez has gained international fame as a conductor and composer. The outstanding Folklore Ballet of the Mexican Institute of Fine Arts has performed here and has delighted many thousands of Americans who have visited Mexico. Mexican and American historians, archeologists and anthropolo-

gists, scientists and scholars, work closely together in both countries.

Our two nations were born of revolution, and the spirit of their revolutions remains a vital, living force. You in Mexico are seeking further to extend the benefits of your revolution to all classes of society. President Diaz Ordaz has said,

To raise, within the shortest possible time, the general standard of living for the vast majority of our people has been, and must continue to be, the great undertaking of the Mexican people.

We in the United States are seeking to create a Great Society, to abolish poverty, and to assure equal rights for all.

"Show Window" of the Alliance for Progress

Beyond our own borders, our two nations, in concert with our sister Republics of the hemisphere, are engaged in a peaceful but revolutionary effort under the Alliance for Progress to expand the opportunities for better housing, better health, and better education. President Johnson has declared that the people of Mexico and the United States working together can make the Western Hemisphere and the entire world "a better, a healthier, a more peaceful, and a much safer place to live in."⁴

Mexico has often been cited as an example for the rest of Latin America and as a "show window" of the Alliance for Progress. The reasons for this are not difficult to find. In an area where, more often than not, political transition has been achieved through violence, all of Mexico's Presidents elected in the last three decades have served out their full terms of office. Despite an annual increase in population of more than 3 percent, Mexico has consistently exceeded the Alliance for Progress goal of a 2.5 percent annual per capita increase in income. Mexico's extensive agrarian reform program was initiated nearly 40 years ago. Agriculture has been diversified. A strong and stable middle class has developed. Industrialization has been rapid. One-quarter of Mexico's national budget is spent on edu-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1964, p. 805.

cation. All of these advances have been achieved within a framework of democratic institutions.

Mexico has in many ways demonstrated its readiness to assume leadership in advancing the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

Students from many other countries in the hemisphere are learning about malaria eradication, construction of rural schools, highway engineering, modern banking, agricultural planning, and other vital subjects in Mexican schools.

Mexico was one of the original participants in the Montevideo treaty, which established the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). We gave our wholehearted approval to the basic principles of the Montevideo treaty. We continue to view favorably the efforts being made in Latin America to reduce internal trade barriers, create broad regional markets, and encourage industries to seek advantages of large-scale operations. We believe that effective economic integration in Latin America would be an important step in accelerating economic development and in attaining the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

Mexico has assumed a leading role in the efforts to establish a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. With respect to our attitude toward these efforts, permit me to quote from my statement of November 22, 1965, to the Second Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro:⁵

The United States believes the project of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America is constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the hemisphere. We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion.

I was interested to learn that your itinerary in this country will also take you to Philadelphia, a city rich in our historic traditions and brotherly love, and to San Francisco, one of our most beautiful cities, the home of cable cars and Giants. We think it important that our friends who visit us from abroad have the opportunity not only to come to Washington but also to visit other areas of our country.

I wish you all an interesting and enjoyable stay in this country and extend to you every wish for success in your deliberations.

Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations Signed With Togo

Press release 31 dated February 18

Conclusion of a treaty of amity and economic relations between the United States and Togo was announced on February 18 by the Department of State. Ambassador William Witman II signed the treaty for the United States at Lomé on February 8, and Georges Apedo-Amah, Foreign Minister, signed for Togo.

The treaty is the first of its type to be entered into between a recently independent African state and the United States. It affirms the friendly and cooperative spirit prevailing in the relations of the two countries and records the mutual acceptance by them of a body of principles designed to promote the continued growth of those relations along mutually beneficial lines.

The new treaty contains 15 articles. It is of the short, simplified type of general treaty that the United States has been negotiating with a number of countries but contains the general substance of the normal treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Each of the two countries:

1. agrees to accord within its territories, to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to carrying on commercial and industrial activities;

2. formally endorses high standards regarding the protection of persons, their property and interests;

3. recognizes the need for special attention to the stimulation of the international movement of investment capital for economic development; and

4. affirms its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

The conclusion of this treaty represents a further step in the program being pursued by the United States for the extension and modernization of its commercial treaty structure and the establishment of conditions favorable to foreign investment.

The treaty will be transmitted as soon as possible to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. In Togo the treaty will be submitted for the approval of the National Assembly. When the ratification processes of both Governments have been completed, it will enter into force 1 month after exchange of ratifications.

NATO Working Group on Nuclear Planning Holds First Meeting

The Department of Defense announced on February 18 that the Nuclear Planning Working Group of the NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers had that day concluded a 2-day session at Washington in which they discussed nuclear planning for the defense of the alliance. The ministers attending the first meeting of the working group were Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Germany; Giulio Andreotti, Italy; Ahmet Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom; and Robert S. McNamara, United States, chairman. Manlio Brosio, NATO Secretary General and chairman of the Special Committee, also attended.

Secretary McNamara opened the meeting with a brief statement, after which the ministers turned to consideration and discussion of views expressed by the various ministers. For its initial meeting the working group concentrated its attention on questions concerning planning with regard to strategic nuclear weapons. This included an appraisal of the process by which the threat to NATO is measured; consideration of the ways in which nuclear forces are planned, procured, and managed; and discussion of problems and procedures in the development

of plans with respect to such forces, as well as the command and control arrangements which govern them.

The discussion of the strategic nuclear threat against NATO and the forces available to counter the threat included a detailed examination of targeting procedures, planning with respect to Allied strategic forces, and an evaluation of what the various kinds of forces could be expected to achieve under different conditions of nuclear war. On February 18 the ministers observed the operation of the Pentagon National Military Command Center.

The Special Committee is a part of the effort which has been underway for a number of years to increase the participation of NATO nations in Allied nuclear planning and policy. It was established by decision of the North Atlantic Council following a proposal made by Secretary McNamara to the defense ministers' meeting at Paris May 31-June 1, 1965.¹ The first meeting of the full Committee was on November 27, 1965, at Paris, at which time three working groups were established.² The Special Committee's working groups on intelligence and data exchange and on communications met at Paris February 7-9. These meetings and the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group just concluded are additional steps to improve and extend Allied participation in planning with respect to nuclear forces, including strategic forces, and to insure that agreed consultation concerning the decision whether to use nuclear forces can take place as expeditiously as advanced technology will permit.

The Working Group for Nuclear Planning will meet next at London at the end of April. At the appropriate time, the working groups will submit recommendations to the North Atlantic Council through the Special Committee of Defense Ministers.

¹ For text of a communique released at the conclusion of the meeting, see BULLETIN of June 21, 1965, p. 993.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1965, p. 939.

In its February issue the German science periodical "Bild der Wissenschaft" published an article, in German, by George C. McGhee, the American Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. Ambassador McGhee has supplied for readers of the Department of State Bulletin the following somewhat expanded English version of his article.

International Scientific Cooperation: An American View

by George C. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

President Johnson, in late 1964, declared for the United States an International Cooperation Year—a year in which the United States would review its cooperative efforts with other nations in all fields of human endeavor, in order to determine what more might be done. A White House Conference on International Cooperation presented its conclusions to the President on December 1, 1965. One of the areas given most active consideration proved to be science and technology.

In this article I will seek to describe the breadth of the United States Government's commitment, through international cooperation, to the worldwide development of science and technology for the benefit of mankind. While this summary is written largely in terms of United States participation, it should be pointed out that the Federal Republic of Germany is also taking an active part in many of these international activities—through the initiative of individual scientists, as well as governmental and private institutions such as the Ministry of Scientific Research and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

While more sophisticated definitions are possible, the terms I will use might be defined as follows: Science is the quest for

knowledge of the laws of nature; technology is the process of applying this knowledge to practical ends. Alternatively, one may meet the parallel terms: "research" and "development." New knowledge is the result of basic research; it involves hypothesis, precise exploratory experimentation, and theory. Technology is the end product of applied research and development; it involves invention, engineering, fabrication, and testing.

Furthermore, the conditions of movement of science and technology are different. Basic scientific knowledge has always moved quickly across international borders. Advances in technology, engineering, and even medicine have, on the other hand, frequently been held back by lack of communications, indifference, varying social customs and beliefs, and occasionally the desire for military or commercial advantage. At the same time, while technology must grow from the science on which it is based, it is largely technology and the application of technology rather than science which means progress for mankind. Only technology can solve the food problems of the world, purify the air and the water, and produce energy for the machines that comprise a nation's industry.

I would like, at this juncture, to differenti-

ate between what might be called "little science" and "big science." "Little science" can still be carried out by the individual scientist working in a laboratory with a certain minimum of laboratory equipment. However, "big science" is research which requires an extensive, complicated, and expensive technology to supply its basic equipment. High-energy physics research requiring ever more powerful particle accelerators, space research requiring boosters and rocket technology, and oceanographic research with its demands for well-outfitted ships and expensive gear—all costing many, many millions of dollars—are examples of "big science." Furthermore, even "little science" gets bigger each year; research costs for a given project rise in the United States at the rate of about 5 percent a year. Governments, which now pay most of the bills for science and technology, support both—"big" and "little" science.

Internationalism in science is no novelty. The increase of scientific knowledge has always been characterized by collaboration among individual specialists from all nations and by widespread dissemination and discussion of results and discoveries. All the great scientists of Western Europe have known the work of their contemporaries, their laboratories and their languages. The heritages of the Italian Galileo, the Englishman Newton, the Frenchman Pasteur, and the German Kekulé, are universal. More recently, even with the rise of a fierce and bellicose nationalism in the Europe of the 1930's, scientific communication through research journals and word of mouth continued. To the list of great pioneers of nuclear structure—from Britain, from France, from Denmark, from Holland, from Italy, from America—was added that of the distinguished German chemist Professor Otto Hahn, with his report in 1939 of the fissionability of the uranium atom. The news spread immediately around the world. The final result was the release of energy from the atom—a new technology, and a new world for governments and for politicians.

Research and Development

It is the level of technical development of a nation which determines the material well-being of its citizens, the ability of its industry to compete for world markets, and the capability of that nation to defend itself from aggression. This, in turn, depends on research and development. There was a time when research and development—"R&D"—were largely a matter of individual preoccupation or hobby. R&D now usually represents huge undertakings, involving a significant share of the mental and physical resources of any given nation. Ninety percent of all scientists who have ever lived—throughout history—are still alive and working today. We live in a world of phenomenally rapid technical progress.

However, this progress is expensive. As an example, it costs in the United States on the average about \$40,000 a year to maintain one industrial scientist active and equipped in the research laboratory. Since scientific and technical capability is a national resource, the Federal Government in the United States has steadily increased its support of R&D. The Federal Government provides today approximately \$15 billion of the total cost of research and development in the United States, which is estimated at nearly \$22 billion or slightly more than 3 percent of the gross national product. About 30 percent of the total comes from private industry—with only a few percent from other private or local government sources.

The organizational structure of the United States research community is too involved to discuss here in detail. However, one can simplify the picture by saying that in the United States most of the basic scientific research is performed in university laboratories (46 percent of all basic research, but only 5 percent of total United States R&D); most of the development work is done in industrial laboratories (73 percent of total United States R&D); and the remainder is carried out in special Government-owned facilities or privately owned research institutions.

The mechanisms whereby the Government can provide funds for R&D within this highly decentralized structure is another complex chapter, but in general the funds are made available as grants to individuals or institutions, direct from a Government agency or department. R&D work done in industry is usually "purchased" by the Government through a contract for a specific project between the Government department in question and the company which has been selected through a process of competitive bidding.

With this cursory introduction to the United States Government's R&D support structure, let us look at several kinds of international scientific activities in which the United States is involved.

Individual Scientists and the Nongovernmental International Scientific Organizations

Individual scientists have always felt the need to communicate with their foreign colleagues. There are now more than 250 nongovernmental international scientific organizations, often operated with very modest means, to provide a common forum for exchange of information, ideas, or publications among specialists in a given field from other lands. It is roughly estimated that 20,000 American scientists now join with some 80,000 of their foreign colleagues at approximately 2,000 international scientific meetings each year. Participation in these activities from the Western countries is on an individual and not a Government basis. The costs of travel to these meetings and the costs of publication of scientific results are high. However, in the United States it is believed that support of travel to meaningful conferences and the costs of publication are legitimate costs of research.

The demand for such travel funds from the United States Government is always greater than the supply. However, through such Government agencies as the National Science Foundation travel grants are frequently provided directly to American scientists to attend international meetings. It

is highly stimulating for a scientist to be able to work in a colleague's laboratory abroad for a year or two. Again through the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Fulbright program (Department of State), and other agencies, the United States Government provides fellowships for qualified American scientists to work abroad or, to a more limited extent, for highly qualified foreign scientists to visit the United States.

One illustration will show another way in which the nongovernmental organizations facilitate scientific cooperation which can be financed by the Government. Probably the most important nongovernmental scientific organization is the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). It began as a coordinating body for its 14 member scientific unions, each representing thousands of individual scientists in such diverse disciplines as geography, physics, chemistry, biology, geophysics, etc. Most important is that each of the 54 member countries of ICSU has an associated national scientific committee. A country is usually represented at the Council by its principal scientific academy. In the United States this body is the National Academy of Sciences; in Germany it is the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

Through the national committees, the efforts of the scientists of each country can be coordinated into a worldwide program. Each nation participates in accordance with its scientists' desires—and to the extent of its financial means. Working committees have been created under ICSU for space research, oceanographic research, geophysical research, and studies in the Antarctic; in short, for dealing with worldwide or regional environmental problems of the earth.

The first of these loosely coordinated international programs was the First International Polar Year in 1882 (which arose before the ICSU was born). The best known of recent efforts was the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957–58. The IGY was planned within a committee of ICSU, beginning in 1952, and ultimately in-

volved 66 nations. Since IGY a number of new programs have been proposed along similar lines. These have included the International Indian Ocean Expedition, in which, during the past 4 years, 25 nations and 44 ships have been cooperatively studying this previously little known ocean, which covers 14 percent of the earth's surface. A direct outgrowth of the IGY is the IQSY—International Year of the Quiet Sun—in which 60 countries are conducting studies of solar-terrestrial relationships at the minimum in the sunspot cycle. Also through one of ICSU's member unions, the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, the International Upper Mantle Project has been started for study of the earth's upper mantle—particularly its relationships to and influence upon the development of the earth's crust.

The newest large, coordinated international program within the ICSU framework is the International Biological Program. Its theme is "The Biological Basis of Productivity and Human Welfare," and its purpose is to insure worldwide study of (1) organic production on the land, in fresh waters, and in the seas, so that adequate estimates may be made of the potential yield of new as well as existing natural resources, and (2) human adaptability to changing conditions. So far 43 nations are participating in this program.

During the IGY a number of research programs were carried out in Antarctica. The continuing wealth of scientific information to be obtained from that huge continent of ice and snow was recognized by ICSU when, in 1958, it formed the Committee on Scientific Antarctic Research (SCAR) to plan additional studies. Governments officially entered the picture in 1959 with the signing by 12 nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, of the Antarctic Treaty. This remarkable document reserves the Antarctic for cooperative scientific investigation and binds all nations to hold all territorial claims in abeyance for 30 years. It outlaws military activities on

that continent, prohibits dumping of atomic wastes there, and provides for open inspection of the Antarctic research stations of any signatory nation by any other at any time.

The success of the Antarctic program over the years, and the outstanding cooperative relationships which have characterized the research there, have prompted us to regard science as a key force in achieving international understanding. It is this same thought which has prompted the last three Presidents of the United States to seek cooperative scientific programs in a variety of fields with the Soviet Union. The United States believes that the doors must always be kept open to a possible understanding, even if any gesture must be tempered with a caution born of experience and reality. We believe that we should extend the hand of peaceful scientific cooperation to all nations where this can be done without compromising the interests of the free world. A number of programs are now underway with the Soviet Union on this basis. They principally involve small-scale exchanges of scientists or scientific information in specific fields. There have been many difficulties in administering these programs, but they do continue to function.

The support of most of the research undertaken by United States scientists in connection with these international programs has fallen upon the United States Government. The Government encourages these private efforts at international cooperation and welcomes the initiative of the scientists and organizations who engage in these activities.

Intergovernmental Scientific Organizations

Since much of human progress and national development depends upon the applications of technology, a great unfinished cooperative task for the nations of the world is the introduction and development of technology in the developing areas. It is an unavoidable responsibility of the highly developed nations to promote, through coopera-

tive efforts, the technological revolution in those areas to which it has not yet come. Furthermore, the developed nations themselves still have many unsolved problems—of health, city development, and pollution control—which can best be approached by collaborative efforts.

While scientific cooperation in research has progressed well on private initiative with Government help, technological cooperation becomes largely the province of intergovernmental organizations. There are about 60 such intergovernmental organizations, the oldest of which is the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, created in 1875. I will attempt only to mention three of the groups and some of their activities.

Since its establishment within the framework of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has attempted to foster international scientific and technical cooperation. The United States is a member of UNESCO and contributes to its operating funds. UNESCO has contributed funds to ICSU and has played a role in strengthening it as a forum for planning large-scale cooperative programs. In other instances, UNESCO has taken the initiative directly, providing a large portion of the operating funds.

One of UNESCO's particularly meaningful programs for a world threatened by a shortage of clean water is the International Hydrological Decade. In the 10-year period 1965–75, a worldwide network of stations will be established to measure and track water in its cycle from rain to the underground water table and back into the atmosphere. It will also study expanding water supplies, flood and drought control, hydroelectric development, and improved navigation.

Through UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Committee, a number of governmental programs on oceanography have been initiated, such as the International Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic—to study the equatorial circulation system of the Atlantic Ocean at different seasons of the year—and the Co-

operative Study of the Kuroshio Current—to investigate the seasonal fluctuation in the Kuroshio system, south and southeast of Japan.

UNESCO has also been actively concerned with the extremely complicated question of the application of science and technology to national development. In 1963 the United Nations convened a conference on the application of science and technology for the benefit of the less developed areas. As a result of this and other conferences, UNESCO has defined certain operational guidelines. It has introduced the concept of the "science autonomy" of a nation, without which no nation can be more than an imitator—a buyer or a borrower of the science and technology of others. To promote national technical development, UNESCO has an active advisory program directed toward two critical questions: (1) domestic science planning and establishment of the necessary planning, financing, and coordinating bodies in the member states, and (2) implementation of the science policy which results from that planning, i.e., development of a scientific community and the initiation of priority research programs in natural resources and industry.

Two regional international organizations are also worthy of mention for their work in the scientific field: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Each of these bodies has a science committee which attempts to promote scientific collaboration among the various members in the interest of all. For instance, the fellowship programs and the summer institute programs of the NATO Science Committee, which are fully independent of any classified or military research, have enabled hundreds of researchers each year to work in foreign laboratories or to attend special institutes for advanced training in a given field.

The OECD's Committee on Scientific Research has instituted a program of "scientific review" of each of its 21 member

countries—18 European nations, the United States, Canada, and Japan. Each nation presents a summary of its science policy and research mechanisms to a board of international reviewers. This procedure has invariably had a salutary effect on the nation reviewed, as the critical international review sharpens the national awareness of shortcomings. One of the great domestic problems for any national government is the development of an effective science policy, including the determination of the "proper" amount of support which should be given to research and development. While a nation's GNP may increase at 4-5 percent a year, as in the United States, R&D expenditures worldwide have been going up much more rapidly—e.g., in the United States at the rate of 10-20 percent a year.

After 2 years of detailed hearings, it appears certain that the United States Congress will permit the support of basic research (which represents only about 12 percent of total Government R&D expenditures) to increase at the rate of about 15 percent a year for the next few years. Applied research, particularly development funds supplied by Government, will level off. Obviously these issues are of great importance to all nations, large and small, and the 21-nation OECD framework provides an effective forum for exchanging national views and experiences.

Department of State Initiatives

Since in these regional organizations the Department of State always represents the United States, the Government is faced with the difficult problem of coupling the domestic scientific community into their efforts. This has worked well when it is simply a matter of providing a scientific or academic adviser for an international meeting. However, when the groups initiate joint research, as has been done both in NATO (to a limited extent) and in OECD (largely in applied research), this coordination of domestic efforts with international programs becomes more complicated.

The United States Department of State is responsible to the President for all official foreign relations of the United States. With the appearance of science and technology on the international stage in such vital roles, the Department has created an office, International Scientific and Technological Affairs. This office has now assigned scientific attachés to 15 United States embassies around the world and at the OECD mission in Paris.

In the American Embassy in Bad Godesberg, I have on my staff both a scientific attaché—a former industrial chemist—and a deputy—who previously served as a United States Government science administrator. It is their job to keep the Embassy and the Government as a whole advised of important developments in science and science policy within the Federal Republic of Germany. They maintain contacts with German science—governmental, academic, and industrial. They respond to questions from Germans relating to United States science and explore the possibilities of additional United States-German scientific cooperation where it appears that such an effort will serve the interests of both countries.

As the costs of research and development increase, the ability of a single nation to carry on "big science" is greatly strained. The only effective way for nations of limited scientific resources (and all nations, including the United States, are limited, in that the potential demand for R&D funds can never be fully satisfied) is through the development of cooperative facilities and programs with other nations.

The movement of Europe toward greater unity has been manifested in the field of science by the growth of such institutions as EURATOM, the European Atomic Energy Community; ELDO and ESRO, the European Launcher Development Organization and the European Space Research Organization; and CERN, the European Nuclear Research Center. In these organizations, with combined funds and pooled national scien-

tific manpower, the nations of Europe reap the benefits of large-scale cooperation in the fields of space and nuclear energy research.

Atomic Energy

The role of the United States Government in most of the activities mentioned above has been a supplementary one—the supplying of research moneys in various ways to nongovernment scientists who plan and carry out through their institutions the cooperative programs. However, atomic energy and space research are two areas which have, in the United States, been supported from the beginning almost entirely by the Government. Over the years they have been extended at Government initiative into huge international programs, primarily by means of bilateral agreements between the United States and other nations. It was in December 1953 that President Eisenhower first proposed his “Atoms for Peace” program. The United States felt a moral obligation to share the potential benefits of nuclear science and technology with other nations. Our country also sought to minimize the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons by initiating a program of safeguards, which would prevent the diversion of nuclear materials supplied under this program from peaceful to military purposes.

The international programs of the United States Atomic Energy Commission are too extensive to present here in detail. They have provided for construction of both research and power reactors abroad; the supplying of nuclear material for reactor fuel as well as isotopes for medical, agricultural, industrial, and research purposes; the exchange of technical information; and the training of scientists of many foreign nations. To date, 45 United States research reactors and 9 power reactors have been built or contracted for abroad. The AEC has bilateral agreements with 36 countries for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Each agreement provides for

safeguards inspections by United States personnel.

The United States strongly supports regional and multinational organizations for peaceful nuclear cooperation and for preventing weapons proliferation. The United States–EURATOM agreement will gradually supersede the individual bilateral agreements with the EURATOM members. EURATOM safeguards will then apply, rather than direct United States inspections. As rapidly as possible, the AEC is urging the placement of national nuclear facilities under the safeguard provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Composed of 93 nations with headquarters in Vienna, this organization has now become an effective world body for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on an international basis. The United States fully supports this concept of international control and development of nuclear energy. The AEC has regional offices in Brussels, for the EURATOM countries; in Paris, for the non-EURATOM countries of Europe and the Middle East; in London, for the United Kingdom and Ireland; in Japan, for the Far East; and in Buenos Aires, for South American countries. The AEC representatives are continuously engaged in the promotion of peaceful nuclear cooperation throughout the world.

One of the priority programs of President Johnson has been a study of the desalting of sea water. Within the broad framework of the IAEA, the United States has signed agreements with Israel, Mexico, and the U.S.S.R. to exchange information and to carry out studies on desalting. A most promising prospect for large-scale, economical production of fresh water from the sea is the combination of a dual-purpose nuclear power station with a desalting facility. In October 1965 the United States was host to the First International Congress on Desalting, which was attended by delegates of more than 60 nations. The potential advantages from successful development and installation of these facilities are enormous.

Space Research

"Atoms for Peace" was in a sense experimental, in that a purely national scientific and technological program was, for the first time, consciously directed toward international cooperation. Procedures, agreements, and mechanisms were created which were without historical precedent. When the second technological wave to sweep over the world since World War II arrived in 1957 with the orbiting of Sputnik I by the U.S.S.R., the United States, acting under the express wishes of the Congress, took the initiative in fostering extensive international ties in space research. No field of human endeavor is more appropriate for international cooperation than is the field of space. Satellites circumnavigate the globe in $11\frac{1}{2}$ hours, making the differences among men and countries 100 miles below seem insignificant.

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration was created in 1958. By 1965, with the astonishing growth which has characterized the United States civilian space program, NASA's annual budget reached \$5.2 billion. While the most glamorous and most expensive part of the United States space effort is the program of manned exploration, which plans to land a man on the moon by 1970, there are countless examples of instrumented projects which indicate a new age in man's ability to probe the mysteries of his planet and solar system. Artificial earth satellites are already in use for cloud mapping and weather forecasting, for transatlantic telephone and television broadcasting, for mapping and navigational purposes, and for purely scientific investigations of the nature of the earth's environment. Lunar and planetary probes have provided important new information on the moon, Venus, and Mars.

NASA has established several specific guidelines for its international programs, among which are:

1. The project must be substantive in nature, with promise of meaningful scientific results.

2. Each nation must commit its own resources, funds, personnel, and equipment. There is no movement of funds in either direction.

3. The project must be conducted openly, and the scientific data obtained must be freely available to the scientific community.

Within these ground rules, a variety of types of cooperative projects have been carried out between the United States and 55 other countries and jurisdictions.

1. *Foreign Satellite Projects.* Agreements have been reached with the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, France, and most recently the Federal Republic of Germany, for joint satellite design, development, and launch. Design and construction is carried out in the foreign country in close coordination with NASA. Launch and tracking facilities are furnished by NASA, with U.S. boosters. The first German satellite, now under development, will be launched by NASA in 1968. The United States is pleased to have this opportunity to cooperate in space research with the FRG and looks forward to a broadening of this relationship in the future.

2. *Foreign Experiments on NASA Satellites.* Any foreign scientist or scientific group may submit experiments for inclusion in satellites developed by NASA. Periodically, a list of forthcoming satellites and experiment possibilities is sent to all interested space research groups in the world. NASA selects, on a competitive basis, the best proposals from all submitted. Thus far, experiments have been accepted from scientists in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Italy.

3. *Sounding Rockets.* Cooperative sounding-rocket projects have special international appeal. A sounding rocket carries instrumentation aloft but does not go into orbit. It provides data on space conditions in a vertical direction, rather than a horizontal direction, as with satellites. To nations wishing to initiate space programs, sounding rockets offer relatively low-cost opportunities on a small but significant

scale. To date more than 150 rockets have been launched in joint NASA projects with 17 countries.

4. *Ground-Based Projects.* Ground-based projects provide for observations of or measurements on NASA spacecraft by experimenters abroad using their own resources. Such projects permit NASA to gain data overseas on a scale that would be difficult, if not impossible, if the United States had to finance the equipment involved in each experiment and make arrangements for its installation. For other countries these ground-based projects permit participation in space programs of great scope, without requiring expensive vehicle or spacecraft hardware. In one of NASA's programs to investigate the ionosphere, 61 ground stations in 32 countries participated in receiving signals from the NASA polar beacon satellite. A similar network will be available in the geodetic satellite program, which will permit the fixing of points on the earth's surface to within a few meters.

Weather forecasting and meteorology have been internationally organized since the formation of the International Meteorological Committee in 1872. The TIROS and Nimbus weather satellite programs of NASA have permitted the comparison of cloud formation pictures taken by the satellites with local conditions reported by national weather services. NASA-sponsored international workshops have studied the correlations between cloud patterns and local weather, so as to permit worldwide forecasting on the basis of satellite pictures. Some 40 foreign weather services are collaborating in this program. Already more than 20 countries have acquired or are building Automatic Picture Transmission receivers (APT) which permit them to receive and immediately print out cloud-cover photographs.

Twelve countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, have constructed their own ground terminals to participate in the communications satellite programs of NASA. The Telstar, Relay, and Syncom satellites have stirred great interest in a

worldwide communications system. The first commercial communications satellite, the Early Bird (belonging to the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and launched for a fee by NASA), is now in stationary orbit 22,300 miles above the Atlantic. On the basis of experience with this system, decisions will be made for the final worldwide system to be deployed beginning in late 1966. An important European link in the COMSAT network is the Federal Republic's ground station in Raisting, operated by the Bundespost. Finally, arrangements for tracking stations abroad permitting 24-hour ground contact with orbiting vehicles have been extremely important for both instrumented satellite and manned space flight programs.

The personnel exchange program of NASA is another important aspect of space cooperation. To date, NASA has sponsored 151 resident research associates from 30 countries, 113 graduate fellowships from 22 universities in 17 countries, and 234 technical trainees in connection with joint programs from 19 countries, and has received about 15,000 visitors from 121 countries and jurisdictions. The United States is proud of this record of open, international, peaceful collaboration in the study of near and outer space.

Aside from cooperation with other countries, NASA has close cooperative relationships with ELDO and ESRO. The United States strongly supports these efforts of the European nations to pool their technical resources in developing a meaningful European space program. We also welcome the fact that ESRO tracking and data acquisition systems will be compatible with those of NASA—thus opening the door to future collaboration. Under a NASA-ESRO agreement, the first two ESRO satellites will be orbited by NASA boosters in 1967.

Military Research and Development

There is a final kind of technical cooperation which should not be forgotten. The United States is committed to the defense of the integrity of the free world and to

the peaceful progress of mankind. There are other forces in the world, however, which would still choose violence—either as the tool of reform or of direct conquest. As a result, the United States and her allies must remain strong. The Second World War fully unveiled the awesome meaning of science and technology for military strength. Military preparedness in a world of supersonic aircraft, ballistic missiles, and hydrogen bombs is an expensive business. The development of a new aircraft engine alone can cost \$40 million. More involved systems can cost billions.

The United States Department of Defense has a large division of research and engineering and also an extensive program of international cooperation. Data exchange agreements, cooperative research and development programs, and broad programs of personnel exchange among the United States and her allies are contributing to the development of the most modern and effective means of national defense in a manner which conserves the resources of individual countries while providing systems that can be effectively used in joint defense. America has, I believe, shown her willingness to place her military R&D efforts at the service of the cooperative interests of the whole free world.

There is, in fact, much more that one might tell: of technical aid to developing nations through the Agency for International Development; of the work of the National Academy of Sciences in maintaining

contacts with other academies around the world; of direct relationships among universities on an international basis; of the fascinating technical side of United States efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty while at the same time maintaining a guarantee of free-world security; of the broad cooperation in the combating of disease; of the vast scientific publication and information networks throughout the world; of the little-known cooperation among international patent authorities; of the newly recommended program for a worldwide earthquake detection and prediction network; of the International Tsunami (tidal wave) Warning System; and of the vast international research programs of the United States Department of Agriculture.

President Johnson has declared the goal of his administration to be the creation of the Great Society in America—to make our country a land of unlimited opportunity for each citizen, within the limits of his natural abilities. He has invited the rest of the world to join in this endeavor. Science and technology are perhaps the most important tools with which the international Great Society must be built. International understanding is the fiber which must hold such a society together. The scientists of the world, with their excellent record of international collaboration in the past, have set us a good example. It is an example, indeed, which we all must follow, since international cooperation is an imperative for every modern nation.

The Asian Development Bank

*Statement by W. Averell Harriman
Ambassador at Large*¹

It is a privilege to come before your committee to discuss the Asian Development Bank. This Bank promises to be an institution of major importance in the life of all Asia. United States national interests will be served significantly by membership.

The Asian Development Bank is in fact an important step toward realization of President Johnson's program to promote economic development in Asia. United States support for the Bank at this time, when world attention is focused on news of the war in Viet-Nam, will demonstrate the vitality of the President's concept of peaceful development in Asia. It will show that the United States is looking beyond the fighting in Viet-Nam to a time when the resources now required to curb aggressions can be devoted to the task of peaceful reconstruction and development.

Before I proceed further, I want to make plain that stress should be laid upon the fact that this Bank is Asian. The initiative that launched it was Asian. The organizing group was Asian. The momentum developed to mobilize its capital resources was organized by Asians. Two-thirds of its capital will be

subscribed by countries in the Asian region. In the history of Asia and the Far East there has never before been an enterprise in which the unmistakable stamp of real Asian interest has been so strong. This Bank offers hospitality and a focus of common venture for countries of a wide variety of economic and political systems, some of them antagonistic to each other. All of them, however, look to an opportunity to accelerate the economic and social growth from which all will benefit. Achievement of this goal is second only to restoration of peace in the area in the fulfillment of our hopes for improving the welfare of the peoples of Asia.

Both the President and Secretary Rusk have become deeply interested in the promise of the Asian Development Bank, and Mr. Rusk regrets that he is unable to discuss this matter with you personally today.

Participation in the Asian Development Bank is an opportunity for the United States to become associated with Asian countries in new enterprises to promote the economic development of Asia and the Far East. It is an institution which can, we hope, make part of that contribution to the realization of the accelerated economic and social development of the troubled area of Southeast Asia envisaged by the President in his speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965.²

¹ Made on Feb. 2 before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. On Feb. 9, by a vote of 292-80, the House passed H.R. 12563, a bill providing for U.S. participation in the Asian Development Bank. On Feb. 21 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ordered the bill favorably reported.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

If our expectations for the Asian Development Bank are fulfilled, we can look to it:

1. As a vehicle for raising additional development capital both in the industrialized countries of the world and among the Asian countries themselves for the accelerated development of the area, the Bank will be a hard-money institution, ready to finance soundly conceived, bankable projects. In time, it will come to enjoy the confidence of the international financial community and be able to borrow capital on the strength of its credit standing.

2. As an institution with a predominantly Asian character, the Bank will be able to concentrate its attention and resources on the problems of growth and development in Asia, thereby providing a vehicle through which the Asians themselves will become more intimately engaged in the process of mutual self-help.

3. As a venture promising bolder regional cooperation, the Bank brings together 19 countries of the Asian-Pacific region in the task of economic development, but it is hoped that this example of Asian economic cooperation will stimulate Asian efforts in other fields—social, cultural, and perhaps political.

Secretary [of the Treasury Henry H.] Fowler and Under Secretary [of the Treasury Joseph W.] Barr have already testified on the financial aspects of the Bank. I would like to dwell upon some of its broader implications.

"Bringing Asians Together"

Since 1947 the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) has been the principal forum for a dialog on Asia's development needs and requirements. The Commission pioneered the concept of an Asian Development Bank. Its able executive secretary, U Nyun, has been one of the Bank's leading advocates. Through its studies and training programs the Commission has fostered a greater understanding and consciousness of the development needs of Asia and of the preconditions and

requirements for successful self-sustaining economic growth.

Despite the Commission's pioneer work in the economic field—as well as that of other organizations such as the Colombo Plan—only limited progress has been made in either actual day-to-day cooperation or joint planning to overcome the region's economic problems, whether in the field of trade policy, the coordination of development planning and financial policies, or in joint industrial development. Aside from the valuable planning work of the Mekong Committee, such cooperation as exists today is essentially restricted to bilateral relations.

It is in this field—by bringing Asians together to consider their economic problems and to seek common solutions—that the Bank would make a major contribution.

The planning of this Bank has already brought together important officials from the countries of the region working with genuine and considerable enthusiasm on the task of charting its course. Although many of the Asian countries suffer from balance-of-payment difficulties, by their joint efforts they have overfulfilled the regional subscription target originally set for them. The Bank includes among its members the countries of the Indian subcontinent as well as most of the countries of Southeast and East Asia. It joins the highly developed countries of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to the developmental efforts of their less advanced neighbors in the region.

There are many obstacles to regional economic cooperation in Asia. It is legitimate to ask why, given these obstacles, we believe that the hopes held for this venture by Asians themselves may bear fruit.

The promoters of the Bank have always emphasized that the Bank should be more than a source of development capital. They envisage that the Bank, through its lending and technical assistance operations, will foster a regional orientation in the economic policies of its member countries in the area. It will do this by:

a. Emphasizing bankable projects with a regional impact;

b. Helping member countries in the preparation and coordination of national development plans;

c. Insisting on reasonable monetary and fiscal policies; and

d. Promoting, where feasible, regional complementarity in industrial and agricultural development and perhaps efforts toward economic integration in appropriate fields.

The Bank also will provide a valuable forum for the exchange of views on these vital issues of economic development. The Board of Directors and the Board of Governors of the Bank will consist of senior economic officials from the countries of the area. As in the case of the World Bank, on whose charter the Asian Development Bank's is modeled, the meetings of these bodies will provide occasions for an exchange of views on the problems of the area and the possibilities of working out common solutions by the coordination of economic and social policies.

In sum, we feel that there are good reasons to hope that the Bank will in time stimulate the development of other forms of economic cooperation.

As has been said in a different context, the mark of an historic event is that it changes people, or more precisely, the way they think, so that they are never quite the same again. We believe the Asian Development Bank will be such an event.

The Bank and U.S. Policy in Asia

I now would like to say a word about the relationship of the Bank to United States policy in Asia.

Our policy in Asia is twofold:

1. To assist the countries of the area to resist subversion and external aggression;

2. To offer the peoples of the area an alternative to violence—an alternative which, in the President's words, would "replace despair with hope and terror with progress."³

³ *Ibid.*

In his speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7 of last year, the President called for an international cooperative effort, responsive to Asian initiative, to accelerate the economic and social development of Southeast Asia. The President proposed this program because of his conviction that the best hope for peace and stability in Southeast Asia, over the long term, lies in such an accelerated program of coordinated regional development.

The President's proposal calls for a great international cooperative effort that would lift the hopes and spirits of the peoples of Asia by promising an alternative to the destruction of wars and the oppression of adverse economic circumstances. It envisages that the countries of Southeast Asia associate themselves in a cooperative enterprise in which, at some future time, a peaceful North Viet-Nam could take its place.

We believe that the Bank will be a stimulating force in such an international program of development for Southeast Asia.

Some of the ways by which the Bank will contribute to such a program are:

1. Emphasis of its own lending policy on regional projects;

2. Lending in conjunction with the United States and other donors for projects too large for any single donor to finance;

3. Through the financing of technical assistance which will improve the effectiveness with which United States and other external assistance is utilized; and

4. By serving as a coordinating mechanism for bilateral programs in particular countries, including leadership in consortia and consultative arrangements.

An important feature of the Bank is its authority to earmark up to 10 percent of its paid-in capital for financial assistance on concessional terms and to accept special funds from member and nonmember donor countries for this purpose. Special funds made available by donor countries will be separate from the Bank's own capital. In view of the development needs of the region, such funds will be a vital complement to

the Bank's own lending operations on commercial terms. Such special funds would be an important supplement to fulfilling the objectives of the Bank for development of the area.

The United States has offered to contribute \$100 million toward a special fund for Southeast Asia's regional development if other industrialized countries will contribute. We are hopeful that the other nations will respond and make available such special funds to the Bank.

Thus, we hope that the Bank can play an important role in mobilizing financing for the modernization and reform of Southeast Asia's agriculture, essential industrial development, the development of the Mekong, and the promotion, on a regional basis, of Southeast Asia's educational system. In a Viet-Nam where peace was restored, the Bank could assume an important role as an instrument of the world community in helping to move ahead with tasks of postwar reconstruction.

Other developed countries have recognized the promise of the Bank to the future of Asia, and their response to the approach by the Asians for their membership and subscription has been encouraging.

Japan, from the outset, has taken a prominent part in the planning of the Bank. Its contribution of \$200 million is equal to that of the United States. Australia and New Zealand likewise have shown a deep interest in the Bank, and their joint contribution—\$108 million—comes to more than half of that of the United States. Canada has contributed \$25 million. Ten Western European countries have decided to participate and have subscribed a total of \$121 million toward the capital stock of the Bank. Thus, the Bank has virtually met its \$1 billion subscription target and is assured of the continuing cooperation and support of most of the developed countries of the free world.

In conclusion, there is substance to the hopes of what this Bank might accomplish:

—The Bank is the product of careful thought by leading Asian statesmen.

—Its proposed organization insures that it will reinforce existing assistance programs in Asia.

—Its design is both practical and imaginative.

—It holds promise of fostering new habits of thought.

In the words of the President, it is "one of the most hopeful events of our times . . . most of all . . . because [it] will bring so many of Asia's diverse peoples together in a cooperative effort for peaceful development and human betterment in Asia."⁴

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

Terminating the Designation of Certain Countries as Less Developed Countries. Communication from the President transmitting a notice of intention to issue an Executive order. H. Doc. 369. January 26, 1966. 2 pp.

World Health Assembly—1969. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 403. S. Rept. 955. February 1, 1966. 3 pp.

Foreign Aid. Message from the President. H. Doc. 374. February 1, 1966. 10 pp.

International Education and Health. Message from the President. H. Doc. 375. February 2, 1966. 10 pp.

Asian Development Bank Act. Report to accompany H.R. 12563. H. Rept. 1267. February 7, 1966. 12 pp.

Study of Foreign Aid Expenditures. Report to accompany S. Res. 182. S. Rept. 965. February 9, 1966. 13 pp.

A War on Hunger. Message from the President recommending a new Food for Freedom Act. H. Doc. 378. February 10, 1966. 8 pp.

Supplemental Military Authorizations, 1966. Report to accompany S. 2791. S. Rept. 992. February 10, 1966. 14 pp.

Fifth Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Message from the President transmitting the report. H. Doc. 382. February 15, 1966. 32 pp.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1015.

U.S. Joins Other American Republics in Denouncing Havana "Tricontinental Conference"

Statement by Ward P. Allen

*Alternate U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States*¹

The Government and people of the United States share the concern and preoccupation here so brilliantly expressed by the distinguished delegates of Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic who have just spoken concerning the statements of the Soviet, as well as of the Chinese Communist, Cuban, and other delegates, to the so-called "Tricontinental Conference" and the decisions and resolutions approved there calling for political and material assistance, including "arms and ammunition," to subversive movements in the territory of free member states of this organization. My Government joins its voice with those of the other American Republics in denouncing these declarations and actions as inadmissible intervention in the internal affairs of free and sovereign governments.

The attitudes and actions of the Soviet delegate and the Cuban delegate offer unfortunate examples of cynical disregard for the pledged word. As the other distinguished representatives have already pointed out, barely 3 weeks previously the Soviet

and Cuban delegations to the United Nations General Assembly professed strong support for and solemnly adhered to Resolution 2131, which includes the statement already cited that, and I quote: "... no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed to the violent overthrow of the régime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State."²

This Communist-dominated, so-called "Tricontinental Conference" is but the latest, though in some respects the most blatant and open, effort by the U.S.S.R., Communist China and Cuba, and their satellites to extend their power and influence in the free world, to exploit legitimate needs, to create discord and sow discontent and strife—in order to seek the violent overthrow of governments in this hemisphere and supplant them with Communist, dictatorial regimes, subservient to Soviet and Chinese Communist imperialism. In this context, a rereading of Resolution I of the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers entitled "The Communist Offensive in America"³ is rewarding and instructive, for that resolution is prescient.

¹ Made before the Council at Washington on Jan. 24 during an extraordinary session called by the Government of Peru to denounce the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Conference, held at Havana, Cuba, Jan. 3-15, for violating the principle of nonintervention.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 128.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.

We do not yet know the full details of what went on in the closed meetings of the conference. Unlike free-world meetings—this Council session for example—the conference was not held in the full light of day. Indeed, not a single representative of a responsible U.S. news medium was permitted to be present in the meeting. Of the approximately 25 American press representatives who applied for entry to cover the conference, only 2, to our knowledge, were able to do so, and they represented the insignificant Marxist press in the United States. I would even suggest that many of the conference delegates themselves—particularly the well-intentioned but politically innocent, non-Communist ones—did not and still do not know what went on, for they were on the periphery of the real decision-taking and policymaking.

The conference was dominated principally by the two giant Communist dictatorships—that of the Soviet Union and Communist China, who themselves are locked in a power struggle for imperialist domination of the Communist and the uncommitted world. The Castro regime, between the two, was seeking to use the advantage of host and chairman to manipulate and to extend its own influence.

But from the excerpts and summaries published of official speeches and the texts of the final declarations and resolutions as they are emerging, the conference outline becomes clear and the picture emerges. The picture is an ironic one of three oppressive dictatorships enlisting the support of others in seeking how best to undermine and overthrow the governments in primary target countries in this hemisphere—all of whom are free and independent, all of whom have either recently held or are scheduled shortly to hold democratic elections, and whose people enjoy living standards higher than many of those in the Communist world. More specifically, the conference took the following steps among others:

1. In the course of the deliberations and actions of the conference, nearly all member states of the Organization of American

States were specifically mentioned, either as objects of attack and calumny or as primary targets marked for overthrow through the support of subversive movements.

2. The political resolution approved by the conference calls for “maximum development” of what they call “militant solidarity” with the Latin American groups who are under arms against their governments in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala, as well as subversive groups in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere, and particularly in the Dominican Republic.

3. A separate resolution which, according to official conference sources was approved by acclamation, and which has already been referred to by the distinguished delegate of Peru, states among other things as follows: *“Demanda de todas las fuerzas revolucionarias de los tres Continentes intensificar sus esfuerzos para hacer llegar a los Movimientos Dirigentes de los países que luchan con las armas en la mano una activa ayuda financiera y material, incluyendo armas y municiones.”*

4. The conference established in Havana itself the provisional headquarters of the executive secretariat of the “Solidarity Organization of the People of Africa, Asia and Latin America” and set up a special committee whose members include representatives of the Soviet Union, of Communist China, and Cuba, and whose objectives include the provision of—and I quote—“all necessary moral, political and material assistance to (the so-called) national liberation movements, particularly those which are up in arms. . . .”

5. The so-called “delegations” claiming cynically to represent Latin American countries were directed to remain in Havana, following the conclusion of the conference, for further secret meetings. Could it be that they are receiving directives, propaganda, training, and funds, to continue subversive purposes before being sent back home?

What, then, should our response be to this renewed, strident, and, as the distinguished delegate from Colombia said, truculent chal-

lenge to the governments and peoples of the hemisphere? I suggest it is a twofold course which we can pursue with determination and with confidence:

First, here and now we denounce these efforts to subvert free institutions through inadmissible intervention in the internal affairs of countries of this hemisphere. Also, as the distinguished delegate from Colombia has already suggested, the Council, in our view, in carrying out its mandate under paragraph 1 of Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers,⁴ might well make a further study of the results and significance of the conference which may reveal the desirability of recommending further measures of vigilance. Without either overestimating or underestimating the seriousness of the challenge, we should intensify our vigilance and continue our efforts to carry out the measures which our OAS bodies and meetings have previously recommended to our governments.

The second course which we pursue with vigor and confidence is the one pointed out by the distinguished delegate of Venezuela in citing the recent words of President Lyndon B. Johnson and the one we have all charted for ourselves in the Charter of Punta del Este. We must intensify our work together to strengthen and perfect our free, democratic, political, economic, and social systems. Following this course, we can be confident that communism is a lost cause. Communism is not the wave of the future. Instead, as it has imposed its dictatorship in the long list of countries from North Korea and North Viet-Nam through Hungary and Cuba, it is clear that it is but a reversion to a discredited, past authoritarianism.

Communism is doomed to fail because it is spiritually bankrupt—because it is based on a denial of the freedom, dignity, and worth of the individual. By contrast, our Charter of Punta del Este⁵ proclaims—and

I quote—“ . . . that the creative powers of free men hold the key to their progress and to the progress of future generations.” It goes on to say, “And our certainty of ultimate success rests not alone on our faith in ourselves and in our nations but on the indomitable spirit of free man which has been the heritage of American civilization.” Thank you, Mr. Chairman.⁶

U.S. Welcomes U.N./FAO Appeal for Worldwide Food Aid to India

*Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The United States welcomes the eloquent appeal addressed to the world community which has just been issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization].²

The United States Government has been in almost constant discussion with the Government of India on its food needs. A team of U.S. Government experts recently toured India to work with the Government there to get a clearer idea of the total dimensions of the crisis and what steps might be needed to meet it. A week ago President Johnson announced³ the immediate allotment of 3 million tons of grain to be shipped to India as quickly as possible, bringing United States emergency grain commitments to India during the current U.S. fiscal year to 6½ million tons.

⁶ On Feb. 2 the members of the Council expressed unanimous support of the denunciation by the Government of Peru. A final resolution condemning the Havana conference was adopted by a vote of 18 to 0, with 2 abstentions.

¹ Released at U.N. Headquarters, New York, N.Y., on Feb. 11 (U.S./U.N. press release 4805).

² The joint appeal, issued Feb. 11, called on the world community to provide all possible aid to India in facing its grave food emergency.

³ At a news conference on Feb. 4; for a statement made by Secretary Rusk at a news conference on Dec. 9, see BULLETIN of Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1009.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 279.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

My Government has stated publicly its firm belief that all nations in a position to do so should join in a special international effort to help India meet the grave food problem it is now confronting. We have also said that we are fully prepared to participate in such an effort. India's problem is the world's problem. We believe that all men of good will have a stake in seeing that people do not starve. As President Johnson said last week: "You can be sure America will do more than her part."

It is inconceivable to me that the world community will not do its part to help the people of India in their hour of need, for their needs are urgent and the time is short.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Health

Amendment to article 7 of the constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.¹
Acceptance deposited: Guinea, December 22, 1965.

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, as amended (TIAS 3532). Signed at Geneva Sep-

¹ Not in force.

tember 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Accession deposited: Brazil, January 6, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II. TIAS 5844.

Acceptance deposited: Brazil, February 15, 1966.

BILATERAL

Greece

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of March 27, 1946 (TIAS 1626). Effected by exchange of notes at Athens February 7, 1966. Entered into force February 7, 1966.

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi February 5, 1966. Entered into force February 5, 1966.

Israel

Understanding regarding a correction in the convention for avoidance of double taxation and for encouragement of international trade and investment, signed June 29, 1965. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv January 26 and February 9, 1966.

Mexico

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative meteorological observation program in Mexico, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico February 4, 1966. Entered into force February 4, 1966; operative January 1, 1966.

Togo

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Lomé February 8, 1966. Enters into force 1 month after exchange of ratifications.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1393 PUBLICATION B044 MARCH 7, 1966

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†28	2/14	U.S.-Japan cultural conference.
*29	2/16	Rusk: National Rural Electric Co-operative Association (excerpts).
30	2/18	Rusk: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
31	2/18	Treaty of amity and economic re-lations with Togo.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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"Whether in the cities and hamlets of Viet-Nam, or in the ghettos of our own cities, the struggle is the same. That struggle is to end the violence against the human mind and body—so that the work of peace may be done and the fruits of freedom may be won."

—PRESIDENT JOHNSON, New York, N.Y., February 23, 1966

Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free

*Address by President Johnson*¹

To be honored with this award by this organization is a very proud moment for me. I accept it with the gratitude of my heart and with renewed commitment to the cause that it represents, the cause of freedom at home and the cause of freedom abroad.

Twenty-five years ago, to a world that was darkened by war, President Franklin Roosevelt described the four freedoms of mankind: freedom of speech and expression; freedom of every person to worship God in his own way; freedom from want; freedom from fear. Franklin Roosevelt knew that these freedoms could not be the province of one people alone. He called on all his countrymen to assist those who endured the tyrant's bombs and suffered his opposition and oppression. He called for courage and for generosity, and for resolution in the face of terror. And then he said:

Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights—or keep them.

Wendell Willkie, Franklin Roosevelt's opponent in the campaign of 1940, shared his

belief that freedom could not be founded only on American shores or only for those whose skin is white. "Freedom is an indivisible word," Wendell Willkie said. "If we want to enjoy it and fight for it we must be prepared to extend it to everyone, whether they are rich or poor, whether they agree with us or not, no matter what their race or the color of their skin."

That was Republican policy 25 years ago. It was Democratic policy 25 years ago. It is American policy here tonight.

Then how well have we done in our time in making the four freedoms real for our people and for the other people of the world? Here in America we accord every man the right to worship as he wills. I believe we are more tolerant of sectional and religious and racial differences than we were a quarter of a century ago. The majority of our people believe that a qualified man or woman, of any race, of any religion, of any section, could hold any office in our land. This was not so—not very clear at all in 1940. We are committed now, however great the trial and tension, to protecting the right of free expression and peaceful dissent.

We have learned to despise the witch hunt, the unprincipled harassment of a man's integrity and his right to be dif-

¹ Made at a Freedom House dinner at New York, N.Y., on Feb. 23 (White House press release; as-delivered text). President Johnson received the National Freedom Award in recognition of his efforts on behalf of freedom in this country in resisting aggression abroad.

ferent. We have gained in tolerance, and I am determined to use the high office I hold to protect and to encourage that tolerance. I do not mean to say that I will remain altogether silent on the critical issues of our day. For just as strongly as I believe in other men's freedom to disagree, so do I also believe in the President's freedom to attempt to persuade.

So let me assure you and my fellow Americans tonight that I will do everything in my power to defend both.

Serving the Vision of Freedom

Twenty-five years ago freedom from want had the ring of urgency for our people. The unemployment rate stood at 14.5 percent. Millions of Americans had spent the last decade in the breadlines or on farms where the winds howled away any chance for a decent life.

Tonight there are still millions whose poverty haunts our conscience. There are still fathers without jobs, and there are still children without hope. Yet for the vast majority of Americans these are times when the hand of plenty has replaced the grip of want. And, for the first time in almost 9 years, tonight the unemployment rate has fallen to 4 percent.

This liberation from want, for which we thank God, is a testimony to the enduring vitality of the American competitive system, the American free enterprise economy. It is a testimony also to an enlightened public policy, established by Franklin Roosevelt and strengthened by every administration since his death. That policy has freed Americans for more hopeful and more productive lives.

It has relieved their fears of growing old by social security and by medical care. It has inspired them with hope for their children by aid to elementary and higher education. It has helped to create economic opportunity by enlightened fiscal policies. It has granted to millions, born into hopelessness, the chance of a new start in life by public works, by private incentive, by poverty programs. For the Negro American,

it has opened the door after centuries of enslavement and discrimination—opened the doors to the blessings that America offers to those that are willing and able to earn them.

Thus we address the spirit of Franklin Roosevelt, 25 years after his message to America and the world, with confidence and with an unflagging determination. We have served his vision of the four freedoms essential to mankind—here in America.

Yet we know that he did not speak only for America. We know that the four freedoms are not secure in America when they are violently denied elsewhere in the world. We know, too, that it requires more than speeches to resist the international enemies of freedom. We know that men respond to deeds when they are deaf to words. Even the precious word "freedom" may become empty to those without the means to use it. For what does freedom mean when famine cloaks the land, when new millions crowd upon already strained resources, when narrow privilege is entrenched behind law and custom, when all conspires to teach men that they cannot change the conditions of their lives?

I do not need to tell you how five administrations have labored to give real meaning to "freedom," in a world where it is often merely a phrase that conceals oppression and neglect.

Men in this room, men throughout America, have given their skills and their treasure to that work. You have warned our people how insatiable is aggression and how it thrives on human misery. You have carried the word that, without the sense that we can change the conditions of their lives, nothing can avail the oppressed of this earth—neither good will, nor national sovereignty, nor massive grants of aid from their more fortunate brothers.

You have known, too, that men who believe they can change their destinies will change their destinies. Armed with that belief, they will be willing—yes, they will be eager—to make the sacrifices that freedom demands. They will be anxious to

shoulder the responsibilities that are inseparably bound to freedom. They will be able to look beyond the four essential freedoms—beyond to the freedom to learn, to master new skills, to acquaint themselves with the lore of man and nature; to the freedom to grow, to become the best that is within them to become, to cast off the yoke of discrimination and disease; to the freedom to hope, and to build on that hope lives of integrity and well-being.

This is what our struggle in Viet-Nam is about tonight. This is what our struggle for equal rights in this country is all about tonight. We seek to create that climate, at home and abroad, where unlettered men can learn, where deprived children can grow, where hopeless millions can be inspired to change the terms of their existence for the better.

That climate cannot be created where terror fills the air. Children cannot learn, and men cannot earn their bread, and women cannot heal the sick where the night of violence has blotted out the sun. Whether in the cities and hamlets of Viet-Nam, or in the ghettos of our own cities, the struggle is the same. That struggle is to end the violence against the human mind and body—so that the work of peace may be done and the fruits of freedom may be won.

We are pitting the resources of the law, of education and training, of our vision and our compassion, against that violence here in America. And we shall end it in our time.

America's Purpose in Viet-Nam

On the other side of the earth we are no less committed to ending violence against men who are struggling tonight to be free. It is about that commitment that I have come here to speak now.

Tonight in Viet-Nam more than 200,000 of your young Americans stand there fighting for your freedom. Tonight our people are determined that these men shall have whatever help they need and that their

cause, which is our cause, shall be sustained.

But in these last days there have been questions about what we are doing in Viet-Nam, and these questions have been answered loudly and clearly for every citizen to see and to hear. The strength of America can never be sapped by discussion, and we have no better nor stronger tradition than open debate, free debate, in hours of danger. We believe, with Macaulay, that men are never so likely to settle a question rightly as when they discuss it freely. We are united in our commitment to free discussion. So also we are united in our determination that no foe anywhere should ever mistake our arguments for indecision, nor our debates for weakness.

So what are the questions that are still being asked?

First, some ask if this is a war for unlimited objectives. The answer is plain. The answer is "No."

Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam.

Second, some people ask if we are caught in a blind escalation of force that is pulling us headlong toward a wider war that no one wants. The answer, again, is a simple "No."

We are using that force and only that force that is necessary to stop this aggression. Our fighting men are in Viet-Nam because tens of thousands of invaders came south before them. Our numbers have increased in Viet-Nam because the aggression of others has increased in Viet-Nam. The high hopes of the aggressor have been dimmed, and the tide of the battle has been turned, and our measured use of force will and must be continued. But this is prudent firmness under what I believe is careful control. There is not, and there will not be, a mindless escalation.

Third, others ask if our fighting men are

to be denied the help they need. The answer, again, is and will be a resounding "No."

Our great Military Establishment has moved 200,000 men across 10,000 miles since last spring. These men have, and will have, all they need to fight the aggressor. They have already performed miracles in combat. The men behind them have worked miracles of supply, building new ports, transporting new equipment, opening new roads. The American forces of freedom are strong tonight in South Viet-Nam, and we plan to keep them so.

As you know, they are led there by a brilliant and a resourceful commander, General William C. Westmoreland. He knows the needs of war, and he supports the works of peace. And when he asks for more Americans to help the men that he has, his requests will be immediately studied and, as I promised the Nation last July,² his needs will be immediately met.

Fourth, some ask if our men go alone to Viet-Nam, if we alone respect our great commitment in the Southeast Asia Treaty. Still again, the answer is a simple "No."

We have seven allies in SEATO, and we have seen five of them give us vital support, each with his own strength and in his own way, to the cause of freedom in Southeast Asia.

Fifth, some ask about the risks of a wider war, perhaps against the vast land armies of Red China. And again the answer is "No," never by any act of ours—and not if there is any reason left behind the wild words from Peking.

We have threatened no one, and we will not. We seek the end of no regime, and we will not. Our purpose is solely to defend against aggression. To any armed attack, we will reply. We have measured the strength and the weakness of others, and we think we know our own. We observe in ourselves, and we applaud in others, a careful restraint in action. We can live with

anger in word as long as it is matched by caution in deed.

The War on Want

Sixth, men ask if we rely on guns alone. Still again, the answer is "No."

From our Honolulu meeting, from the clear pledge which joins us with our allies, there has emerged a common dedication to the peaceful progress of the people of Viet-Nam—to schools for their children, to care for their health, to hope and bounty for their land.³

The Vice President returned tonight from his constructive and very highly successful visit to Saigon and to other capitals, and he tells me that he and Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge have found a new conviction and purpose in South Viet-Nam—for the battle against want and injustice as well as the battle against aggression.

So the pledge of Honolulu will be kept, and the pledge of Baltimore stands open⁴—to help the men of the North when they have the wisdom to be ready.

We Americans must understand how fundamental is the meaning of this second war—the war on want. I talked on my ranch last fall with Secretary [Orville L.] Freeman, the Secretary of Agriculture, and in my office last week with Secretary [John W.] Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, making, over and over again, the same central point: The breeding ground of war is human misery. If we are not to fight forever in faraway places—in Europe, or the far Pacific, or the jungles of Africa, or the suburbs of Santo Domingo—then we just must learn to get at the roots of violence. As a nation we must magnify our struggle against world hunger and illiteracy and disease. We must bring hope to men whose lives now end at two score or

³ For texts of a joint communique and the "Declaration of Honolulu," see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

⁴ For an address by President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University on Apr. 7, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 16, 1965, p. 262.

less. Because without that hope, without progress in this war on want, we will be called on again to fight again and again, as we are fighting tonight.

Seventh, men ask who has a right to rule in South Viet-Nam. Our answer there is what it has been for 200 years. The people must have this right—the South Vietnamese people—and no one else.

Washington will not impose upon the people of South Viet-Nam a government not of their choice. Hanoi shall not impose upon the people of South Viet-Nam a government not of their choice. So we will insist for ourselves on what we require from Hanoi: respect for the principle of government by the consent of the governed. We stand for self-determination—for free elections—and we will honor their result.

Eighth, men ask if we are neglecting any hopeful chance of peace. And the answer is "No."

A great servant of peace, Secretary Dean Rusk, has sent the message of peace on every wire and by every hand to every continent. A great pleader for peace here with us tonight, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, has worked at home and abroad in this same cause. Their undiscouraged efforts will continue.

How much wiser it would have been, how much more compassionate toward its own people, if Hanoi had only come to the bargaining table at the close of the year. Then the 7,000 Communist troops who have died in battle since January the first, and the many thousands who have been wounded in that same period, would have lived in peace with their fellow men.

Today, as then, Hanoi has the opportunity to end the increasing toll the war is taking on those under its command.

Ninth, some ask how long we must bear this burden. To that question, in all honesty, I can give you no answer tonight.

During the battle of Britain, when that nation stood alone in 1940, Winston Churchill gave no answer to that question. When the forces of freedom were driven from the Philippines, President Roosevelt

could not and did not name the date that we would return.

If the aggressor persists in Viet-Nam, the struggle may well be long. Our men in battle know and they accept this hard fact. We who are at home can do as much, because there is no computer that can tell the hour and the day of peace, but we do know that it will come only to the steadfast and never to the weak in heart.

Tenth, and finally, men ask if it is worth it. I think you know that answer. It is the answer that Americans have given for a quarter of a century, wherever American strength has been pledged to prevent aggression.

The contest in Viet-Nam is confused and hard, and many of its forms are new. Yet our American purpose and policy are unchanged. Our men in Viet-Nam are there. They are there, as Secretary Dillon [former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon] told you, to keep a promise that was made 12 years ago. The Southeast Asia Treaty promised, as Secretary John Foster Dulles said for the United States, that "an attack upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain."⁵

The Pledge of Four Presidents

But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in Viet-Nam tonight. We keep the faith for freedom.

Four Presidents have pledged to keep that faith.

The first was Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his state of the Union message 25 years ago. He said:

... we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

The second was Harry S. Truman, in 1947, at a historic turning point in the history of

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 391.

guerrilla warfare—and of Greece, Turkey, and the United States. These were his words then:⁶

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

The third was Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his first inaugural address. He promised this:

Realizing that common sense and common decency alike dictate the futility of appeasement, we shall never try to placate an aggressor by the false and wicked bargain of trading honor for security. Americans, indeed, all free men, remember that in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains.

And then 5 years ago, John F. Kennedy, on the cold bright noon of his first day in office, proclaimed:

Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

Freedom's Frontier in Viet-Nam

This is the American tradition. Built in free discussion, proven on a hundred battlefields, rewarded by a progress at home that has no match in history, it beckons us forward tonight to the work of peace in Viet-Nam. We will build freedom while we fight, and we will seek peace every day by every honorable means. But we will persevere along the high, hard road of freedom. We are too old to be foolhardy, and we are too young to be tired. We are too strong for fear and too determined for retreat.

Each evening when I retire, I take up—

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534.

from a bedside table—reports from the battlefield and reports from the capitals around the world. They tell me how our men have fared that day in the hills and the valleys of Viet-Nam. They tell me what hope there seems to be that the message of peace will be heard and that this tragic war may be ended. I have read of individual acts of heroism—of dedicated men and women whose valor matches that of any generation that has ever gone before. I read of men risking their lives to save others—of men giving their lives to save freedom. Always among these reports are a few letters from the men out there themselves. If there is any doubt among some here at home about our purposes in Viet-Nam, I never find it reflected in those letters from Viet-Nam.

Our soldiers, our marines, our airmen, and our sailors know why they are in Viet-Nam. They know, as five Presidents have known, how inseparably bound together are America's freedom and the freedom of her friends around the world.

So tonight let me read you from a letter that I received from an American father, a warm friend of mine of many years, about his son, a young Army captain. He said:

I have never known a man at war who showed less bravado in his communications with home. When he was not flying missions in his helicopter or working out of the battalion headquarters he and some of his buddies on their own visited the orphanages as individuals and played with the kids. He was deeply interested in the Vietnamese people, particularly the peasants, and he told me how sorely they wanted, more than anything else, to just be left alone in some semblance of freedom to grow their rice and to raise their families. This good young American, as thousands like him, was not on the other side of the world fighting specifically for you or for me, Mr. President. He was fighting in perhaps our oldest American tradition, taking up for people who are being pushed around.

The young captain described in this letter is dead tonight, but his spirit lives in the 200,000 young Americans who stand out there on freedom's frontier in Viet-Nam. It lives in their mothers and in their fathers here in America, who have proudly watched them leave their homes for their distant struggle.

So tonight I ask each citizen to join me, to join me in the homes and the meeting places our men are fighting to keep free, in a prayer for their safety.

I ask you to join me in a pledge to the cause for which they fight—the cause of human freedom, to which this organization is dedicated. I ask you for your help, for your understanding, and for your commitment so that this united people may show forth to all the world that America has not ended the only struggle that is worthy of man's unceasing sacrifice—the struggle to be free.

Vice President Reviews Asian Problems With Thai Premier

Vice President Humphrey was in Thailand February 13–15 during a special mission to Asia for President Johnson.¹ Following is the text of a joint communique released at Bangkok on February 15 at the conclusion of talks between the Vice President and the Prime Minister of Thailand, Thanom Kittikachorn.

The Vice President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Thailand have concluded a most useful discussion and review of the common struggle against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, including the results of the recently concluded conference in Hawaii.²

The Vice President paid tribute to the strong and unhesitating stand which Thailand and her leaders have taken against the many forms of Communist aggression, the disguised as well as the blatant ones. He expressed the gratitude of his Government for Thailand's initiatives in seeking a larger regional framework for the peaceful achievement of social and economic progress. He emphasized the determination of the United

States to provide all necessary assistance to enable Thailand and the other countries of Southeast Asia threatened by Communist aggression to defend themselves and to achieve in peace their just economic and social aims.

The Prime Minister concurred with the principle underlying the Declaration of Honolulu: that the war in Southeast Asia must be waged on two fronts simultaneously—the military front and the struggle to improve the social, economic, and physical well-being of the people.

Recognizing Thailand's commitment to defend itself against Communist aggression both from within and from without, the Vice President reaffirmed the United States pledge to assist in programs for the improvement of individual well-being and security in Thailand. Despite the progress already made in the development of rural areas, a need was clearly identified for greater efforts to provide more ample water supply, further expansion of rural credit for agriculture and related small industry, irrigation of farmlands, expansion of rural electrification, an expanded road system to connect outlying areas to markets, better medical care extended to presently isolated villages, and the provision of more schools to educate the populace and to insure that they will be better equipped to share in the progress of their country and contribute to its strength and stability.

It was agreed that the steps taken to improve the security in certain areas had proved their worth, but that further strengthening of security forces was an urgent necessity. Both Governments would provide additional resources to achieve this end, so that villages would be freed from the threat of Communist terrorism and harassment. At the same time further assistance beyond on-going programs for the improvement and modernization of the Thai Armed Forces was a pressing requirement which would be met by the United States with the flexibility and promptness required by the current emergency.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

² *Ibid.*

Thailand's present contributions in regional affairs were jointly reviewed with specific reference to the constructive role Thailand has played in the Mekong Committee, its leadership in the recent regional educational conference, its strong support for the Asian Development Bank,³ and leadership in forming a highly competent regional council for exchange and coordination of development plans. The Prime Minister stressed the need for Asian initiative and innovation in achieving more rapid progress in economic development so as to improve the lives of the Asian peoples. This is one of the objectives underlying the renewed interest in the Association of South-east Asia. The Vice President recalled President Johnson's pledge in April 1965⁴ of a \$1 billion American contribution to such a program following its organization by Asian leadership. In this context the Vice President noted the visit of Mr. Eugene Black for discussions with the Prime Minister,⁵ which have resulted in the necessary engineering or other survey actions for all the 13 projects proposed by the Prime Minister.

It was agreed that organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asia could play a valuable role in fostering new cooperative institutions and stimulating the ideas that would make dramatic economic transformations possible.

Letters of Credence

Burma

The newly appointed Ambassador of Burma, U Tun Win, presented his credentials to President Johnson on February 25. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated February 25.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1965, p. 215.

U.S. Rejects Soviet Allegations on Air Accident in Spain

Press release 36 dated February 26

Following is the text of an aide memoire transmitted by the American Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 25.

The Government of the United States rejects the allegations made by the Soviet Government in its aide memoire of February 16, 1966.¹ The Government of the U.S.S.R. must be aware—or could easily have ascertained—that no nuclear weapon test, no nuclear explosion of any kind, and no radioactive pollution of the sea were involved in the unfortunate accident over the coast of Spain. Consequently, there is no question of a "violation" or of "actions in conflict with" either the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, or of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, or of the principle of freedom of the high seas. Accusations to this effect by the Soviet Government are therefore without any foundation.

It is common knowledge that flights of U.S. military aircraft are carried out with the agreement of nations of the free world and for the express purpose of reinforcing their collective security against the threat posed by the huge nuclear forces of the Soviet Union, including its many bomber aircraft. Our policies and practices designed to meet this nuclear threat have been adopted only after the most careful assessment of security requirements and after provision of necessary safeguards.

It is not surprising that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is opposed to military security measures undertaken in defense against the threat of its armed power, or that it should attempt to limit or reduce such defense. It is, however, a matter of deep regret that the Soviet Union should be

¹ Not printed.

willing to distort the meaning of international treaties to suit the purpose of a propaganda campaign to that end. It seems clear that if the Soviet Government had been genuinely concerned about possible violations of international agreements and law, it would have requested, and awaited, a reply and clarification from the United States Government instead of resorting to tactics designed to advance purely propaganda objectives.

Substantial Improvement Achieved in Balance of Payments in 1965

Following are statements regarding the U.S. balance of payments made during a joint news conference at the Treasury Department on February 14 by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor, and J. L. Robertson, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY FOWLER

Final computations, now available, confirm the earlier preliminary estimate of a substantial improvement in the United States balance of payments in 1965.

In 1965 we had a balance-of-payments improvement of \$1.5 billion, so that we ended the year with a deficit in our international payments of \$1.3 billion. That is on the overall, or liquidity, accounting basis.

—That is the smallest overall balance-of-payments deficit since 1958.

—It is less than half the size of our deficits of \$2.8 billion in 1964 and \$2.7 billion in 1963.

—It compares with average deficits, on this same accounting basis, of \$3 billion a year in the 7 preceding years, 1958 through 1964.

I want to go over with you some of the main components of the 1965 record, as they

bear upon the future. There are both favorable and unfavorable elements.

The \$1.5 billion net reduction in the payments deficit on an overall basis occurred despite heavy outflows on private capital account during the early months and despite setbacks for the year as a whole in trade and other accounts. The improvement is in very large part attributable to the effectiveness of the program of voluntary cooperation which President Johnson called for in his balance-of-payments message of February 10, 1965.¹

Prospects for 1966

This 1965 record, and the tightening and sharpening of this phase of the President's balance-of-payments program for 1966, give reason to believe that there will be continuing improvement in the private capital area.

I would hope particularly that the Foreign Tax Investors Act, now in the House Ways and Means Committee, could become law this year, providing the basis for a long-term expansion of the scale of private foreign portfolio investment in the United States.

This prospect, the increase in investment income, a moderation of direct investment outflows, and a movement toward an expanding trade surplus, interrupted in 1965 by special circumstances, offer the most promising areas for our march toward equilibrium in 1966.

Of course the two main imponderables are the rising balance-of-payments costs in Southeast Asia in both the military and the aid programs, which are the result of Viet-Nam and the direct and indirect impact of Viet-Nam on the domestic economy and the balance of trade.

With this in mind, we must certainly make every effort—we must not fail in our continuing efforts, both in and out of Government—to find and to make every reason-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282. For background on the balance-of-payments program for 1966, see *ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1966, p. 22.

able and practicable offset to the impact of Viet-Nam on our balance of payments.

But it should be kept in mind that the balance-of-payments costs of the Viet-Nam conflict are not permanent or ordinary costs and that, although we have made provision for an increase in these costs in our outlook for 1966, it is simply not possible to say at this time how greatly, in fact, they will affect our balance of payments in 1966.

What I can tell you now is that we still have equilibrium, as we have defined it, as our goal for 1966, but we cannot be certain that present measures as they currently operate will lead us to that goal *if* the foreign exchange costs of Viet-Nam rise sharply over the increases presently projected. Let me add and emphasize that, as of now, the program we have is an effective program and we see no reason to change its character.

Secretary Connor will discuss with you the part of the President's balance-of-payments program that is his responsibility, chiefly, international trade and the voluntary program for keeping the growth of American business investment overseas within our balance-of-payments possibilities.

Governor Robertson will discuss the program concerned with United States lending overseas.

On the other principal accounting basis, the official settlements account, our deficit in 1965 was somewhat less than \$1.4 billion.

—This was slightly larger—about \$126 million—than the official settlements deficit in 1964.

—However, the official accounts deficit in 1965 was less than two-thirds the size of the average deficit of \$2.2 billion a year, on this same basis, in the 7 years 1958 through 1964.

By and large, the official settlements deficit will differ from the liquidity deficit to the extent of change in liquid dollar holdings of private foreigners, since inclusion of these liabilities in the liquidity account is the major difference between the two concepts.

It is characteristic for private dollar bal-

ances held abroad to vary their rate of growth sharply from year to year. There was very little increase in private foreign dollar holdings last year, making for very little difference in the two accounts for the year. The chief reasons are:

—The large increase in privately held dollars abroad in 1964 must have sufficed to satisfy increases in working balance and other requirements for some time ahead.

—American firms repatriated dollars that had been held abroad, to cooperate with the President's program.

—Tightening of domestic credit in a number of countries inspired foreign banks to shift from dollar to domestic assets.

—The improvement in the British pound sterling brought about shifts from dollar accounts to sterling accounts.

Factors Affecting 1965 Payments

I will try, in the remainder of my summary, to point out some of the main factors that, taken altogether, added up to last year's achievement, in reducing the deficit on the overall, or liquidity, basis, concluding with a summary of our gold transactions during the year.

Let me begin with the adverse factors affecting our payments in 1965:

The largest adverse change in our payments last year was the decline of nearly \$1.9 billion in our trade surplus. This was due, as you can see, to an increase of nearly \$2.9 billion (about 15 percent) in imports, while our gain for the year on exports was only \$1.0 billion, or 4 percent. The trade surplus for the year was \$4.8 billion as compared with \$6.7 billion in 1964; but in the fourth quarter of 1965 it was running at an annual rate of about \$5.2 billion.

Our tourist deficit apparently rose again, from \$1.6 billion to \$1.8 billion.

Direct investment abroad in 1965 was larger than in 1964. But it should be recalled that the new balance-of-payments program did not get started until February of 1964—just a year ago—and that many investment commitments had already been

made. What is encouraging is that there was a substantial improvement during the year. Secretary Connor will tell you more about this program and the outlook for 1966.

Net transactions in foreign securities, new and outstanding, remained almost unchanged in 1965 from the 1964 level, due to the Interest Equalization Tax and the voluntary program for restraint by nonbank financial institutions.

One major unfavorable factor was of a quite special character. This was the shift during 1965 of some United States securities, and some other long-term assets held by the United Kingdom Government, into short-term liquid assets. The change in type of asset held affects our deficit. The amount involved was some \$500 million. This item largely explains the figure in the table² that you have for net sales of United States securities by foreigners.

Favorable items included the following:

The largest single impact of our balance-of-payments program, through the end of 1965, was in the field of bank credit. Outflows of short- and long-term credit reported by banks, which were almost \$2.5 billion in 1964, shifted to a slight inflow in 1965.

In addition—although the information on this point is still incomplete—nonbank claims on foreigners, excluding United States purchases of foreign securities, shifted from an *outflow* in 1964 of over \$900 million to an *inflow* in 1965 which we estimate at around \$300 million. More than half of this estimated \$1.2 billion shift in nonbank flows last year represents repatriation of liquid funds by financial and nonfinancial corporations in response to the voluntary program.

In concluding my part of these remarks with a summary of our gold transactions, I want to emphasize that gold movements are not necessarily related to the balance of payments in any one year. Gold claims arise from official dollar balances accumulated in any year, past or present.

Net gold sales last year amounted to nearly \$1.7 billion, of which \$259 million

represented a gold payment to the International Monetary Fund in connection with an increase in our drawing rights and \$118 million represented sales to domestic industrial users. Of the remaining \$1.3 billion gold sales, \$1.1 billion occurred during the first half and \$177 million during the second half of the year.

The steady decline in gold sales throughout the year, along with some strengthening of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, suggests a healthy state of foreign confidence in the dollar.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY CONNOR

The improvement in the U.S. balance of payments during 1965 shown in the figures just released is both striking and gratifying. It is striking because it was achieved in the face of a number of obstacles; it is gratifying because it justifies our confidence that the Nation's businessmen and bankers could be relied upon—within the framework of a voluntary program—to make a major contribution toward reducing the deficit in our international accounts.

The obstacles to an even greater improvement in our balance of payments during 1965 were serious:

—Partly because of the slower pace of economic activity in some of our major markets abroad, and the acceleration of production at home, total exports rose by about 4 percent. But imports climbed by more than 15 percent. The result was a decline in our trade surplus from \$6.7 billion in 1964 to \$4.8 billion in 1965.

—The travel gap also rose appreciably. Although the final figures are not yet available, indications are that the travel gap rose from \$1.6 billion in 1964 to over \$1.8 billion in 1965.


—The further buildup of our military forces in Viet-Nam also had an adverse impact on our balance of payments.

—The outflow for direct investment also rose substantially compared with the level in the previous year. However, the program of voluntary cooperation with the business community was clearly helpful in moderat-

² Not printed here.

Direct Investment Income, Outflow, and Income Surplus by Quarters, 1964 and 1965

(Millions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted)



ing its course—especially after midyear.

When the President's voluntary program was launched just over a year ago, we stressed that, because of outstanding commitments, the response of the direct investment outflow would not be evident until the statistics were available for the third and fourth quarters. The fourth-quarter figures are still not in. During the first three quarters of 1965, the outflow amounted to \$2.6 billion, or over \$3.4 billion at an annual rate, compared with \$2.4 billion in 1964. Since the third-quarter outflow was already down to \$515 million, the total for 1965 will undoubtedly be well below \$3.4 billion.

These trends are summarized in the at-

tached chart. The sharp turnabout in the behavior of direct investment outflow after mid-1965 is especially striking. During the last half of 1964, the outflow amounted to more than \$1.3 billion, or \$2.7 billion at an annual rate. Thus the trend was climbing rapidly from the level in the first 6 months of that year. In the first quarter of 1965, before the voluntary program got effectively underway, a further acceleration occurred. While a moderate decline was recorded in the second quarter, the outflow for direct investment during the first half of 1965 was at an annual rate of \$4.1 billion. In contrast, the annual rate during the last half of 1965 was clearly far below that figure. Thus, in

response to the voluntary program, the annual rate of direct investment outflow was cut substantially.

The impact of the turnabout is also evident when direct investment outflow is compared with direct investment income. The income figure for the fourth quarter of 1965 is not available; but given the trend during the year, the fourth-quarter income was probably at least \$1.0 billion. It will be noted in the chart that the surplus of direct investment income over outflow declined steadily through 1964 and into the first quarter of 1965—when it was negative by \$100 million. But as the outflow was moderated and the repatriation of income was accelerated in response to the voluntary program, the income surplus recovered appreciably.

The fourth quarter of 1965 also saw the fruition of another important part of the voluntary program relating to direct investment. An increasing number of participating companies have decided to borrow funds abroad and thus minimize the impact of their projects on our balance of payments. During the fourth quarter, about \$175 million of proceeds of such borrowing through the sale of securities to foreign investors were recorded in the U.S. balance-of-payments statistics. About the same amount was raised through the sale of securities by the companies' subsidiaries abroad—although the latter proceeds are not shown in our balance of payments.

The important point is that the \$175 million borrowed by firms incorporated in the United States can be considered as a partial offset to the direct investment outflow during 1965. Allowing for this offset would put the estimated outflow for direct investment during 1965 almost \$200 million below the figure which will be recorded in the balance-of-payments accounts.

We are still awaiting the fourth-quarter reports from most of the 500 companies which participated in the voluntary program during 1965. But the results through the first 9 months, plus the trend evident in the early returns for the fourth quarter,

clearly suggest that the cooperating companies will substantially achieve the projected improvement of \$1.3 billion on selected foreign transactions. Moreover, they have repatriated about \$400 million of short-term financial assets. Thus, the expanded contribution of this sector of the business community to our balance of payments during 1965 may well approximate \$1.7 billion.

In our opinion, the balance-of-payments results for 1965, including the results for direct investment, clearly demonstrate the soundness of the decision to rely on the cooperative effort of the American business community in our drive to reduce the deficit. We shall continue this reliance, and we are confident of another favorable outcome for the current year.

STATEMENT BY GOVERNOR ROBERTSON

I am pleased to report today that foreign loans and investments of U.S. commercial banks in 1965 expanded by less than the amount provided by the target ceiling suggested in the February 1965 guidelines. This result is a tribute to the spirit of wholehearted cooperation with which banks and other financial institutions have complied with the guidelines designed to meet the important national problem of improving our balance of international payments.

Despite the usual relatively large seasonal increase in December, foreign loans and investments of monthly reporting banks on December 31, 1965, were only \$155 million higher than on December 31, 1964. Thus, at the end of the year the banking system was \$320 million below the target (105 percent of the December 31, 1964, base) suggested by the 1965 guidelines. The increase of \$155 million last year compares with an increase of \$2.4 billion in 1964 and of over \$1 billion on the average for the 3 years 1961–1963, although the latter figures include some foreign claims not covered by the program, such as customers' assets. The net change of \$2.25 billion between 1964 and 1965 was

larger than the total improvement in the U.S. balance of payments.

With the \$320 million margin remaining under the 1965 target ceiling, and the additional expansion of 1 percent of the base per quarter which would be consistent with the guidelines for 1966, banks should have more than ample leeway to accommodate all priority credit needs—for export financing and credits to developing countries—during the coming year.

On December 31, 1965, 35 banks held foreign claims in amounts which exceeded the target. However, half of those banks had foreign claims of less than \$5 million each and had been over the target when the program was announced. Among the other half, a substantial portion of the excess represented an outflow of a seasonal nature in December which has since been reversed (see attached tables).

Yearend data on financial institutions other than banks are still being compiled. Statistics through the third quarter, previously released, indicated that these institutions, too, on balance were then well within the guidelines as revised in June 1965.

Data on the foreign lending activities of commercial banks in 1965 are set forth in the attached tables.

TABLE 1
Foreign Credits of U.S. Banks, 1965
(millions of dollars)

Item	End of period			
	March	June	Sept.	Dec.
Number of reporting banks	150	161	160	161
Total foreign credits subject to 105 percent ceiling	9896	9589	9503	9654
Target ceiling (105 percent of December 1964 base)	9971	9981	9979	9975
Net expansion of credit since December 1964	398	82	-2	155
Net leeway for further expansion of credit within target ceiling	75	391	477	320

TABLE 2
Foreign Credits of Banks in Excess of Target Ceiling, 1965

Item	End of period			
	March	June	Sept.	Dec.
Number of banks	60	56	35	35
Aggregate amount in excess of target (\$ million)	274	107	86	113

TABLE 3
Distribution of Excess Over Ceiling
December 31, 1965

Percent of 1964 base	Number of banks	Amount in excess of ceiling (\$ million)
105-110	10	\$ 78.2
110-115	4	9.2
115-120	6	6.6
Over 120	15	19.2
	35	\$113.2

NOTE: Ceiling is 105 percent of December 1964 base.

Advisory Group on International Business Problems Meets

The Department of State's Advisory Committee on International Business Problems met at the Department on February 11 for discussions centering on investment problems abroad and East-West trade.

This Committee, established in 1963, meets periodically to review the handling by the Department and its missions abroad of problems faced by American business in connection with overseas operations. Some of these are specific in nature; others relate to broad problem areas involving complex political and economic issues.

The members of the Committee are as follows:

Clarence B. Randall, former chairman, board of directors, Inland Steel Co., Chicago, Ill., *chairman*
William Blackie, president, Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Ill.
Jacob Blaustein, president, American Trading & Production Corp., Baltimore, Md.
Francis C. Brown, president, Schering Corporation, Bloomfield, N.J.
Ray R. Eppert, president, Burroughs Corp., Detroit, Mich.
Edward Gudeman, partner, Lehman Brothers, New York, N.Y.
Daggett Harvey, chairman, board of directors, Fred Harvey Restaurant Chain, Chicago, Ill.
Donald P. Kircher, president, The Singer Co., New York, N.Y.
Edwin A. Locke, Jr., president, Modern Homes Construction Co., Valdosta, Ga.
Harold C. McClellan, chairman, board of directors, Old Colony Paint & Chemical Co., San Marino, Calif.
William H. Wendel, president, The Carborundum Co., Niagara Falls, N.Y.

Eugene M. Braderman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, serves as executive director of the Committee.

Government advisers to the Committee who participated in the February 11 discussions were:

Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Alexander B. Trowbridge, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business

Richard D. Kearney, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State

Donald W. Hoagland, Assistant Administrator, Office of Development Finance and Private Enterprise, Agency for International Development

Henry L. Pitts, Jr., chief, U.S. Business Protection Division, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Council on International Monetary Policies Set Up

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 (30 F.R. 9353), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Establishment of Council.* (a) There is hereby established the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, hereinafter referred to as the Council.

(b) The Council shall be composed of the following members: the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be the chairman of the Council, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

(c) Whenever matters within the jurisdiction of the Council may be of interest to Federal agencies not represented on the Council under Section 1(b) of this order, the Chairman of the Council may consult with such agencies and may invite them to designate representatives to participate in meetings and deliberations of the Council.

SEC. 2. *Functions of the Council.* (a) Exclusive of the functions delegated by the provisions of Section 3, below, and subject to the limitations contained in

subsection (b) of this Section, all of the functions which are now vested in the President in consequence of their transfer to him effected by the provisions of Section 1(b) of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 are hereby delegated to the Council.

(b) The functions under Sections 4(a) and 4(b) (3) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, including those made applicable to the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Development Association (22 U.S.C. 286b(a) and (b)(3); 282b; 283b; 284b), to the extent that such functions consist of coordination of policies, are hereby delegated to the Council. The functions so delegated shall be deemed to include the authority to review proposed individual loan, financial, exchange, or monetary transactions to the extent necessary or desirable to effectuate the coordination of policies.

SEC. 3. *Functions of the Secretary of the Treasury.*

(a) Functions which are now vested in the President in consequence of their transfer to him effected by the provisions of Section 1(b) of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 are hereby delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury to the extent of the following:

(1) Authority to instruct representatives of the United States to international financial organizations.

(2) Authority provided for in Section 4(b)(4) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286b(b)(4)).

(b) In carrying out the functions delegated to him by subsection (a) of this Section the Secretary shall consult with the Council.

(c) Nothing in this order shall be deemed to derogate from the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States.


SEC. 4. *Information.* (a) All agencies and officers of the Government, including representatives of the United States to international financial organizations, (1) shall keep the Council or the Secretary of the Treasury, as the case may be, fully informed concerning the foreign loan, financial, exchange, and monetary transactions in which they engage or may engage or with respect to which they have other responsibility, and (2) shall provide the Council and the Secretary with such further information or data in their possession as the Council or the Secretary, as the case may be, may deem necessary to the appropriate discharge of the responsibilities of the Council and Secretary under Sections 2 and 3 of this order, respectively.

(b) The Council shall from time to time transmit to all appropriate agencies and officers of the Government statements of the policies of the Council under this order and such other information relating to the above-mentioned transactions or to the functions of the Council hereunder as the Council shall deem desirable.

¹ No. 11269; 31 *Fcd. Reg.* 2813.

SEC. 5. *Executive Order No. 10033*. Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 10033 of February 8, 1949, is hereby amended by substituting for the name "National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems" the following: "National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies."

SEC. 6. *Effective date*. The provisions of this order shall be effective as of January 1, 1966.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1966.

U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Held at Tokyo

Press release 28 dated February 14

"The Role of Universities in Mutual Understanding: Japan and America" will be the theme of the Third U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange, to be held at Tokyo March 2-7.

Hugh Borton, president of Haverford College and scholar in Japanese history, will again head the American delegation. He was chairman of the U.S. delegations to the first meeting, at Tokyo in January 1962, and the second, at Washington in October 1963.

The Japanese delegation will be headed by Tatsuo Morito, who was chairman of the Japanese delegations to the first and second conferences.

The four major topics to be discussed at the Tokyo conference are: the development of mutual understanding through education; binational approaches to university education; developing bilateral faculty and material resources; and the foreign student and mutual understanding.

The first conference, in 1962, was devoted to an exploration of the most critical areas of exchange activity. As a result, the second conference, in 1963, considered possibilities of expansion in the exchange of educational television programs between the two countries; increasing the translation

and abstracting of Japanese scholarly works; broadening Japanese studies in the United States and American studies in Japan; and promoting wider exchanges in the performing arts. Statements of progress achieved in those areas will be included in the 1966 conference documentation.

Agreement to hold binational conferences on cultural and educational interchange was reached during the talks between the late President John F. Kennedy and the late Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in June 1961 at Washington.¹

Other American delegates will be: Burnett Anderson, Deputy Director (Policy and Plans), U.S. Information Agency; H. Stanley Bennett, dean of the division of biological science, University of Chicago; Charles B. Fahs, minister counselor for cultural affairs, American Embassy, Tokyo; Ralph C. M. Flynt, Associate Commissioner for International Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Thomas H. Hamilton, president of the University of Hawaii; Harlan H. Hatcher, president of the University of Michigan; Pendleton Herring, president of the Social Science Research Council; Hugh Jenkins, president of the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs; James W. Morley, director of the East Asia Institute, Columbia University; Douglas Overton, executive director of the Japan Society, New York; Edwin O. Reischauer, U.S. Ambassador to Japan; and J. E. Wallace Sterling, president of Stanford University.

Other Japanese delegates will be: Shintaro Fukushima, president, Japan Times; Yoshio Gamo, director, Research Bureau, Ministry of Education; Masayuki Harigai, director, Cultural Affairs Department, Foreign Ministry; Yoichi Maeda, professor of French literature, Tokyo University; Kanichi Moroi, president, Chichibu Cement Corp. and member of board, Keidanren; Nobumoto Ohama,

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

president of Waseda University; Takashi Oizumi, president of Sophia University; Azuma Okuda, president of Kyoto University; Kazuo Okochi, president of Tokyo University; Kiyoshi Sugie, director, Higher Education and Science Bureau, Ministry of Education; Harusada Suginome, president of

Hokkaido University; Nobushige Ukai, president of International Christian University; Takeo Watanabe, professor and former dean, science department, Tokyo University, and member of National Science Council; and Shigeharu Matsumoto, executive director, International House.

THE CONGRESS

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*¹

Mr. Chairman [Chet Holifield], I welcome this opportunity to comment on Senate Resolution 179, introduced by the distinguished vice chairman of this committee, Senator [John O.] Pastore, and cosponsored by 55 of his Senate colleagues. And I am not unmindful of the fact that you, Mr. Chairman, have introduced one of several similar resolutions in the House.

In commending the President's efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, this resolution reinforces the position of the executive branch in dealing with the threat of nuclear proliferation—a problem President Johnson

has characterized as the “gravest of all unresolved human issues.”² We welcome this significant expression of congressional support.

At the same time we recognize that the resolution takes appropriate cognizance of the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress in the treatymaking process. In this connection the resolution is also a useful vehicle for promoting coordination between the Congress and the executive branch in the implementation of our respective responsibilities.

Nonproliferation as a Foreign Policy Objective

The further spread of nuclear weapons increases the danger of nuclear war and diminishes the security of all nations, including the United States. This is true for a variety of reasons, and it may be useful to spell out some of the reasons that have led

¹ Made before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Feb. 23 (press release 32) during hearings on the Pastore resolution (S. Res. 179), a resolution commending the President's “serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons” and supporting “the principle of additional efforts by the President which are appropriate and necessary in the interest of peace for the solution of nuclear proliferation problems.”

² For a statement by President Johnson dated Aug. 17, 1965, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1965, p. 466.

the executive branch to make nonproliferation a major objective of our foreign policy.

Nuclear proliferation could add a new and dangerous dimension to historical ethnic and territorial disputes existing between nations. A decision by one party to acquire nuclear weapons could generate pressures on others to "go nuclear"—or to destroy the nuclear facilities of the acquiring state before the program reaches completion.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of more countries could have consequences for world security which no one can foresee. Every additional country having nuclear weapons, no matter how responsibly governed, is an additional center of independent decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons. International relations are thereby made more complex and more dangerous. And the risk that one of such centers could fall into irresponsible hands is increased. Indeed, the United States believed that even one nuclear power was too many, and immediately after World War II we sought to remove nuclear energy from the military field. It is a great tragedy that our proposals were not accepted then.

Efforts of the present nuclear powers to negotiate mutually advantageous nuclear arms control agreements will be more complex and hence more difficult as the number of such powers increases.

And, of course, the overall chance of accident or unauthorized use would increase as more nations acquired nuclear weapons.

Our efforts to maintain friendly relations with as many countries as possible would become more difficult by virtue of nuclear weapons spread. If one of two parties to a continuing dispute should decide to produce a nuclear arsenal, the United States might have to decide whether to assist the other party, either through direct military assistance or security assurances; whether to continue economic assistance for the acquiring country; or whether to attempt to disengage completely from the area. The impact of any of these decisions would be far-reaching and complex.

The spread of national nuclear capabilities would interfere with vitally needed economic

growth in the less developed countries. Some potential new countries are attempting to promote their economic development with the support of the United States. The cost of developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems could force curtailment of that effort and tend to cancel out benefits of economic assistance provided by the United States.

In a variety of ways we use our diplomacy to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons, not only by exerting our influence directly to discourage such spread but also by assisting in resolution of disputes which could give rise to pressures for developing nuclear weapons.

The NATO Alliance and Nuclear Weapons Spread

I would like to emphasize that there is no conflict between United States nonproliferation policy and possible nuclear arrangements proposed for the NATO alliance. No one in NATO has been talking about any arrangement which would involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons. No NATO nuclear sharing proposal would increase the number of independent nuclear weapon entities.

Certainly the Soviet Union has made charges to the contrary. They object to the very existence of NATO. They object to any arrangements which tie the United States and Western Europe more closely together for defense purposes. They object to the Federal Republic of Germany participating in the alliance on a basis of equality and partnership with other European members of the Western community. Their main propaganda drive has been directed against the Federal Republic in an effort to divide and weaken the NATO alliance. And their action in targeting hundreds of Soviet missiles on Western Europe is what created a nuclear problem in the alliance in the first place. The West German Government also is clearly on record as being opposed to acquiring a national nuclear weapons capability.

This development on the Soviet side led our allies in Europe, at the end of the last

decade, to be concerned about more adequate participation in nuclear matters. Living under the shadow of Soviet missiles, they are understandably concerned about what is going on in the nuclear field and desire to have a responsible part in the discussions and arrangements respecting their own defense.

This would not constitute proliferation. Indeed, such an arrangement would complement a nonproliferation treaty by meeting the security concerns of our allies and thus discouraging the acquisition of national nuclear weapons capabilities. This fact was recognized in the joint communique by President Johnson and Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard last December.³ They specifically upheld the principle of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons into national control. They expressed the view that alliance nuclear arrangements would not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in fact, should contribute to the goal of preventing nuclear spread.

President Johnson further clarified our position on this subject in his message to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee when it convened in Geneva last January 27.⁴ In outlining this country's seven-point program for preventing nuclear spread and curbing the arms race, he said:

First, let us seek a nonproliferation treaty which, in the words of the United Nations General Assembly, is "void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form." We are prepared to sign such a treaty, making it applicable to nuclear and nonnuclear countries alike. We are prepared to work with other countries to assure that no nonnuclear country acquires its own nuclear weapons, gains national control over nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third countries or groups of countries, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance.

This being the case, if the Soviet Union is really interested in preventing nuclear

spread—and not just in political objectives they appear to be pursuing under the guise of nonproliferation—it ought to be possible to move promptly toward agreement. But we should not and we cannot be placed in a position of surrendering legitimate NATO interests which are wholly consistent with the objective of nonproliferation.

Current U.S. Initiatives To Prevent Nuclear Weapons Spread

In seeking to deal with the threat of nuclear spread, the executive branch has not, of course, confined its efforts solely to a nonproliferation treaty.

We continue to believe that the perils of proliferation would be materially reduced by an extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground tests. By virtue of a comprehensive test ban, the principal nuclear powers would demonstrate their willingness to nonnuclear powers to forgo all nuclear weapons testing when calling upon the latter states to refrain from ever becoming nuclear powers.

The President has also urged that states strive to strengthen United Nations and other international security arrangements so that those who forswear nuclear weapons may forever refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race. "Meanwhile," he said, "the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail."⁵

The United States continues to urge a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons and the transfer of large quantities of such materials to peaceful purposes under international safeguards. During the past year, we proposed the demonstrated destruction of a substantial number of nuclear weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. to produce this fissionable material.⁵ This suggestion meets the Soviet criticism that our previous proposal amounts to control without disarmament. More importantly, it meets the

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1966, p. 50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1966, p. 263.

⁵ For background, see p. 410.

call of nonnuclear states for moves toward nuclear reductions by the nuclear powers. The nonnuclear states have called for such action to match their self-denial in not acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.

To reduce the dangers and burdens of nuclear arms, we have proposed the exploration of a verified freeze on offensive and defensive strategic bombers and missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons. Last fall we stated that, if progress could be made here, we would be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles. This again would help meet the call for nuclear disarmament made by nonnuclear powers which we would like to see adhere to a non-proliferation treaty.

The United States has also supported the establishment of nuclear-free zones in certain areas of the world, such as Africa and Latin America. Because of their obvious relationship to nonproliferation objectives, we believe that the creation of such zones should be encouraged in areas of the world where they would not disturb necessary security arrangements and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance. It is, of course, also important that the initiative for such zones originate in the areas concerned and that all states deemed essential to the denuclearization of the area participate.

International Safeguards

The members of this committee are aware of the program which has been developed for United States support for international nuclear energy safeguard programs designed to detect diversions of nuclear materials or equipment from peaceful to military purposes. As you know, we have vigorously pursued a program to strengthen the safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM. We feel our efforts in this regard have been successful and that both the IAEA and EURATOM systems are equivalent and effective.

However, safeguards programs cannot re-

main static but must evolve to meet the challenges posed by the ever-quickenings developments in the civil uses of atomic energy. In recognition of this fact, our efforts to assure effective safeguards continue. The United States played a leading role in support of the International Agency in the improvements of the safeguards system which were recently put into effect following overwhelming endorsement by the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency when the Board of Governors and the General Conference met in Tokyo last September.⁶

Similarly, we have requested the IAEA to assume safeguards responsibility for a number of our bilateral arrangements for cooperation with other countries in the civil uses of nuclear energy. Thus far we have completed the transfer of nine such bilaterals and have others which are being worked on actively in the furtherance of this program. We have also demonstrated our full support for the international safeguards concept by voluntarily submitting several of our own reactors to international safeguards inspection in order to demonstrate to the world that we do not view the inspections as representing any loss of sovereign rights or of commercial technology. The responsible managers of the private utility companies which have been associated with this program of voluntary inspections have assured us repeatedly that the inspection has not caused any serious impediments to the effective operation of their commercial power stations.

As you know, we normally have required our safeguards system to control the use of material and equipment supplied under our bilateral peaceful uses programs. However, we feel that international safeguards are basically more suitable than bilateral safeguards. They tend to be more credible to the world at large, since they are clearly objective, disinterested, and not subject to pressure or influence from either the supplier or

⁶ For a message to the conference from President Johnson and a statement by Glenn T. Seaborg, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 677.

receiver of supplies and assistance. They also lend themselves to greater uniformity on an international basis than would be the case if each of the supplier countries designed and administered its own separate safeguards system. We also believe that the international safeguards give greater assurance of adherence by the countries in which the reactors are located, since they are backed by the united sponsorship of the 94 members of the IAEA or by the full membership of EURATOM, as the case may be.

We have strongly supported the expansion of the international safeguards system on the basis of our expectations that it might well develop into a significant step toward the creation of an acceptable inspection system which might serve other purposes in our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the world community.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a point in the President's recent message to the Geneva disarmament conference that is also pertinent to the interests expressed by the sponsors of Senate Resolution 179. He said:

... through a nonproliferation treaty and through efforts outside such a treaty, we must continue to secure application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities. To this end, I urge agreement that all transfers of nuclear materials or equipment for peaceful purposes to countries which do not have nuclear weapons be under IAEA or equivalent international safeguards. At the same time, the major nuclear powers should accept in increasing measure the same international safeguards they recommend for other states.

Recently, many responsible Members of both Houses of the Congress of the United States introduced resolutions dealing with measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. These resolutions are an indication of the importance that the people of the United States attribute to such measures, and to the role that international safeguards should play in them. I fully share these views.

Mr. Chairman, I also share these views and I wish to commend the sponsors of the resolution.

The International Negotiations for Arms Control and Disarmament

Following is President Johnson's letter of transmittal for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's fifth annual report to Congress, covering the period January 1–December 31, 1965,¹ together with a portion of the report entitled "The International Negotiations."

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

White House press release dated February 15

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting the Fifth Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This report describes a year of intense negotiation and research. It reveals an increased seriousness on the part of many nations toward the problems of arms control and disarmament.

In 1965, under the increasing pressure of the nuclear threat, arms control and disarmament was taken up at the first meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in five years; at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva; in the fall session of the 20th General Assembly; and in private diplomatic exchanges.

In all of these activities the United States' position benefited from the thorough research and careful preparations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, carried out under the authority granted it by the Congress.

This research and preparation has been carried out on a wide variety of problems—from weapons inspection to the economic consequences of reductions or shifts in military spending. In all this work our guiding principle has been the long-range security of

¹ H. Doc. 382, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Single copies of the report are available upon request from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 20451.

the United States, which inevitably involves the long-range peace and stability of the world.

Halting the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

During 1965 the concern of the world turned increasingly to the vital question of preventing nuclear weapons from becoming standard equipment in the world's arsenals. We are approaching a critical period in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Many countries now have the resources, the technical ability, and the scientific manpower needed to build nuclear weapons systems. We hear voices saying that these countries can afford such costly weapons, even though they would have to be bought at the expense of the basic needs of their people.

I have committed my administration to the task of persuading the nonnuclear countries that it is neither in the interests of their security, nor of world peace, to develop nuclear weapons. This has been the main thrust behind the efforts of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the past year, and it will continue to be in the year we are now entering.

On January 27, 1966, I presented to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva a seven-point program designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear stocks.² I have instructed our negotiators to walk the extra mile necessary to insure that the weapons of war submit to man's need for peace.

In giving these instructions, and in transmitting this report, I reaffirm my belief that it is possible through reason and through patient effort to translate the world's common interest in survival into concrete acts of restraint and accommodation between the nations.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 15, 1966.

² For text of the President's message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 21, 1966, p. 263.

EXCERPT FROM ANNUAL REPORT

THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

In 1965, despite the trials of the war in Viet-Nam, the United States pushed determinedly ahead in its search for ways to turn down the arms race. A U.S. draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons³ was presented for negotiation to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) at Geneva.⁴ An existing U.S. proposal to cut off all production of fissionable materials for weapons was expanded to include the actual destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. The United States also restated its willingness to explore the possibilities of a freeze in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which would limit further production to present levels and prevent the development of new and even more destructive types of missiles and bombers. The latest improvements in the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions were brought to the attention of international disarmament negotiators. The United States expressed a readiness to take current scientific capabilities fully into account in discussing the number and kind of on-site inspections for verifying compliance with a total ban on testing.

These activities took place under the general guidance of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which bears principal responsibility for the preparation and management, under the direction

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474.

⁴ The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament will enter its fifth year on March 14, 1966. The Committee, which meets at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, was established under a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement, and welcomed by the General Assembly. While it is not a United Nations body, it reports to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission and is serviced by the U.N. Secretariat. Membership is made up of five NATO nations (United States, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, and France; the last has never taken her seat at the conference table), five from the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, U.S.S.R.), and eight nonaligned nations (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and United Arab Republic). [Footnote in original.]

of the Secretary of State, of international negotiations in disarmament.

Throughout the year, in New York, Geneva, Washington, London, and Paris, U.S. negotiators pursued the urgent goal of an agreement to stop nuclear proliferation. In Vienna and Tokyo⁵ the United States joined with 93 countries of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its effort to bring worldwide power reactor development under improved international safeguards, and ACDA shared the scientific and diplomatic effort with U.S. agencies more directly responsible for this problem, so important to our nonproliferation objectives.

ACDA's Director, William C. Foster, who is principal adviser on arms control and disarmament to the President and the Secretary of State, spent over 6 months representing the United States at the international conference table.

On April 21, the long-dormant United Nations Disarmament Commission⁶ was called into session at the request of the Soviet Union on the ground that the U.N. dues dispute had made it impossible for the General Assembly to hold its usual disarmament debate. The United States agreed, although it would have preferred early resumption of the ENDC talks in Geneva. The meeting lasted 8 weeks and opened with a violent Soviet attack on U.S. policies in Vietnam. The 117-nation membership, however, was more interested in the problem of nuclear proliferation, and on June 16 wound up its deliberations with an overwhelming call for a return to Geneva "as soon as possible" in order to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty and the extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground testing.

Under this mandate, the Geneva confer-

⁵ For a statement made by Glenn T. Seaborg before the IAEA General Conference at Tokyo Sept. 22, 1965, and a message from President Johnson, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 677.

⁶ The Commission was created in 1952. It originally consisted of the 11 members of the Security Council plus Canada, and was enlarged in 1958 to include all U.N. members. It had not met since 1960. [Footnote in original.]

ence convened the following month, on July 27. There, on August 17, the United States introduced its draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This question held the center of the stage during the short, 7-week session.

On September 16, when the 18-Nation Committee came to its customary recess on the eve of the United Nations General Assembly, it was clear that any agreement on a nonproliferation treaty would come only after difficult negotiation. The Soviet Union had greeted the U.S. draft coldly, saying it offered "no basis" for negotiation but had offered no alternate draft of its own.

Nevertheless, agreement of another kind had begun to emerge from the months of intense activity at the international conference table. There was an almost universal view that the further spread of nuclear weapon capabilities would constitute a grave and immediate threat to international peace. And while there was disagreement about how it was to be accomplished, the involvement of the Chinese Communists in disarmament discussions became an important objective of a growing number of countries.

When the United Nations 20th General Assembly met in New York (September 21–December 21), the Soviet Union introduced its own version of a draft nonproliferation treaty.

Disarmament questions dominated the agenda of the General Assembly's First Committee and were debated for 7 weeks.

The Assembly itself passed by overwhelming votes five disarmament resolutions, covering nonproliferation, a comprehensive test ban, a world disarmament conference, the denuclearization of Africa, and general and complete disarmament. The United States voted for all five. The Soviet Union abstained on the comprehensive test ban resolution but voted for the others. France abstained on every vote.

After completion of the disarmament items, the Soviet and American cochairmen of the 18-nation conference promptly agreed on reconvening at Geneva on January 27, 1966.

Nuclear proliferation dominated the de-

bate and the character of the resolutions throughout the General Assembly session. By the end of 1965 the alarm had been raised on an international scale. In this fact lies the greatest element of hope for agreement.

Nonproliferation

The U.S. draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was presented at Geneva on August 17. It had been foreshadowed by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson earlier in the year. On April 26 at the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York, he had characterized the problem of proliferation as the most urgent facing the world, and had called for a "simple and effective" agreement, along the lines of the "Irish resolution," unanimously approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1961.⁷ Such an agreement, he said, should obligate the nuclear powers not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons or provide assistance necessary for their manufacture to nations not now possessing them. As a corollary, the nonnuclear states should agree not to manufacture, seek, or receive such weapons or data necessary for their manufacture, or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons.

As the debate in the Disarmament Commission ran its 8 weeks' course, the sense of urgency expressed by Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. Foster on this issue was echoed by many U.N. members and attention was directed toward the need for a nonproliferation treaty and for a total ban on testing; the latter was widely regarded as an essential element in preventing further spread of nuclear weapons. In June, the Commission by a vote of 83 to 1 (with 18 abstentions, including the Communist states), called for the resumption of the Geneva conference "as early as possible" in order that priority attention be given to drafting a nonproliferation treaty and extending the partial test ban treaty to the underground environment.

⁷ For text of Ambassador Stevenson's statement, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1965, p. 762.

The Commission's vote heralded a growing confidence in the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament as the best forum for the conduct of these complicated negotiations.

Some of the themes developed in New York were orchestrated at Geneva, as the 18-nation conference met July 27 for the first time since September 1964. The Soviet Union continued in its long-held position that no agreement was possible on nonproliferation so long as the United States continued to hold open the possibility of such nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO as the multilateral force or the Allied nuclear force. These schemes, they contended, would constitute proliferation and place nuclear weapons within reach of additional countries, particularly Germany.

The consensus in New York that proliferation was a priority item had not extended to a formula for the best methods for preventing it. There was concern in some quarters that a single measure such as a treaty was not adequate and that a broad program was needed to accompany it. Certain of the nonnuclear states were worried about possible threats to their security should they forgo nuclear weapons. Some advocated agreement to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, or prohibition of their use against nonnuclear states. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by the nuclear states were called for to match the self-denial by nonnuclear states in not acquiring or developing such weapons.

Throughout, the United States indicated its awareness of the responsibility of the nuclear powers to those states agreeing to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons. ACDA Director William C. Foster reminded delegates that the United States had offered a broad program of measures related to nonproliferation: a comprehensive test ban treaty, a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials, worldwide safeguards on reactors to prevent their diversion to military purposes, a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and support for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in

certain areas of the world, such as Africa and Latin America.

To the Soviet claim that proposals for nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO would constitute proliferation, the United States answered with its draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This document, worked out in consultation with the Western members of the Eighteen Nation Committee (Canada, the U.K., and Italy), set out specific terms for an agreement for the first time. It would prohibit nuclear powers from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly through a military alliance, or assisting in the manufacture of such weapons. Nonnuclear states would have a corresponding obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to manufacture them.

The draft treaty contains language which specifically prevents any increase in the present number of nuclear entities. Its provisions bind both nuclear and nonnuclear states "not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons."

Mr. Foster emphasized that

... the United States is opposed to any form of dissemination of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. We seek no nuclear sharing arrangement in NATO which could involve such dissemination. The treaty we have suggested would bar such dissemination since it would prevent the creation of any additional entity, whether a state or organization, having an independent power to use nuclear weapons.⁸

Under the U.S. proposal a new organization having independent power to use nuclear weapons can come into existence only if one of the present nuclear nations voluntarily turns over its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons to a collective entity, thereby giving up its own national capability.

The Soviet Union and its allies, while not rejecting the U.S. draft treaty outright,

stated that a basis for negotiation had not been offered. They held to their position that the draft treaty permitted dissemination in that it did not rule out the possibility of "access" to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. [Amintore] Fanfani, proposed to the Geneva conference that the nonnuclear powers individually undertake a temporary moratorium—a unilateral declaration to refrain from developing nuclear weapons for a given period of time or until the terms of a treaty could be worked out among the nuclear powers. By placing a time limit on such voluntary self-restraint, he suggested, pressure for agreement would be maintained. This idea has not yet been actively pursued, given the continuing hope for agreement on a treaty within a reasonable time period.

The Eighteen Nation Committee recessed on September 16, 1965, in preparation for consideration of disarmament items at the 20th U.N. General Assembly. There, on September 24, the Soviet Union introduced its own version of a nonproliferation treaty. It was obvious that the treaty had been drafted in such a way as to preclude the type of nuclear sharing arrangements which were currently under discussion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The eight nonaligned members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference played an active role in the debate of the General Assembly's 117-nation First Committee. Their initiatives contributed importantly to the compromise resolution on nonproliferation adopted by the General Assembly on November 19.⁹

The resolution calls on the ENDC to reconvene as early as possible to negotiate a treaty. It urges that "the treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any

⁸ For a statement made by Mr. Foster in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 18, 1965, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873.

⁹ U.N. doc. A/RES/2028(XX). The vote was 93-0, with 5 abstentions (Cuba, France, Guinea, Pakistan, and Rumania). [Footnote in original.]

form." The United States considered this language to be consistent with its position. In voting for the resolution, Mr. Foster said:¹⁰

We agree that there should be no loopholes, and the United States draft treaty permits none. . . . (It) would not permit any nonnuclear country to acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or access to information on manufacture of nuclear weapons. What could not be done directly would not be permitted indirectly through a military alliance.

Soon after the completion of United Nations consideration of the five disarmament items, the Soviet and American cochairmen of ENDC agreed to reconvene the Geneva conference on January 27, 1966. There the arduous negotiating task will continue as the Committee works to reconcile the differences in the two draft treaties.

Comprehensive Test Ban

The preamble to the limited test ban treaty of 1963 pledges its signatories to seek "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and to continue negotiations to that end. It has not been possible, however, to conclude a comprehensive test ban agreement because of Soviet refusal to accept any on-site inspections. The U.S.S.R. has maintained that national means of detection and identification can adequately verify observance of a ban on underground tests and that no on-site inspections are needed. The previous Soviet offer of two or three on-site inspections was withdrawn shortly after the limited treaty was signed. The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have pointed out that some seismic events remain unidentified and, for this reason, on-site inspection is necessary.

Intensive research in seismological detection techniques has been carried out in the United States and the United Kingdom. By 1965, significant technical advances had been made and led to the construction of

the first Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA) installation at Billings, Montana. This facility is a part of the VELA Project—a multimillion dollar research program to improve the detection and identification of seismic disturbances. Representatives from 21 nations attended the public ceremony opening the array, on October 12, and technical discussions were held afterward with foreign scientists. On that occasion Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pointed out that while LASA was a scientific tool whose potentialities were still not completely known, "it is clear that a worldwide system of such instruments will provide a major improvement to our capabilities for verifying a comprehensive test ban." President Johnson, in a special message marking the occasion, directed that "data from the new installation be made freely available to all countries of the world."

These encouraging developments are narrowing the gap between the U.S. and Soviet positions. But while Western seismologists have made progress in the techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and manmade explosions underground, remote instrumentation alone still cannot provide the necessary assurance that cheating is not taking place. Repeated attempts over the years to get Soviet scientists to join with those from other parts of the world for an appraisal of the present technical situation have been fruitless.

The greatest technical difficulties lie in identifying small seismic events as earthquakes; the larger events can be sorted out with a greater degree of confidence. For this reason, the idea of including them in the limited treaty has been suggested, first by Brazil in 1963, and later by other non-aligned members of the ENDC. In this approach, underground events over a "threshold" of 4.75 seismic magnitude would be banned in the belief that events of this size could be identified by seismic instrumentation alone, without on-site inspection.

At the 1965 session of the Geneva con-

¹⁰ BULLETIN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 883.

ference, the United Arab Republic renewed its previous proposals for a 4.75 threshold, a moratorium on all other tests, and scientific and technical discussions on problems of detection and identification. The Soviet Union stated that it would accept the threshold, coupled with the moratorium, but it ignored the U.A.R. proposal for technical talks. The United States made it clear that it could not agree to an unverified moratorium.

Throughout 1965, the nonnuclear states continued to press for a comprehensive test ban. The debate in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee reflected their sense of inequity in the proposition that they should forswear development of a nuclear capability while the nuclear giants continued to improve their weapons through underground testing. The nonaligned eight presented a memorandum to the ENDC on September 15, calling for an immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests. This memorandum noted, however, that agreement on a comprehensive test ban could be facilitated by international cooperation in the work of seismic detection and in the exchange of scientific information—a suggestion that was strongly endorsed by the United States and a number of other countries.

A few weeks later, at the U.N. General Assembly, the Geneva eight drafted a resolution urging that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended and calling on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to continue its efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty, “taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection.” This resolution¹¹ was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 92 to 1, with Albania casting the dissenting vote. The Communist states abstained, apparently because the injunction to take “into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection” implied a need for the scientific

and technical discussions which the U.S.S.R. opposed.

Denuclearized Zones

Continuing interest in the idea of nuclear-free zones in certain areas of the world was heightened in 1965, in part because of its obvious relationship to nuclear proliferation and in part because of the progress being made by the Latin American nations in working out plans for the denuclearization of their area. Also, 28 African nations sponsored a resolution,¹² overwhelmingly adopted by the 20th General Assembly, calling upon all states to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

The United States has encouraged the creation of nuclear-free zones in areas of the world where such zones would not disturb existing security arrangements and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance. It is, of course, also important that the initiative for such zones originate in the geographical area concerned and that all states essential to the denuclearization of the area participate. The United States has opposed past Soviet proposals for the denuclearization of Central Europe and other areas, which clearly do not meet these criteria.

¹² Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (U.N. doc. A/RES/2033(XX)). Vote: 105-0 with 3 abstentions. Calls upon all states to refrain from testing, manufacturing, using or deploying nuclear weapons in the continent of Africa or acquiring such weapons, or to take any action which would compel African states to do so. Urges those states possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear capability not to transfer nuclear weapons, scientific data or technological assistance to the national control of any state, either directly or indirectly in any form, which may be used to assist such states in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa. Expresses the hope that the African states will initiate studies with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa and take necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity to achieve this end. [Footnote in original.]

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/2032 (XX).

The work carried on in 1965 by the Latin American Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was characterized as "constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the hemisphere" by Secretary of State Dean Rusk at the November meeting of the Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro.¹³

"The United States has followed with keen and sympathetic interest," he said, "the efforts of Latin American countries to work out agreed arrangements for excluding the proliferation, the stationing, or storage of nuclear weapons within the territory of Latin American states. We have noted the encouraging progress toward this end which was made during the current year at discussions in Mexico City. . . . We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion."

The "Cutoff" and Weapons Destruction

In his opening address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23,¹⁴ Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg offered a new U.S. proposal to reduce the nuclear threat.

The proposal was a significant one. In connection with an existing U.S. proposal for a verified cutoff of fissionable materials, and a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, the new proposal provided for the destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons to obtain the materials for transfer. The United States had earlier suggested such a transfer in the ratio of 60,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 for the U.S. to 40,000 kilograms for the U.S.S.R. This amount of material, if completely fissioned, would be equivalent in electrical energy potential to roughly two-thirds of the total electric energy produced in the U.S. each year.

Ambassador Goldberg told the United Na-

tions that the U.S. was also ready, if the Soviet Union would do likewise, to add to this transfer associated plutonium obtained from the destroyed weapons in an agreed quantity or ratio and to place these materials under IAEA or equivalent safeguards.

The Treaty Drafts for General and Complete Disarmament

Both the United States and the Soviet Union tabled draft treaty outlines for general and complete disarmament at the beginning of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in March 1962. Later that year, a plan of work was agreed to for the conference's discussion of measures to take place in the first stage of the disarmament process.

At the time of the September 17, 1964,¹⁵ adjournment, the Committee was working on the stage I agenda item covering nuclear delivery vehicles. In addition to conventional arms, nuclear disarmament, and military bases (on which there has been some discussion), there still remain to be taken up stage I agenda items on armed force levels, military expenditures, outer space measures, peacekeeping machinery, measures to reduce the risk of war, transition from first to second stages, and establishment of an International Disarmament Organization.

During the single and relatively short session of the conference in 1965, discussions centered on nonproliferation and the suspension of all nuclear weapon tests and no progress was made in developing a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The 20th U.N. General Assembly, without a dissenting vote, called on the ENDC to continue its efforts "on the question of general and complete disarmament under ef-

¹³ For an address made by Secretary Rusk on Nov. 22, see BULLETIN of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578.

¹⁵ For a description of the status of the discussions during 1964, see *Fourth Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*, H. Doc. 66, 89th Cong., 1st sess. [Footnote in original.] For excerpts from the fourth annual report, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 308.

fective international control, as well as on collateral measures.”¹⁶

World Disarmament Conference

The idea of a World Disarmament Conference, while not a new one, was revived in 1964 at the second conference of non-aligned countries in Cairo. In the spring of 1965, a groundswell of sentiment favoring such a conference began to develop in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Commission, in a resolution on which the United States abstained, asked the General Assembly to take up the question when it met in the fall. From the outset, the United States expressed reservations about the idea, on the grounds that such an unwieldy gathering would require the most careful preparation, and even then was unlikely to advance disarmament. However, when the question of preparing for a world conference eventually came to a vote in the General Assembly, the United States voted in favor, since it was clear that governments could reserve their positions until satisfied that adequate preparations had been made. The resolution called for preparatory work to be done toward the convening of the conference no later than 1967. It was then approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 112-0, with France abstaining.

In voting for the resolution, Ambassador Goldberg made clear that the United States continued to maintain its initial reservations, but was willing to go along with the decision “in principle” to convene such a conference.¹⁷ He went on to note that the United States had been struck by “the elementary common sense” in the approach taken by the delegate from Saudi Arabia (who had suggested that the United States, the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, and Communist China might want to explore whether there was in fact a constructive

basis for convening a world conference). He indicated a U.S. willingness to participate in a small “exploratory” group as a step preliminary to the preparatory work itself. As for the composition of such a group, Ambassador Goldberg suggested that a few other countries be added, since Communist China “has stated that it would not be prepared to meet with that particular group.” The addition might include states with major peaceful nuclear programs and those who had played leading roles in developing the idea for a world disarmament conference.

It was unmistakably clear—and frankly stated by most delegates—that the motivating force behind the movement for a world disarmament conference was the strong feeling that some way had to be found to draw the Chinese Communists into deliberations on disarmament and that it would have to be done in a forum not associated with the United Nations.

The Chinese Communists have held to the “absolutely unalterable” position that they will “have nothing to do with the United Nations as long as the latter fails to restore to the representative of the People’s Republic of China the legitimate rights as the representative of the sole legal government of the Chinese people and as long as the illegal status of the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique is not nullified.” As for the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, “it will not have the pleasure of our company.”¹⁸

On November 29, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, placed his stamp of approval on the idea of a world conference outside the aegis of the U.N. “The nations of the world now have an opportunity to bring into being a disarmament conference that will include all countries,” he told the General Assembly, “and that can give a new impetus towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament on a universal basis.”

¹⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/2031 (XX).

¹⁷ For text of Ambassador Goldberg’s statement, see BULLETIN of Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1032.

¹⁸ *People’s Daily*, Peking, November 22, 1964. [Footnote in original.]

President Sends Convention on Investment Disputes to Senate

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated February 16

The President on February 16 transmitted to the Senate the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.¹ The convention is one of a number of efforts designed to promote economic growth in less developed countries through private investment.

The convention was prepared under the auspices of the World Bank and has already been signed by 30 nations in addition to the United States. When the convention becomes effective—after 20 nations have ratified it—an International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes will be established to provide procedures for conciliation and arbitration of disputes between private investors and member states. While the convention does not lay down specific rules of international law—and both conciliation and arbitration would be based on consent—it is expected that the Center will provide a new and valuable forum for the settlement of disputes and for the development of international law.

The President recommended that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the convention.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 16, 1966.*

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States which was approved on March 18, 1965, by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Re-

construction and Development and which is open for signature at the Bank's headquarters in Washington.

The convention was signed for the United States of America by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler.

I transmit also for the information of the Senate the report of the Secretary of State with respect to the convention and also a copy of Resolution No. 65-14 adopted by the Executive Directors of the Bank on March 18, 1965, a copy of the accompanying report of the Executive Directors, and a summary containing further explanatory comments concerning the convention.

The purpose of the convention is to provide facilities for settlement or adjudication of international disputes relating to international private investments and thereby to encourage a larger flow of such investments. The convention would establish an International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the seat of which would be at the principal office of the Bank. The Center would provide facilities, rules of procedure, and panels for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes directly between private citizens or corporations of one country and the government of another country.

The convention would not establish any substantive rules of international law. Moreover, by becoming a party to the convention a country would not obligate itself to submit any given dispute or contract to the mechanisms of the convention. Both conciliation and arbitration would be based on consent, to be given either ad hoc or as part of an investment agreement. Once a consent to resort to either conciliation or arbitration under the convention has been given with respect to a particular matter, that consent would be irrevocable. The arbitration mechanism provided by the convention is such that refusal by one party to name its arbitrator would not prevent arbitration proceedings from going forward. Arbitral awards are stated to be binding on the parties and not subject to any appeal except as provided in the convention. Where appli-

¹ S. Ex. A, 89th Cong., 2d sess.

cable, and unless otherwise provided, the convention would provide for settlement through the mechanisms of the Center, without requirement of prior exhaustion of local remedies.

As indicated in the enclosed report by the Secretary of State, the U.S. Director of the Bank, pursuant to action 65-39 of February 12, 1965, of the National Advisory Council on

International Monetary and Financial Problems, voted in favor of the resolution by which the Executive Directors of the Bank approved the text of the convention.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the convention and to its ratification.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

The U.N. Development Program, a New Effort in Peacebuilding

Statement by James Roosevelt

*U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council*¹

This first session of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program marks the beginning of a new chapter in the voluntary efforts of the United Nations family to assist the development of that part of the world which is still only on the lower rungs of the ladder of development. The fact that we have celebrated the beginning of a new year between the establishment of the UNDP by the General Assembly and this, the first session of the Governing Council of the U.N. Development Program, is symbolic of the spirit in which we should approach this session.

In our debates in the General Assembly we tended to dwell on the long, hard efforts

which had already gone into the planning of the merger of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund into the U.N. Development Program. Thus the action of the General Assembly in adopting the merger resolution seemed like the end of a long road. But, in fact, it marked a beginning, or what Winston Churchill once characterized as "the end of the beginning."

Now we can look forward to the challenges which lie before the new development program and consider this first session of the Governing Council as the initiation of a new and greater effort to forge an even more effective and flexible instrument in the U.N. family to provide the technical and preinvestment assistance which are key elements in faster, more effective strides up the ladder of development.

Mr. Chairman, all these organs of the UNDP—the Administrator, the Inter-

¹ Made in the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program on Jan. 11 (U.S./U.N. press release 4784 dated Jan. 10, for release Jan. 11); for a statement made by Mr. Roosevelt in the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 22, see BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1965, p. 958.

Agency Consultative Board, and the Council—will necessarily devote much of their time to procedural and technical questions related to the operations of the program. But we must never lose sight of our ultimate goal: to assist people to achieve a better life for themselves and their children. This challenge demands a practical idealism from all of us. Rules and regulations must be made our servants, not our masters, and we must be ever alert to finding new approaches and to adapting old procedures so that the U.N. Development Program, which is, after all, one of the major sources of technical and preinvestment assistance to developing countries, can make the greatest possible contribution to the common goal of a better life for all the people of this world.

The new Administrator [Paul G. Hoffman] and Co-Administrator [David Owen] of the U.N. Development Program—old friends who now have new titles—have already called our attention to the important role of the various instruments in the new organization. The document on the administrative budget which is before us (DP/L.2) describes in some detail the organization and functions of one key element—the secretariat staff, without whom there would be no program. I will refer later to the need for maintaining a suitable balance in headquarters staff between ability to review the functional aspects of proposed projects and consideration of the impact of the program on individual countries and groups of countries. I want here only to emphasize that my Government looks forward to the intensified efforts of the UNDP staff, both at headquarters and in the field, to use the various tools at their disposal to help developing countries to receive from the U.N. Development Program the assistance which will be of maximum benefit to each of them.

The new Inter-Agency Consultative Board has a major role to play in making the total program more effective. Without the special competence of each of the specialized agencies of the United Nations family and the U.N. Secretariat, the program could

never achieve its potential as a key agent in assisting development. We hope that the new opportunity for the agencies to be consulted as a group on matters related to Special Fund activities of the program will serve to increase the Fund's effectiveness and contribute to greater coordination of all UNDP programs with the technical assistance activities undertaken under the agencies' regular budgets.

I would like to call particular attention to the importance which my Government attaches to the opportunity for the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] to have a voice in questions related to the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance as well as to the Special Fund, as a result of IBRD membership on the Inter-Agency Consultative Board. We view it as increasingly important that preinvestment activities cover the whole range of services and assistance needed by a developing country to reach the point of assured investment. Increasingly close working relations between the IBRD group and the UNDP is one step in insuring such coverage and avoiding gaps between the preinvestment survey and the actual investment.

We anticipate also that the opportunity for the Executive Directors of UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] and the World Food Program to participate as appropriate in the work of the Inter-Agency Consultative Board will permit increasingly closer coordination between the U.N. Development Program and those programs which, while directed toward specific aspects of the overall development effort, have much to give and much to gain from closer association with other development efforts.

Role of the Governing Council

At this first session of the Governing Council of the U.N. Development Program, I want to emphasize particularly the role of the Council in this intensified effort by the United Nations family. The Council should not administer the program. That is

the job for the Administrator and his staff, as clearly set forth in General Assembly Resolution 2029. But it should not be a rubber stamp. If the Administrator will present to the Council sufficiently detailed reports on financial and administrative matters, we can then try to discipline ourselves to avoid unduly long and technical discussions of these subjects and have time to consider larger issues. We will need help from the Administrator, particularly during this formative period, in making an appropriate division of our time between broad policy issues, program questions—including the continuous evaluation of ongoing and completed programs—and financial and administrative matters.

The paper on the administrative budget which we have before us is an example of an area in which this body should give thoughtful and well-considered advice to the management of the program. We look forward to a growing volume of such papers; we hope that at a Council session in the near future we may have before us the Administrator's thoughts on such questions as the possibilities for increasing the effectiveness of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. Such a paper should, of course, cover such questions as the possible change in the proportion of the program devoted to regional activities, possible substitutes for the present system of biennial programing, and the continuing problem of the great variations between the original program and that which is eventually carried out.

We also feel that a paper on the question of reimbursable provisions in some Special Fund projects is badly needed. This subject requires much more careful consideration by management and by this Council than has yet been given to it. My delegation will have more to say on this point in connection with a later point on our agenda.

There is another, more exciting area on which we feel this Council should receive and study the Administrator's views: possible new fields of activity for the work of

the United Nations Development Program. In my first statement to the Second Committee of the 20th General Assembly,² I said that I dreamed of the day when the United Nations would be concerned with the development of resources under the sea. I also spoke of President Johnson's great interest in efforts to solve the earth's water shortage. Here are two areas in which the U.N. Development Program should be considering new or greatly increased activities. There are others, and I hope that before too many sessions of this Council have met we may undertake a preliminary, but nonetheless exciting, discussion of the Administrator's ideas along these lines.

Mr. Chairman, my references to beginnings are not intended to ignore all that has gone before. This marriage inherits two lusty children (if I may continue the somewhat mixed figure of speech which was used in the General Assembly statements on the merger resolution). Since this session of the Council is concerned primarily with the Special Fund activities of the U.N. Development Program, I will refer primarily to them, but, in doing so, I do not mean to ignore the major contribution the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance has made during its 16 years of existence. Indeed, the \$500 million contributions which have made it possible to send more than 30,000 experts to one or more of 130 countries and to provide fellowships for more than 30,000 nationals of those countries have provided groundwork without which much of the Special Fund's work would have been impossible. We believe that, increasingly, the facilities of the Expanded Program can and should be used to assist in preparing the groundwork for Special Fund projects and to follow up their results and that its rules and regulations should be under constant review to insure that the program is of maximum benefit to the developing countries it serves.

Nor will I do more than mention in passing the U.N. regular program of technical

² For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 798.

assistance, for which this Council must also provide policy guidance. One aspect of this program will be considered under item 10 of our agenda.

Coordinating UNDP Activities

The Special Fund itself has grown remarkably in its short 6-year life. We all know well of the 522 projects which have been approved with a total value of over \$1 billion. We are encouraged by the information just given us by the Administrator that almost 100 projects reached the operational stage during 1965. Yet, since more than 100 projects were approved by this Council last year, there remain some 18 percent of the projects which have been approved by the Council which are not yet operational.

We hope that the Administrator will review this problem with the Inter-Agency Consultative Board at an early meeting to see what steps can be taken to further improve this situation and that he will report to a later session of this Council on the factors which delay signatures of plans of operations and on the causes of delays in getting fieldwork underway once the plans are signed.

Some of the problems of making Special Fund projects operational as quickly as possible have already been identified in documents presented to this Council and to earlier sessions of the Governing Council of the Special Fund. We know, for instance, of the problems faced by the executing agencies in recruiting experts to carry out projects. We welcome the Administrator's plans for a meeting of recruitment officers of the agencies to consider these problems.

We continue to wonder if adequate use is being made of the possibilities of contracting with private institutions, as well as universities and government agencies of member governments. We have not changed our opinion that there are some cases in which the Administrator should contract directly with a private or governmental group to execute the project. Our own

Agency for International Development is relying increasingly on contracts with private groups to widen the pool of resources from which it draws, and we feel that the UNDP needs to consider the feasibility of much greater use of contracting as a means of widening the field from which qualified experts are sought.

Another factor delaying getting projects actually underway is the difficulty of persuading understaffed, overburdened governments to provide the essential counterpart personnel and other support to the projects they have requested. We wonder if this problem might not be alleviated if more attention were given in the early stages of formulation of project requests to insuring that the proposed project attacks a problem which has been given high priority in the development plans of the requesting countries.

It is because we attach such importance to the coordination of all UNDP activities with the development plans and programs of each receiving country that we are concerned that the secretariat of the U.N. Development Program give adequate attention to the country and regional aspects of its work. In addition to the key role of the resident representatives and their staffs, with their on-the-spot knowledge and understanding of a country's problems, there is a need for continuing similar awareness at headquarters. The review of project requests must be related to the changing priorities in each country. We trust that the staffing and work plans of the Administrator's staff will keep the need for such a review constantly in mind.

Preparatory missions and consultants can be helpful in assuring that the right project is submitted to the UNDP at the right time. They can also work with the countries, the agencies, and the UNDP staff in developing the precise plans for projects even before they are recommended to this Council. It is gratifying to learn that well over half of the projects which have been recommended for approval at this session have benefited from such special expert consideration and

review, and we trust that this augurs well for their prompt, effective implementation.

The three pilot projects in adult literacy related to economic development which are recommended to us by the Administrator reflect a particularly interesting use of preparatory assistance. The development of these projects over the past 18 months has been a step in efforts to learn more about the relation of literacy to development and to test techniques for making and keeping adults literate which has involved close, continuous cooperation between UNDP and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. Expert missions financed with preparatory assistance have played a key role in preparation of the project proposals. We will all watch with interest the progress of these projects themselves and the "multiplier effect" which they have in serving as guides to other literacy programs not financed through the UNDP.

My delegation is hopeful that close, continuing cooperation between the UNDP and the technical agency concerned, of which these three literacy projects are but the latest example, can be repeated in the crucial area of industrial development. We all know of the distressing shortage of action-oriented technical assistance and pre-investment programs directly related to manufacturing industry. We all hope that the new U.N. Organization for Industrial Development just established by the General Assembly will give priority attention to remedying this situation.

My Government was in the forefront of those who felt that funds for operational activities of the UNOID should be made available to the UNDP in order to avoid undue proliferation of special funds for activities in specific areas of technical and preinvestment assistance. We therefore wish to emphasize again in this Council the importance which we all attach to the prompt cooperative efforts by the Administrator and the Commissioner for Industrial Development to make effective, imaginative use of the special funds which have been

made available. We have been gratified to hear from the Administrator that he and his staff will "spare no effort" to help governments in the industrial field. We urge him to press forward in this spirit so that this Council, at an early session, may hear encouraging reports not only of the use of the special contributions which have been made for industrialization but also of a greatly increased volume of good Special Fund projects directly related to manufacturing industry.

The United States has a lively and lasting interest in the possibilities of applying new scientific and technological developments to the problems of developing countries. We have supported and encouraged the Special Fund's steps in this direction—in the efforts to determine the toleration of various grains to irrigation with brackish water in the Tunisian project, the experiment in Turkey to eliminate infestation of stored grain by irradiation, the efforts to eliminate the Mediterranean fruitfly through irradiation in the Central American project.

We have also watched and applauded the work of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology in identifying the priority areas for application of new techniques or greater efforts to find new approaches. We believe that the Committee's report should be a useful guide to countries and the UNDP in determining priority needs for UNDP assistance. We note also the Advisory Committee's recent request in its report of its fourth session last November to meet with the Administrator at an early date. Such a meeting could, we believe, establish a basis for continuing close cooperation between the Committee and the Development Program, to their mutual advantage.

Financial Advisory Services

There is another area in which my delegation has long felt that the Special Fund could be of greater service to developing countries. This is in the area of financial advisory services. We are pleased to see that such services have already been attached to 10 projects and that 4 of the

projects in the current program will include financial advisers.

As I have said, the United States sees the field of preinvestment as extending right through to the absolute assurance that the investment will be made. We have been gratified at the consistently encouraging reports of the investment which has resulted from Special Fund surveys, not only in the total level of such investments but also in the number of projects involved, for this is an area in which many small investments resulting from Special Fund surveys may be even more important in their impact than one or two large investments.

I have already mentioned the importance of close cooperation with the IBRD. We should also not lose sight of the opportunities offered by the various regional banks which have been or are being established. They will provide, I feel sure, an increasing proportion of the investment capital for development of possibilities identified through Special Fund surveys.

The United States continues to believe that financial advisory services should be made available by the UNDP on a much wider basis. In this connection, I want to quote an excerpt from the statement made by one of my predecessors, Ambassador Philip Klutznick, in his statement to the Second Committee of the 16th General Assembly on October 6, 1961:³

We believe that the Special Fund should establish a financial service to provide guidance and advice to developing countries. This service would maintain current familiarity with potential public, private, national, regional, and international sources of development capital and with the processes, rules, regulations, and preferences of capital suppliers. Developing countries could channel their inquiries to the Special Fund through the resident representatives. On request the service would provide potential users directly through . . . appropriate channels with information concerning available sources of capital and technical assistance. The service would also provide guidance on procedures for obtaining aid.

When this request was considered at the eighth session of the Governing Council of the Special Fund, the Managing Director

was given authority to assign financial experts as part of appropriate projects, but it was agreed that the study of the broader need would continue. We believe that the time is now ripe for establishing this service on a broader basis, and we hope that the Administrator and his staff will review the matter and submit recommendations regarding it to an early session of this Council.

Mr. Chairman, the word "coordination" is used so often that I fear it has lost its impact if not its meaning. Too often we think of it in a negative sense: avoiding duplication or friction. Webster's dictionary defines the verb "to coordinate" as "to harmonize" so as "to act together in a smooth concerted way." It is this positive note which I want to emphasize when I speak of the need for ever-increasing coordination.

The new U.N. Development Program has provided us with an opportunity and a stimulation to increase this concerted, smooth action, not only between the two arms of the Program itself—the Special Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance—but also among the agencies of the U.N. family and between the agencies and the U.N. Development Program secretariat. Addendum 2 of the Administrator's report on implementation of projects (DP/SF/L.1/Add.2) calls our attention to at least 200 projects in 62 countries which have benefited from assistance from some 76 different sources. Since the definition used is necessarily narrow and includes only assistance directly to the Special Fund projects themselves, this is a noteworthy indication of cooperation and coordination at its best. In some cases, such as the faculty of engineering at the University College, Nairobi, assistance is being provided from as many as six sources in addition to the U.N. Development Program.

This Council session indeed marks the beginning of a great new adventure, and so before we turn our thoughts to the questions which we must decide here and now, let me summarize the wide range of subjects which my delegation at least feels that future ses-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 939.

sions of the Council should consider. They range all the way from new areas of activity for the Development Program and the review of the effectiveness of present program rules and procedures for the Expanded Program to the possibilities for greater use of subcontracts and the question of reimbursable Special Fund projects. They include the question of establishment of financial advisory services.

We shall have a rich fare before us at coming sessions. And throughout our work we will always be seeking to improve the lot of the people on this planet. All the efforts of the U.N. Development Program ultimately come to this: to assisting people to lead better lives—to find jobs, to gain an education or the specialized training which will fit them for better jobs, to identify and use the natural resources of their own countries, to apply new techniques and scientific discoveries to solve their age-old problems.

This is truly an effort in peacebuilding. For it is the old and basic conflict between those who have not and those who have which has lain behind so much of the strife and fighting of our troubled world. Truly the UNDP is a key unit in that united army against want in which we all serve.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Convention on settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹
Ratification deposited: Ivory Coast, February 16, 1966.

Health

Amendment to article 7 of the constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.¹
Acceptance deposited: Ghana, February 9, 1966.

¹ Not in force.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.¹

Acceptance received: China, January 27, 1966.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratifications deposited: Morocco, February 21, 1966; Panama, February 24, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II. TIAS 5844.

Acceptance deposited: Spain, February 18, 1966.

Approval deposited: United Arab Republic, February 24, 1966.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 31, 1964 (TIAS 5717).

Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei February 11, 1966. Entered into force February 11, 1966.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 31, 1964 (TIAS 5718).

Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei February 11, 1966. Entered into force February 11, 1966.

Costa Rica

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 18, 1956. Entered into force February 8, 1961. TIAS 4682.

Terminated: February 7, 1966.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 21-27

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to February 21 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 28 of February 14.

No.	Date	Subject
32	2/23	Rusk: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
*33	2/23	Allen appointed Director, FSI (biographic details).
†34	2/25	Rusk: House Committee on Agriculture.
†35	2/25	Bundy: Philippine-American Assembly, Davao, Philippines.
36	2/26	Soviet allegations regarding air accident over Spain rejected.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles. Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free (Johnson)	390	Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Held at Tokyo	405
Asia. Vice President Reviews Asian Problems With Thai Premier (joint communique) . . .	396	International Organizations and Conferences. President Sends Convention on Investment Disputes to Senate (White House announcement, letter of transmittal)	419
Atomic Energy		Japan. U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Held at Tokyo	405
The International Negotiations for Arms Control and Disarmament (President's letter of transmittal and excerpt from ACDA's fifth annual report to Congress)	410	Presidential Documents	
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1394 PUBLICATION 8047 MARCH 14, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

The Issue in Viet-Nam

The struggle in Viet-Nam can be properly understood only if Americans recognize it as part of a vast and continuing struggle against aggression in which we have been engaged for more than two decades, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball asserted recently.

In a review of the great shifts and changes in the world brought about by the Second World War, Mr. Ball defines the Viet-Nam fighting as battles and skirmishes in a continuing war to prevent one Communist power after another from violating internationally recognized boundaries. The Under Secretary takes issue in his address with those who imply that we should let Red China establish hegemony over the East Asian landmass south of the Soviet Union. He explains why the United States, in its unceasing search for peace in Southeast Asia, is not obdurate about considering the views of the National Liberation Front but will not give legitimacy to this Communist organization by accepting it as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people.

This pamphlet is based upon an address the Under Secretary made on January 30 before Northwestern University alumni at Evanston, Ill.

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United States Policy Toward South Africa

*Statement by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

You are to be congratulated on your decision to look into the problem of U.S. policy toward South Africa. Your interest in this aspect of our foreign policy is a healthy and heartening development. It reflects the increasing concern among Americans about the policy of *apartheid* in South Africa. Your investigation will undoubtedly create a more enlightened public opinion and provide new insights into this problem. I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Government's aims, interests, and policies in relation to the Republic of South Africa.

South Africa poses one of the most difficult policy problems faced by the United States Government. Essentially this is because of the nature of the problem itself. It is a problem involving one of the most sensitive aspects of human relations, the problem of getting people of different races to live together in harmony, mutual respect, and cooperation.

We know from our own experience, from our own unfinished business in this field, that fundamental changes in longstanding patterns of human behavior are often difficult to achieve. Although the process of change in this country has accelerated in recent years, it is still neither as easy nor as rapid as we would like. This is true despite the fact that we Americans have a common culture, speak the same language, and as a nation are able to enlist an impressive array of constitutional, judicial, economic, political, and moral forces on behalf of change.

In South Africa on the other hand there is

no common unifying national culture, no universally spoken national language, and most of the instruments of national power are arrayed against the change desired by the majority rather than in its support. Moreover, in our case deep-seated and irrational fears play a less important role than in South Africa since our problem involves a deprived minority, theirs an oppressed majority.

There are other difficulties. There are deep and honest differences of opinion as to how constructive change can be induced in South Africa. It is frequently said that in the last analysis the peoples of South Africa themselves must work out their own destiny. But how is this to take place with the internal forces for change so effectively repressed? It is also pointed out that in South Africa economic forces are breaking down segregationist practices and isolationist patterns of thought. But how are such changes to be translated into the political and social fields? How long will it take? And what can outside forces properly do to accelerate it? There is no agreement on these important questions.

Contradictory U.S. Interests

Another range of difficulties is the fact that our relations with South Africa involve mutually contradictory American national interests. In formulating our policy one must examine not only the balance sheet of our

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 1.

bilateral relations with South Africa but also the effect of these relations on our national goals elsewhere in the world. Bilaterally we enjoy mutually beneficial relations with South Africa in several fields. On the other hand, the racial policies of the Republic impose severe restraints on these relations. Some forms of cooperation have become impossible because we cannot accept for Americans visiting or working in South Africa the racial conditions imposed by South Africa upon her nationals. Internationally, the racial policies of South Africa have been almost universally condemned, and the U.N. General Assembly has called on all U.N. members to bring pressure on South Africa to change its policies.

Thus in formulating our policy we must take into account the liabilities as well as the benefits from our relations. There is no doubt, for example, that the Communists have had some success in Africa by seeking to identify themselves with African aspirations in South Africa and by identifying the United States with the controlling white minority. A peaceful accommodation among people of all races in South Africa based on respect for the rights of the individual would thus be in our interest and that of the free world and a major blow to the Communists. A shift of South African policy away from racialism would improve relations between Africans and Europeans throughout Africa and aid the work of numerous international organizations. Such developments, naturally, would be in the U.S. national interest.

South Africa, with its abundant human and material resources and strong modern economy, could play a leading role in the progress of Africa. Instead, by its racial policies it is isolating itself from the rest of Africa and from most of the international community. It is diverting its own resources to the machinery of security and repression, which might better be used to assist its own people and others in Africa. Instead of mutually beneficial relationships in trade and other fields, all forms of contact with the rest of Africa are minimal. Elsewhere in

Africa, too, resentment and fear of South Africa have been among the factors diverting new African nations from full concentration on the tasks of nation-building and provoking them into unconventional actions against South Africa in international organizations. The accelerating cycle of mutual suspicion and hostility is thus not only dangerous but also ill serves Africa's development. It would be in our interests to see this cycle reversed.

Broad Aims of U.S. Policy

The broad aims of U.S. policy toward South Africa must be an integral part of our overall national policies. In his speech a week ago on receiving the National Freedom Award, President Johnson said:² "We know that the four freedoms are not secure in America when they are violently denied elsewhere in the world." It is American policy, he said, that freedom is indivisible, that everyone has this right regardless of race or color. In his great civil rights message in March 1965 he said, "Discrimination based on race or color is reprehensible and intolerable to the great American majority." "In the world," he said, "America stands for—and works for—the right of all men to govern themselves through free, uninhibited elections."

Of U.S. policy in southern Africa Secretary Rusk has said, "In our dealings with those areas our position is based firmly on the belief that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."³ The late Ambassador Stevenson, speaking on *apartheid* in the Security Council on December 4, 1963, declared his Government's belief "that no longer can any society long endure in peace, really live with itself, really prosper economically, if in that society one race denies to another human and political rights."⁴

These authoritative statements embody our main aim in southern Africa as else-

² BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1964, p. 498.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 92.

where—the evolution of stable, progressive societies based on nondiscrimination and government by consent of the governed. While the form these societies take will and properly should be up to the peoples themselves, it is in our interest to see peace in that area and the development of societies with which we can enjoy relations of mutual benefit and mutual respect.

The African Context

In most of Africa there has during the past 10 years been a great surge of independence. We have welcomed the emergence of the new African states and are doing what we can in cooperation with others to help them develop firmer foundations for their independence. We recognize that with independence there have come new problems and that there have been setbacks, but on balance we believe that independence has brought new life and hope to Africa. In Africa as elsewhere we see human freedom not as an immediate panacea for all human problems but as a great creative force. Moreover, in Africa, freedom has another dimension. It has brought to an end for millions of Africans the humiliation of domination by members of another race. Thus, as the area of political independence has advanced to the frontiers of southern Africa, so has the area of human dignity.

The remaining problems in the whole region of southern Africa are, of course, the most difficult of all. Each country has its unique and distinctive features but all contain the seeds of trouble, serious trouble, as long as they deny the enjoyment of self-determination, freedom, and human dignity to the majority of their populations. We believe that the forces for change in southern Africa are increasing their tempo. While on the one hand this is encouraging, it also increases the threat of violence. As intensified pressures for change meet intensified resistance, as peaceful avenues to change are blocked off one by one, fewer and fewer alternatives to violence remain open.

I am not here as a prophet of doom. I do

not mean that violence cannot be avoided. What I do mean is that the search for peaceful accommodation of the forces for change in southern Africa, both inside and outside the area, must be intensified before it is too late.

U.S. Approach

The U.S. Government has no prescription for South Africa. But if South Africa's peoples are to devise their own solution, it seems to us that a good way to begin would be to start some form of dialog among the racial groups in South Africa. We are alarmed at the severance one by one of constructive contacts between the whites and nonwhites in South Africa. If we and other like-minded nations could contribute to the creation in South Africa of an atmosphere of free discussion and mutual effort to understand and respect the other person's real interests and aspirations, a great stride would have been made toward stable human relations in the subcontinent. It is clear that a lasting solution in South Africa can only be one devised by the South Africans themselves. But it must be the creation of all groups. Whether imposed paternalistically or by force, a formula imposed by one group upon the others will not endure.

It must be recognized that there are serious obstacles in South Africa to the free discussion and compromise we consider indispensable if the long-range trend toward large-scale violence is to be arrested and reversed. While accommodation of conflicting aspirations and interests is vital, the forces within South Africa making for such accommodation are being repressed. There is growing disillusionment in South Africa with *apartheid* as a solution of its problems. Churchmen criticize its morality; businessmen question its practicality; administrators, educators, and the great nonwhite majority doubt its honesty. But the vast machinery of the state and the highly organized Afrikaner Nationalist community repress discussion effectively by means of punitive laws putting the individual at the



mercy of the state without recourse to the courts, by control of the radio and much of the press, by intimidation and ostracism. Time and again in recent years attempts to shine the light of free discussion on at least the dark places of *apartheid* excesses and absurdities have been shut off by the police power or the behind-the-scenes pressure of Afrikaans organizations. This repression of any reasonable opportunity of self-expression for accommodation or evolution has the inherent danger of turning such tendencies underground, where Communist penetration is often the consequence of frustration.

U.S. Aims Essentially Political

The broad aims of U.S. policy toward South Africa are essentially political. We support freedom, equality, and justice for the people of South Africa for the same reasons we support them elsewhere, both at home and abroad. We support them because they are the keystones of our heritage. We support them because we believe that at home they safeguard and enhance our enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and that abroad in doing the same thing they strengthen the basis for a just and lasting peace.

These basic freedoms are of course fun-

damental to our role of leadership as a non-racialist nation in a multiracial world. We support renewed efforts to initiate in South Africa a peaceful, evolutionary process toward these goals. Despite the frustrations we must persist in the search for a peaceful solution. A resort to violence would be enormously costly, not only to the peoples of South Africa but also to the peoples of Africa generally. It would also be costly to us and to the free world and would undoubtedly be exploited by forces hostile to us.

These political aims are paramount. In scientific, economic, and strategic respects our bilateral relationships with South Africa are useful to us—even in some fields important—but they are not essential to our national security.

Specific Interests

Before discussing the specific policies implementing our broad aims, a review of our specific interests may be helpful. Many of these interests, while not decisive in determining our policy, are important. They are and should be taken into account in formulating our policy, though they do not, as is sometimes alleged, dominate it. Our basic policies regarding South Africa stem from broad principles much more than from immediate specific interests largely because in southern Africa the clash of basic principles and values threatens our long-range interests in much of the world.

U.S. Facilities in South Africa

The position of southern Africa athwart the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope makes its ports highly useful logistically to the U.S. Navy, particularly in support of Atlantic Fleet ships en route to and from Viet-Nam waters. If the Mediterranean route were closed, the importance of the Cape route would be enhanced.

Space-tracking facilities in South Africa have been, and continue to be, important, particularly for the lunar and other deep-space programs. Sudden removal of these

facilities would adversely affect the progress of these programs. However, these considerations cannot override the greater imperatives of the larger principles to which we are committed.

Economic Interests

Other specific interests are economic.

Direct U.S. investment in South Africa was valued at \$467 million at the end of 1964. We have no figures for portfolio investment, but according to our best estimates it would bring total U.S. investment in South Africa up to about \$650 million. American direct investment in South Africa is about 28 percent of our total direct investment in Africa, and the 72 percent outside South Africa is growing more rapidly. Our investment in South Africa is only about 1 percent of our total foreign investment.

U.S. trade with South Africa has a favorable balance amounting in 1965 to about \$213 million. Our exports, largely machinery, vehicles, and industrial goods, amounted to \$392 million in 1964 and our imports, largely minerals, to \$250 million. This was a considerable increase over previous years. In 1963 the trade balance was favorable by \$19 million, in 1962 unfavorable by \$34 million. Our trade with South Africa is about 1½ percent of our foreign trade.

Minerals

South Africa is an important source of strategic minerals, including industrial diamonds, chemical chrome, several types of asbestos, platinum, and gold. The U.S. has been buying uranium oxide under an agreement of 1950. The contract expires at the end of 1966 and is not expected to be renewed, as U.S. sources are adequate for our needs. South Africa's importance as a source of industrial diamonds has greatly diminished because of the availability of industrial diamonds elsewhere in Africa. Furthermore, the U.S. manufactures synthetic industrials. Other minerals, including chemical chrome, asbestos, and platinum, have

been stockpiled or are available from other sources, including substitutes.

Main Policies

These specific interests must be viewed against the broad aims of U.S. policy. We have expressed our policy aims with respect to South Africa repeatedly both in the U.N. and bilaterally. Time and again we have pointed out the dangers we see in the policy of *apartheid* and have urged a change in approach more consistent with U.N. principles and present day realities.

U.S. Policy of Persuasion

The U.S. Government over the years has sought to dissuade South African officials at all levels from discriminatory and repressive laws and from employing various oppressive measures. We have, through diplomatic channels, warned against the extension of *apartheid* practices to the international territory of South-West Africa. The U.S. Government has expressed its critical views to South Africans on the basis of a large accumulation of firsthand evidence. American officials have devoted much time and effort to the study of *apartheid* in its many aspects. Despite the many frustrations we have encountered in our efforts to persuade South African leaders to change their policies, the increasingly manifest contradictions and unrealities of *apartheid* give at least some grounds for hope that the situation in South Africa has not rigidified irreparably.

U.S. Nonracial Policies in South Africa

Along with our policy of persuasion, we have followed a policy of continuing certain forms of cooperation with South Africa and keeping open the lines of communication. Pursuing these policies simultaneously has faced us with some difficult dilemmas. Our representatives in South Africa are exposed to strong pressures from the South African Government and its supporters to conform with *apartheid* practices. Wherever it is

legally possible to do so, our representatives resist these pressures.

Our Embassy and consulates hold non-racial receptions and individual officers entertain nonracially. Our diplomatic and consular posts hire local employees on a non-discriminatory basis. The U.S. Government makes clear that it disapproves of the appearance of Americans, whether as amateurs or professionals, before segregated audiences in South Africa. It will not sponsor visits to South Africa of performers who would appear before such audiences. As a result this aspect of our exchange program is virtually suspended. More importantly, we have canceled operational port calls in South Africa of U.S. naval vessels and aircraft rather than accept the application of racial conditions to our personnel.

U.S. Policy in the U.N.

In the U.N. the United States strongly supports the application to South Africa and to the mandated territory of South-West Africa of the basic principles of the U.N. Charter's affirmation of respect for human rights, the dignity and worth of the individual, and the equal rights of men and women. We support the aim of promoting respect for international law. We have supported a number of resolutions against *apartheid* in the U.N. General Assembly.

The shooting of many unarmed men, women, and children at Sharpeville in March 1960 marked a watershed in U.N. treatment of *apartheid*. For the first time the Security Council considered a South African issue. The United States then supported a resolution deploring *apartheid* and the loss of life at Sharpeville and calling for abandonment of repressive policies. We have supported several similar Council resolutions since then condemning repression and injustice in South Africa.

Arms Ban

As concrete evidence of our abhorrence of *apartheid* and our determination not to contribute to its enforcement, we do not sell

to South Africa any arms, ammunition, military equipment, or materials for their manufacture and maintenance. Our first step in this direction was when we placed a ban on arms that could be used in enforcing *apartheid* within South Africa.⁵ As international opposition to *apartheid* increased in tempo, along with repression in South Africa, the growth of violence, and the flight of refugees, we took a further step in August 1963. We extended our arms ban against South Africa to all arms, ammunition, and military equipment, except those under existing contracts and those which might be required in the interests of world peace.

Ambassador Stevenson, in announcing the arms ban,⁶ said that

... the United States as a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and the intent of this resolve.

We adopted this comprehensive ban prior to the adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on all U.N. members to apply such a ban. We supported the resolution and have strictly observed the ban. In the Security Council the late Ambassador Stevenson explained this policy as intended to contribute to a peaceful solution and to avoid actions adding directly to international friction in the area. In December 1963, in support of another resolution of the Security Council, our ban was extended to equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa.⁷

Economic Relations

Aside from the arms embargo, the U.S. Government does not interfere with trade and investment in South Africa. This is in

keeping with our traditional policy of keeping world trade and other economic relations as free as possible from Government interference. An exception is where the national security is directly affected, as in the cases of Communist China and Cuba.

The U.S. Government neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa. Potential investors who seek our advice are briefed on the political and racial situation, the outlook, and American policy and interests. The decision about whether to invest remains with the individual or company.

The U.S. Government of course encourages both new and old companies to maintain high standards in the treatment of personnel employed in South Africa. We believe American companies abroad should lead in such respects as fair wages, nondiscrimination, pension systems, and the like. While American companies operating in South Africa are, of course, obligated to abide by South African laws, we are encouraged by their generally progressive record.

Opposition to Economic Sanctions

Despite strong pressures in the U.N. and from various American organizations concerned about civil and human rights in South Africa, we have not been prepared to support U.N. economic sanctions against South Africa. Several problems are involved. These are:

1. the problem of a legal basis for such actions;
2. the problem of economic effectiveness; and
3. the problem of psychological effectiveness.

With regard to the legal problem, the U.S. Government believes that the conditions envisaged in chapter VII of the U.N. Charter for the imposition of compulsory sanctions, i.e., the existence of a threat to international peace or an act of aggression, do not apply to South Africa at this time.

Much thought has been given in this Government and in the U.N. to the problem of the economic effectiveness of sanctions. In the summer of 1964 the U.N. Security

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1962, p. 791.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 92.

Council established a committee of experts to study the feasibility, effectiveness, and implications of sanctions, or as it described them, measures which might be taken against South Africa within the framework of the U.N. Charter.⁸ The committee was requested to make a technical and practical study of sanctions without reference to the circumstances in which their application might be considered. The United States participated actively in the work of the committee. Its report⁹ was submitted to the Security Council in February 1965. It emphasized the view that, although South Africa would not be readily susceptible to economic measures, South Africa is not immune to impact from such measures. It concluded that the degree of effectiveness of economic measures would directly depend on the universality of their application and on the manner and the duration of their enforcement. Should a situation arise in which the U.N. appropriately might consider resort to sanctions, the United States believes the availability of this detailed, practical study will be helpful.

Cessation of investment is most often urged as a first step in applying graduated economic pressures. Could the United States exert effective pressure on South Africa by withholding investment? A generation ago the South African economy depended to a very large extent on foreign investment. Now foreign investment plays a much smaller role in the economy. The United States provides only a small proportion either of total investment in South Africa or of foreign investment there. Our investment in South Africa is only 14 percent of all foreign investment there. From 1950 to 1963 U.S. direct investment in South Africa by companies amounted to only 2.3 percent of the total net domestic capital formation there. If one includes portfolio investment, the percentage is still only 3.5.

South Africa is one of the countries which is subject to all aspects of the United

States program to improve its balance of payments. This means that all types of U.S. private capital flows to South Africa are subject either to the interest equalization tax or to the President's program of voluntary restraints on private corporate investment and bank lending abroad. It is probable that new U.S. investment in South Africa will be reduced as a result. Even before this program was begun American companies had been financing their investments largely by profits made in South Africa, advances from South African banks, and the issuance of stock both in South Africa and Europe. From 1955 to 1963 the net outflow to South Africa of new American capital amounted to only \$9 million. American investment in South Africa is minor—compared with that of the United Kingdom, about one-fourth. The United States, alone, would have little leverage. Since U.S. investment is not essential to South Africa, the argument for such action is largely psychological, i.e., that it would jar South African whites into a better appreciation of the worldwide opposition to their policies.

Discouraging or prohibiting U.S. investment in South Africa would, of course, improve our relations with much of the world. It is also undoubtedly true that the stopping of American investment would have a considerable impact on South Africans. Even though the economy were not shaken, the confidence of those relying on *apartheid* as a permanent pattern for South Africa's economy and society would be undermined. The cessation of investment would be seen as one of a long series of developments tending to isolate South Africa. Many who profit from *apartheid* would be induced to reflect on its long-term disadvantages more seriously than they do now.

Whether increased doubt about the advantages of *apartheid* would affect South African policies beneficially is questionable. It might harden South African policies even further and undoubtedly would impel South Africa to turn to other sources of investment and to accelerate its already consider-

⁸ For background and text of a resolution adopted on June 18, 1964, see *ibid.*, July 6, 1964, p. 29.

⁹ U.N. doc. S/6210 and Add. 1.

able efforts to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

While cessation of investment might increase our credibility and influence with African countries in our efforts to encourage a nonviolent solution, it could seriously handicap our ability to carry on a dialog with South Africa. It could cause some damage to our own economic, scientific, and strategic interests.

Cultural and Scientific Relations

The United States, at both public and private levels, has a wide variety of cultural and scientific contacts with South Africa. Such contacts are intended to promote mutually beneficial relations in these fields. We hope they may also have the effect of combating the tendency of South Africa to drift off into sterile isolation.

Both public and private U.S. educational and exchange programs, though small, include all cultural groups as well as supporters of the Government and Opposition. A special effort is made, particularly in Government programs, to reach nonwhites, in view of their greater need and the many obstacles encountered. The South African Government's reluctance to give travel documents to nonwhites is one such obstacle, but we do not believe the effort should be abandoned. Particular aims of these programs include familiarizing South Africans with how the United States is dealing with its own problems, including civil rights, and providing leaders and especially young potential leaders with opportunities for training and observation in the United States. Of the approximately 400 South (and South-West) African students in U.S. institutions of higher learning, 137 are supported by U.S. Government funds. Of this number 122 are nonwhite. The U.S. Government has specific programs in Africa and the United States to help refugees from South Africa and South-West Africa obtain training and education. We have also contributed to U.N. programs for the education of South-West Africans and South Africans.

South-West Africa

While the international territory of South-West Africa is not part of the Republic of South Africa, it is a problem that affects U.S. policy toward South Africa; so I think I should say a few words about it. The territory was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations. South Africa's administration of the territory is the subject of a case before the International Court of Justice brought by Ethiopia and Liberia. They seek a determination as to whether South Africa, which has applied *apartheid* in South-West Africa, is complying with the terms of the mandate and whether the U.N. has inherited the supervisory functions of the League. As the matter is still before the Court, it would not be proper for me to comment on the substance of the case.

I would point out, however, that in this case the Court's judgment will be binding on all parties. A judgment is expected within the next few months. The United States naturally expects the parties to the suit to comply with the judgment. Moreover, under article 94 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is empowered to make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. Thus, depending on the nature of the judgment and the reaction of the parties to it, members of the Security Council may be called upon after the judgment to consider various means of enforcing international law, including sanctions. This case can be an important landmark both in the development of the rule of law in international affairs and in the evolution of the southern African problem.

Former High Commission Territories of the U.K.

I should perhaps also mention in passing another group of territories closely related to our policy toward South Africa. These are the British territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, which are wholly or partially surrounded by South Africa. Two of these territories—Basuto-

land and Bechuanaland—are expected to reach independence this year, and Swaziland is expected to follow before long.

The economies of these new African countries will, of course, remain closely related to South Africa's. Politically and socially, however, they are taking quite a different path. All are dedicated to nonracial democracy. The degree to which they are successful in establishing themselves on this basis could have in time a significant impact on racial patterns in southern Africa. In any event, I believe developments in these emerging countries will be worth following with sympathetic interest. It is partly for this reason that we are planning a modest expansion of our representation in these territories. By this summer instead of one consul, based in Swaziland, covering all three territories, we expect to have consuls in all three territories.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, we must frankly admit that the problems that we and other like-minded nations face regarding South Africa remain virtually intractable. Nobody can overlook the fact that race relations in that part of the world have worsened despite the efforts of the outside world, whether of persuasion, condemnation, or pressure. We must recognize that many countries have reacted to the worsening situation in South Africa by increasingly favoring a policy of pressures and that many others favor at least a policy of disengagement. We must recognize these as political factors affecting our own attitude toward the South African situation. At the same time we believe we must constantly examine and re-examine ways to ameliorate the situation.

Frustrated by the harm that *apartheid* does to human beings and to our policies, many believe we should manifest our disapproval of *apartheid* in more concrete ways. We in the Department, too, keep looking for new and constructive measures that we can take in dealing with this problem. In doing so, however, we constantly ask ourselves

whether a particular action would be effective. That is, would it actually improve the situation in South Africa, or might it even worsen it? We must also ask ourselves what effect the action would have on our position in Africa and the rest of the world and thus on our ability to influence the various forces that may be brought to bear on the situation.

We cannot neglect either our own values and specific interests in South Africa or those of major allies whose cooperation is of great importance to our worldwide policy goals. It is a frustratingly difficult set of policy considerations to juggle. In view of our position of world leadership and our commitment as Americans to equality here at home, it is impossible for us to have fully satisfactory relations with South Africa as long as it pursues policies so diametrically opposed to our own fundamental beliefs. At the same time it would be shortsighted and unwise to turn our backs on the South African problem. To the extent that we can without compromising our principles, we believe we must keep the channels of communication with South Africa open. Despite all frustrations, we must keep on seeking ways to influence constructively the problem of race relations in South Africa.

In the meanwhile we must do what we can to encourage more progress on the periphery of the main problem by aiding nonracial states in the rest of southern Africa. It may be that such states, while resisting the virus of *apartheid*, can have constructive relations with South Africa and by their example perhaps may gradually undermine the fear and prejudice which so obstruct healthy human relations at the foot of the continent.

American policy in southern Africa is, of course, part and parcel of our policy toward Africa as a whole and toward emergent peoples everywhere. We seek to assist independent African states in their efforts to achieve stable, progressive societies based on self-determination, the rule of law, and the dignity of the individual. Is it not rea-

sonable to assume that progress along these lines in the rest of Africa, and especially in the emergent states in southern Africa itself, will have a constructive influence on the South African problem?

Despite all the barriers, the wind of change is blowing ever stronger in southern Africa, and we must do what we can to see that, instead of destruction, it brings a new, more hopeful day to all the peoples living there and therefore to the cause of peace and freedom in the world.

Secretary Rusk Congratulates CENTO on 11th Anniversary

Following is the text of a message from Secretary Rusk to Gen. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization.

FEBRUARY 24, 1966

On the eleventh anniversary of the CENTO alliance, I am pleased to extend my personal congratulations and those of the United States Government to you and to our friends and colleagues in the Central Treaty Organization.

Since the beginning of the organization in 1955, CENTO countries have recorded impressive gains toward greater regional cooperation in the economic and social spheres. We, in the United States, believe that regional cooperation is one of the keys to greater well-being and prosperity for all. As President Johnson recently observed:¹

Regional cooperation is often the best means of economic progress as well as the best guarantor of political independence.

It is significant that the countries of CENTO, behind the defensive shield of the alliance, are continuing to pursue cooperative efforts which provide benefits for the entire region.

The United States is resolved to continue its support for the constructive work of the alliance.

U.S. Recognizes Ghana Government of National Liberation Committee

*Department Statement*²

Mr. K. Y. Boafo, Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of Ghana, was called to the State Department late Friday [March 4] by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Wayne Fredericks. He was handed a reply to a routine diplomatic note, thus constituting United States recognition of the Ghanaian Government of the National Liberation Committee.

In the note handed to Mr. Boafo by Mr. Fredericks the Department expressed the United States hope "for continuation of friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the governments and peoples of Ghana and the United States."

The Ghanaian Ambassador to the United States, Miguel Augustus Ribeiro, is presently in Accra. The United States Ambassador to Ghana is Franklin H. Williams.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

² Read to news correspondents on Mar. 4 by a Department spokesman.

"... from an intriguing idea into an inspired operation."

Fifth Anniversary of the Peace Corps

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

Mr. Vice President; Mr. Secretary of State; Your Excellencies, the Ambassadors and representatives of the 46 countries where the Peace Corps is today operating; returned Peace Corps volunteers; members of the Peace Corps National Advisory Council; the first Peace Corps Director and the new Director; Members of Congress; all other members of our Government; all other members of the Peace Corps; ladies and gentlemen: Happy birthday!

All of you have earned that greeting. Every person here, and many more who could not be here, helped to turn the Peace Corps from an intriguing idea into an inspired operation. You acted on faith

—faith in the power of men and women to always translate their convictions into action;

—faith in the ability of our society to trust its citizens when they choose to be different;

—faith in the desire of other nations to welcome with patience and good will those who come to them offering not money or goods but only themselves.

It was an act of faith on the part of that great President who established the Peace Corps by Executive order² 5 years ago today, and it was faith on the part of the Congress of the United States that voted by

increasingly overwhelming majorities to support this wonderful activity.

All of that faith, I think, has been vindicated. The constructive work of more than 20,000 people over long years—and the collaboration of the peoples with whom they have lived—is a real testament to the trust upon which the Peace Corps was founded.

In a world of violence these volunteers have shown that there is really another way—the way of private dedication and quiet courage working unheralded for ends that each has accepted as valuable and as vital. In this way those of you in the Peace Corps have carried forward the real revolution of our day and time, the revolution of peaceful change. In this way you are really waging the only war that we in America want to wage—the war against the inhumanity of man to his neighbor and the injustice of nature to her children.

Viet-Nam: Hope for Peaceful Change

In Viet-Nam there is another war. It is fueled by those who believe that they somehow might be able to accomplish their ends by means of terror and violence. America's purpose there is to give peaceful change a real chance to succeed.

In that struggle, soldiers are necessary not only to prevent but to halt aggression and to provide security for those who are determined to protect themselves and to raise their families. So, too, are the other workers of peace necessary who must lay

¹ Made at a ceremony at the White House on Mar.

1 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1961, p. 400.

the foundation for economic and social progress in that land. Political freedom, no matter how dearly bought, can flourish only when men and women are free from want and free from despair.

We have already begun that important work in Viet-Nam. The day, I hope, will soon come when the Peace Corps will be there, too. It must somehow find the day and the time that it can go and make its contribution when peace is assured. The same spirit that the Peace Corps volunteers brought to thousands of villages and cities in 46 countries should be carried to the hamlets of Viet-Nam.

Yesterday, at the University of Michigan, your new Director, Mr. Vaughn, said: "All of the energy, the faith, the devotion which we in the Peace Corps bring to our service serves a single cause." I can only say, then, that no group, no organization, contributes more to the cause of peace, in my judgment, than the Peace Corps, which we honor here today.

You are fortunate. You are equipped with an idea whose time has really come. It has come in Viet-Nam. We are there in order to restore peace and in order to let the works of peace serve the life of man.

So to the people of that land—North and South—we acknowledge that there are great differences between our people and our nations. But these gulfs of culture and tradition are spanned by a common humanity and shared needs of man—of food and shelter and education, a decent life for each family, the chance to build and to work and to till the soil free from fear and the arbitrary horrors of battle—and to walk in the dignity of those who have chosen their own destiny.

"Let War Stand Aside"

It is more than a shame; it is a crime—perhaps the greatest crime of man—that so much courage, and so much will, and so many dreams must be carelessly flung on the fires of death and war.

The long history of this conflict is filled with misunderstandings and invectives and

passions. I think the time has come to strike off the chains of the past so that we may be free to shape anew the future. We should not permit endless and unrewarding argument over what has already happened to bar us from accomplishing what should happen.

Peace is within our grasp if we will both reach for it together, and beyond peace are the wondrous gifts of peace, and beyond that a time when hope can reach unbounded for consummation.

There may be those who do not want peace, those whose ambitions stretch so far that war in Viet-Nam is but a welcome and a convenient episode in an immense and doomed design to subdue history to their will. But let them not suppose that our desire for peace springs either from weakness or from hesitation. Our desire for peace springs, rather, from a further recognition of our knowledge that the search for peace also always requires great skill and great courage.

If there are others, however, who do want peace, and if it is equally true that total victory is beyond expectation for them, as they must now know that it really is, then we think there is only one answer: Negotiate peace and let war stand aside while the people of Viet-Nam make their choice. For our part, here in America, we are eagerly willing to abide by the outcome.

We sincerely desire neither territory nor bases in Viet-Nam, neither economic domination nor military alliance. We fight for the principle that the people of South Viet-Nam should be able to choose their own course, free from the coercions of violence and terror and fear. We believe that the people of South Viet-Nam, through the process of elections, can select their own leaders and their own way of life.

That is the example we have set. That is the procedure we follow in our own land, and all the people of Viet-Nam can then freely express their will on the great questions of unification and national destiny.

That is what your country wants for the people of South Viet-Nam. That is what the

people of South Viet-Nam, we think, want. So together we seek the day when we can be as generous in peace as we must be determined in battle. We are ready when that day comes, ready to join in a massive effort of reconstruction and development that is open to all, including North Viet-Nam.

The Asian Bank, which we suggested in our speech in Baltimore,³ is only a beginning of what can be done when aggression ends and when men decide that peace and not war should be the testing ground of human experience. That measure has already passed the House and been reported in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously,⁴ and we hope it can be acted upon this week. It will be a great step forward.

Disciples of Peace

The Peace Corps has already shown us what it can do. For the Peace Corps is a movement. It is a movement to place the vessel of peace in the hands of individual men and women, driven by their own conscience to do something about healing this wounded world in which we live.

The man who, more than any other man, gave fire and gave purpose to your movement is stepping aside today on the fifth anniversary of the day that that movement began. Is there any doubt of the enormous bequest that he is leaving? For generations to come, as the harvests of his efforts are reaped time and time again, men will marvel at his contributions.

Of Sargent Shriver,⁵ it can be said that

he is a man to whom excellence and public service are synonymous, one of those rare men of whom Virgil spoke when he said, "They can because they think they can."

Five years ago only a few thought he could. There were moments, I am sure, at least from some of the cables I received from him when he was out in other parts of the world, when he, himself, doubted that he could. But he did. He was, of course, inspired, so inspired that he ran off rather rudely, I thought, with one of my assistants back in 1961. The last few months I have tried to pay him back. I have run off with several of his. One of them is here today to succeed him.

Jack Vaughn I first met out in a little fishing village in Africa, but he, like Sargent Shriver, I observed on the first meeting, is a disciple of peace. His life has been spent in the service of the cause of peace. This is the third job that I have asked Jack Vaughn to take since I met him in that fishing village in 1961. Each of these jobs he has served with great distinction.

This is going to be the last time, though, that I make a request for him to take another job, because, frankly, I am tired of attending his swearing-in ceremonies!

Jack, I think you know that you are stepping into the shoes of a man who has done more for his country than his country knows. His hands are going to be full with poverty and yours are going to be full with peace, and I hope that all of us will be the better for the work that both of you do.

In you two men I have the greatest confidence, and I have no doubt but what you will prove worthy of it.⁶

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.

⁵ Mr. Shriver now is Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

⁶ At the conclusion of the President's remarks, Mr. Vaughn was sworn in as Director of the Peace Corps.

Elements of the Philippine-American Partnership

by William P. Bundy

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am delighted to have the opportunity to meet with the members of the first Philippine-American Assembly.

This is a pioneer assembly—the first opening assembly held outside the United States. Yet its pattern and purposes are the same: to bring together leaders from various walks of life in our two discussions and to discuss our common problems frankly. You have already had extremely useful sessions, and the results of your deliberations—in this atmosphere of free, informal interchange of ideas and points of view—must surely be of great benefit to the peoples of both our countries and to our two Governments.

Reading the papers that have been prepared for this Assembly and the summary of General Romulo's [Carlos Romulo, Philippine Secretary of Education and president of the University of the Philippines] remarks yesterday, I am sure it will not be said, at least at this gathering, that—as Professor Taylor's [George Taylor, director, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington] paper so cogently puts it—the intellectual relationship between our two peoples is "marked by blandness and patronage."

I am conscious, too, of our presence in the city of Davao, on this island of Mindanao, which has played a historic part in the sweep of peoples and cultures at the confluence of the Asian Continent and the Pacific Ocean. Mindanao also, and perhaps

even more significantly, symbolizes the future. For Mindanao represents a frontier—appealing to the aspiration for land, for space, for the wise exploitation of the rich resources conferred by nature; to the pioneering spirit; to the promise of fulfillment of the good life. It is, therefore, particularly appropriate that on this island we turn our thoughts toward the future and toward our common goals.

What we—Filipinos and Americans alike—seek in this whole region is very simple indeed. It is that the nations of this area should develop as they see fit, free from external interference, working toward the welfare of their citizens under patterns of organization that they themselves develop, and in accordance with their own traditions. If Americans ever had the idea that our own experience furnishes any exclusive blueprint for ordering a free and vigorous society, we have long since outgrown that notion. What we seek, as has been well put, is to protect the option of peoples, to live in a world of diversity—a world which stands in striking contrast to that drab conformity which we know others are striving to promote and impose.

The Broad Sweep of Philippine-American Relations

Our Philippine-American partnership well illustrates the premium both of our peoples put on diversity, as well as on the fundamental unity of national aspirations which makes diversity possible. Our two peoples are linked by countless ties of sentiment and affection; by common business, pro-

¹ Address made before the Philippine-American Assembly at Davao, Philippines, on Feb. 24 (press release 35 dated Feb. 25).

fessional, educational, and civic endeavors; by the shared sacrifices of war. These ties have nurtured our partnership against a background of two diverse, dynamic, and proudly independent cultures.

Among the distinguished American members of this audience are many who are as vitally interested in the problems of partnership as is their own Government: problems concerning military bases, problems arising from our mutual trade and investments, as well as problems stemming from our current mutual effort to modernize every element of our Philippine-American partnership in line with present conditions and interests of our two countries.

The predominant characteristic of our partnership is that we share a basic international outlook and philosophy which shapes our national aspirations. To be sure, we pursue these from different vantage points, from distant corners of the globe, from differing economies, from distinct historical backgrounds. But we converge in our mutual regard and respect for human dignity, for the individual's right to live in a free society, for the conduct of international relations on the basis of equality and law rather than on coercion and conquest. Our relationship is dynamic and growing. The existence of competing political systems simply accents the challenge to build a better world—a world in which we can progress in eliminating hunger and disease, ignorance and injustice.

The interest of the Philippines today is directed most strongly toward economic development. And in this interest it dovetails with ours. Basic to the policy of the United States is the desire to see rapid and meaningful growth in the developing countries. This stems from the profound conviction that such growth, with equitable participation and sharing by the people, contributes to the preservation of those values of human dignity and freedom which are basic to our own life and to our shared concepts of real peace and international justice.

We speak often of the strategic importance of the Philippines in this part of Asia

and the world, and this is true. But what is perhaps more fundamental is that the Philippines, as the oldest operating democracy in Southeast Asia, presents to Asia and the world a sharp antithesis to exploitative oligarchy and radical military dictatorships. Perhaps the Philippines is not growing in the economic sense as rapidly as it would like—what country does? But the important thing is that such growth as has occurred in the Philippines has taken place against the backdrop of the Republic's own high spiritual values, of individual liberty and of individual, and national, freedom of choice.

In a precise and limited sense, we could equate U.S. interests with our commercial investments here of nearly a half billion dollars, our trade as the fourth largest in all Asia, our big resident community of some 25,000, our vital military bases, our sustained military assistance, U.S. aid and payments of all kinds worth almost \$2 billion since the end of World War II, and—perhaps not least—our separate continued direct payments of benefits to some 100,000 veterans and dependents of veterans of the Philippine and U.S. Armed Forces (a tie and obligation, by the way, we have nowhere else in this region).

But more important, I think the Philippines means so much to the United States because the Filipino people have so often demonstrated that, across barriers of oceans and of cultures, this is a country where Americans are always, as Filipinos so often say, made to feel "at home"; where U.S. policies have had, and we hope earned, effective and intelligent support; where our motivations are widely understood and accepted.

With generations gradually fading from the scene, the memories of our shared sacrifices are becoming less vivid, less firsthand and universal. As General Romulo pointed out yesterday, the history of our relationship has been reexamined, with all its faults, perhaps with an overemphasis on these faults. Inevitably, as in all free human associations, differences and irritants have occasionally cropped up to strain or even

mar our relations. Yet in the enduring support and good will of the Filipino people, the United States recognizes friendship it cherishes and which it will take the greatest pains to continue to deserve.

Of the many challenging statements in the papers that have been prepared for this conference—papers which surely show that Americans as well as Filipinos can be critical of the past and present—the only single statement that I would deny with all my heart and mind is the statement, appearing in the introduction, that “The Philippines . . . is peripheral to any vital American interest.”

Believe me, this is not so in the thinking of our Government, and it is not so in the thoughts of the American people.

Our concern for the Philippines goes far beyond our concrete ties and interests here, important as these are. It is a part of the basic concern that I stated at the outset for the preservation of the rights of peoples to go their own way. It is part of that concern, as it relates not only to Asia but to the whole world. And it is a concern made more acute and poignant by our deep ties of history and present association.

Let me turn now to the central elements of our partnership, as they relate to our bilateral relations in particular.

Defense Relationships

Nothing is more central in our relations than the commitment of the United States to the defense of the Philippine Republic.

As President Eisenhower stated to President García, as President Johnson stated to President Macapagal, and as Secretary Rusk only last month reiterated to President Marcos: Any armed attack against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack against the United States Armed Forces there and against the United States and would be instantly repelled.

It is above all in relation to this commitment that the United States maintains military bases, forces, and facilities in the Philippines.

But if these bases and the U.S. forces they

accommodate are necessary to the defense of the Philippines, so also are properly equipped and actively trained Philippine security forces. The present members of the armed forces of the Philippines are the heirs of a proud tradition. In its efforts to support and maintain forces that can insure internal security and contribute to our shared obligation for the defense of Philippine territory, the Philippine Government can count on the continued assistance of the United States.

As most of you are well aware, the bases in the Philippines today fulfill a vital role in the logistic support of the free world's effort in Viet-Nam. I can assure you, as I am confident the Philippine people have been assured by their Government, that the question of the role of U.S. bases here in the protection of our mutual interests has been and will remain a matter of joint concern. In this connection the United States and the Philippines, in the past 2 years, began an orderly review of the agreements governing our base relationships, which led last year to the conclusion of agreements on criminal jurisdiction² and the relinquishment by the United States of 25,000 acres at Clark Field in addition to other base lands.³ Both our Governments are continuing to work toward the resolution of other outstanding issues in the same spirit of cooperation and mutual purpose which has characterized our base discussions of the past 2 years. Our joint consultation, through the Mutual Defense Board established in 1959, must be maintained and strengthened, looking not only to the specific problems that may arise but to our common concern for the security of the Philippines and of the area.

Bilateral Economic Problems

The United States believes that in our economic cooperation planning we should look to the future rather than reminisce or fret about the past. We are not, accordingly, disposed to reopen questions long since

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5851; for a Department announcement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 30, 1965, p. 358.

³ TIAS 5924.

closed, and involving events of over 20 years ago, regarding which the United States—on both the executive and legislative sides of the Government—feels in good conscience that it has fulfilled its obligations. On the other hand, we are quite prepared to look into the possibilities of a more equitable administration of benefits to Filipino veterans of the Second World War; and for this purpose a joint commission is soon to be created, which will seek to make unified recommendations to the President of the United States for his endorsement to the United States Congress.

At the same time, our two Governments are now also beginning to negotiate on the disposition of what we call the special fund for education, which, you will recall, was established pursuant to an amendment of the Philippine war damage legislation of 1962.⁴ This fund, involving some \$28 million, is to be transferred gradually but within the minimum required period of time to the Philippine Government, to be used to further educational projects to promote the general development of the Philippines, as may be determined by our two Presidents.

The United States will continue to work with the Philippine Government on problems for which final solutions have as yet eluded us. I might observe here that in the case of many problems where satisfactory solutions have been found, this type of progress sometimes tends to escape the kind of public notice given to as yet unsolved problems.

We have, for example, found mutually satisfactory answers to questions of pay and allowances for Filipino laborers employed at overseas U.S. bases. On the other hand, we have not as yet been able to eliminate the gap between our positions on concluding a bilateral civil aviation agreement. These problems are never easy. But we are confident that we will achieve a solution, to mutual advantage, which will exploit the expanding traffic potential and enhance our already growing trade.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 301.

Economic Progress and Partnership

Let me now touch on some of the economic aspects of our future partnership.

The Philippines is well justified in being proud of the great progress of the past two decades, since the time within easy memory when the Philippines lay prostrate and ravaged by war. By the beginning of the 1960's the Philippine economy had achieved all the essentials for self-sustained and vigorous growth. Still we must observe that the average rate of growth—4.9 percent in the period 1957–1964—while ahead of many Latin American countries, of India, Pakistan, and Iran, ranked the Philippines behind Thailand at 7.4 percent over the same period, behind Taiwan at 7.1 percent, and behind Malaysia at 5.9 percent. In the more relevant terms of per capita GNP over the same years, the Philippines averaged only a 1.7-percent rate of growth, well behind that of Thailand, Taiwan, Iran, India, and Pakistan, and markedly behind the Philippines' own average of 2.5 percent in the years from 1953 to 1959.

The problem that remains to be tackled if the Philippine economy is to achieve a satisfactory rate of growth in per capita income, assuming an annual population increase estimated by U.N. demographers at well over 3 percent, is illustrated by calculation of gross investment requirements for the remaining years of this decade. With this rate of population increase, an annual growth rate of 6 percent in GNP is by no means an excessive target for the Philippine economy. Such a growth rate should yield an annual increase in per capita income of about 2.8 percent; surely compatible with Philippine aspirations and in accord with Philippine needs. With due caution for statistical error, best estimates are that the Philippines will need a large inflow of foreign capital—\$1 billion or more over the next 5 years—to achieve this rate of growth.

I believe that an examination of the underlying statistics and estimates on which this prediction is based will reveal it not to be excessive, given the necessity for building

up foreign exchange reserves, as well as debt repayment and servicing costs.

While opportunities for use of U.S. aid have perhaps been limited in recent years, the Government and leaders of the Philippines are aware that our willingness to assist where needed has continued and stands unimpaired. The United States regards itself as engaged, in partnership with the Philippines, in the process of Philippine economic growth and development for as long as the job needs doing and American aid is wanted and required.

What now seems most important is to stimulate rising levels of income and purchasing power in the countryside. President Marcos has placed high priority on increased rice production and improved standards of living for the rural population. The United States, of course, supports such programs and is prepared to assist as required—as it supports, and continues to assist in, the expansion of the industrial sector and the development of needed infrastructure. Public U.S. loan funds facilitated the emergence of the important steel complex at Iligan here in Mindanao. The United States supports the concept that industrial growth in the Philippines is in our mutual interest. Such growth in our view must parallel economic development in the rural sector, creating the markets which Philippine industry will need to develop and prosper.

I cannot in this short time review fully all aspects of the various development programs in which we are now mutually engaged. But I cannot refrain from expressing interest in evidences of Philippine private and public concern with family planning. Here is a symptom of awareness of matters joyful and tragic, sacred to the most private part of the individual home. Here is the beginning of awareness, too, that all can suffer if society ignores the needed balance between men and resources.

I come now to our current and proximate future relations in the fields of investment and trade. Some of you will already have exclaimed: "Mr. Bundy has talked for some time and has not yet even mentioned the

Laurel-Langley Agreement or the parity clause!"

Trade and Investment

As I stated in Manila on March 8 of last year,⁵ 1974 is a long way off, and the agreement which I have just mentioned has, I think, served well both Philippine and U.S. interests since it was concluded back in 1955. During the life of the present agreement, its provisions will naturally continue to be operative. We believe that both our countries will want to provide a framework for continuity of our trade and investment relationship which will be mutually beneficial when the present agreement expires. As far as the Laurel-Langley parity article is concerned, namely article VI of the agreement, I can reiterate United States policy that we have no intention of seeking its extension. We rely on the Philippine Constitution, the existing and future laws of the Philippines, and the sense of justice and fairness of the Philippine courts, leaders, and people to protect the rights and interests of American investors.

More specifically, I hope that, beginning with this conference and subsequently in many similar meetings which may take place in the coming months and years, Filipinos and Americans will together be able to consider, to discuss, and to agree on what is needed to replace Laurel-Langley when it expires. The United States Government believes that a new instrument—for example, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, adapted in whatever way is found to be necessary and desirable to meet the requirements of the Philippine-American situation—can be discussed and eventually negotiated before 1971. The provisions of such an agreement could clarify for American businessmen desiring to invest in the Philippines the conditions under which they could operate here after the Laurel-Langley Agreement has expired in 1974 and a new agreement has become operative to take its place.

⁵ *Ibid.*, May 3, 1965, p. 664.

What is, I think, needed most of all is a clear realization on both sides of the need for continued private as well as public resources to meet the development goals of the Philippines. The American side, for its part, recognizes that the entry of certain Philippine products into the United States market has become part of an historic pattern of trade. Although both of us need to give thought to the shape of future markets and of the need for agricultural diversification, we are confident that the Philippines will continue to find a major market for their products in the United States even after the expiration of the present agreement. Yet this is not to deny that trade patterns and policies of both our countries have undergone some basic changes in the past 20 years or so of Philippine independence. And we fully expect that they will continue to do so in the future.

The extent of this kind of change is already evident in our trade patterns.

From the time when (in the pre-Laurel-Langley period) the United States supplied well over half of total Philippine imports, the U.S. share of the Philippine market has now gradually declined to about 40 percent. And less than one-half of Philippine exports are destined for the United States. We look on this evolution as healthy and natural in an independent nation seeking to develop growing markets for its products in many parts of the world. And we take satisfaction also from the fact that, despite these percentage changes, our overall trade level has continued to expand in absolute terms.

We note therefore that long-range expansion in the level of trade stems not from preferential devices but from the natural circumstance that increasing prosperity in both our countries is creating a higher level of demand. For the Philippines, we believe this means that both its capacity to export as well as its ability to buy is inescapably dependent upon the success of its overall program for economic growth and development.

I have mentioned earlier what we believe to be conservatively estimated needs for for-

eign investment inflow if the Philippines wishes to grow at a reasonable and realistic target rate. We feel secure in the conviction that U.S. direct investment has contributed substantially over the years to the buildup of Philippine capital, that it has been instrumental in building Philippine economic prosperity and has contributed in raising the earning capacity of the nation and of many Filipinos individually.

And Philippine experience in this respect is similar to our own. Foreign investment played an absolutely crucial role in U.S. economic growth. It continues to make a major contribution. We welcome it, and our "investment climate" is warm, because we want capital to flow.

For the future, we will be first to acknowledge that some changes in attitudes may be desirable on both sides. Our relations in this field must be built on a solid foundation of recognition and respect for Philippine aspirations and Philippine financial and managerial resources and capabilities and all management and ownership arrangements that give full and adequate scope to these resources and capabilities, and to the natural Philippine desire—shared in other countries in like circumstances—for a full nation sharing in this type of enterprise.

But there is no gainsaying the need on the Philippine side for the consideration and adoption of steady policies, which will provide not merely American but all foreign investors with adequate clarification of conditions and reasonable incentives. In a capital-short world, where there is significant competition for private U.S. investment, such favorable policies are necessary if the essential flow of investment to the Philippines is to be maintained. This flow, in our view, cannot but serve the interest of the Philippine economy.

Our Partnership in the Wider Context

The Philippines and the United States share a long and productive past association, a mutually beneficial relationship in the present, and—the wellspring of this past and present—our common hopes and aspira-

tions for the future. So both of us for many years now, and surely increasingly into the future, have been looking outside ourselves to the wider role that each of us can play in Asia as a whole.

It is heartening that the Philippines, in looking after its own enlightened interests, is ever growing in its stature among the nations of this region. Deeply conscious of our own close relations with the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, with Thailand, and with Malaysia, we see Philippine friendship with these nations as a crucial link in a chain of mutual interdependence among the free peoples of the Far East to assure their continued freedom. Growing Philippine relations with Japan, which we hope will expand still further, is another encouraging development in the interest of both nations and a further impetus to ever-growing mutual cooperation in this region of the world. This expanding role of the Philippines contributes no less to its own and our mutual security than to the prospects of stability in the region, indeed to the prospect of peace in the world.

I need not dwell in great detail on the struggle in Viet-Nam; and on the consequences for the security of this entire region should brave and dedicated men—bending under awesome and cruel burdens too long sustained alone—ever despair of moving their neighbors and others who cherish freedom to respond to their need for help.

We know how much the people and the Government of Viet-Nam will value the further contribution which the Philippines is now considering. I am much encouraged that President Marcos' plans, as announced, emphasize that civic action and social construction will be the main task of the Philippine engineer forces for Viet-Nam. Nothing could be closer to the central purpose of all strivings there. This was the point of the recent conference in Honolulu,⁶ on which our Vice President has now fully informed your Government. It is a point, indeed, that owes much to the lessons learned in

your own fight against Communist insurgency here in the Philippines.

True to its past actions, its farsighted and devoted support for and contribution to the United Nations, its role in SEATO (to which it has now provided, as Secretary General, one of its ablest public servants, General Jésus Vargas), its remarkably effective support of private organizations devoted to international understanding, the Philippines has in most recent times done much to strengthen mutual cooperation and association among the states of this area. The United States thinks much of these contributions, sees their especial worth because the countries concerned themselves impel them.

The resumption of normal relations with like-minded neighbors of the Philippines can only contribute to the same goal of regional progress. It may open the door to highly beneficial cooperation among groups of nations and deep economic and cultural ties. Such associations would have neither hostile nor exclusive intent and could, in our view, provide a magnet of attraction to others similarly desiring to move peacefully ahead.

Regional progress has indeed recently taken several great strides which are no doubt a major source of satisfaction to the Philippines—as of course they are to us. Since 1963, the Philippines has been host to two significant ECAFE conferences, at which a number of far-reaching decisions were taken. Most important, I believe, was the decision to establish an Asian Development Bank.⁷ That decision is now a reality, and the location of the Bank's headquarters in Manila is a measure of the confidence and trust which the other nations of Asia repose in the Philippines.

With the establishment of the Bank come new challenges and new opportunities for the member countries in the region and for the Philippines in particular. We have great expectations for the Bank and confidence in the Philippine role in its future development. This will be to the benefit of all the peoples of this area, upon whose hopes and aspira-

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.

tions for a better life this new institution was built.

We stand, ladies and gentlemen, at the beginning of a new era in regional cooperation and in the partnership between two old friends—the Philippines and the United States. We stand also at the beginning of a most promising new administration in the Philippines. My country, and President Johnson in particular, have expressed on a number of recent occasions the confidence which we repose in the person of President Marcos and of everyone on his able team.

I have tried today to review some of the principal elements of our partnership, their significance to both countries, and their value as example in a hoped-for world of unity in diversity. I conclude in stating my conviction that this partnership, rising to the challenges of the new world ahead, will long endure, not static but ever changing and evolving, as the common effort of two very different peoples in two far-distant regions of the globe, providing together the elements of a relationship of continuing benefit not only to both sides but to mankind.

The United States and the Far East: Problems and Policies

by Leonard Unger

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

My topic is the problems and policies that the United States is pursuing in the Far East. They are problems that concern all of us. In many ways, I would like to spend a large share of my time talking about what is happening beneath the surface, such as the continuing economic progress of so many countries, Japan foremost and recently Korea. Other encouraging factors are the tremendous developments of the last year in the formation of regional economic ties as shown by the Asian Development Bank; the organization, at least in the beginnings, of effort to do a serious job in the Mekong Valley in Southeast Asia; and such highly constructive and statesmanlike developments as the reestablishment of normal relations between Japan and Korea. A great deal, much of it constructive, is going on in the

Far East, and it would be a great pleasure to discuss it extensively.

Yet I know that the situation in Viet-Nam is necessarily at the front of our thoughts. I will try to sketch the historic setting of the view that we take toward Viet-Nam, proceed to the recent diplomatic developments, particularly the suspension and resumption of bombing and the diplomacy and the other actions that surrounded it, and conclude with a discussion of where I think we stand, where we may be heading, and what the stakes are.

If you look at Viet-Nam broadly, I think you can see that it represents in an acute form the three major problems that I regard as the essence of the situation in the Far East. *First*, the problem of the security of individual nations from external aggression and subversion. *Second*, the problem of healthy and sound political, economic, and social development within individual nations. *Third*, cutting across in a sense each of the

¹ Address made at Terre Haute, Ind., on Feb. 18 at a meeting sponsored by the Wabash Valley Lecture Club and Indiana State University.

other two, the maturing of a healthy spirit of nationalism, free of the scars of past history of local rivalries and particularly of past colonial domination. All of these problems in one degree or another have been, and continue to be, present among the Far Eastern nations, as indeed elsewhere in the world. Meeting them is central to the kind of Far East that may develop over the next 25 years.

U.S. Objectives in the Far East

Our objectives in relation to the Far East are simple, at least to state. There, as throughout the world, we wish to see independent nations developing as they see fit and in accordance with their own traditions. We may hope that that development will be in the direction of governments based on consensus, and increasingly on democratic processes, with economic systems that enlist the initiatives of the individual. But we have long since outgrown any notion that we, in what may loosely be called the West, have a blueprint for government and economic organization that can be applied in any pat sense to other nations as they emerge from different conditions and different heritages.

Our national interest—I speak as an American—is no longer explicitly guided in the Far East, by particular economic or military concerns with individual areas, as was indeed to a considerable extent the case not only with ourselves but also with the British and others before World War II. We have a deep concern for expanded trade and cultural ties—which alone can in the end bind the world together—and we have military base rights and needs related to our role in assisting in the security in the area. But neither of these is an end in itself. The first will, we believe, flourish if the nations in the area are able to develop in freedom; the second, the security role, must now be maintained but will over time, we hope, become susceptible of reduction and indeed, wherever possible, of elimination.

Rather, we care about the total picture partly because a nation with our traditions

and our present power could hardly do otherwise and partly because we know in our hearts as well as our minds that it makes a great deal of difference to our most concrete national interests that the vast potential and talent of the Far East should be developed in healthy national entities, and that the Far East should not go through a second stage—as Europe had to do—of waves of domination that must in the end be met at the cost of vast human misery.

So we need not apologize for our objectives or for our deep involvement in the Far East. Whatever their differences with us may be, the free peoples of Asia have the same objectives for themselves and generally understand that, in present circumstances, an American role is necessary, even though they—as we—may look to the day when that involvement, at least in its military aspect, may be reduced and the area have its own balance of power.

I have spoken of three central problems, of security, of political, economic, and social development, and of the development of a healthy spirit of nationalism overcoming the particular problems of colonial domination. If I had to summarize the Vietnamese situation in a single sentence, I would say that it embodied all three problems. The Vietnamese problem stems from an unfortunate history of emergence from colonial control and a failure by the colonial power to train Vietnamese for the practice of self-government. That history in turn created a Communist security threat. In the face of the French refusal to promise a timetable for independence, leadership in the nationalist movement fell to the toughest and most disciplined group—the Communist minority. These developments in turn have retarded and made infinitely more difficult political and particularly economic development which would normally have lent itself to rapid and relatively easy progress.

Nobody doubts that post-'54 Viet-Nam has had political difficulty or that President Diem, an ardent nationalist in many ways comparable to Syngman Rhee in Korea, became narrower and narrower in his theories and application of government, became out

of touch with and finally lost the support of his people. And yet the root of the problem in Viet-Nam does lie in the North. Had the South been left alone to work out its problems, we could have looked, I think, to some process akin to what has taken place in Korea, where Syngman Rhee was eventually replaced, first by a popular but ineffective government under Chong, then by a military dictatorship, and then by the free democratic government which exists there today. Something of that type of evolution would have taken place. The North did not wish it so.

Hanoi had, at the time of the '54 settlement, expected to take over the South through the 1956 elections provided for in the 1954 accords. Taking a Communist view of what a free election would comprise, they had little doubt of the outcome, and indeed at the time the fighting ended they might have had considerable ground for their expectations.

The Situation in 1956

By 1956, however, the situation was entirely different in both North and South. Diem had taken hold in the South. A strong spirit of cohesion, of non-Communist nationalism had become aroused and reflected in a going concern which even Professor [Hans] Morgenthau described as a "miracle." In the North, as General [Vo Nguyen] Giap admitted to the 10th Communist Congress, there was at that period intense repression, "terror" became "far too widespread," and "torture came to be regarded as a normal practice."

The basic point in 1956 was that the North Vietnamese Communist regime was not prepared to make the slightest gesture toward a free election in the sense that the accords had required, in the sense that all of us would recognize. In that position it was in company with every Communist regime that has ever been in power.

The North bided its time, having left behind in the South groups for political agitation, cached arms, and many other assets in violation of the accords. In the late 1950's,

seeing Diem's increasing difficulties, North Viet-Nam decided to go on the march. It began the systematic infiltration of military forces, political cadres, and arms. That infiltration is the essence of the problem. It turned a discontent that would have been worked out within South Viet-Nam's own internal framework into a situation where the North was trying to impose its will by force in the South. That is the root of the problem, the basis for our increasing action to assist the Government and the people in South Viet-Nam in their own self-defense.

In 1959, 1960, and 1961 there was a steady buildup of hostile incidents so that by the fall of 1961 there were widespread uses of terror, involving the assassination and kidnaping of officials and other civilians. In the fall of 1961 President Kennedy made the decision that the United States would have to go beyond the limits of the Geneva accords. That decision was a fully justified response to the wholesale violation of the accords by the other side. We raised our military personnel from the levels provided in the Geneva accords to 10,000 men in 1962 and to roughly 25,000 men at the end of 1964. These men acted as advisers and assisted the Government of South Viet-Nam in its logistics. They did not operate as combat ground units.

In late 1963 political difficulties culminated with the overthrow of Diem. In retrospect, one of the most significant facts is that neither before nor after that overthrow did any political leader of any consequence in South Viet-Nam go over to the Viet Cong. That, I think, is one of the strongest proofs that, whatever their differences, whatever the degree of respect and standing that a particular government in Saigon may have had at a particular moment, the people of South Viet-Nam were quarreling among themselves. The process was the inevitable political evolution of a new nation, particularly of one without training and practice in government, which was at the same time trying to defend itself from a foreign-supported insurgency. The struggles among the non-Communist nationalists were not connected in any way with the Viet Cong.

By early 1965 steadily increasing military action and infiltration required our Government and the South Vietnamese Government to face the decision of whether they should any longer leave immune the territory of the North which was being used as the base for the infiltration of the key elements of aggression. We concluded that we should not, and we began the measured, carefully directed bombing of military targets in the North.

Beginning (as we now know) in the middle of 1964, with the first organized units entering in December, North Viet-Nam began to send south not merely individual North Vietnamese, as had been the case for some time, but organized units, regiments and divisions. Hanoi obviously intended to move the conflict to conventional warfare described in the teachings of Mao and of General Giap, the North Vietnamese commander, as the stage used to administer the coup de grace when the adversary had sufficiently weakened. That was Hanoi's strategy for 1965. I think they had quite a high expectation of achieving it.

To meet that strategy the United States began to increase its forces and, beginning in the spring of last year, to use them in combat roles. In the summer the United States decided to raise its combat force to very significant levels. They now number about 205,000 men.

Each of these steps was in response to the whole pattern of action of the North and followed aggressive steps taken first by the North.

The Search for Peace

Throughout this period, our Government was concerned with the possibilities of peaceful negotiations and settlement. We had worked tirelessly on the problem of Laos in 1961 and 1962. A solution had been brought about which, had it been adhered to, would have been a reasonable and just arrangement for Laos. It was not adhered to, not for one day, by the other side. Their violations are documented in the reports of the International Control Commission. Hanoi

kept its forces in Laos. Hanoi went on sending men and equipment through Laos into South Viet-Nam. That effort—the Laos accords of 1962—to create what could have been a major building block in a peaceful structure for Southeast Asia was frustrated by the Communists.

The United States continued its search for peace. A government in a position such as ours must follow and always will follow every reasonable avenue toward a peaceful settlement. In the first half of 1965 one can list 15 publicly known initiatives and in the latter half of the year perhaps another 10 through which the United States sought peace. We tried always to see if there was some basis on which Hanoi would discuss the matter, or to see if there might be some way of coming at peace through the avenue of a reciprocal reduction of hostilities that would permit the situation to be settled down.

Our objective in South Viet-Nam is quite simple. We seek the removal of external interference so that the people of South Viet-Nam will be in a position to determine their own future. That is surely the fundamental sense of the Geneva accords of 1954. We expressly stated that we envisaged the same kind of procedure provided by the Geneva accords of 1954 with respect to the reunification of the country. Our position is, as it has always been on Viet-Nam and on Germany and on Korea, that in these divided countries the ultimate test should be the will of the people in both halves as to whether they wish to be one country or two. That was required by a United Nations resolution on Korea that was never honored in North Korea. It has been our repeated proposal in Germany. It is our position on Viet-Nam, and it is the position of the South Vietnamese Government on Viet-Nam. Those are our fundamental objectives. They are quite straightforward.

As these various initiatives were pursued, many people told us that from a psychological standpoint it was very difficult for Hanoi to show a sign of willingness to move toward peace because of the bombings of the

North. Could not the bombings be suspended for a reasonable period to see if this would create an atmosphere in which Hanoi might be better able to respond? The suggestion came to us from our friends. It came to us from nonaligned countries. It came to us from Communist powers. It came to us usually, particularly from the Communist nations, in terms of a suspension of from 2 to 3 weeks to a month at the outside and with no assurance that Hanoi would respond but rather with indications that there was reason to hope that something would happen.

We had, of course, stated all along that we would consider a suspension but that we hoped for a confidential indication that there would be some response by the other side. The answer usually given was, "We can't even ask Hanoi unless you try it." So we tried it. And for 37 days we suspended the bombings. I want to emphasize that we never set a time limit. We stressed that the suspension could be continued if Hanoi were prepared to respond. We said this privately, directly to Hanoi, and we said it through a great variety of third countries in a position to communicate with Hanoi, because we believe, and I think with some assurance, that Hanoi is the key to this problem. Although there may be pressures from Peking and Moscow, Hanoi is in the last analysis in the position to decide.

We gave it every opportunity. Governor Harriman was not sightseeing, nor was Ambassador Goldberg, nor was McGeorge Bundy in going to Ottawa, nor was Governor Williams in visiting the African nations. Some of the visits were to inform allied countries who perhaps were not in a position to act, but there were dispersed through these serious, profoundly serious, efforts to deal with and to explain our position clearly to governments in a position either to communicate with Hanoi or to discuss the matter with other governments that were in such a position. It was an intensely serious diplomatic effort.

The days went on and on, and there was no evidence of any response. The record piled up of the actions taking place on the ground.

There were two possible ways that Hanoi might have responded with moves toward peace. Hanoi might quietly have taken actions without acknowledging them publicly, and used the direct and indirect contacts that were opened up, to give us a confidential indication that such action was taking place. We in turn would have responded. The pace could have been lowered, a better atmosphere created, and conceivably even the problem solved over the long run. Such was our hope.

We cannot speak with any assurance on present evidence of the exact levels of infiltration that took place during the suspension, but we do know that our reconnaissance aircraft operating over Laos and over the southern part of North Viet-Nam saw roads and bridges repaired at a feverish rate, saw movement carried on intensively by day, and counted literally hundreds of trucks moving south. We cannot set an exact figure on men infiltrated at this stage. We do not know what was in each truck. Until men have arrived, been in action with their units, and have been taken prisoner, we are unable to reconstruct the whole pattern of unit movement. But the evidence during the suspension showed conclusively that there was no reduction whatever in infiltration but if anything a clear increase. The flow had been increasing since the late summer, from the then reliably estimated level of about 1,500 men a month toward or perhaps now to a level possibly as high as 4,500 men a month. That steady increase went right on through the suspension.

Increase in Military Activity From North

Secondly, there was the possibility that there might be some response in the form of a nonadvertised reduction of military activity in the South. There again the evidence negated any such possibility. The number of incidents per week for the period was slightly higher than in the preceding period, markedly higher than the 1965 average. The total number of military attacks, those of company size or larger, those of battalion size or larger, all showed increases over the

preceding period and were significantly higher on the average than during 1965. There were not, it is true, spectacular actions on the scale of the engagement of North Vietnamese regular units in the Plei Me area in November, but we did continue to encounter regular North Vietnamese units throughout this period. Prisoners and equipment were taken as firm evidence of this. The irregularity of operation that had been noted throughout 1965 continued. There was no indication of any change other than normal regrouping in respect to those units. The overall picture was clear. The military activity, if anything, increased during this period.

In both direct and indirect contacts, the opportunity was provided, as I have said, for Hanoi to suggest that something affirmative was taking place. There was no such indication in our reading of the evidence. In any case their response was negative.

On the diplomatic side, the possibility existed that Hanoi might at least be prepared to discuss aspects of the issues or, preferably, to accept really broad discussions or negotiations either without conditions or on the bases of the Geneva accords. We had said quite clearly that our own 14-point summary² represented our views. These were not conditions. On the contrary, the third and fourth points were that we are prepared to talk without conditions or on the basis of the Geneva accords. We said we were prepared to discuss those 14 points. We were prepared to discuss Hanoi's four points. We were prepared to discuss any proposition that anyone thought would lead anywhere. Nevertheless, even during the bombing pause there was an absolute refusal on the part of Hanoi to discuss anything with anybody. That was true of all third-country reports. It was true of our direct contacts and inquiries.

The picture that had formed privately was in essence reflected in Hanoi's final and authoritative response contained in Ho's letter to the heads of Communist states, sent on

January 24th and published on the 28th. That letter contains only repetitions of past themes. It requires us to accept Hanoi's four points, the third of which calls, in effect, for the immediate installation of a coalition government in Saigon with the National Liberation Front having the decisive voice. In short, it calls for the kind of coalition government that was used by Communists in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, that would have been used but for the leadership of General de Gaulle in France, to bring about Communist control in very short order. That is the core of the four points and of our difficulty with them. In addition, Hanoi stated that we must not only accept the four points but prove our good faith by actual deeds, namely, the elimination once and for all of bombing or any military activity against the North. Furthermore, Hanoi demanded that we accept and negotiate with the so-called National Liberation Front as the *sole* representative of the South Vietnamese people. In other words Hanoi, perhaps with even a shade of additional hardness at the end of this period, was restating its fundamental condition that it was not prepared even to discuss the matter unless we accepted in advance the essence of its position and the achievement of its objective.

That was the total picture. We would have been prepared to wait. We would have been prepared to give every opportunity for anything to develop that anyone could have suggested was developing. But by the end of this period the answer had come back negative and clearly negative on all channels, both direct and indirect, and Ho's letter fully reflects anything that transpired privately during the period of the suspension.

The Resumption of Bombing

The President was faced with a decision. Should we continue the suspension despite the lack of any indication whatever that any response was ever forthcoming, or must we not resume what we have always regarded as an essential aspect of the military actions that are required to protect South Viet-Nam.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.

that is, to bring about a situation in which Hanoi will cease its interference and turn the struggle, if it must go on, from a military to a political channel? At any rate, Hanoi must leave South Viet-Nam alone.

On the military side, nobody supposed that resumed bombing could cut off the infiltration or even could prevent the forces in or entering the South from being adequately supplied. But it was clear on the record of nearly a year that bombing had markedly increased the costs and difficulties of infiltration and supply, had undoubtedly kept the rates of infiltration substantially below what they would otherwise have been, and had tended to impose a ceiling on the level to which North Viet-Nam could go in introducing forces into the South. That was the military aspect. I am frank to say that there was also a political aspect—if Hanoi had drawn the conclusion that we were not prepared to follow through to that extent in our efforts to aid South Viet-Nam, I think one can say flatly that it would have led away from an eventual peaceful resolution of the problem.

In international law there is specific justification for the bombing as an act of self-defense against a country that is deliberately and consciously supplying the crucial sinews, men and material, of war. That is what we were doing on a measured basis against military targets. But in evaluating the bombing it is also very important to realize the significance of not granting immunity to the territory of a nation committing such acts of aggression. That point is well appreciated in many nations, particularly in those that may themselves be threatened by future “wars of national liberation” or “people’s wars.” Our refusal to grant Hanoi immunity will serve to deter such actions in the future and therefore in the longer run help to bring about a world at peace.

We knew that the bombing of the North, by itself, could never bring Hanoi to withdraw its military and cease its subversive efforts. In the short term there is evidence that it may have had the reverse effect. However, in the long run, with the situation

in the South becoming increasingly difficult for the Viet Cong and with their hopes of victory receding, the additional element of measured and controlled bombing must in the end have a very significant cumulative, and possibly decisive, effect. Without our bombing, North Viet-Nam would be in the position of being able to turn the spigot of aggression off and on with no pressure at any time to pull its forces back and really end its assaults.

In the most basic sense the bombing of the North seemed to us an element essential to the protection of the South Vietnamese, who last year died at the ratio of 7 of their men to 1 of ours and the other allied forces, Australians, New Zealanders, and Koreans, fighting alongside them. So it was undertaken, and so it was resumed.

The Current Situation

Where do we stand at this stage? We have said two things very clearly in connection with the suspension. First, that the bombing attacks would continue to be measured and directed solely against military targets. Second, that the search for some avenue toward peace will go on.

Our Security Council initiative is a part of that quest.³ While quiet diplomacy was going on, we believed, U Thant believed, many believed, that it would be a great mistake to initiate a procedure that might become the subject of public debate in the United Nations. With the ending of all private diplomatic efforts that had appeared to be possible during a suspension, that disadvantage disappeared. Concurrently it was possible to hope that in the atmosphere that now existed it might be possible to see the Security Council or some grouping of its membership achieve a consensus, if not a formal resolution, that could lead to additional activity and exploration of the positions. At this moment we cannot say what will come out of the Security Council initiative, but it does offer some hope.

The search for peace will go on, and we

³ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

shall welcome the initiatives of others, any constructive initiative that can bring the positions closer together. But at the present time I am bound to say that on all frequencies the readings from Hanoi have been negative.

On the military side, the core of the matter is what is done within South Viet-Nam. We shall never lose sight of that. Nor shall we lose sight of the fact that within South Viet-Nam itself what is accomplished by the military effort will not lead to a lasting turn in the situation or to the ultimate goal of a stable and self-reliant country unless there is a very much more effective and intensive effort on all the political, economic, civil, and social aspects of the conflict. Those are fundamental to success itself in the sense of establishing security and providing a basis for stable government in the country. They are essential to the emergence in the end of the kind of South Viet-Nam we envision. The central objective of President Johnson's trip to Honolulu⁴ was to discuss those nonmilitary programs with the leaders of the South Vietnamese Government.

For the South Vietnamese, of course, are playing the central role in their struggle for independence. That fact is sometimes obscured by the natural tendency of the newspapers to play up every action as though it were an American one. However, South Vietnamese casualties are many times ours—just the other day they lost six civilians in one public affairs team in one province in one ambush. South Vietnamese losses remain great—well over 10,000 last year. They are the ones willingly bearing the brunt of this conflict. They are the ones who have developed for themselves a workable program for restoring law and order and bringing to the villages better government and hope of social and economic development—their key program for rural construction. They are the ones taking the essential steps to deal with the problems discussed at Honolulu: rural development, land reform, agri-

cultural credits, rural electrification, seeds and fertilizers, education, medical help, financial stability, refugees, building the bases for a democratic constitution and for free elections. It is on such things that we are focusing along with the military effort, even though it, of course, remains essential. Without conditions of security you cannot get on with the other tasks, while security will remain fragile until the other tasks are moving forward as well.

On the military side, it is true that the percentage of area controlled has not changed significantly in the past year. But the control of territory has little meaning as a measure of the progress of the war. Much of the territory "controlled" by the Viet Cong consists of very sparsely populated highland. Furthermore, control varies with the movement of even small numbers of armed men. Moreover, Government forces can move into any area of the country, if sufficient forces are allocated to the task.

The Morale Factor

If one were to assume that the morale and the fighting effectiveness on the other side was a constant, one could see this war as simply escalatory on both sides. I cannot say that is not the true picture. But I would suggest, on the basis of some study of comparable situations—Greece, Malaya, the Philippines—that the underlying determinant of this conflict will be the morale factor. I remember the desperate situation of Greece in December 1947 and January 1948. Later the Yugoslavs decided to break with the Soviets and to close their border with Greece. That did not cut off what was coming in. There were still open borders with Albania and Bulgaria. However, the Yugoslav act catalyzed a change that must have already been underway. The guerrilla bands which had been within 10 miles of Athens and had threatened the whole country were rolled back finally and finally defeated within the next year and a half. A break in morale was the crucial factor. The myth that that particular Communist move-

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

ment, which incidentally at one point also called itself the National Liberation Front, spoke for the people of Greece has been conclusively refuted by the developments of the last 18 years.

One can see only the most frail indications at the present time of what is happening to morale on the other side. On the South Vietnamese side—the Government side—the common testimony of all observers is that morale is infinitely better than it was a year ago. There is the real sense that progress is possible, that local governmental structure can be established, and that military victories can be won.

The converse is almost certainly true. The evidence of the systematic prisoner interrogation that is now available about the Viet Cong makes it clear that the percentage of prisoners asserting their confidence in short-term or even ultimate victory, which was very high a year ago, is now low. Confidence in victory must be a critical ingredient in the life of any guerrilla living the kind of life these men lead. There are the faintest signs that the damage to Viet Cong morale goes deeper. In addition to their loss of confidence they are hard hit in their conditions of life, forced to move, and constantly harassed. That pressure is one argument for the fairly aggressive military policies that are now being pursued, for without them the other side would just be able to sit back and bide its time. These pressures are having their effect, and there are at least straws in the wind such as the fact that for January the total of the returnees coming into the Government's amnesty camps was the highest that it has ever been. I do not suggest for one moment that this struggle is not going to be long and difficult if Hanoi does not choose to seek the path to peace. I do say that there are

the traces of cracks that could at some point be crucial.

We shall go on searching for peace wherever we can. But we have no alternative but to pursue this conflict if Hanoi wills it so. The stakes, which concern us all, are very great. It is a grave matter to be fighting for an opportunity for a nation to determine its own future. Democracy doesn't come readymade. It hardly existed in Greece in 1947-48. It hardly existed in Korea in 1950-53. It is the opportunity to work out your own fate without interference that is at stake in the very direct sense in Viet-Nam.

There is in addition the strategic stake, for, without accepting the pat simplicities of "domino" theories, none of us could doubt that the preservation of the independence of Thailand, of Malaysia, of Singapore, of Burma, and beyond them in the long run of India, the Philippines, and Australia would become infinitely more difficult if this Communist venture were to succeed in South Viet-Nam. It is a Hanoi venture, but its success would feed the fires of the clearly expansionist thrust of Communist Chinese policy. That expansion must be contained so that over time there may emerge the latent moderate and constructive elements within Communist China.

There is the world stake in defeating efforts to change the international framework by force, whether the attempt be, as in this case, by a Communist nation across a line that separates it from a non-Communist country or across a line that divides countries where communism is not a part of the issue. These are the stakes as we see them. We shall continue to do what is necessary to insure that South Viet-Nam will be able to stand on its own feet and determine its own future.

Space Exploration, a New Dimension in U.S.-European Cooperation

by George C. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany¹

On December 20, 1965, President Johnson, at a White House dinner in honor of Chancellor Erhard, raised his glass in a toast to his distinguished guest.² The President cited Goethe's reminder that each day a man should try to say some reasonable thing. He proceeded to touch on several important current themes. However, of prime interest for us this evening was his proposal for a new co-operative program in the exploration of space.

We have (he said) already begun a mutual adventure in space. Only last summer our two Governments worked out an agreement whereby we would launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts.

Now we would like to discuss with you—and with others—an even more ambitious plan to permit us to do together what we cannot do so well alone. Examples would be two projects which stand high on the space agenda. Both are very demanding and both are quite complex. One would be a probe to the sun and another a probe to Jupiter. To cooperate on such a major endeavor would contribute vastly to our mutual knowledge and to our mutual skills.

It so happened—and it was no mere coincidence—that Chancellor Erhard had also come to Washington with a proposal for closer collaboration in space research. The Chan-

cellor replied that he welcomed the President's suggestion. He added:

It is my experience that great plans are imbued with a fascination that stirs men and at the same time constitutes a part of their success.

I can, moreover, assure you that these were more than perfunctory toasts. They not only symbolized the degree to which space exploration—originally largely a national matter—has become a part of international relations. With this exchange, the foundation was also laid for a new dimension in U.S.-German and U.S.-European scientific and technological cooperation. I want to use the occasion of my scheduled address here this evening at this great and venerable university of Bonn to share with you some thoughts about the profound opportunities for men and nations which exist today in space.

In the field of unmanned space exploration, the center of the stage for the next years will be the earth-sun relationship. Interplanetary probes are useful principally as a means to this end. President Johnson, in his talks with Chancellor Erhard in Washington, expressly mentioned as possible areas of cooperation probes to the sun and to the planet Jupiter. These represent two high-priority scientific programs for the near future.

Progress has been made in the use of nuclear energy as a source of propulsion for a spacecraft. Also, plasma propulsion systems are under intensive development, particularly here in Germany. In the fields of com-

¹ Excerpts from an address made at the Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms University at Bonn, Germany, on Jan. 14. For an article by Ambassador McGhee entitled "International Scientific Cooperation: An American View," see BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1966, p. 369.

² For texts of toasts exchanged between President Johnson and German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard at the White House on Dec. 20 and a joint communique released on Dec. 21, see *ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1966, p. 46.

munications, weather forecasting, and cartography, broad applications of already existing systems, with promise of great human benefits, still lie ahead.

Hence, in the areas of unmanned as well as manned space exploration, it appears that there will in the next decade be few logical missions to be undertaken which cannot be achieved with systems already available or under development. It is likely that advances during this period will largely be in ground-based improvements in basic subsystem capabilities, or by flight exploitation of the major new equipment capabilities either already on hand or nearing completion.

In short, this means that a functional space technology for the near future of space exploration is now or will soon be available.

President Johnson has said that America is ready to share this advanced technical capability with others. America is aware of the contention in some quarters that space exploration is being monopolized by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—that there is little opportunity for countries with more limited resources to participate effectively. But the United States is far from monopolizing space—as the unparalleled openness of its programs attests and its extensive cooperative programs prove. On the contrary, we believe that there is a meaningful role for many nations.

The potential for scientific investigation in space is limitless. The immediate upper atmosphere, with its mysterious electromagnetic phenomena, the complex spectrum of solar radiation, and the magnetic properties of the earth itself are only the first stages in a comprehensive exploration of all of space. Special technical capabilities of infinite variety will be needed. The scientific and technological community of every nation will be able to participate. Areas of special competence will develop in individual nations, which will permit each to be a leader in space—with all of the resulting promise for that nation's scientific, technological, and industrial future.

Projects of ELDO and ESRO

There are two international space efforts of great significance to Germany, and to the concept of a technically advanced and united Europe, which I would like to emphasize. These are the European Launcher Development Organization and the European Space Research Organization, ELDO and ESRO. These bodies were established in the belief that they would permit the European countries to combine their space efforts in projects of common interest, thus making the most efficient use of their individual national resources.

ELDO's objective is the development of a European launch vehicle capability, and plans are complete for the launch of a three-stage ELDO booster in 1968.

ESRO, whose purpose is the promotion of European collaboration in the peaceful exploration of space, was modeled after the already existing and successful European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN). Its program is built around the design and construction of sounding-rocket payloads and earth satellites, and the launching of space probes. The close collaboration between ESRO and the domestic programs both of individual European countries and the United States represents an important cooperative effort to produce original and creative research. I am pleased to note that ESRO I (a polar ionosphere satellite) and ESRO II (a solar astronomy and cosmic ray satellite) will be launched by NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] under joint agreement with ESRO.

We in the United States endorse this scientific integration of Europe in the conquest of space. It is a development of importance not only for the future of Europe but of the entire free world. We will continue to encourage these developments and to cooperate with them fully. I will come back to this point momentarily.

It has been argued that the development of organizations such as ESRO makes individual national efforts unnecessary. This is, in our judgment, not the case. As the report of the German Space Commission issued in

May 1965 points out, the benefits of international cooperation in space can only be fully realized by a nation whose direct national investment in space research and technology is of a proper magnitude. For instance, only if a strong national German capability for design and construction of spacecraft exists can German companies bid successfully on ESRO contracts. This capability must be developed through an unambiguous commitment to a domestic space program.

German Space Effort

And now let us look at the German domestic space effort and its present relationship to the United States. Negotiations for the first cooperative satellite project between NASA and the German Ministry for Scientific Research were completed in August 1965. The Ministry, through contracts with German industry and based on designs of German scientists, will fabricate a satellite (the so-called 625-A) to perform an integrated study of the spectra and flumes of energetic particles in the earth's inner radiation belts. NASA will provide the launch of the satellite, which is now scheduled for 1968, as well as certain facilities for tracking and data receiving. The keynote of the agreement between us is that each country will support its own share of the work, bearing its own responsibilities, both financial and scientific.

Of even longer standing, however, are a variety of joint projects using sounding rockets. The Bundespost ground station at Raisting is already a part of the Early Bird communications link to America. Four separate German groups have, or will shortly have, equipment to receive transmitted pictures of cloud patterns from NASA's TIROS and Nimbus satellites. Germany has also cooperated with NASA in studies of the ionosphere, using ground observations coordinated with satellite soundings.

Perhaps the most extensive type of cooperation between us in space matters, however, lies in the many ties which exist between individual German and American

aerospace scientists. The majority of German researchers in this field have already spent considerable time working in the United States. An outstanding example is Professor Priester of this university, who alternates between Bonn's Institute for Astrophysics and Extraterrestrial Research and the Goddard Space Flight Center in the United States. Some dozen valuable joint research papers have already resulted from this cooperation. Your Rector, Professor Groth, accepting his new office last November, presented a distinguished lecture on photochemical reactions in the upper atmosphere. Such studies would be particularly suitable for cooperative sounding-rocket and satellite flight experiments.

Probes to Jupiter and the Sun

I have so far described in general terms the history, current activities, and future objectives of our space program. I want now to return to President Johnson's toast to Chancellor Erhard. As possible objects of a new cooperative relationship in space between Europe and the United States the President, as has been mentioned, suggested probes to Jupiter and to the sun. These projects are not to be considered the exclusive objects of possible cooperative efforts between our countries. They are, however, two important areas in which Europe and America could combine their efforts to provide the answers to questions of basic scientific concern to all of mankind.

U.S.-German and U.S.-European agreement to proceed jointly in these projects would result in a very considerable increase in our present level of cooperation. It would require a major expansion of the national space programs in Germany and in the other European countries involved. In order to initiate discussions with Germany and other interested European government officials for increased cooperation, the President announced that he will soon dispatch to Europe a high-level delegation headed by Mr. James Webb, the chief of NASA.

As to what the organizational basis for international cooperation in space should be,

we have no set ideas. The unprecedented nature of the objective, the heavy expenditures involved, and the need for close working relationships among many scientific disciplines do, however, require us to choose viable and competent mechanisms for international cooperation. The scale of the effort places a premium on large-scale organization rather than small independent programs.

Experience in space efforts to date has proved the importance of the most exacting administrative standards to avoid losses, delays, and lack of coordination. A new vocabulary term, "systems management," has been devised to describe the major effort made to achieve effective control of our extensive space activities. The basic problem, which is difficult to solve through existing organizations, lies in assuring quality control to extremely high tolerances over large systems.

In our efforts to promote international space cooperation, Western Europe, and especially the Federal Republic, assume a role of particular importance. These technologically and industrially advanced nations are readily capable, as they have already demonstrated, of undertaking responsibility for important space projects. Conversely, their industry is in an excellent position to profit from the close political ties between America and Europe. Further cooperation in space would constitute an additional contribution to the concept of Atlantic partnership within the Atlantic community.

President Johnson, after the successful completion of the Gemini-5 flight in August of last year, issued an invitation to the world.³ It is even more valid today—after Gemini 6 and 7. He said:

... the capacity of this country for leadership in this realm is no longer in valid question or dispute any place in the world. Openly, proudly, we are proceeding on our course, willing always to share our knowledge and our gains with all of mankind. So, I would repeat and I would renew again ... America's invitation to all nations to join together

to make this adventure a joint adventure. This globe seems much smaller today than it has ever seemed before.

He has reiterated this invitation directly to Germany and to Europe in his toast to Chancellor Erhard.

America hopes that the Federal Republic, having accepted this invitation of President Johnson, will move vigorously into a new program of space cooperation with us and with others. The extent to which Germany and Europe are willing to extend their commitments in the new fields of science and technology embodied in today's space research is a matter for their own decision. It is, however, a decision of vital importance, not just to them but to the technological future and overall strength of the free world.

Presidential Mission Studies Resource Management in Germany

The White House announced on February 26 a Presidential factfinding mission to the Federal Republic of Germany to study natural resource management, with special emphasis on environmental pollution.

The mission, headed by Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, was scheduled to arrive at Bonn on March 3 and return to the United States on March 10 after conferring with experts in both the private and public sectors of the German economy at Bonn, Munich, West Berlin, and in the Ruhr District.

The trip marks the first round of what is envisaged by President Johnson and German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard as a continuing consultation between the two Governments and was first proposed on December 20, 1965, at a White House dinner in honor of Chancellor Erhard.¹

The group concentrated its study on nine areas of mutual concern between the two countries: water and air pollution, strip

³ For text of a statement made by President Johnson on Aug. 29, 1965, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1965, p. 475.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 10, 1966, p. 46.

mining and restorations, regional resource planning, forest conservation, parks and outdoor recreation, solid waste disposal, environmental pollution, fish and wildlife conservation, and urban land-use planning.

Other members of the factfinding mission include:

Sam Baxter, president, American Water Works Association

John Buckley, Science Adviser's Office, Department of the Interior

Charles M. Harr, Assistant Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development

Representative Robert E. Jones, member of the House Committee on Public Works

Vernon G. Mackenzie, Chief, Division of Air Pollution, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Senator Edmund S. Muskie, member of the Senate Committee on Public Works

Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State

Alfred Puhan, Director, Office of German Affairs, Department of State

James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

U.S.-Canada Economic Committee Concludes Tenth Meeting

Text of Communiqué

Press release 44 dated March 5

The Tenth Meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held in Washington, D.C., March 4-5, 1966.

As background to the discussions on trade and economic matters, the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed major recent international developments.

The Committee exchanged views on current developments in the closely related economies of the two countries, noting with satisfaction that both had achieved a record of sustained economic expansion unparalleled in their histories and they looked forward to another year of strong growth. They recognized, however, that maintaining

price and cost stability will require close and continuing attention.

The Committee discussed the balance of payments of both countries. They recognized that decisive progress had been made toward reducing the United States balance of payments deficit and reviewed the measures being taken to bring the United States external accounts into balance. In this connection, the Committee noted the measures that have been taken to maintain access to the United States capital market for an unlimited amount of new Canadian securities free of the Interest Equalization Tax. The United States members reaffirmed that, in buying such issues, U.S. investors were completely free to be guided by market considerations.

Canadian Ministers expressed their concern over the possible implications for Canada of the United States voluntary program on direct investment and the relation of this program to the position of Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The United States members made clear that the U.S. Government was not requesting U.S. corporations to induce their Canadian subsidiaries to act in any ways that differed from their normal business practices as regards the repatriation of earnings, purchasing and sales policies, or their other financial and commercial activities. United States members re-emphasized the view that United States subsidiaries abroad should behave as good citizens of the country where they are located. Where U.S. companies were in doubt as to these views, the U.S. Government would ensure that any misunderstandings would be dispelled.

The Canadian Ministers expressed serious concern that proposed Securities and Exchange Commission regulations would subject to United States law Canadian companies not deliberately seeking to sell securities in the United States if their shares had happened to be purchased by United States residents. These regulations, moreover, would discriminate against Canadian companies by imposing more severe requirements relative to other foreign companies.

Canadian Ministers referred to plans under way in Canada to improve the disclosure of information regarding Canadian enterprises and the regulation of the issue of securities. They strongly urged that the United States authorities refrain from applying these SEC regulations to Canadian companies which do not seek to sell their securities in the United States. The United States members appreciated the concern of the Government of Canada and assured the Canadian members that the most careful consideration would be given to Canadian views in an effort to work out at an early date mutually satisfactory arrangements.

The Committee discussed United States foreign assets controls as they may affect the exports of companies in Canada. The United States members reaffirmed their readiness to consult promptly on any transactions of importance to Canada which are affected by United States foreign assets control. They also stated that regulations over exports of technical data are being revised and that, in light of the Committee's discussions, further consideration will be given to the possibilities of additional modifications of the regulations.

The Committee discussed a number of specific bilateral trade and financial matters on both sides, including Canadian cheddar cheese and Canadian oil exports to the United States, and agreed to keep them under review. The Committee agreed that a joint examination should be made of trade in agricultural implements, tractors, and aircraft for which tariff liberalization would be most important.

They agreed that the removal of unnecessary restrictions on the free flow of goods and services across the border would contribute importantly to the continued prosperity of both countries. The Committee recognized that the Automotive Agreement¹ represents a long stride toward free trade in a basic industry of major importance to

the two countries and had resulted in a substantial increase in two-way trade to the benefit of production and employment both in Canada and the United States. Greater benefits are to be expected as industry in both countries adjust their operations to take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the Agreement.

In the area of international economic relations, the Committee agreed that the Kennedy Round negotiations in Geneva provided an unparalleled opportunity for the substantial liberalization of world trade, which would benefit all participating countries—developing as well as developed. The Committee, therefore, concluded that the highest priority must be given to the timely completion of these negotiations which are now entering their critical phase. They agreed that the Canadian and U.S. delegations would continue to work closely together in the interest of a successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round negotiations, including the negotiation of a world cereals agreement in which the two North American exporting countries have a strong common interest.

The Committee reviewed the trade and development problems of the developing countries particularly in food and agriculture. They noted the food needs in India and the steps being taken by the Indian Government to deal with the problem. Although both countries were providing assistance to India and other developing countries, they noted that more would be needed during the period ahead from other countries. The Canadian members informed the Committee of Canada's recent decision to make available to India a substantially larger amount of food aid.

The Committee discussed the consultative arrangements between the two Governments in the light of the Heeney-Merchant report² and agreed on the importance of close and effective working relationships between the two Governments.

The Committee took note of the importance of the work on improving the international

¹ For background and text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191; Apr. 26, 1965, p. 638; May 24, 1965, p. 830; and Nov. 15, 1965, p. 793.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1965, p. 193.

monetary system being undertaken by the International Monetary Fund and the Deputies of the Group of Ten. They expressed the hope that the Deputies will be able to reach agreement on a constructive report to the Ministers, which would permit further negotiations on a broader basis.

The Ministers noted with concern the serious problem of pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the international section of the St. Lawrence River, as described in the recent Interim Report to the Canadian and the United States Governments by the International Joint Commission.³ They recorded their support for the recommendations in the report and agreed that efforts in both countries should be coordinated to deal with this problem as a matter of urgency.

The Canadian Delegation was led by the Honorable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and included the Honorable Robert Winters, Minister of Trade and Commerce; the Honorable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance; the Honorable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Industry; the Honorable Jean-Luc Pépin, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys; the Honorable John J. Greene, Minister of Agriculture; Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of Canada; Sydney D. Pierce, Chief Canadian Trade Negotiator; the Honorable C. S. A. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, and advisers.

The United States Delegation was headed by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and included the Honorable Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; John A. Carver, Jr., Under Secretary of the Department of Interior; Thomas C. Mann, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Honorable Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; the Honorable Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Honorable W. Walton Butterworth, American Ambassador to Canada, and advisers.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1966, p. 293.

All U.S. Exports to Rhodesia To Require Validated Licenses

The U.S. Department of Commerce on February 26 announced a decision to control all U.S. exports to Southern Rhodesia. Validated licenses will be required for practically all shipments.

Implementation of this decision will have the effect of cutting off virtually all U.S. exports of importance to the economy of Southern Rhodesia.

This decision was made as one of a series of actions which the U.S. Government has taken in the spirit of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 20, 1965,¹ on Southern Rhodesia. It follows decisions to embargo exports of arms, military equipment, and all petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia.²

A current export bulletin setting forth the effective date of the regulations supporting this decision will be published in the near future.

U.S. exports to Southern Rhodesia were about \$21 million in 1964. The principal items were construction machinery, transport equipment, textiles, paper, and wheat.

Department Holds NGO Conference

The Department of State announced on March 4 (press release 42) that it would hold its 1966 National Foreign Policy Conference for Nongovernmental Organizations on March 8 and 9.

The purpose of the conference is to provide opportunity for discussion of international affairs between leaders of nongovernmental organizations and senior Government officials. By means of these conferences the memberships of nongovernmental organizations, and through them a much broader public, gain deeper understanding of international issues.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1966, p. 27; Jan. 17, 1966, p. 85; and Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Peru Amend Air Agreement

Press release 40 dated March 2

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Notes were exchanged at Washington on March 2, 1966, to amend the air transport services agreement of 1946 between the United States and Peru. Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon signed for the United States, and Celso Pastor, Ambassador of Peru, signed for Peru.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

MARCH 2, 1966

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the negotiations which took place in Washington from October 25 to November 4, 1965 between delegations representing our two Governments concerning the Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Peru signed at Lima on December 27, 1946, as amended by the exchange of notes signed at Washington on April 24 and May 28, 1958.¹ The following represents the understanding of my Government with respect to the agreements reached in these negotiations:

1) The two Governments find themselves in agreement that under the terms of the Air Transport Agreement the responsibility for the determination of the appropriate capacity, frequency, and type of aircraft used over agreed routes, consonant with the terms of the Agreement, rests in the first instance with the designated airlines. In light of the requirement of Peruvian legislation with regard to the filing of schedules, it is agreed that each Government may require the airlines designated by the other Government to submit schedules, for information purposes only, thirty days prior to the proposed entry into effect of such schedules.

2) Neither Government will delay nor deny the entry into effect of proposed schedules.

3) If, after a reasonable period of operation under the schedules, either Government believes that the service is not consonant with the letter and the spirit of paragraphs B, C, D, and E of the Annex to the Air Transport Agreement, and wishes to object to the service, it shall set forth in writing to the other Government the basis for its objections.

4) The other Government shall have a period of thirty days within which it may convey in writing its disagreement with the position of the objecting Government. The two Governments will thereupon make arrangements for formal consultations under the provisions of paragraph G of the Annex to the Air Transport Agreement for the purpose of an *a posteriori* review of the operations over the route or routes in question. The operations in question shall be permitted to remain in effect pending the conclusion of such consultations.

5) If the other Government does not, within thirty days of receipt of the communication from the objecting Government referred to in paragraph 3 above, convey its disagreement with the position of the objecting Government the latter shall be free to take such action as it deems necessary and appropriate to make the services in question conform to paragraphs B, C, D, and E of the Annex to the Agreement.

6) Should the aeronautical authorities of either country authorize any of its designated airlines to use the aircraft, or aircraft and crews, of a non-designated airline of the same nationality in operations over one or more of the agreed routes, the other Government will, upon being officially notified through diplomatic channels of such authorization, grant approval for the use of such aircraft, or aircraft and crews, provided that such aircraft may be required to bear on its exterior the name of the designated airline as well as the markings of the airline owning the aircraft. Such approval shall be without prejudice to the right of the other Government to interpose objections to frequency or capacity as provided under paragraphs two to five above, inclusive.

7) Paragraph H of the Annex to the Air Transport Agreement is amended to read as follows:

H. Airlines of the United States of America, designated in conformity with the present agreement, are accorded rights of transit and of non-traffic stop in and through the territory of the Republic of Peru as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail, separately or in combination, at Talara, Iquitos, and Lima on the following route via intermediate points in both directions:

The United States and/or the Canal Zone to Talara, Iquitos, and Lima; and beyond Peru to points in Chile and Bolivia or beyond.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1587 and 4050.

Points on the above route may be omitted on any or all flights at the option of the operating airlines.

8) Paragraph I of the Annex to the Air Transport Agreement is amended to read as follows:

I. Airlines of the Republic of Peru, designated in conformity with the present agreement, are accorded rights of transit and of non-traffic stop in and through the territory of the United States of America as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail, separately or in combination, at Miami, Florida, Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, California on the following routes in both directions:

1. Peru via intermediate points to Miami and Washington and beyond to Montreal, Canada.

2. Peru via Guayaquil, Ecuador and Mexico City, Mexico to Los Angeles.

Points on the above routes may be omitted on any or all flights at the option of the operating airlines.

If the Government of Peru agrees to the foregoing proposal, I have the honor to suggest that the present note and Your Excellency's reply² to that effect should be regarded as confirming the understanding arrived at in this matter and as amending paragraphs H and I of the Annex to the Agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

ANTHONY M. SOLOMON

His Excellency
Senor Don CELSO PASTOR,
Ambassador of Peru.

U.S. and U.K. Consult on Civil Air Transport

The Department of State announced on February 28 (press release 37) that civil air transport consultations between delegations representing the United States and the United Kingdom would begin at Washington on that day under the provisions of the air transport services agreement of 1946, as amended.¹ They will deal with a

² Not printed here.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1507, 1640, 1714, 3338, 3675, 3719.

variety of questions concerning routes and other issues under the agreement.

The British delegation is under the chairmanship of Robert Burns, Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation. It will include other representatives of the British Ministry of Aviation, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office, as well as airline observers and advisers from British overseas territories interested in the questions to be discussed.

The United States delegation is headed by Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State. It includes Robert T. Murphy, Vice Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and other representatives of the Department of State and the Civil Aeronautics Board and American airline observers.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with annex, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force August 2, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.

Ratification deposited: Panama, March 2, 1966.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Ratification deposited: Iran, January 7, 1966.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.

Accession deposited: Italy, February 18, 1966.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Open for signature at Washington January 17 through February 28, 1966.

Signature: Sudan, February 18, 1966.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Notification of undertaking to seek approval: United Arab Republic, February 18, 1966.

Notification of undertaking to seek ratification: Sudan, February 23, 1966.

Acceptance deposited: United States, February 23, 1966.

Entered into force: February 23, 1966.

Health

Amendment to article 7 of the constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.²
Acceptance deposited: Rwanda, January 5, 1966.

Judicial Cooperation

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Open for signature at The Hague November 15, 1965.²

Signature: Belgium, January 21, 1966.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, March 1, 1966; Sudan, March 4, 1966.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962.²

Acceptance deposited: Belgium, February 10, 1966.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Denunciations received: New Zealand, February 14, 1966; Spain, October 29, 1965.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance received: Belgium, February 10, 1966; New Zealand, February 14, 1966; Switzerland, January 12, 1966.

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, as amended (TIAS 3532). Signed at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta, January 3, 1966.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.²

Accession deposited: Brazil, January 6, 1966.

Trade

Second procès-verbal extending the declaration on provisional accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into

force for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734.

Acceptances deposited: Dahomey, January 18, 1966; Tanzania, February 4, 1966.

Procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965.

Acceptances deposited: Belgium, January 28, 1966; Finland, February 9, 1966; Greece, January 25, 1966; Israel, Japan, December 28, 1965; Netherlands, December 30, 1965; Norway, January 24, 1966; Sweden, January 25, 1966; United Kingdom, January 26, 1966; United States, December 30, 1965; Yugoslavia, December 23, 1965.

Procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965.

Acceptances deposited: Finland, February 9, 1966; Greece, January 25, 1966; Iceland, December 16, 1965; Israel, Japan, December 28, 1965; Netherlands, December 30, 1965; Norway, January 24, 1966; Sweden, January 25, 1966; Switzerland, January 3, 1966; United Kingdom, January 26, 1966; United States, December 30, 1965.

Third procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6, 1966.

Acceptances deposited: Belgium, January 28, 1966; Finland, February 9, 1966; Greece, January 25, 1966; Japan, December 28, 1965; Netherlands, December 30, 1965; Norway, January 24, 1966; Sweden, January 25, 1966; Switzerland, January 3, 1966; Tunisia, January 6, 1966; United Kingdom, January 26, 1966; United States, December 30, 1965.

BILATERAL

Guinea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Conakry February 4, 1966. Entered into force February 4, 1966.

Japan

Agreement amending the civil air transport agreement of August 11, 1952, as amended (TIAS 2854, 4158). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo December 28, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965.

Peru

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of December 27, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1587, 4050). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 2, 1966. Entered into force March 2, 1966.

Togo

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Lomé February 8, 1966. Enters into force 1 month after exchange of ratifications.

² Not in force.

³ Not in force for the United States.

Agencies To Exchange Personnel for Selected Training Assignments

The Department of State, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Commerce have approved plans to exchange personnel for training assignments in selected positions of each department, it was announced on February 28 (Department of State press release 38).

Secretary Rusk; Donald Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; James Webb, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Leland Haworth, Director, National Science Foundation; and Herbert Holloman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology, participated in a ceremony held at the Department of State on February 28 to set the exchange program in motion.

The exchange program is designed to promote mutually a better understanding of the relationships between science, technology, and foreign affairs and a continuing development of personnel in each depart-

ment and agency who share understanding and perspective in the area where science and foreign policy interact. The personnel nominated for this program will be full-fledged members of the staff to which assigned and will function as an integral part of the host agency. Assignments will be for a period of either 1 or 2 years.

Though modest in its initial stages, the program is designed to serve the dual purpose of providing over the years a continuing process of broader development of a pool of future key personnel and to bring to each of the agencies concerned a better appreciation of the functions and responsibilities of the other in meeting common problems.

At the ceremony the first two individuals to be nominated for the program—Thomas Gabbert, Atomic Energy Commission, and Edward R. O'Connor, Department of State—were congratulated by Secretary Rusk and by the other participants. It is expected that the remainder of the group will be selected within the next few months.

Confirmations

The Senate on February 25 confirmed the following nominations:

Lincoln Gordon to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 47 dated March 9.)

Jack Hood Vaughn to be Director of the Peace Corps. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated January 17.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1395 PUBLICATION 8053 MARCH 21, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to February 28 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 35 of February 25.

No.	Date	Subject
37	2/28	Civil air transport talks with the United Kingdom.
38	2/28	Exchange of personnel between NASA, State, AEC, Commerce, and NSF (rewrite).
*39	3/1	Allen sworn in as FSI Director (biographic details).
40	3/3	Amendment of air agreement with Peru.
†41	3/3	Meeting of chiefs of U.S. Missions in Far East.
42	3/4	Foreign policy conference for nongovernmental organizations (rewrite).
†43	3/4	Regional foreign policy conference at Atlanta (rewrite).
44	3/5	U.S.-Canada Economic Committee communique.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

The Issue in Viet-Nam

The struggle in Viet-Nam can be properly understood only if Americans recognize it as part of a vast and continuing struggle against aggression in which we have been engaged for more than two decades, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball asserted recently.

In a review of the great shifts and changes in the world brought about by the Second World War, Mr. Ball defines the Viet-Nam fighting as battles and skirmishes in a continuing war to prevent one Communist power after another from violating internationally recognized boundaries. The Under Secretary takes issue in his address with those who imply that we should let Red China establish hegemony over the East Asian landmass south of the Soviet Union. He explains why the United States, in its unceasing search for peace in Southeast Asia, is not obdurate about considering the views of the National Liberation Front but will not give legitimacy to this Communist organization by accepting it as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people.

This pamphlet is based upon an address the Under Secretary made on January 30 before Northwestern University alumni at Evanston, Ill.

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THE
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BULLETIN

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VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY REPORTS
TO PRESIDENT ON ASIAN TRIP

Text of Memorandum 489

THE LEGALITY OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION
IN THE DEFENSE OF VIET-NAM

Text of Legal Memorandum 474

This legal memorandum was prepared by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser of the Department, and was submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 8.

The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam

MARCH 4, 1966

I. THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIET-NAM HAVE THE RIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AGAINST ARMED ATTACK

In response to requests from the Government of South Viet-Nam, the United States has been assisting that country in defending itself against armed attack from the Communist North. This attack has taken the forms of externally supported subversion, clandestine supply of arms, infiltration of armed personnel, and most recently the sending of regular units of the North Vietnamese army into the South.

International law has long recognized the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. South Viet-Nam and the United States are engaging in such collective defense consistently with international law and with United States obligations under the United Nations Charter.

A. South Viet-Nam Is Being Subjected to Armed Attack by Communist North Viet-Nam

The Geneva accords of 1954 established a demarcation line between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam.¹ They provided for withdrawals of military forces into the respective zones north and south of this line.

¹ For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

The accords prohibited the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to "further an aggressive policy."

During the 5 years following the Geneva conference of 1954, the Hanoi regime developed a covert political-military organization in South Viet-Nam based on Communist cadres it had ordered to stay in the South, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva accords. The activities of this covert organization were directed toward the kidnaping and assassination of civilian officials—acts of terrorism that were perpetrated in increasing numbers.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated an estimated 10,000 men into the South. It is estimated that 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated in 1962, and, by the end of 1964, North Viet-Nam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam.

The International Control Commission reported in 1962 the findings of its Legal Committee:

... there is evidence to show that arms, armed and unarmed personnel, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South.

... there is evidence that the PAVN [People's Army of Viet Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the

South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.

Beginning in 1964, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of Southerners who had gone North. Since then the greater number of men infiltrated into the South have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the South.

In the guerrilla war in Viet-Nam, the external aggression from the North is the critical military element of the insurgency, although it is unacknowledged by North Viet-Nam. In these circumstances, an "armed attack" is not as easily fixed by date and hour as in the case of traditional warfare. However, the infiltration of thousands of armed men clearly constitutes an "armed attack" under any reasonable definition. There may be some question as to the exact date at which North Viet-Nam's aggression grew into an "armed attack," but there can be no doubt that it had occurred before February 1965.

B. International Law Recognizes the Right of Individual and Collective Self-Defense Against Armed Attack

International law has traditionally recognized the right of self-defense against armed attack. This proposition has been asserted by writers on international law through the several centuries in which the modern law of nations has developed. The proposition has been acted on numerous times by governments throughout modern history. Today the principle of self-defense against armed attack is universally recognized and accepted.²

The Charter of the United Nations, concluded at the end of World War II, imposed

an important limitation on the use of force by United Nations members. Article 2, paragraph 4, provides:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

In addition, the charter embodied a system of international peacekeeping through the organs of the United Nations. Article 24 summarizes these structural arrangements in stating that the United Nations members:

... confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

However, the charter expressly states in article 51 that the remaining provisions of the charter—including the limitation of article 2, paragraph 4, and the creation of United Nations machinery to keep the peace—in no way diminish the inherent right of self-defense against armed attack. Article 51 provides:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Thus, article 51 restates and preserves, for member states in the situations covered by the article, a long-recognized principle of international law. The article is a "saving clause" designed to make clear that no other provision in the charter shall be interpreted to impair the inherent right of self-defense referred to in article 51.

Three principal objections have been raised against the availability of the right of individual and collective self-defense in the case of Viet-Nam: (1) that this right applies

² See, e.g., Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, 163 ff. (1948); Oppenheim, *International Law*, 297 ff. (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955). And see, generally, Bowett, *Self-Defense in International Law* (1958). [Footnote in original.]

only in the case of an armed attack on a United Nations member; (2) that it does not apply in the case of South Viet-Nam because the latter is not an independent sovereign state; and (3) that collective self-defense may be undertaken only by a regional organization operating under chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. These objections will now be considered in turn.

C. The Right of Individual and Collective Self-Defense Applies in the Case of South Viet-Nam Whether or Not That Country Is a Member of the United Nations

1. South Viet-Nam enjoys the right of self-defense

The argument that the right of self-defense is available only to members of the United Nations mistakes the nature of the right of self-defense and the relationship of the United Nations Charter to international law in this respect. As already shown, the right of self-defense against armed attack is an inherent right under international law. The right is not conferred by the charter, and, indeed, article 51 expressly recognizes that the right is inherent.

The charter nowhere contains any provision designed to deprive nonmembers of the right of self-defense against armed attack.³ Article 2, paragraph 6, does charge the United Nations with responsibility for insuring that nonmember states act in accordance with United Nations "Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of

international peace and security." Protection against aggression and self-defense against armed attack are important elements in the whole charter scheme for the maintenance of international peace and security. To deprive nonmembers of their inherent right of self-defense would not accord with the principles of the organization, but would instead be prejudicial to the maintenance of peace. Thus article 2, paragraph 6—and, indeed, the rest of the charter—should certainly not be construed to nullify or diminish the inherent defensive rights of nonmembers.

2. The United States has the right to assist in the defense of South Viet-Nam although the latter is not a United Nations member

The cooperation of two or more international entities in the defense of one or both against armed attack is generally referred to as collective self-defense. United States participation in the defense of South Viet-Nam at the latter's request is an example of collective self-defense.

The United States is entitled to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack, as that right exists in international law, subject only to treaty limitations and obligations undertaken by this country.

It has been urged that the United States has no right to participate in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam because article 51 of the United Nations Charter speaks only of the situation "if an armed attack occurs *against a Member of the United Nations*." This argument is without substance.

In the first place, article 51 does not impose restrictions or cut down the otherwise available rights of United Nations members. By its own terms, the article preserves an inherent right. It is, therefore, necessary to look elsewhere in the charter for any obligation of members restricting their participation in collective defense of an entity that is not a United Nations member.

Article 2, paragraph 4, is the principal provision of the charter imposing limitations on the use of force by members. It states that they:

³ While nonmembers, such as South Viet-Nam, have not formally undertaken the obligations of the United Nations Charter as their own treaty obligations, it should be recognized that much of the substantive law of the charter has become part of the general law of nations through a very wide acceptance by nations the world over. This is particularly true of the charter provisions bearing on the use of force. Moreover, in the case of South Viet-Nam, the South Vietnamese Government has expressed its ability and willingness to abide by the charter, in applying for United Nations membership. Thus it seems entirely appropriate to appraise the actions of South Viet-Nam in relation to the legal standards set forth in the United Nations Charter. [Footnote in original.]

... shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Action taken in defense against armed attack cannot be characterized as falling within this proscription. The record of the San Francisco conference makes clear that article 2, paragraph 4, was not intended to restrict the right of self-defense against armed attack.⁴

One will search in vain for any other provision in the charter that would preclude United States participation in the collective defense of a nonmember. The fact that article 51 refers only to armed attack "against a Member of the United Nations" implies no intention to preclude members from participating in the defense of nonmembers. Any such result would have seriously detrimental consequences for international peace and security and would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations as they are set forth in article 1 of the charter.⁵ The right of members to participate in the defense of nonmembers is upheld by leading authorities on international law.⁶

D. The Right of Individual and Collective Self-Defense Applies Whether or Not South Viet-Nam Is Regarded as an Independent Sovereign State

1. South Viet-Nam enjoys the right of self-defense

It has been asserted that the conflict in Viet-Nam is "civil strife" in which foreign intervention is forbidden. Those who make this assertion have gone so far as to compare Ho Chi Minh's actions in Viet-Nam with the efforts of President Lincoln to preserve the Union during the American Civil War. Any such characterization is an entire fiction disregarding the actual situation in Viet-Nam. The Hanoi regime is anything but the legitimate government of a unified country in which the South is rebelling against lawful national authority.

The Geneva accords of 1954 provided for a division of Viet-Nam into two zones at the

17th parallel. Although this line of demarcation was intended to be temporary, it was established by international agreement, which specifically forbade aggression by one zone against the other.

The Republic of Viet-Nam in the South has been recognized as a separate international entity by approximately 60 governments the world over. It has been admitted as a member of a number of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly in 1957 voted to recommend South Viet-Nam for membership in the organization, and its admission was frustrated only by the veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council.

In any event there is no warrant for the suggestion that one zone of a temporarily divided state—whether it be Germany, Korea, or Viet-Nam—can be legally overrun by armed forces from the other zone, crossing the internationally recognized line of demarcation between the two. Any such doctrine would subvert the international agreement establishing the line of demarcation, and would pose grave dangers to international peace.

The action of the United Nations in the Korean conflict of 1950 clearly established the principle that there is no greater license for one zone of a temporarily divided state to attack the other zone than there is for one state to attack another state. South

⁴ See 6 UNCIO Documents 459. [Footnote in original.]

⁵ In particular, the statement of the first purpose: To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. . . . [Footnote in original.]

⁶ Bowett, *Self-Defense in International Law*, 193-195 (1958); Goodhart, "The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949," 79 *Recueil Des Cours*, 183, 202-204 (1951, vol. II), quoted in 5 *Whitman's Digest of International Law*, 1067-1068 (1965); Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations*, 793 (1950); see Stone, *Aggression and World Order*, 44 (1958). [Footnote in original.]

Viet-Nam has the same right that South Korea had to defend itself and to organize collective defense against an armed attack from the North. A resolution of the Security Council dated June 25, 1950, noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea," and determined "that this action constitutes a breach of the peace."

2. The United States is entitled to participate in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam whether or not the latter is regarded as an independent sovereign state

As stated earlier, South Viet-Nam has been recognized as a separate international entity by approximately 60 governments. It has been admitted to membership in a number of the United Nations specialized agencies and has been excluded from the United Nations Organization only by the Soviet veto.

There is nothing in the charter to suggest that United Nations members are precluded from participating in the defense of a recognized international entity against armed attack merely because the entity may lack some of the attributes of an independent sovereign state. Any such result would have a destructive effect on the stability of international engagements such as the Geneva accords of 1954 and on internationally agreed lines of demarcation. Such a result, far from being in accord with the charter and the purposes of the United Nations, would undermine them and would create new dangers to international peace and security.

E. The United Nations Charter Does Not Limit the Right of Self-Defense to Regional Organizations

Some have argued that collective self-defense may be undertaken only by a regional arrangement or agency operating under chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Such an assertion ignores the structure of the charter and the practice followed in the more than 20 years since the founding of the United Nations.

The basic proposition that rights of self-defense are not impaired by the charter—as expressly stated in article 51—is not conditioned by any charter provision limiting the application of this proposition to collective defense by a regional arrangement or agency. The structure of the charter reinforces this conclusion. Article 51 appears in chapter VII of the charter, entitled "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," whereas chapter VIII, entitled "Regional Arrangements," begins with article 52 and embraces the two following articles. The records of the San Francisco conference show that article 51 was deliberately placed in chapter VII rather than chapter VIII, "where it would only have a bearing on the regional system."⁷

Under article 51, the right of self-defense is available against any armed attack, whether or not the country attacked is a member of a regional arrangement and regardless of the source of the attack. Chapter VIII, on the other hand, deals with relations among members of a regional arrangement or agency, and authorizes regional action as appropriate for dealing with "local disputes." This distinction has been recognized ever since the founding of the United Nations in 1945.

For example, the North Atlantic Treaty has operated as a collective security arrangement, designed to take common measures in preparation against the eventuality of an armed attack for which collective defense under article 51 would be required. Similarly, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was designed as a collective defense arrangement under article 51. Secretary of State Dulles emphasized this in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1954.

By contrast, article 1 of the Charter of Bogotá (1948), establishing the Organization of American States, expressly declares that the organization is a regional agency within

⁷ 17 UNCIO Documents 288. [Footnote in original.]

the United Nations. Indeed, chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter was included primarily to take account of the functioning of the inter-American system.

In sum, there is no basis in the United Nations Charter for contending that the right of self-defense against armed attack is limited to collective defense by a regional organization.

F. The United States Has Fulfilled Its Obligations to the United Nations

A further argument has been made that the members of the United Nations have conferred on United Nations organs—and, in particular, on the Security Council—exclusive power to act against aggression. Again, the express language of article 51 contradicts that assertion. A victim of armed attack is not required to forgo individual or collective defense of its territory until such time as the United Nations organizes collective action and takes appropriate measures. To the contrary, article 51 clearly states that the right of self-defense may be exercised “until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”⁸

As indicated earlier, article 51 is not literally applicable to the Viet-Nam situation since South Viet-Nam is not a member. However, reasoning by analogy from article

⁸ An argument has been made by some that the United States, by joining in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam, has violated the peaceful settlement obligation of article 33 in the charter. This argument overlooks the obvious proposition that a victim of armed aggression is not required to sustain the attack undefended while efforts are made to find a political solution with the aggressor. Article 51 of the charter illustrates this by making perfectly clear that the inherent right of self-defense is impaired by “Nothing in the present Charter,” including the provisions of article 33. [Footnote in original.]

⁹ For a statement made by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson in the Security Council on Aug. 5, 1964, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272.

¹⁰ For texts, see *ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1965, p. 240, and Mar. 22, 1965, p. 419.

¹¹ For background and text of draft resolution, see *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 231.

51 and adopting its provisions as an appropriate guide for the conduct of members in a case like Viet-Nam, one can only conclude that United States actions are fully in accord with this country's obligations as a member of the United Nations.

Article 51 requires that:

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The United States has reported to the Security Council on measures it has taken in countering the Communist aggression in Viet-Nam. In August 1964 the United States asked the Council to consider the situation created by North Vietnamese attacks on United States destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf.⁹ The Council thereafter met to debate the question, but adopted no resolutions. Twice in February 1965 the United States sent additional reports to the Security Council on the conflict in Viet-Nam and on the additional measures taken by the United States in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam.¹⁰ In January 1966 the United States formally submitted the Viet-Nam question to the Security Council for its consideration and introduced a draft resolution calling for discussions looking toward a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords.¹¹

At no time has the Council taken any action to restore peace and security in Southeast Asia. The Council has not expressed criticism of United States actions. Indeed, since the United States submission of January 1966, members of the Council have been notably reluctant to proceed with any consideration of the Viet-Nam question.

The conclusion is clear that the United States has in no way acted to interfere with United Nations consideration of the conflict in Viet-Nam. On the contrary, the United States has requested United Nations consideration, and the Council has not seen fit to act.

G. International Law Does Not Require a Declaration of War as a Condition Precedent To Taking Measures of Self-Defense Against Armed Attack

The existence or absence of a formal declaration of war is not a factor in determining whether an international use of force is lawful as a matter of international law. The United Nations Charter's restrictions focus on the manner and purpose of its use and not on any formalities of announcement.

It should also be noted that a formal declaration of war would not place any obligations on either side in the conflict by which that side would not be bound in any event. The rules of international law concerning the conduct of hostilities in an international armed conflict apply regardless of any declaration of war.

H. Summary

The analysis set forth above shows that South Viet-Nam has the right in present circumstances to defend itself against armed attack from the North and to organize a collective self-defense with the participation of others. In response to requests from South Viet-Nam, the United States has been participating in that defense, both through military action within South Viet-Nam and actions taken directly against the aggressor in North Viet-Nam. This participation by the United States is in conformity with international law and is consistent with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

II. THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDERTAKEN COMMITMENTS TO ASSIST SOUTH VIET-NAM IN DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH

The United States has made commitments and given assurances, in various forms and

at different times, to assist in the defense of South Viet-Nam.

A. The United States Gave Undertakings at the End of the Geneva Conference in 1954

At the time of the signing of the Geneva accords in 1954, President Eisenhower warned "that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern," at the same time giving assurance that the United States would "not use force to disturb the settlement."¹² And the formal declaration made by the United States Government at the conclusion of the Geneva conference stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."¹³

B. The United States Undertook an International Obligation To Defend South Viet-Nam in the SEATO Treaty

Later in 1954 the United States negotiated with a number of other countries and signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.¹⁴ The treaty contains in the first paragraph of article IV the following provision:

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Annexed to the treaty was a protocol stating that:

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

Thus, the obligations of article IV, paragraph 1, dealing with the eventuality of

¹² For a statement made by President Eisenhower on June 21, 1954, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 163.

¹³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

armed attack, have from the outset covered the territory of South Viet-Nam. The facts as to the North Vietnamese armed attack against the South have been summarized earlier, in the discussion of the right of self-defense under international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The term "armed attack" has the same meaning in the SEATO treaty as in the United Nations Charter.

Article IV, paragraph 1, places an obligation on each party to the SEATO treaty to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" in the event of an armed attack. The treaty does not require a collective determination that an armed attack has occurred in order that the obligation of article IV, paragraph 1, become operative. Nor does the provision require collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. As Secretary Dulles pointed out when transmitting the treaty to the President, the commitment in article IV, paragraph 1, "leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in the event an armed attack occurs."¹⁵

The treaty was intended to deter armed aggression in Southeast Asia. To that end it created not only a multilateral alliance but also a series of bilateral relationships. The obligations are placed squarely on "each Party" in the event of armed attack in the treaty area—not upon "the Parties," a wording that might have implied a necessity for collective decision. The treaty was intended to give the assurance of United States assistance to any party or protocol state that might suffer a Communist armed attack, regardless of the views or actions of other parties. The fact that the obligations are individual, and may even to some extent differ among the parties to the treaty, is demonstrated by the United States understanding, expressed at the time of signature, that its obligations under article IV, paragraph 1, apply only in the event of *Communist*

aggression, whereas the other parties to the treaty were unwilling so to limit their obligations to each other.

Thus, the United States has a commitment under article IV, paragraph 1, in the event of armed attack, independent of the decision or action of other treaty parties. A joint statement issued by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand on March 6, 1962,¹⁶ reflected this understanding:

The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.

Most of the SEATO countries have stated that they agreed with this interpretation. None has registered objection to it.

When the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, it noted that the treaty area was further defined so that the "Free Territory of Vietnam" was an area "which, if attacked, would fall under the protection of the instrument." In its conclusion the committee stated:

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1.

C. The United States Has Given Additional Assurances to the Government of South Viet-Nam

The United States has also given a series of additional assurances to the Government of South Viet-Nam. As early as October 1954 President Eisenhower undertook to provide direct assistance to help make South Viet-

¹⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 820.

¹⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498.

Nam "capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."¹⁷ On May 11, 1957, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Viet-Nam issued a joint statement¹⁸ which called attention to "the large build-up of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Viet-Nam" and stated:

Noting that the Republic of Viet-Nam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that "the United States is determined that the Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States Government can render."¹⁹ On December 7 of that year President Diem appealed for additional support. In his reply of December 14, 1961, President Kennedy recalled the United States declaration made at the end of the Geneva conference in 1954, and reaffirmed that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence."²⁰ This assurance has been reaffirmed many times since.

III. ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIET-NAM ARE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954

A. Description of the Accords

The Geneva accords of 1954²¹ established the date and hour for a cease-fire in Viet-Nam, drew a "provisional military demarcation line" with a demilitarized zone on both sides, and required an exchange of prisoners and the phased regroupment of Viet Minh forces from the south to the north and of French Union forces from the north to the south. The introduction into Viet-Nam of troop reinforcements and new military equipment (except for replacement and

repair) was prohibited. The armed forces of each party were required to respect the demilitarized zone and the territory of the other zone. The adherence of either zone to any military alliance, and the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to "further an aggressive policy," were prohibited. The International Control Commission was established, composed of India, Canada and Poland, with India as chairman. The task of the Commission was to supervise the proper execution of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. General elections that would result in reunification were required to be held in July 1956 under the supervision of the ICC.

B. North Viet-Nam Violated the Accords From the Beginning

From the very beginning, the North Vietnamese violated the 1954 Geneva accords. Communist military forces and supplies were left in the South in violation of the accords. Other Communist guerrillas were moved north for further training and then were infiltrated into the South in violation of the accords.

¹⁷ For text of a message from President Eisenhower to President Ngo Dinh Diem, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

¹⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, May 27, 1957, p. 851.

¹⁹ For text of a joint communique issued by President Kennedy and Vice President Chen Cheng of the Republic of China, see *ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 372.

²⁰ For text of an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and President Diem, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.

²¹ These accords were composed of a bilateral cease-fire agreement between the "Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet Nam" and the "Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China," together with a Final Declaration of the Conference, to which France adhered. However, it is to be noted that the South Vietnamese Government was not a signatory of the cease-fire agreement and did not adhere to the Final Declaration. South Viet-Nam entered a series of reservations in a statement to the conference. This statement was noted by the conference, but by decision of the conference chairman it was not included or referred to in the Final Declaration. [Footnote in original.]

C. The Introduction of United States Military Personnel and Equipment Was Justified

The accords prohibited the reinforcement of foreign military forces in Viet-Nam and the introduction of new military equipment, but they allowed replacement of existing military personnel and equipment. Prior to late 1961 South Viet-Nam had received considerable military equipment and supplies from the United States, and the United States had gradually enlarged its Military Assistance Advisory Group to slightly less than 900 men. These actions were reported to the ICC and were justified as replacements for equipment in Viet-Nam in 1954 and for French training and advisory personnel who had been withdrawn after 1954.

As the Communist aggression intensified during 1961, with increased infiltration and a marked stepping up of Communist terrorism in the South, the United States found it necessary in late 1961 to increase substantially the numbers of our military personnel and the amounts and types of equipment introduced by this country into South Viet-Nam. These increases were justified by the international law principle that a material breach of an agreement by one party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding, or related provision until the defaulting party is prepared to honor its obligations.²²

In accordance with this principle, the systematic violation of the Geneva accords by North Viet-Nam justified South Viet-Nam in suspending compliance with the provision controlling entry of foreign military personnel and military equipment.

D. South Viet-Nam Was Justified in Refusing To Implement the Election Provisions of the Geneva Accords

The Geneva accords contemplated the reunification of the two parts of Viet-Nam. They contained a provision for general elections to be held in July 1956 in order to obtain a "free expression of the national will." The accords stated that "consultations will be held on this subject between the compe-

tent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards."

There may be some question whether South Viet-Nam was bound by these election provisions. As indicated earlier, South Viet-Nam did not sign the cease-fire agreement of 1954, nor did it adhere to the Final Declaration of the Geneva conference. The South Vietnamese Government at that time gave notice of its objection in particular to the election provisions of the accords.

However, even on the premise that these provisions were binding on South Viet-Nam, the South Vietnamese Government's failure to engage in consultations in 1955, with a view to holding elections in 1956, involved no breach of obligation. The conditions in North Viet-Nam during that period were such as to make impossible any free and meaningful expression of popular will.

Some of the facts about conditions in the North were admitted even by the Communist leadership in Hanoi. General Giap, currently Defense Minister of North Viet-Nam, in addressing the Tenth Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Oc-

²² This principle of law and the circumstances in which it may be invoked are most fully discussed in the Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, articles 18, 20 (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/120(1959)) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 37 (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1959/Add.1) and in the later report by Sir Humphrey Waldock, article 20 (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add. 1-3 (1963)) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 36 (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1). Among the authorities cited by the fourth report for this proposition are: II Oppenheim, *International Law* 136, 137 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); I Rousseau, *Principes généraux du droit international public* 365 (1944); II Hyde, *International Law* 1660 et seq. (2d ed. 1947); II Guggenheim, *Traité de droit international public* 84, 85 (1935); Spiropoulos, *Traité théorique et pratique de droit international public* 289 (1933); Verdross, *Völkerrecht*, 328 (1950); Hall, *Treatise* 21 (8th ed. Higgins 1924); 3 Accioly, *Tratado de Direito Internacional Publico* 82 (1956-57). See also draft articles 42 and 46 of the Law of Treaties by the International Law Commission, contained in the report on the work of its 15th session (General Assembly, Official Records, 18th Session, Supplement No. 9(A/5809)). [Footnote in original.]

tober 1956, publicly acknowledged that the Communist leaders were running a police state where executions, terror, and torture were commonplace. A nationwide election in these circumstances would have been a travesty. No one in the North would have dared to vote except as directed. With a substantial majority of the Vietnamese people living north of the 17th parallel, such an election would have meant turning the country over to the Communists without regard to the will of the people. The South Vietnamese Government realized these facts and quite properly took the position that consultations for elections in 1956 as contemplated by the accords would be a useless formality.²³

IV. THE PRESIDENT HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO COMMIT UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

There can be no question in present circumstances of the President's authority to commit United States forces to the defense of South Viet-Nam. The grant of authority to the President in article II of the Constitution extends to the actions of the United States currently undertaken in Viet-Nam. In fact, however, it is unnecessary to determine whether this grant standing alone is sufficient to authorize the actions taken in Viet-Nam. These actions rest not only on the exercise of Presidential powers under article II but on the SEATO treaty—a treaty advised and consented to by the Senate—and on actions of the Congress, particularly the joint resolution of August 10, 1964. When these sources of authority are taken together—article II of the Constitution, the SEATO treaty, and actions by the Congress—there can be no question of the legality

²³ In any event, if North Viet-Nam considered there had been a breach of obligation by the South, its remedies lay in discussion with Saigon, perhaps in an appeal to the cochairmen of the Geneva conference, or in a reconvening of the conference to consider the situation. Under international law, North Viet-Nam had no right to use force outside its own zone in order to secure its political objectives. [Footnote in original.]

under domestic law of United States actions in Viet-Nam.

A. The President's Power Under Article II of the Constitution Extends to the Actions Currently Undertaken in Viet-Nam

Under the Constitution, the President, in addition to being Chief Executive, is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. He holds the prime responsibility for the conduct of United States foreign relations. These duties carry very broad powers, including the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military operations when the President deems such action necessary to maintain the security and defense of the United States.

At the Federal Constitutional Convention in 1787, it was originally proposed that Congress have the power "to make war." There were objections that legislative proceedings were too slow for this power to be vested in Congress; it was suggested that the Senate might be a better repository. Madison and Gerry then moved to substitute "to declare war" for "to make war," "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." It was objected that this might make it too easy for the Executive to involve the nation in war, but the motion carried with but one dissenting vote.

In 1787 the world was a far larger place, and the framers probably had in mind attacks upon the United States. In the 20th century, the world has grown much smaller. An attack on a country far from our shores can impinge directly on the nation's security. In the SEATO treaty, for example, it is formally declared that an armed attack against Viet-Nam would endanger the peace and safety of the United States.

Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 instances in which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain positions abroad without obtaining prior congressional authorization, starting with the "undeclared war" with France (1798–1800). For example, President Truman ordered 250,000 troops to Korea during the Korean war of the early

1950's. President Eisenhower dispatched 14,000 troops to Lebanon in 1958.

The Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to determine whether the circumstances of a particular armed attack are so urgent and the potential consequences so threatening to the security of the United States that he should act without formally consulting the Congress.

B. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Authorizes the President's Actions

Under article VI of the United States Constitution, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Article IV, paragraph 1, of the SEATO treaty establishes as a matter of law that a Communist armed attack against South Viet-Nam endangers the peace and safety of the United States. In this same provision the United States has undertaken a commitment in the SEATO treaty to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" in the event of such an attack.

Under our Constitution it is the President who must decide when an armed attack has occurred. He has also the constitutional responsibility for determining what measures of defense are required when the peace and safety of the United States are endangered. If he considers that deployment of U. S. forces to South Viet-Nam is required, and that military measures against the source of Communist aggression in North Viet-Nam are necessary, he is constitutionally empowered to take those measures.

The SEATO treaty specifies that each party will act "in accordance with its constitutional processes."

It has recently been argued that the use of land forces in Asia is not authorized under the treaty because their use to deter armed attack was not contemplated at the time the treaty was considered by the Senate. Secretary Dulles testified at that time that we did not intend to establish (1) a land army in Southeast Asia capable of deterring Communist aggression, or (2) an

integrated headquarters and military organization like that of NATO; instead, the United States would rely on "mobile striking power" against the sources of aggression. However, the treaty obligation in article IV, paragraph 1, to meet the common danger in the event of armed aggression, is not limited to particular modes of military action. What constitutes an adequate deterrent or an appropriate response, in terms of military strategy, may change; but the essence of our commitment to act to meet the common danger, as necessary at the time of an armed aggression, remains. In 1954 the forecast of military judgment might have been against the use of substantial United States ground forces in Viet-Nam. But that does not preclude the President from reaching a different military judgment in different circumstances, 12 years later.

C. The Joint Resolution of Congress of August 10, 1964, Authorizes United States Participation in the Collective Defense of South Viet-Nam

As stated earlier, the legality of United States participation in the defense of South Viet-Nam does not rest only on the constitutional power of the President under article II—or indeed on that power taken in conjunction with the SEATO treaty. In addition, the Congress has acted in unmistakable fashion to approve and authorize United States actions in Viet-Nam.

Following the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin against United States destroyers, Congress adopted, by a Senate vote of 88-2 and a House vote of 416-0, a joint resolution containing a series of important declarations and provisions of law.²⁴

Section 1 resolved that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Thus, the Congress gave its sanction to specific actions by the President

²⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

to repel attacks against United States naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin and elsewhere in the western Pacific. Congress further approved the taking of "all necessary measures . . . to prevent further aggression." This authorization extended to those measures the President might consider necessary to ward off further attacks and to prevent further aggression by North Viet-Nam in Southeast Asia.

The joint resolution then went on to provide in section 2:

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Section 2 thus constitutes an authorization to the President, in his discretion, to act—using armed force if he determines that is required—to assist South Viet-Nam at its request in defense of its freedom. The identification of South Viet-Nam through the reference to "protocol state" in this section is unmistakable, and the grant of authority "as the President determines" is unequivocal.

It has been suggested that the legislative history of the joint resolution shows an intention to limit United States assistance to South Viet-Nam to aid, advice, and training. This suggestion is based on an amendment offered from the floor by Senator [Gaylord] Nelson which would have added the following to the text:

The Congress also approves and supports the efforts of the President to bring the problem of peace in Southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is "limited and fitting." Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military

advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict.²⁵

Senator [J. W.] Fulbright, who had reported the joint resolution from the Foreign Relations Committee, spoke on the amendment as follows:

It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be appropriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as "respond to provocation in a manner that is limited and fitting," and so forth. We do not wish any political or military bases there. We are not seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of these people to develop along the lines of their own desires, independent of domination by communism.

The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. However, I cannot accept the amendment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this resolution. The House joint resolution is about to be presented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters.

I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay matters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy.²⁶

Senator Nelson's amendment related the degree and kind of U. S. response in Viet-Nam to "provocation" on the other side; the response should be "limited and fitting." The greater the provocation, the stronger are the measures that may be characterized as "limited and fitting." Bombing of North Vietnamese naval bases was a "limited and fitting" response to the attacks on U. S. destroyers in August 1964, and the subse-

²⁵ 110 *Cong. Rec.* 18459 (Aug. 7, 1964). [Footnote in original.]

²⁶ *Ibid.*

quent actions taken by the United States and South Viet-Nam have been an appropriate response to the increased war of aggression carried on by North Viet-Nam since that date. Moreover, Senator Nelson's proposed amendment did not purport to be a restriction on authority available to the President but merely a statement concerning what should be the continuing policy of the United States.

Congressional realization of the scope of authority being conferred by the joint resolution is shown by the legislative history of the measure as a whole. The following exchange between Senators Cooper and Fulbright is illuminating:

Mr. COOPER [John Sherman Cooper]. . . . The Senator will remember that the SEATO Treaty, in article IV, provides that in the event an armed attack is made upon a party to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or upon one of the protocol states such as South Vietnam, the parties to the treaty, one of whom is the United States, would then take such action as might be appropriate, after resorting to their constitutional processes. I assume that would mean, in the case of the United States, that Congress would be asked to grant the authority to act.

Does the Senator consider that in enacting this resolution we are satisfying that requirement of article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty? In other words, are we now giving the President advance authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting South Vietnam and its defense, or with respect to the defense of any other country included in the treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is correct.

Mr. COOPER. Then, looking ahead, if the President decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I would interpret it. If a situation later developed in which we thought the approval should be withdrawn it could be withdrawn by concurrent resolution.²⁷

The August 1964 joint resolution continues in force today. Section 2 of the resolution provides that it shall expire "when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress." The

President has made no such determination, nor has Congress terminated the joint resolution.²⁸

Instead, Congress in May 1965 approved an appropriation of \$700 million to meet the expense of mounting military requirements in Viet-Nam. (Public Law 89-18, 79 Stat. 109.) The President's message asking for this appropriation stated that this was "not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our efforts to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam."²⁹ The appropriation act constitutes a clear congressional endorsement and approval of the actions taken by the President.

On March 1, 1966, the Congress continued to express its support of the President's policy by approving a \$4.8 billion supplemental military authorization by votes of

²⁷ 110 *Cong. Rec.* 18409 (Aug. 6, 1964). Senator [Wayne] Morse, who opposed the joint resolution, expressed the following view on August 6, 1964, concerning the scope of the proposed resolution:

Another Senator thought, in the early part of the debate, that this course would not broaden the power of the President to engage in a land war if he decided that he wanted to apply the resolution in that way.

That Senator was taking great consolation in the then held belief that, if he voted for the resolution, it would give no authority to the President to send many troops into Asia. I am sure he was quite disappointed to finally learn, because it took a little time to get the matter cleared, that the resolution places no restriction on the President in that respect. If he is still in doubt, let him read the language on page 2, lines 3 to 6, and page 2, lines 11 to 17. The first reads:

The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

It does not say he is limited in regard to the sending of ground forces. It does not limit that authority. That is why I have called it a predated declaration of war, in clear violation of article I, section 8, of the Constitution, which vests the power to declare war in the Congress, and not in the President.

What is proposed is to authorize the President of the United States, without a declaration of war, to commit acts of war. (110 *Cong. Rec.* 18426-7 (Aug. 6, 1964)). [Footnote in original.]

²⁸ On March 1, 1966, the Senate voted, 92-5, to table an amendment that would have repealed the joint resolution. [Footnote in original.]

²⁹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 24, 1965, p. 822.

392-4 and 93-2. An amendment that would have limited the President's authority to commit forces to Viet-Nam was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 94-2.

D. No Declaration of War by the Congress Is Required To Authorize United States Participation in the Collective Defense of South Viet-Nam

No declaration of war is needed to authorize American actions in Viet-Nam. As shown in the preceding sections, the President has ample authority to order the participation of United States armed forces in the defense of South Viet-Nam.

Over a very long period in our history, practice and precedent have confirmed the constitutional authority to engage United States forces in hostilities without a declaration of war. This history extends from the undeclared war with France and the war against the Barbary pirates at the end of the 18th century to the Korean war of 1950-53.

James Madison, one of the leading framers of the Constitution, and Presidents John Adams and Jefferson all construed the Constitution, in their official actions during the early years of the Republic, as authorizing the United States to employ its armed forces abroad in hostilities in the absence of any congressional declaration of war. Their views and actions constitute highly persuasive evidence as to the meaning and effect of the Constitution. History has accepted the interpretation that was placed on the Constitution by the early Presidents and Congresses in regard to the lawfulness of hostilities without a declaration of war. The instances of such action in our history are numerous.

In the Korean conflict, where large-scale hostilities were conducted with an American troop participation of a quarter of a million men, no declaration of war was made by the Congress. The President acted on the basis of his constitutional responsibilities. While the Security Council, under a treaty of this country—the United Nations Charter—recommended assistance to the Republic of Korea against the Communist armed attack, the United States had no treaty commitment

at that time obligating us to join in the defense of South Korea. In the case of South Viet-Nam we have the obligation of the SEATO treaty and clear expressions of congressional support. If the President could act in Korea without a declaration of war, *a fortiori* he is empowered to do so now in Viet-Nam.

It may be suggested that a declaration of war is the only available constitutional process by which congressional support can be made effective for the use of United States armed forces in combat abroad. But the Constitution does not insist on any rigid formalism. It gives Congress a choice of ways in which to exercise its powers. In the case of Viet-Nam the Congress has supported the determination of the President by the Senate's approval of the SEATO treaty, the adoption of the joint resolution of August 10, 1964, and the enactment of the necessary authorizations and appropriations.

V. CONCLUSION

South Viet-Nam is being subjected to armed attack by Communist North Viet-Nam, through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and regular combat units. International law recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. South Viet-Nam, and the United States upon the request of South Viet-Nam, are engaged in such collective defense of the South. Their actions are in conformity with international law and with the Charter of the United Nations. The fact that South Viet-Nam has been precluded by Soviet veto from becoming a member of the United Nations and the fact that South Viet-Nam is a zone of a temporarily divided state in no way diminish the right of collective defense of South Viet-Nam.

The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression from the North. The United States gave undertakings to this effect at the conclusion of the Geneva conference in 1954. Later that year the United States undertook an international

obligation in the SEATO treaty to defend South Viet-Nam against Communist armed aggression. And during the past decade the United States has given additional assurances to the South Vietnamese Government.

The Geneva accords of 1954 provided for a cease-fire and regroupment of contending forces, a division of Viet-Nam into two zones, and a prohibition on the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to "further an aggressive policy." From the beginning, North Viet-Nam violated the Geneva accords through a systematic effort to gain control of South Viet-Nam by force. In the light of these progressive North Vietnamese violations, the introduction into South Viet-Nam beginning in late 1961 of substantial United States military equipment and personnel, to assist in the defense of the South, was fully justified; substantial breach of an international agreement by one side permits the other side to suspend performance of corresponding obligations under the agreement. South Viet-Nam was justified in refusing to implement the provisions of the Geneva accords calling for reunification through free elections throughout Viet-Nam since the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam created conditions in the North that made free elections entirely impossible.

The President of the United States has full authority to commit United States forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This authority stems from the constitutional powers of the President. However, it is not necessary to rely on the Constitution alone as the source of the President's authority, since the SEATO treaty—advised and consented to by the Senate and forming part of the law of the land—sets forth a United States commitment to defend South Viet-Nam against armed attack, and since the Congress—in the joint resolution of August 10, 1964, and in authorization and appropriations acts for support of the U. S. military effort in Viet-Nam—has given its approval and support to the President's actions. United States actions in Viet-Nam, taken by the President and approved by the Congress, do not require any declaration of war, as

shown by a long line of precedents for the use of United States armed forces abroad in the absence of any congressional declaration of war.

Vice President Humphrey Reports to President on Asian Trip

Text of Memorandum

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated March 5, for release March 6

MARCH 3, 1966

To: The President

FROM: The Vice President

At your request, I visited South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea. I was accompanied by Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President Jack Valenti, Ambassador Lloyd Hand, members of the National Security Council staff and of my own staff, and other American officials. We departed Honolulu on February 9 and returned to Washington on February 23.

We talked with chiefs of state and heads of government, cabinet ministers, government officials (and in some cases, leaders of the opposition), our own embassy staff and Peace Corps volunteers, labor leaders, teachers, students, rural workers, U.S. voluntary agency representatives, and the ordinary people of the countries visited.

On your instructions, I reported on the Honolulu Conference¹ to those governments

¹ President Johnson and several members of his Cabinet held a 3-day meeting at Honolulu, Feb. 6-8, with the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Nguyen Van Thieu, and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky. For texts of a joint communique and the Declaration of Honolulu, together with an exchange of remarks between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey at Los Angeles on Feb. 8, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302; for a joint communique issued at Bangkok on Feb. 15 by the Vice President and Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand, see *ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1966, p. 396.

not present at the conference, listened to the views of those we visited, and exchanged ideas and opinions about the problems and opportunities of Asia.

I have already reported to you in detail my extensive conversations with foreign leaders within the countries we visited. I have also briefed most of the Members of Congress in general and in particular those Committees of the Congress which have jurisdiction in these matters.

I submit to you a summary of my conclusions:

1. In Vietnam, the tide of battle, which less than a year ago was running heavily against the Government of South Vietnam, has begun to turn for the better. A series of defeats of main force units of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces has greatly encouraged the South Vietnamese and our forces. Ahead lies a long and costly struggle—one which will test our patience and perseverance; yet I am confident that we can prevent the success of the aggression in South Vietnam.

2. The war being waged in Vietnam and in most of Asia is two-fold:

the struggle of nations to chart their own destinies and maintain their national independence while threatened by Communist subversion and aggression;

and the struggle to bring about a social and economic revolution for the people.

There is a growing appreciation by Asian leaders that successful resistance to Communist-backed subversion and/or aggression depends on the success of a social revolution that improves the lives of people, as well as on armed defense.

3. The significance of the struggle in Vietnam is not simply the defense of a small nation against powerful neighbors. Vietnam is, in a larger sense, the focus of a broad effort to restrain the attempt by Asian Communists to expand by force—as we assisted our European allies in resisting Communist expansion in Europe after World War II.

4. The Honolulu Declaration emphasizing

the defeat of aggression and the achievement of a social revolution could represent a historic turning point in American relationships with Asia. The goals agreed upon by President Johnson and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam at Honolulu are taken very seriously:

to defeat aggression,
to defeat social misery,
to build a stable democratic government,
to reach an honorable, just peace.

5. Most Asian leaders are concerned about the belligerence and militancy of Communist China's attitudes. None wishes to permit his country to fall under Communist domination in any form. All are dedicated nationalists.

6. Among the leaders with whom I spoke, there was repeatedly expressed a concern as to whether our American purpose, tenacity and will were strong enough to persevere in Southeast Asia. I emphasized not only the firmness of our resolve but also our dedication to the rights of free discussion and dissent.

7. Free Asia is astir with a consciousness of the need for Asian initiatives in the solution of Asia's problems. Regional development and planning are increasingly being recognized as necessary for political and economic progress. The power of nationalism is now tempered by a growing realization of the need for cooperation among nations. Asians seek to preserve their national identity. They want gradually to create new international structures. But they want to pursue such aims themselves. They want foreign assistance when necessary, but without foreign domination.

8. The future of free institutions in Asia will be reinforced if India and Pakistan can (1) meet the social and economic needs of their people, and (2) avoid fighting each other. To do this will require internal discipline and careful allocation of resources, combined with large and sustained economic and technical assistance from the free world.

9. Most Asian leaders believe that Hanoi

and Peking are blocking efforts for peace in South Vietnam. Deeply concerned over the continuing conflict in Vietnam, several reaffirmed their offers of good offices to bring about negotiations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We must pursue two objectives in South Vietnam:

to help preserve their independence, which is threatened by Communist subversion and aggression, and

to help achieve a social and economic revolution in the lives of the Vietnamese people.

2. A second "Honolulu Conference" could usefully be held sometime later this year in order to evaluate progress being made on the goals set at Honolulu in February. Our partners participating in the struggle in South Vietnam should be invited to such a conference. In particular, such a review would be useful in moving forward the program of social and economic development.

3. We and the government of South Vietnam must do everything we can to check inflation there. Such measures in Vietnam as increased taxation, commodity and construction control, improved transport and distribution of goods must be put into effect promptly.

4. A special effort should be made both in the United States and in other free nations to help the South Vietnamese with additional volunteer medical teams (at least 400 people this year), and with the dispatch of hospital and ambulance and immunization units for rural areas. Free world nations can also contribute by training Vietnamese as auxiliary medical personnel in greater numbers. Consideration should be given to making available to the South Vietnamese a number of packaged emergency hospitals which are being released by the civil defense units of various American cities.

5. The continued plight of the refugees in South Vietnam who have fled to the areas

under government control is one that demands not only our increased attention, but also the cooperative and humanitarian efforts of all nations. The refugee problem arose with extraordinary speed and on a large scale and overtaxed existing resources. In particular, the most pitiful victims of war—the sick, the elderly and the children—deserve the assistance of men and women of good will everywhere. A vigorous effort should be made internationally to help these people, in addition to the effort now being made through United States and South Vietnamese resources.

6. The United States and other friendly nations should give high priority to assuring India and Pakistan the economic and technical assistance required to implement their development programs while these nations honor the provisions of the Tashkent agreement.

7. We must continue your vigorous efforts to pursue every possibility to an honorable peace in Vietnam and Asia. We must continue to seek the assistance and good offices of all other nations, the United Nations, the Pope and other religious leaders in this effort.

Travel Controls to Restricted Areas Relaxed for Scholars

*Department Statement*¹

In 1957, when the Department authorized the travel of U.S. newsmen to Communist China,² the Department noted then this was being done so that additional information could be made available to the American people respecting current conditions within China.

Now, in line with that purpose, the Department will henceforth consider on an individual basis applications from scholars, as well as newsmen, for travel to restricted

¹ Read to news correspondents on March 10 by a Department spokesman.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 9, 1957, p. 420.

areas.³ As in the case of reporters, the Department will require the scholar to be professionally involved in furnishing the public with information concerning the areas for which passport validation is being sought.

The Department today [March 10] will issue the first passport validation under this new interpretation of passport restrictions to Dr. Norman Auburn, president of the University of Akron. Dr. Auburn's plans are to study educational methods in Communist China and Albania.

U.S. Task Force Studies Viet-Nam Health and Education Needs

President Johnson on March 5 (White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.)) announced the selection of a task force to study the health and education needs of the people of South Viet-Nam.

The task force, headed by Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner, was scheduled to depart for Saigon March 12 to help plan an intensified attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease in Viet-Nam in accordance with a joint pledge made by the President and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Viet-Nam during their recent conference at Honolulu.¹

In announcing the task force, the President said of the Gardner mission:

The United States has a twofold objective in Viet-Nam—not only to help the Republic of Viet-Nam win its war against aggression but also to lay the groundwork for meaningful and durable peace.

The members of this mission will bring professional competence to the work of the health and education task force. This can only be the beginning of what must be a continuing effort on the part of both Governments to give new promise and new purpose to the lives of the Vietnamese people.

The health and education team is made up of specialists drawn from universities and other nongovernment organizations and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The team's education specialists will

be headed by Francis Keppel, Assistant Secretary for Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the health specialists by William H. Stewart, Surgeon General of the Public Health Service.

Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, will serve on the task force, and S. Douglass Cater, Jr., Special Assistant to the President, will represent the White House.²

Following conferences with American and Vietnamese officials in Saigon, the HEW task force planned to split into sections for field trips and consultation with Vietnamese and U.S. personnel engaged in health and education activities in the provinces.

The HEW task force is the second to visit Viet-Nam since the Honolulu conference. A team of agricultural experts headed by Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman arrived at Saigon on February 11.

U.S. Mission Chiefs in Far East Meet at Baguio, Philippines

Joint Statement, March 3

Press release 41 dated March 3

United States Chiefs of Mission to thirteen countries in the Far East, joined by Washington officials and military representatives, have concluded four days of talks at Baguio, the Republic of the Philippines. This was the fifth such ambassadorial conference arranged by the United States Department of State at Baguio. The meeting was chaired by William P. Bundy, Assistant

² For a Department statement of Dec. 29, 1965, announcing relaxation of travel controls to restricted areas for doctors and medical scientists, see *ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 90.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

⁴ For names of other members of the task force, see White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated Mar. 5.

Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

The participants are deeply appreciative to the Government of the Philippines for its hospitality and the opportunity to meet again in this country which plays such a vital role in the pursuit of an independent and free Asia.

The conferees met to review the current world situation, with particular emphasis on the struggle in Viet-Nam, Communist strategy and objectives in the Far East, and the search for increased economic and social development in the area.

The conferees reaffirmed the soundness of basic United States policy objectives in the Far East: to work cooperatively toward security and stability in the area, so that each nation may act to determine its own destiny in the way it sees fit and to improve the welfare of its people by eradicating ignorance, poverty and disease.

The conferees noted that the integrally related tasks of achieving continued growth and greater strength cannot be accomplished without long and arduous effort, but were impressed by the progress made over the past year by many countries of the region in the pursuit of these goals, and by the major steps taken toward increased regional cooperation, such as the recently-established Asian Development Bank.¹

The conferees concluded that central to the area's prospects for future security and stability is the effective collective prosecution of South Viet-Nam's struggle for freedom and self-determination. Without successful resistance to external aggression, the success of a long-term effort throughout the Far East for social and economic development—such as enunciated by President Johnson on April 7, 1965,² and at the Honolulu conference in February of this year³—will not be possible.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Atlanta

The Department of State announced on March 4 (press release 43) that U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, will be the principal speaker in a five-State foreign policy conference at Atlanta, Ga., on April 2. The conference, jointly sponsored by the Department of State, the Atlanta chapter of the United Nations Association, the Atlanta Public School System, and Emory University, has the cooperation of some 30 other State and community organizations in the area. It will be attended by several hundred representatives of local, State, and national organizations and by media representatives from Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, and eastern Tennessee.

Other officials scheduled to participate are: Fulton Freeman, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico; Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; and William C. Foster, Administrator, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mrs. Katie S. Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Advisory Services, will be the conference moderator.

The Atlanta conference is one of a series conducted by the Department of State to bring Government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy together with citizen leaders and representatives of the radio, television, and press.

In addition to the main conference, there will be similar programs in the morning for selected college and high school students and faculty from both public and private institutions. Francis W. Carpenter, Director of Public Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, will address the conferences on the subject of the United Nations. The students will join for an afternoon youth session at which Under Secretary Johnson will discuss U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

Study Completed on Large-Scale Power-Desalting Plant for Israel

Following is the text of an announcement released concurrently on March 7 by the Department of State, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the Government of Israel.

Press release 45 dated March 7

The U.S.-Israel Joint Board has received the final report of the Engineering Feasibility and Economic Study performed under contract by Kaiser Engineers of Oakland, California, in association with Catalytic Construction Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.¹ The contract has been jointly supported by the Governments of Israel and the United States, the latter represented by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Office of Saline Water of the Department of the Interior.

Pursuant to the program of cooperation in desalting agreed during Prime Minister Eshkol's visit of June 1964 with President Johnson, a Joint Team of experts made a preliminary review during the summer of 1964 of the possibilities of employing the rapidly advancing technology of saline water conversion to help meet Israel's growing water needs.² As recommended by the team, the contractors have studied the engineering feasibility of a proposed dual-purpose (electric power-desalted water) facility for Israel. On the basis of the ground rules of the study, a nuclear powered 200 megawatt (electrical) and 100 million gallons of water per day plant, to be in commercial operation by 1972, was found technically feasible, assuming early initiation of design and the successful completion of a water plant mo-

dule developmental program. The study, using 1965 prices, estimated the plant capital costs at about \$200 million. Assuming a power credit of 5.3 mils per KWH, the resulting water costs would range from \$.29 to \$.67 per thousand gallons for fixed charge rates of 5 percent and 10 percent respectively.

The Joint Board, established by the two governments to oversee the study, has recommended that the final report be accepted by the contracting officer and is submitting the study to the two governments. The membership of the Joint Board included Aharon Wiener, Director of TAHAL (Water Planning for Israel); Dr. Haim Cats, the Israel Electric Corporation, Ltd.; and Dr. Shimon Yiftah, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, representing Israel. Milton A. Chase, Department of the Interior; Stewart F. Mulford, Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior; and Jack O. Roberts, Atomic Energy Commission, represented the United States.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has participated in this cooperative program, beginning with the Joint Team's preliminary survey in 1964. Mr. Donat B. Brice, IAEA Desalting Specialist located in Vienna, participated in the latest activities of the Joint Board.

Agricultural Education Agreement Signed With Colombia

The White House announced on March 7 that agricultural education in Colombia would be greatly expanded and developed under an agreement signed on that day at Bogotá between the Government of Colombia and the United States Agency for International Development (AID).

The agreement reflects the increased emphasis by President Johnson on improving educational opportunities and expanding food production abroad and was signed in the presence of President Guillermo León Valencia of Colombia and U.S. Ambassador

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 635. Single copies of the report are available from the Clearing House for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Va., 22151.

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 958; June 29, 1964, p. 1001; Aug. 17, 1964, p. 230; and Nov. 16, 1964, p. 724.

Covey T. Oliver at the Presidential Palace at Bogotá.

Under the agreement AID joins a number of other U.S. and international organizations assisting the Colombians in a sweeping program of expansion of the agricultural campuses of the Colombian National University at Bogotá, Medellín, and Palmira. This program has been under development for some time with particular help from the Rockefeller, Kellogg, and Ford Foundations. Other active or prospective participants in the program include the United Nations Special Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the International Bank.

At the same ceremony, AID signed a contract with the University of Nebraska and associated colleges in the Mid-America State University Association to carry out that portion of the overall program covered by the AID agreement.

U.S. Agencies Urged To Help Achieve Balance of Payments

Following is the text of a memorandum from President Johnson to Cabinet officers and heads of major agencies.

White House press release dated March 8

Our balance of payments requires our continuing attention and concern. We achieved a substantial improvement in the overall deficit in 1965 and we look forward to further improvement this year.

Federal overseas transactions play an important role in our balance of payments, and

for the past several years we have made a great effort to minimize the adverse impact that our Federal programs might have on our balance of payments. But the requirements associated with Vietnam, both for military and for economic assistance, now demand even greater vigilance in controlling our overseas Federal transactions.

Under the procedures which have been established to control the balance of payments impact of the Federal Government's overseas activities, you are scheduled to report by March 15 to the Bureau of the Budget on your agency's international transactions. I urge that you use this occasion to reexamine all of your overseas programs with the utmost care. Your objective should be to maximize receipts and to minimize expenditures abroad consistent with the achievement of U.S. objectives.

I have instructed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to examine your reports carefully and to inform me promptly of the progress which is being made by each Federal agency in assisting the Nation to achieve equilibrium in its balance of payments.

Letters of Credence

Switzerland

The newly appointed Ambassador of Switzerland, Felix Schnyder, presented his credentials to President Johnson on March 8. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated March 8.

Food for Freedom Act of 1966

Statements by Secretary Rusk

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, FEBRUARY 25¹

Press release 34 dated February 25

Mr. Chairman, since these hearings began 10 days ago, this committee has heard a most distinguished group of witnesses. The subject matter deserves our best. The world has made great progress in development; yet a majority of the people on earth still do not have enough to eat. And in recent years food production has not kept pace with the requirements of expanding populations.

This is a very disturbing trend. Unless checked it will lead to grave dangers. The key question is whether we—and I use the word “we” in a universal sense—have the capacity to prevent massive hunger and consequent political chaos. This is a question of basic importance, even to our own prosperous nation with its ever-amazing farm production.

The central concern of our foreign policy is, in familiar words, to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” We know that in the shrunken world of today, we cannot secure those blessings in national isolation, or through policies and defenses confined to the North American

Continent, the Western Hemisphere, the North Atlantic basin, or other limited areas. We have to be concerned with the world as a whole—and with mankind as a whole.

The goal of our policy is the kind of world sketched in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter—a world of independent nations, each free to choose its own institutions, but cooperating with one another to prevent aggression, maintain peace, and to further their mutual interests, a world which yields continuing progress in economic and social justice for all peoples.

One of the most important segments of our foreign policy is assistance to the developing nations in modernizing themselves—to move forward economically and socially and politically. For, apart from our humanitarian interests in fellow human beings, we know that we cannot find enduring security in a world in which a few are rich and other people live in misery and starvation.

So the question we address here is basic to the welfare, and even the survival, of the human race, hence basic to our own welfare and security.

Mr. Chairman, there appears to have been extensive agreement among the experts who appeared before you last week. The gravity of the downward trend in per capita food production can scarcely be exaggerated. The witnesses you have heard have emphasized that the world must give priority attention to the food/population equation.

¹ Read by Under Secretary Thomas C. Mann during hearings on H.R. 12785 (S. 2933), a bill to promote international trade in agricultural commodities, to combat hunger and malnutrition, to further economic development, and for other purposes.

In dealing with this problem American food and agricultural skills are assets of great worth. This is especially true if their use is well planned, as has been done in the broad interrelated foreign aid program the President has proposed to the Congress.²

I recommend this program to you as strengthening the foreign policy of the United States. There are a number of different ways in which food is being used in the conduct of this policy. Hardly a day passes, in fact, that I am not involved in a food-related question somewhere in the world. Perhaps it may be helpful to discuss briefly a few examples.

Aid to India and Pakistan

Food for Peace has been an effective instrument in strengthening democratic governments. Nowhere has this been more true than in India. Over the past two decades the people of the United States have followed with friendly concern the efforts of the people of India to fashion a modern democratic state.

Those of us who campaigned in the India-Burma theater in World War II carried away a profound respect for the people of South Asia and for the significance of this area in future world peace. While we have not always agreed with India's views on specific foreign policy matters, we have applauded her successful adherence to democratic concepts and practices; her energetic efforts, against great odds, to develop economic and social strength; and her determined stand against external Communist aggression. Indeed, India, with 485 million people, is the largest democracy in the world. Now a drought in India, widespread and unprecedented in this century, threatens a hundred million people with the prospect of famine.

India is determined to meet the impending crisis firmly and boldly. The Govern-

ment is distributing available food under tight rationing in the cities and through fair-price shops. Special attention is being given to the needs of children and other particularly vulnerable groups. Additional manpower is being assigned to projects of urgent benefit to agriculture.

President Johnson last month released an additional 3 million tons of food to India, bringing to a total of 6½ million tons of grain our efforts this fiscal year to help the Government of India close its food gap.

Eighteen other nations have also offered India some form of assistance. These contributions, with those of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and His Holiness Pope Paul VI, now total approximately \$70 million in value and are increasing as the urgency of the problem becomes more clearly defined. We expect that other countries in a position to render assistance, whether in food, fertilizer, pesticides, shipping, or any other form, will come forward. We hope and expect that those which have already contributed will find the means to do more.

Although the effects of the drought in the subcontinent may be less severe in Pakistan than in India, acute food shortages are anticipated there as well. A P.L. 480 agreement signed in 1961 expired at the end of 1965, and we are now discussing with the Government of Pakistan an interim P.L. 480 agreement for fiscal year 1966.

But in the long run the problem of famine in the world cannot be solved by reliance on the transfer of food from surplus to deficit nations. Only by increasing their own agricultural production can the developing countries cope with the problem of adequately feeding their people.

Even more is at stake. It is in the rural areas, Mr. Chairman, that the people are. In virtually all the developing countries of the world an increase in agricultural productivity may well be the critical element to satisfactory economic growth. In our own experience growing agricultural production proved to be the best stimulus for the growth of

² For texts of the President's messages on foreign assistance, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, pp. 320, 328, 336.

industry. We believe this will be true as well for those countries that are now making a determined effort to move ahead. Advance in the countryside will go hand in hand with advance in the cities.

The present Government of India is aware of the need to give priority to agriculture as a key to economic development. In addition to its efforts to meet the immediate food emergency, India is giving high priority to programs to increase agricultural production. Our food assistance should help India achieve this objective.

Pakistan's impressive growth in recent years provides an excellent testimonial to the developmental value of food aid. Our P.L. 480 program there has made a particular contribution in a highly successful rural works effort, a labor-intensive self-help project through which the Government of Pakistan has supplied roads, irrigation facilities, and other basic agricultural help to its farmers, who make up the bulk of her population. One heavily Food for Peace-supported, multipurpose power project, the Indus basin development plan, will mean as much to the irrigation and economic development of an area of West Pakistan as the Tennessee Valley Authority has meant to the United States.

The subcontinent is both a test and an opportunity for the new concepts on the use of food embodied in H.R. 12785. We expect through this program to strengthen the efforts for freedom and democracy on the part of the two great countries in the area. On humanitarian grounds and on grounds of self-interest, we have the responsibility for continuing our support for this great effort and for making our aid more effective.

Food-for-Work Projects

Another kind of creative influence can be seen at work in North Africa. Throughout Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria hundreds of thousands of unemployed workers or seriously underemployed workers have contributed to the economies of their countries

through food-for-work projects. Of special interest here is the nature of the unemployed. In Algeria, for example, one of the major problems facing the country, following the 7-year war for independence, was how and where to put to work the large number of unemployed, amounting to over 50 percent of the labor force. Many of them had been fighting for years and knew no other skills. We had known from experiences elsewhere that, unless such a group were put to productive work, it could play havoc with the development of a nation. Under a food-for-work arrangement, thousands of Algerians were called on to help reforest the country, denuded of trees by the lengthy fighting. In the process these men learned skills and realized, too, the importance of self-reliance in the solution of their economic problems. Similar programs have been undertaken in Asia and Latin America. We propose to continue and expand such programs under H.R. 12785.

Support for Defense Efforts

In those areas of the world directly facing aggressive Communist expansion, our food programs have been of value in supporting military capacity and strengthening the will and ability of peoples to maintain their freedom and independence. Taiwan and Korea are successful examples of this policy, as were Greece, Turkey, and Iran earlier examples of mutual defense programs significantly assisted by United States food and food-generated local currencies. Our food is today supporting the energetic effort of the Government of South Viet-Nam to establish stability in its economy despite the strains of its defense efforts and to provide adequately for its people despite the deliberate destruction of food stocks by the enemy.

This type of food assistance can be as important a contribution as weapons themselves in forestalling or coping with developments which are a basic threat to the national security of the societies in the area and, in fact, to world order itself.

Food for Transitional Periods

When our friends approach economic viability, as in Greece, Israel, or Taiwan, our agricultural resources can serve a useful and sometimes necessary transitional role. If we maintain our aid programs in a country any longer than the minimum time required for "takeoff," we saddle ourselves with an unnecessary burden, and we do no favor to the country. We cannot, however, anticipate precisely a smooth transition, and there may be some unevenness in development that threatens to undo the previous investment. Under such conditions food provides a resource that can be used as a transitional and flexible device to assist an economy which may, thereafter, be a healthy market for American products.

Achievements of Food for Peace

Our experience has been that United States agricultural commodities provide a particular, valuable asset to support American foreign policy. Often the very success of our development efforts may bring problems with foreign policy implications. As countries increase their own agricultural production to the point where one or more crops may be exported, traditional marketing patterns may be affected. We must be careful to protect normal trade patterns, avoid hampering the economic development we have encouraged, and preserve our own commercial interests.

Our experience, of course, has been that markets become larger—not smaller—in the process of nation-building. As our foreign assistance programs have strengthened economies overseas, they have served well, too, the American farmer. The same will be true for this program.

Our pattern of operation necessarily is different in different countries. The *quid pro quo*, for example, often is different as relationships with countries differ. But what I want to emphasize is that our food programs are important components of our overall bilateral relationships. We have

programs in over 100 countries. In each case, as we negotiate agreements, we consider the United States national interest, just as the other country considers its national interest. As food aid must be part of an integrated foreign aid program, so it must be part of our total policy toward each individual country. I would like to reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that our food aid program has been a valuable foreign policy tool because it is directed toward positive changes—strengthening democratic governments, promoting political stability, encouraging economic stability, assisting national development. Our food has been and will continue to be used in the cause of peace. On certain occasions our donation programs, especially child-feeding programs, have continued in countries when other forms of formal relationships were ruptured.

As President Johnson said,³ this Food for Freedom program ". . . proclaims our commitment to a better world society—where every person can hope for life's essentials—and be able to find them in peace. It proclaims the interdependence of mankind in its quest for food and clothing and shelter."

The legislation before you is based on two American traits—a compassion for fellow human beings in need and a technical skill and productivity in agriculture which must surely be considered as one of the great success stories of modern history. These two threads of American greatness were woven together by the 83d Congress more than 10 years ago, during the administration of President Eisenhower, with the enactment of P.L. 480. As you well know, the evolution of the Food for Peace program over the years has made it one of the most successful and imaginative of our overseas assistance programs. Your committee has long encouraged this transition to self-help.

The achievements of Food for Peace have been many, and we have learned much during the decade of P.L. 480. The new legislation takes advantage of this experience. It

³ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

is adapted to the needs and conditions of today.

President Johnson has proposed that "the United States lead the world in a war against hunger." I view the legislation being studied by your committee as the vehicle to this goal. Should the Food for Freedom Act be enacted by the Congress, I predict the day will come when we will regard Food for Freedom with the same respect in which we now hold the Marshall Plan, Point 4, P.L. 480, and other significant milestones of our United States foreign assistance efforts.

As I said at the outset, we are dealing with a problem of immense proportions. From my desk at the State Department, it looms as one of the major problems we will be facing during the coming decades.

I recommend to you the Food for Freedom Act and its companion legislation as being in the best interests of the foreign policy of the United States.

SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, MARCH 7

Press release 46 dated March 7

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you this morning the problem of food and population—a problem which has been receiving high priority from all of us in the executive branch who are concerned with matters of international well-being. It is a subject which doesn't make the headlines that Viet-Nam does day after day. Nevertheless, it is of very great importance. Our handling of it will have a significant impact upon our own and future generations.

The root of the problem is clear enough: In many parts of the world, food production is beginning to lag behind population growth. As Secretary [of Agriculture Orville L.] Freeman has said, "The less developed world is losing the capacity to feed itself."

The problem of growing enough food to meet the need is not new. What is new is the dimension the problem has assumed as we look at the next decade. With the contin-

uing and sudden sharp rise of population throughout much of the world, this food crisis demands urgent attention. Fortunately, there is a growing world recognition of this problem, which may in itself be the first step toward its elimination. It has prompted activity within the highest councils of this Government—reflected by the President's recent message to the Congress on Food for Freedom, as well as related legislation which has been referred to this committee.

Before World War II the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were exporting sizable quantities of grain to the more economically advanced nations. In the 1930's, for example, Latin America exported more grain than any other region of the world. Today, for the most part, the laden grain ships are sailing in the opposite direction—and nearly three times as many are required to do the job. As an illustration, more than 30 million tons of grain probably will be shipped this year from the industrialized to the nonindustrialized countries. This amount is more than double the magnitude of annual shipments of the 1950's, and an increase of more than 50 percent just in the past 5 years. And even with these enormous imports—much of them in the form of food aid—and with some developing countries already straining their port capacity, there are many countries in which the food intake per individual was less this year than last year, less last year than the year before.

Unless this disturbing trend can be reversed, it will soon have profoundly deteriorating effects. There is a very real relationship between hunger and political instability. There is also a very real relationship between the ability to meet elementary human needs and economic and social development. In coming years the problem we discuss today, unless curbed, could become a serious obstacle to important foreign policy goals of the United States.

What can be done? Throughout history the hungry man often solved his problem—when it was solved—in one of two ways. He

either cultivated new lands or migrated to a region of the world with greater opportunities. The latter alternative no longer exists today as it did in the past. Although less than a tenth of the earth's land surface currently produces crops, the new supply of potentially productive land is severely limited. The only other alternative was starvation, an alternative which is unacceptable in today's world.

The Food/Population Equation

In what other direction can we turn? First, we cannot realistically face the food crisis without simultaneously looking at the population problem. In country after country, impressive increases in food production have been offset by population growth. However, a number of countries have come to recognize that the food problem cannot be solved without addressing themselves to both sides of the food/population equation. The race between food and population is a critical one.

Nevertheless, even with the most optimistic of achievements in family planning, we realistically face the fact that such measures cannot prevent the serious threat of hunger in the next decade.

With limited land availability, our best hope is to obtain more food from lands already under cultivation and from the sea. We have known for a number of years that better seeds, fertilizers, flood control, irrigation, pesticides, and other miracles of technology can multiply food production many times. However, the benefits of such techniques have largely been confined to the already rich nations. In the United States and Canada, for example, yield per acre in the last quarter century has been increased over 100 percent—compared with only 8 percent in the less developed world. Secretary Freeman often describes his grandfather's farm which operated in the days when the American farmer could feed himself and three others. In contrast, the American farmer today feeds himself and 32 others. The prime reason is modern technology which enables the American farmer to grow

six times as much corn on an acre of land as does a farmer in India.

How do you best encourage such an increase? How do you best transfer a technology which we know exists and can work? How do you encourage the needy countries to face up to this problem and solve it with their own resources? How can we make the most effective and, at the same time, the most economical contribution to such an effort?

These are the questions to which the administration has addressed itself. No one has been more aware of the gravity of the situation than the President, and his deep, personal concern is reflected in the legislation which is now before your committee.

Last year President Johnson requested a thorough analysis of the situation, and the bill we are discussing today is the culmination of more than a year's intensive study by the executive branch. It adds a new dimension to an effort which has been evolving over the past two decades:

- The bill gives recognition to the importance of food as an integral factor in a country's life and growth.
- The bill recognizes the gravity of the food problem, certainly the most critical many countries will be facing over the next decade.
- The bill correctly suggests that the only solution to the food problem will be through the increased agricultural production of the developing countries themselves and that we should make efforts to assist that process.
- The bill proposes that our own agricultural effort be directed not only to domestic needs but also to our participation in overseas requirements through both commercial and assistance channels.

Four Aspects of Legislation

Mr. Chairman, there are four aspects of this legislation to which I would like to direct your special attention.

First is the emphasis placed on self-help. There is little question that the final resolution of the world food problem must come

from the developing nations themselves. Yet, in many ways, agriculture has been the weakest rung in the ladder to development. In many countries it has been shortchanged, time and again, in favor of more glamorous industrial projects. Today a new philosophy is emerging. Now there is a growing recognition that a strong agricultural base is a prerequisite to development. The concept of self-help is inherent in this legislation, and any food assistance on our part will be directly related to the extent of these efforts. We will carefully assess the self-help efforts by the recipient countries to assure that they are doing everything possible to increase their own productive capacity.

The second point I would like to call to your attention is the transition from sales for local currencies to sales on dollar credit terms. Some criticism has been leveled over the years—perhaps some of it justified—that certain recipients of our food aid had assumed that our food assistance would continue indefinitely, and thus encouraging them to neglect their own agriculture for other priorities. Some may have felt they were doing us a favor by taking our so-called “surplus problem” off our hands. With this new provision, and the fact of our disappearing surpluses, food will be provided on the same terms as development loans—and will highlight the fact that food aid has the same value as aid in other forms.

Third, I would like to point out the emphasis of this legislation on combating malnutrition. This is a new dimension to the food problem, which was barely recognized in the early days of Public Law 480. Scientific findings of the past few years emphasize the fact that the kind of food we eat is often more important than how much we eat. We now realize that protein malnutrition, especially among young children, can result in both physical and mental retardation. Indeed, as the President has said on a number of occasions, the problem of malnutrition could well become one of the basic obstacles to the entire development process. At a conference of the National Academy of Sciences it was

pointed out that our approach to this aspect of the food problem could have a direct effect “on what our civilization looks like, acts like, and thinks like in 1984.”

Fourth, and perhaps the most dramatic element in this new program, is the concept of “growing to meet the need.” This is a positive and logical extension of previous food aid efforts. It provides a link between domestic farm programs and overseas commercial and assistance requirements which cannot help but make a more effective use of our magnificent agricultural capacity.

I do not pretend to possess expertise in a field which you gentlemen have studied for many years. However, in addition to the foreign policy implications which I know are very serious, the domestic economic benefits of the Food for Freedom Act are readily apparent to me. Time and again we see evidence that the developing nations are important potential customers. As their economies grow, their dollar purchases increase. What we’re really suggesting, aside from the obvious humanitarian and foreign policy features of the legislation presented here, is that we are helping to build bigger dollar markets more quickly. Food is a stimulus which can help, and has helped, to expedite the arduous development process.

I would like to stress, Mr. Chairman, that our food aid program has been a valuable foreign policy tool because it is directed toward positive changes—strengthening democratic governments, promoting political stability, encouraging economic stability, assisting national development. Our food has been and will continue to be used in the cause of peace. On certain occasions our donation programs, especially child-feeding programs, have continued in countries when all other forms of formal relationships were ruptured.

Our pattern of operation necessarily is different in different countries. The *quid pro quo*, for example, often is different as relationships with countries differ. But what I want to emphasize is that our food programs are important components of our

overall bilateral relationships. In each case, as we negotiate agreements, we consider the United States national interest, just as the other country considers its national interest.

Two Threads of American Greatness

The legislation before you is based on two American traits—a compassion for fellow human beings in need, and a technical skill and productivity in agriculture which must surely be considered as one of the great success stories of modern history. These two threads of American greatness were woven together by this committee during the 83d Congress more than 10 years ago, with the enactment of P.L. 480. As you well know, the evolution of the bipartisan Food for Peace program over the years has made it one of the most successful and imaginative of our overseas assistance programs.

The achievements of Food for Peace have been many, and we have learned much during the decade of P.L. 480. The new legislation takes advantage of this experience. It is adapted to the needs and conditions of today.

President Johnson has proposed that “. . . the United States lead the world in a war against hunger.”⁴ I view the legislation being studied by your committee as supporting this goal.

As I said at the outset, we are dealing with a problem of immense proportions. From my desk at the State Department, where rarely a day passes in which I am not involved in some food-related issue, it looms as one of the major problems our nation will be facing during the coming decades. A major attack on the problem today can prevent serious political, economic, and social turmoil in many countries within a very few years.

I recommend to you the attack on hunger as proposed in the Food for Freedom Act and its companion legislation as being in the best interests of the foreign policy of the United States.

⁴ *Ibid.*

President Reports to Congress on Communications Satellite Act

Following is the text of a letter from President Johnson to the Congress transmitting a report¹ on the activities and accomplishments under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.

To the Congress of the United States:

A new communications era has begun.

The first commercial satellite is in orbit over the Atlantic Ocean, in an unchanging location linking millions of people, thousands of miles apart, in reliable telecommunications between North America and Europe.

The flights of our astronauts, the Olympic games, international policy discussions, and other occasions of broad interest and major importance have been transmitted throughout the world by way of communications satellites. Today information is made available for improving health, warning against major storms, and increasing agricultural output.

This historic space bridge will be enlarged. Satellites scheduled to be launched later this year are to span the Pacific and expand coverage over the Atlantic.

The commercial satellite service will advance to provide this new and unique telecommunications capability to other areas of the world.

In the foreseeable future, entire newspapers and service from the world's greatest libraries will be able to enter the homes of all those eager for knowledge.

This dramatic effort follows from the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, which called for the establishment of a worldwide commercial communications system as soon as practicable.

With the Communications Satellite Corp. as the U.S. representative designated by the act, an international consortium of participants in this global venture continues to grow. Forty-eight countries are now engaged

¹ H. Doc. 400, 89th Cong., 2d sess.

in this joint venture, with the corporation acting as manager on behalf of all participants under the international agreements.

In the forward movement of the communications satellite program, all agencies of the Government and the committees of the Congress have assisted in carrying out the objectives and purposes of the act.

Under section 404(a) of the act, I am transmitting to the Congress a report on this national program, which is successfully advancing communications satellite technology to the benefit of the people of the United States and the world.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 3, 1966.

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1964

*Following is the text of a message from President Johnson transmitting to the Congress the 19th annual report on U.S. participation in the United Nations.*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, I submit herewith the nineteenth annual report covering United States participation in the United Nations during 1964.

This report, like its predecessors, describes the activities of the United Nations agencies and programs that together carry out the aims of the Charter: to maintain peace and security, to adjust and settle international disputes, to cooperate in economic and social development, and to promote the self-determination of peoples and worldwide respect for human rights. It also

covers legal, administrative, and financial matters at the United Nations.

The activities covered in this report document the commitment of this Nation to the purposes and programs of the United Nations—a commitment demonstrated by the extent and character of our participation in and financial support for a broad range of United Nations activities over the past twenty years.

During 1964 the constitutional-financial crisis in the General Assembly tended to overshadow in the public mind all other affairs at the United Nations. The Assembly was limited to those minor actions which could be taken by unanimous consent without a vote. It is regrettable that a major organ of the United Nations could not function normally. However, the other elements of the United Nations system carried forward.

The Security Council in 1964 had one of its busiest years; it held over 100 meetings and dealt with some of the most intractable problems of peace and security.

—It successfully organized the difficult peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, averting the threat of a direct military confrontation between two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

—It aired the Kashmir dispute, the Malaysian charges against Indonesia, and the question of *apartheid* in South Africa.

—It sent a factfinding group to report on the border situation between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

—It requested the Secretary-General to help the United Kingdom and Yemen resolve their differences over the Yemen-Aden border.

—It provided a forum for the United States to explain the action it had taken to counter the attacks by Hanoi against United States naval vessels in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. In this connection, regrettably, Hanoi was unwilling to admit that the United Nations had any competence in the conflict in Viet-Nam. Despite the fact that Hanoi and Peking rejected United Nations involvement, given

¹ *U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1964* (H. Doc. 178, 89th Cong., 2d sess.); Department of State publication 7943, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (\$1.75).

its responsibility for international peace and security, the United Nations should clearly be concerned about the conflict in Viet-Nam. It was with this thought in mind that in San Francisco on June 25, 1965, at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations, I urged United Nations members, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring to the negotiating table all governments involved in an attempt to halt all aggression and evolve a peaceful solution.² I also wrote the Secretary-General the following month saying how much I appreciated his efforts to remove the Viet-Nam dispute from the battlefield to the negotiating table and expressed the hope they would be continued. The Secretary-General replied by expressing his determination to pursue such efforts by all means at his disposal.³

Elsewhere in the world during 1964 the United Nations continued to maintain several active peacekeeping operations. United Nations peacekeepers continued to police the Sinai and Gaza lines. The United Nations also supervised the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and the truce line in Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

During 1964 the United Nations ended its military (but not its civilian) operation in the Congo and its observer mission in Yemen.

On the economic front, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) during the summer of 1964 was unquestionably the most significant development of the year. It opened a search by the developing nations for trading and financial arrangements designed to accelerate their development. Machinery was established to carry on the dialogue within the United Nations among developed and less developed countries concerning international trade and related questions of development. A hopeful sign was the adoption by UNCTAD of a system of mutual adjustment and con-

ciliation designed to achieve a meeting of minds before arriving at decisions on important matters.⁴

The record of operations of United Nations Specialized Agencies in the economic and social fields was impressive.

—The World Bank and its affiliates—the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation—made loans, credits, and investments totaling over \$1 billion.

—The World Health Organization spurred important advances in the worldwide campaigns to eradicate malaria and smallpox and in the field of epidemiology.

—The World Meteorological Organization moved ahead toward a projected World Weather Watch—a worldwide cooperative venture to improve man's ability to predict the course of the weather.

—The Food and Agriculture Organization dispatched about 1,000 technical experts to member countries to assist in agricultural productivity, pest control, animal health, and rural community development.

As science and technology develop, there will be new opportunities for international cooperation and common undertakings to serve mankind. On October 2, 1964, I proclaimed 1965 International Cooperation Year (ICY) in the United States.⁵ To implement our national program for ICY, on November 24, 1964, I named a Cabinet Committee for International Cooperation Year (1965)⁶ and called on our national citizens' organizations to help find new areas for common endeavor against the ancient enemies of mankind—ignorance, poverty, and disease.⁷ Every such enterprise helps in some small way to strengthen the fabric of peace. As I said at

⁴ For the preamble and recommendations contained in the Final Act which was adopted on June 16, 1964, see *ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1964, p. 857.

⁷ Two special issues of the BULLETIN were devoted exclusively to International Cooperation Year. For articles by chairmen of the ICY Cabinet committees, see *ibid.*, Sept. 6, 1965; for articles by senior government consultants to the citizens' committees, see *ibid.*, Nov. 22, 1965.

² BULLETIN of July 19, 1965, p. 98.

³ For the texts of letters exchanged by President Johnson and Secretary-General U Thant, see *ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1965, p. 275.

that time—the quest for peace through co-operation is the “assignment of the century.”

In transmitting this report, I should like to add a more general observation about our policy toward the United Nations. Every President since the founding of the United Nations has expressed the deep commitment of this Nation to the purposes of the Organization. This commitment has been expressed in our dedication to the purposes of the Charter and in our participation in the entire range of United Nations operations described in this report.

I reaffirmed our dedication on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations at San Francisco on June 25, 1965, when I said:

... I come to this anniversary not to speak of futility or failure nor of doubt and despair. I come to raise a voice of confidence in both the future of these United Nations and the fate of the human race.

And let all remember—and none forget—that now more than 50 times in these 20 years the United Nations has acted to keep the peace.

By persuading nations to justify their own conduct before all countries, it has helped, at many times and in many places, to soften the harshness of man to his fellow man.

By confronting the rich with the misery of the poor and the privileged with the despair of the oppressed, it has removed the excuse of ignorance, unmasked the evil of indifference, and has placed an insistent, even though still unfulfilled, responsibility upon the more fortunate of the earth.

By insisting upon the political dignity of man, it has welcomed 63 nations to take their places alongside the 51 original members—a historical development of dramatic import, achieved mainly through peaceful means.

And by binding countries together in the great declarations of the Charter, it has given those principles a strengthened vitality in the conduct of the affairs of man.

The record of our participation in the United Nations for 1964—set forth in this report—documents the deeds that support these words.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 1, 1966.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Secretary Gets New Responsibility for Conduct of Foreign Affairs

Following are texts of a White House announcement and a message dated March 4 from Secretary Rusk to his colleagues in the Department of State and abroad.

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated March 4

The President on March 4 discussed with his Cabinet and other high officials a new procedure, which he has approved, for the purpose of modernizing and streamlining the executive branch of Government in the conduct of foreign affairs.

In order to assist him in discharging his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, the President has directed the Secretary of State, as his agent, to assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas (less exempted military activities). Up to now, the Secretary of State, assisted by the regional Assistant Secretaries, has performed a coordinating function in interdepartmental matters abroad. Now he has received formal and specific overall directive authority from the President. While the term “interdepartmental matter” has not been specifically defined, in the present context it covers those activities abroad involving more than a single department or agency, or which is of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region.

To assist the Secretary of State in this new role, there will be a permanent inter-

departmental committee, called the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), with the Under Secretary of State as its executive chairman. The latter term is used to describe a chairman who has the authority and responsibility to decide all matters coming before his committee, subject to the right of any member to appeal from his decision to higher authority. This is an important provision which makes the difference between the normal committee and an incisive, decisionmaking body.

The other regular members of the Senior Interdepartmental Group are: the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of AID, [Agency for International Development], the Director of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of USIA [United States Information Agency], and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The chairman will invite representatives of other departments and agencies when they have an interest in the matters under consideration.

The Senior Interdepartmental Group will function as a focal point for decisions and actions on overseas interdepartmental matters which are referred to it by the Secretary of State or by an Assistant Secretary of State, or raised by the action of an individual member. Any department or agency not a member may also raise matters for action by the group.

Beneath the Secretary of State and the Senior Interdepartmental Group, the regional Assistant Secretaries of State will occupy important focal positions in the channel of responsibility for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental matters in the regions of their responsibility. The Assistant Secretaries will serve as executive chairmen of interdepartmental regional groups, analogous in membership and responsibilities to the Senior Interdepartmental Group. They will work closely with U.S. ambassadors and the country teams abroad and will assure the ade-

quacy in their regions of U.S. policy, plans, programs, resources, and performance. It is at this level that the volume of work will be done, leaving for the Senior Interdepartmental Group only the major problems. As in the case of the Senior Group, the new arrangements are for the purpose of expediting decision and action.

Thus the overall purpose of the changes directed by the President is to formalize relationships and clarify responsibilities in the conduct of our overseas business, operating within the framework of existing law. This action does not affect in any way the statutory responsibilities of any of the key Government officials involved or their relations with the Congress. For example, the P.L. 480 (Food for Freedom) program will remain the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture.

In establishing the Senior Group and the regional groups, it creates a regular meeting place for the key officials involved in overseas activities and assures decisive action by giving unusual authority to the executive chairman. These meetings also assure the departments and agencies primarily involved in overseas affairs a forum in which all views can be expressed in advance of decisions. The departments and agencies with an occasional interest will be invited to attend these meetings when there are matters affecting them on the agenda, or they may propose matters for the agenda. In any case, their representative will have the same rights as the regular members when their business is being considered.

While these procedures are not for the purpose of injecting some kind of automaticity or production-line quality into the handling of overseas affairs, they will, it is hoped, bring greater method into the conduct of foreign affairs, permit a sharper and more rapid focus of the efforts of several departments on complex overseas problems, and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem.

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY RUSK

The President has assigned to me and the Department of State additional responsibility for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. This assignment extends to the limits permitted by law and covers all operations of the United States Government abroad except U.S. military forces under area military command and such other military activities as the President may elect to conduct through military channels. The President's directive also established a systematic mechanism for considering the views of other agencies involved in our activities abroad, and for reaching decisions promptly. This responsibility will be discharged in Washington primarily through the Under Secretary and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. They will be assisted by interdepartmental groups of which they will be executive chairmen with full powers of decision on all matters within their purview. Thus the Department, and the regional Assistant Secretaries with respect to their geographic areas, will exercise leadership functions and responsibilities at the seat of Government similar to those delineated for Ambassadors within the countries of their assignment by the President's action of May 1961.¹

In accepting these expanded duties, I have assured the President that the Department will be organized and manned to perform them effectively and expeditiously. I have also assured my colleagues in the Cabinet that their interests and needs that relate to activities abroad will receive careful and sympathetic consideration.

To enable us to discharge our enlarged responsibilities efficiently, I have today directed certain organizational changes be undertaken systematically within the Department.

The Under Secretary and other designated

officers of the Department will proceed immediately to strengthen our capability to meet this new challenge and to establish, through prescribed interdepartmental groups and other means, the interdepartmental working relationships essential to achievement of the President's objectives.

No organizational chart can substitute for the abilities and attitudes of people. Our job requires the exercise of exceptional qualities of leadership and demands that officers working on country and regional matters apply an overview of wisdom and judgment that transcends bureau or departmental interests and focuses on the needs and purposes of the United States Government as a whole in its relationships with other nations. They will be dealing with difficult multiple-agency and Government-wide issues of policy, the planning and control of programs, and the distribution of resources. Their tasks will encompass not only the anticipation and management of crises but the handling of day-to-day operating problems and the orderly promotion of the objectives of our Government with such responsibilities. There can be no room for parochial viewpoints or petty bureaucratic "in fighting." Each of us must recognize that at all times we are, in a real sense, acting for and on behalf of the President, and through him, serving all the people of the United States.

I particularly hope that the new and increased responsibilities given to the geographic Assistant Secretaries and the gradual establishment of the new positions of "Country Directors" will enable us better to serve both the President and our missions abroad. I look to the Country Directors to assume full responsibility, under their Assistant Secretaries, for all activities in the country or countries assigned to them, and to be single focal points in Washington to serve our Ambassadors. In a sense, we are applying the valuable experience that has been gained in the operations of country

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1961, p. 993.

teams abroad to operations here in Washington.

I wish to assure all the Assistant Secretaries that the formation of the Senior Interdepartmental Group will not reduce their access to me. Indeed, I would hope that the work of the SIG would make it possible for problems to come to me more systematically than in the past.

I know that all of you will share with me a deep resolve to justify the confidence in the Department which the President has manifested by his directive today. Our job is to serve the interests of the United States. Our paramount concern is always the safety of our nation—in familiar words “to secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” We know that it is no longer possible to find security apart from the rest of the world—that we must work incessantly toward a safe environment, toward a reliable peace in which all men can enjoy a better life. In working toward that goal we serve not only our own deepest interests but those of all other peoples who want freedom, progress, and peace.

Designations

Harry H. Schwartz as Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and as Special Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State, effective March 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 48 dated March 9.)

Frank A. Sieverts as Deputy Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, effective March 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 48 dated March 9.)

Appointments

George V. Allen to be Director of the Foreign Service Institute, effective March 1. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 33 dated February 23.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta, January 3, 1966.

Application to: Fiji (with reservations and declarations), January 15, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965.¹

Ratification deposited: Central African Republic, February 23, 1966.

Health

Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.¹

Acceptance deposited: Dahomey, February 2, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Singapore, January 17, 1966.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.²

Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta, January 3, 1966.

Trade

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹

Acceptance: Cuba, December 28, 1965.

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.

Acceptance: Central African Republic, October 14, 1965.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration on the provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade done at Geneva November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461). Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Acceptance: Central African Republic, October 14, 1965.

Declaration on provisional accession of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force April 27, 1963; for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5678.

Acceptance: Central African Republic, October 14, 1965.

Second procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963. Entered into force November 24, 1964. TIAS 5809.

Acceptances: Central African Republic, October 14, 1965; Turkey, December 28, 1965.

Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force April 19, 1964; for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.

Acceptance: Kenya, December 20, 1965.

Second procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960, as extended (TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964; for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733.

Acceptances deposited: Central African Republic, October 14, 1965; Kenya, December 20, 1965.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964; for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5732.

Acceptances deposited: Central African Republic, October 14, 1965; Cuba, January 5, 1966; Kenya, December 20, 1965; Switzerland, November 15, 1965.

Second procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Switzerland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force November 25, 1964; for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734.

Acceptances: Central African Republic, October 14, 1965; Ceylon, October 21, 1965; Indonesia, December 29, 1965; Ivory Coast, December 7, 1965.

BILATERAL

Ceylon

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo February 23, 1966. Entered into force February 23, 1966.

Kenya

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 7, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5725, 5769, 5870, 5919). Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi February 28, 1966. Entered into force February 28, 1966.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of June 18, 1963 for financing certain educational exchange programs. (TIAS 5366). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 10 and November 2, 1965. Entered into force November 2, 1965.

Rwanda

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Kigali July 6 and August 9, 1965. Enters into force on date of notification from Government of Rwanda that agreement has been approved in conformity with constitutional procedures.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1396 PUBLICATION 8055 MARCH 28, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 7-13

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.
 Releases issued prior to March 7 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 34 of February 25 and 41 of March 3

No.	Date	Subject
45	3/7	Engineering feasibility study complete on Israel power-desalting plant.
46	3/7	Rusk: Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.
* 47	3/9	Gordon sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress (biographic details).
* 48	3/9	Schwartz named Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group (biographic details).

* Not printed.

The Heart of the Problem

Secretary Rusk, General Taylor Review Viet-Nam Policy in Senate Hearings

This pamphlet contains the statements made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in mid-February by Secretary Rusk and General Maxwell D. Taylor in which they discuss the interests and involvement of the United States in South Viet-Nam.

In his testimony Secretary Rusk emphasizes that the issues posed in Viet-Nam "are deeply intertwined with our own security" and that "the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children must live."

Three basic issues are discussed by General Taylor: what we are doing in Viet-Nam, how we are doing it, and how we can improve upon what we are doing.

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